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During the history of century XX there were progressive ameliorations in the fight 
against sexual and gender-based crimes in the international law.  
 
This evolving process reached its apex in the enactment of the Rome Statute. 
The latter created the International Criminal Court (ICC) and established central 
milestones. The Statute was the inaugural instrument in international law to 
present a broad roster of sexual and gender-based crimes and regard them as 
war crimes (in both international and non-international armed conflicts). It 
extended beyond the crime of rape the list of sexual and gender-based crimes 
constituting crimes against humanity, so as to encompass “sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form 
of sexual violence of comparable gravity”, and persecution based on gender. It 
established valuable progress in the rights and prerogatives of the victims "lato 
sensu", and of the victims of sexual and gender crimes "stricto sensu", 
guaranteeing them protection, participation and reparation.1 
 
The Statute system was conceived to constitute a step forward in eradicating the 
impunity that affects gender crimes. The Rome Statute entailed a significant 
advance in the combat against sexual and gender-based crimes, from a 
theoretical viewpoint.  
 
The present doctoral thesis provides an extensive background of the 
aforementioned evolution of the handling of these crimes. It also explains the 
process that led to the creation of the ICC, and highlights the innovations brought 
by the Rome Statute in relation to sexual and gender-based crimes and their 
victims. 
 
The backdrop contextualizes and permits the understanding of the expectations 
behind the functioning of the International Criminal Court related to the 
investigation and the prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes under the 
Court´s jurisdiction. Certainly, it was presumed that the International Criminal 
Court, in discharging its mandate, would live up to the provisions of the Rome 
Statute.2  
 
It was anticipated that the Court would efficiently investigate, charge and 
prosecute sexual and gender-based crimes. By avoiding failures, and rightly 
delineating, investigating and prosecuting violence against women in situations 
of armed conflict, the ICC would end the impunity of the perpetrators of such 
crimes and contribute to their prevention. 
 
However, the necessary impulse to face the gender and sexual violence foreseen 
in the Rome Statute does not seem to have been transferred in its entirety to the 
practice of the ICC.3 
 
1 International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes, pp. 5,9 (9 June 2014); Bedont, B., & Martinez, K. H. (1999), pp. 65-85; The Trust 
Fund for Victims website, Rome Statute, Art. 7 (1) (g),   
2 Kambale, P. K. (2015). In De Vos, C., Kendall, S., & Stahn, C., (eds.), pp. 171-197 




In view of that, this work carries out a juridical review of the practice in the ICC- 
the first three ICC cases involving sexual and gender-based crimes in which final 
judgements have been rendered (The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the 
Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo) 
are analysed. The examination consists in an in-depth study of the approach of 
the International Criminal Court towards sexual and gender-based crimes in each 
of the cases.  
 
The main objective of the doctoral thesis is to determine how the International 
Criminal Court has been handling the sexual and gender-based crimes in its 
cases. The thesis also examines the perspective of the victims by verifying if and 
how the ICC is providing adequate assistance to the victims of sexual and 
gender-based crimes.  
 
The work is organized in the following manner.  
 
Chapter 2 addresses the historical evolution of sexual and gender-based crimes 
in the International Criminal Law scenario, covering the antecedents, from the 
trial of Peter von Hagenbach until the trial of the Rwandan genocide.  
 
Chapter 3 deals with the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court, 
presenting the antecedents and the construction process (inclusive of the efforts 
of the United Nations to create an International Criminal Court, and the insertion 
of gender-related issues in the Rome Statute). This chapter expands on the ICC`s 
jurisdiction, admissibility, applicable law and procedure, as well as the beginning 
of its functioning.  
 
Chapter 4 discusses the sexual and gender-based crimes in the Rome Statute, 
disposing about the relevance of the Statute for these crimes, and analysing their 
extent and definition (covering the Statute`s provisions on sexual and gender-
based crimes and the respective elements of crimes). 
 
The theme of Chapter 5 is the victims of sexual and gender-based crimes in the 
Rome Statute. It examines several aspects, such as the innovations in the rights 
granted to victims, the specific provisions directed at protecting victims of sexual 
and gender-based crimes, and the issue of how to balance protection of the rights 
of the victims and witnesses, protection of rights of the accused and promotion of 
an impartial and just trial. 
 
In Chapter 6, the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is presented. 
The case the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is analysed with emphasis on 
the handling of sexual and gender-based crimes, and the rather restrict charging 
of crimes against Lubanga, which led to the absence of charges for alleged 
sexual and gender-based crimes. 
 
The subject of Chapter 7 is the case the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga. After 
offering a background and overview of the case, the charging and prosecution of 
sexual and gender-based crimes are examined as well as the fact that the Trial 
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Chamber II (contrarily to the Pre-Trial l´s understanding) considered that the 
accused could not be held responsible for these crimes. 
 
Chapter 8 deals with the situation in the Central African Republic. Then, it 
discusses the case the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, highlighting 
Bemba´s conviction grounded on sexual and gender-based crimes, which was 
subsequently reversed by the Appeals Chamber. It is analysed the impact of such 
outcome for the victims, and how it affects the prosecution of sexual and gender-
based crimes in the International Criminal Law scenario. It is verified the 
repercussion on the Court´s credibility and its role in fighting the impunity of the 
perpetrators of sexual and gender-based crimes and promoting a deterrent effect.  
 
In the Discussion and Conclusions, the main findings are gathered, offering a 
portrait of the evolution of the International Criminal Court in the handling of 
sexual and gender-based crimes.  
 
The correct steps adopted by the Court up to now are stressed, and the issues 
where there is room for improvement are pointed out. Finally, we make 
recommendations to the ICC regarding its approach to sexual and gender-based 
crimes.  
 
Hence, we aim to contribute to the effective prosecution and punishment of the 





























2. Historical evolution of sexual and gender-based crimes in the 
International Criminal Law scenario  
 
2.1. Antecedents- from the trial of Peter von Hagenbach until the 
trial of the Rwandan genocide  
 
2.1.1. Trial of Peter von Hagenbach in Breisach, 1474 
 
The 1474 trial of Peter von Hagenbach in Breisach, Germany, is regarded as a 
momentous and conceptual backbone of international criminal law's ancient 
history. Indeed, the history of international war crimes trials was initiated with the 
prosecution of Peter von Hagenbach for crimes (including rape and murder) 
perpetrated while working for the Duke of Burgundy as governor in Alsatian 
territories from 1469 to 1474.4 
 
According to Bassiouni, Hagenbach was a Dutch “condottiere” (a mercenary 
soldier), which corresponds to a contemporary mercenary leader. The Duke of 
Burgundy (who was French and had got the city of Breisach after rendering 
services to the Holy Roman Empire) hired Hagenbach to form an army to occupy 
Breisach and collect heavy exactions from the population. In view of the 
population´s insurgency, the Duke ordered Hagenbach to raid, plunder, rape, and 
burn the city and, as expected at the time, Hagenbach complied with his 
superior's orders. It was propagated all over the empire that the attack on 
Breisach was an overwhelming aggression. This gave rise to a general 
agreement that the attack amounted to “crime against the laws of God and Man”.5 
 
At the time, the Holy Roman Empire was formed by twenty-six member states. 
The leaders of these states (personally or using representatives) acted as 
international judges to try Hagenbach for offences carried out in Germany in 
obedience to the orders of a French ruler. In a practical sense and having the 
modern standards as a parameter, this “ad hoc” tribunal constituted “the first 
international criminal tribunal”.6 
 
At the trial, the accused´s intention was to exhibit the written orders he had 
received from the Duke of Burgundy. Nevertheless, the judges did not consent it 
(permitting the presentation of such evidence would entail that people occupying 
a subordinate position as Hagenbach should not comply with the orders of their 
superiors in case they are clearly “against the laws of God and Man”). Moreover, 
the court's rejection of Hagenbach´s defense of superior orders protected the 
Duke from responsibility. Hagenbach was condemned for rape and murder 
among other crimes against the “laws of God and Man”, losing his knighthood, 
and being convicted to death. 
 
This trial is the first brick in the complex construction of the sexual and gender-
based crimes as constituting offences addressed by the international criminal 
law. Supporting this idea, Gordon explains that the majority of legal scholars 
 
4 Gordon, G. S. (2013). In Heller, K. J., & Simpson, G. pp. 13-49; Scharf, M. P., & Schabas, W. 
A. (2002), p. 39 




consider the prosecution of Hagenbach as a landmark: while some exalt it for the 
manifest charge of rape as a war crime, others value it on the grounds of devising 
an incipient version of crimes against humanity, and all of them agree that it is 
the earliest recorded case in history in which the defence of superior orders was 
rejected.7 
 
2.1.2. Lieber Code, 1863 
 
During the American Civil War (1861-1865), the US Government was urged to 
recognise that the sectional conflict had trespassed the regulation of municipal 
law, and, in order to regulate the laws of warfare, President Lincoln promulgated 
the US Army General Order No.100 (Lieber Code) on 24 April 1863. This first 
undertaking to codify the laws of war was prepared by Francis Lieber, a professor 
at Columbia College in New York.8 
 
In spite of been binding solely on the forces of the United States, the Lieber Code 
expressly stated the principle of military necessity (“military necessity does not 
admit of cruelty”) and comprised a significant extent of the customs and laws of 
war adopted at the time. It had an important influence in the subsequent 
codifications and regulations of the laws of war and prompted the enactment of 
the Hague conventions on land warfare of 1899 and 1907.9 
 
The Lieber Code´s relevance for the sexual ad gender-based crimes history lays 
on the fact that, in accordance with the principle of military necessity, it prohibits 
rape against persons in the invaded country “under the penalty of death, or such 
other severe punishment as may seem adequate for the gravity of the offence”.10  
 
Along the same lines, it states that rape committed by an American soldier in a 
hostile country against its inhabitants is  
 
“not only punishable as at home, but in all cases in which death 
is not inflicted the severer punishment shall be preferred.”11 
 
Moreover, in its Article 19, the Code instructs commanders to  
 
“whenever admissible, inform the enemy of their intention to 
bombard a place, so that the non-combatants, and especially the 




7 Bassiouni, M. C. (2010), pp. 270-323; Gordon, G. S. (2013). In Heller, K. J., & Simpson. G. 
(eds.), pp. 13-49; Scharf, M., & Schabas, W. A. (2002) p. 39   
8 McCoubrey, H., & White, N. D. (1992), p. 217; Schindler, D., & Toman, J. (eds.) (1988), p. 3 
9 Schindler, D., & Toman, J. (eds.) (1988), p. 3; Kwakwa, E. K. (1992), p. 34; United States. 
General Order No.100, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field 
(Lieber Code), Art. 16. (24 April 1863) 
10 Lieber Code, Art. 44  
11 Lieber Code, Art. 47 
12 Lieber Code, Art. 19  
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Therefore, the Lieber Code expressly prohibits rape against persons in the 
invaded country, prescribing severe punishments, and envisages special 
protection to women and children as to shield them from US bombardments.  
 
2.1.3. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land (the Hague, 29 July 1899) and the 
Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land (the Hague, 18 October 1907): the 
Martens Clause and the principle of humanity  
 
The First Hague Peace Conference of 1899 failed to achieve its main goal of 
limiting or decreasing the armaments, but engendered the adoption of three 
Conventions, including the Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land and the annexed Regulations, and other acts referred 
to in the Final Protocol.13 
 
Even though the St. Petersburg Declaration (1868) had already mentioned the 
“laws of humanity” in its preamble, it was in the preamble of above-mentioned 
Convention that the Martens Clause appeared for the first time:14 
 
"Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High 
Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not 
included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and 
belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the 
principles of international law, as they result from the usages 
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, 
and the requirements of the public conscience.”15 
 
Since then, this clause has integrated the laws of armed conflict.16 
 
The Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and 
the annexed Regulations were subsequently revised at the Second International 
Peace Conference in 1907. The two versions of the Convention and the 
Regulations are very similar and the preamble of the 1907 Hague Convention 
(IV) also refers to the “laws of humanity”. These unarticulated humanistic values 
served as the foundation for the normative prescriptions of both conventions and 
the words “laws of humanity” constitute the only precedent references in the 
international law panorama to the term “crimes against humanity”, which was 
used for the first time in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
(1945).17 
 
13 Schindler, D., & Toman, J. (eds.) (1998), p. 49 
14 Bassiouni, M. C. (1992), p. 167, footnote 68; Ticehurst, R. (1997), pp. 125-134; Saint 
Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles of under 
400 Grams Weight (11 December 1868). 
15 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Preamble (29 July 1899).  
16 Ticehurst, R. (1997), pp. 125-134. 




Moreover, Article 46 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) states that “[f]amily 
honour and rights … must be respected”, which has been interpreted as 
englobing rape.18 
 
Although the Hague Conventions regulated “war crimes” in a strict sense, such 
crimes came about from the broader signification of the violation of “laws of 
humanity” and, as a result, such words were designed to enclose protection 
against undefined violations that would be subsequently determined by future 
normative advances in positive international law.19   
 
The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
I), 8 June 1977, set up in its Article 1 paragraph 2 a later version of the Martens 
Clause by adopting the term "principles of humanity", which is a synonymous 
with the expression “laws of humanity” of the preamble of the 1899 Hague 
Convention (II).20 
 
E. Kwakwa affirms that the principle of humanity complements (and sometimes 
is used interchangeably with) the principle of military necessity in the sense that 
it forbids measures of violence that are unnecessary to reach a definite military 
advantage.21  
 
Therefore, the 1899 Hague Convention (II) by instating the principle of humanity 
built-in the Martens Clause (which intended to provide protection against 
violations yet unspecified but that in the course of time would be regulated by the 
international law positive rules) contributed to the development of the of armed 
conflict laws and, ultimately, to the future banishment of sexual and gender-based 
crimes by the international community.22   
 
In fact, the principle of humanity, reinstating the principle of military necessity, 
proposed that combatants should keep at large of avoidable harm and suffering,23 
that is the essence of the criminalisation of sexual and gender-based offences in 
the international armed conflict scenario. 
  
2.1.4. The Paris Preliminary Peace Conference  
 
During World War I, the governments of France, Great Britain and Russia (28 
May 1915) released a joint declaration denouncing the massacres of the 
Armenian population in Turkey as constituting “crimes against civilization and 
humanity” for which all the members of the Turkish government would be held 
 
Convention (IV) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Preamble (18 October 1907). 
18 Meron, T. (1993), pp. 424-428. 
19 Bassiouni, M. C. (1992), p. 166 
20 Ticehurst, R. (1997), pp. 125-134; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I), Art. 1 (2) (8 June 1977). 
21 Kwakwa, E. K. (1992), pp. 36-37 
22 Ibidem; Bassiouni, M. C. (1992), p. 166 
23 Kwakwa, E. K. (1992), p. 37 
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accountable in conjunction with the agents involved in the massacres. After the 
end of the war, the Allies started to plan how to implement that commitment.24 
 
With the aim of establishing the conditions of peace to be offered to Germany 
and its allies, the five Great Powers (the United States of America, the British 
Empire, France, Italy, and Japan) summoned the Preliminary Peace Conference, 
held in Paris on 18 January 1919.25  
 
In the Conference´s second plenary session (25 January 1919), the Commission 
on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties 
(the "Commission of Fifteen") was set up to examine and report on the violations 
of international law incurred by Germany and its allies during the war.26 
 
Nevertheless, the Commission of Fifteen was not able to arrive at conclusions 
satisfactory to all of its members on all subjects under consideration, and, on 29 
March 1919, presented a Report that also contained the Dissenting Reports of 
the American and Japanese members.27 
 
In this 29 March 1919 Report, the Commission concluded that the “clear dictates 
of humanity” had been abused by the enemy powers by the use of “barbarous or 
illegitimate methods” inclusive of “the violation of … the laws of humanity”. The 
Report further stated:28 
 
“all persons belonging to enemy countries … who have been 
guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war or the laws 
of humanity, are liable to criminal liability.”29 
 
The Commission divided its work in three sub-commissions (sub-commission I 
on Criminal-Acts, sub-commission II on Responsibility for the War, sub-
commission II on Responsibility for the Violation of the Laws and Customs of 
War) and arrived at a list of war crimes.30  
 
Annex I of the Report included a summary table enumerating the offences that 
the enemy countries had incurred during the war. The crimes of rape and 
abduction of girls and women for the purpose of enforced prostitution were among 
the infringements of the non-exhaustive list of the Annex I.31   
 
 
24 Armenian Memorandum presented by the Greek delegation to the Commission of Fifteen of 
March 14, 1919, reprinted in Schwelb, E. (1946), pp. 178-226; Bassiouni, M. C. (1992), pp. 168-
169; Matas, D. (1989), pp. 86-104. 
25 Finch, G. A. (1919), pp. 159-186. 
26 Matas, D. (1989), pp. 86-104. 
27 Ibidem 
28 29 March 1919 Report reprinted in Schwelb, E. (1946), pp. 178-226; 29 March 1919 Report 
cited in Maogoto, J. (2009). In Doria, J., Gasser, H., & Bassiouni, M. C. (eds.), pp. 3-22. 
29 Ibidem; Ibidem 
30 United Nations, War Crimes Commission (1948 b), pp. 32-34. 
31 Brownmiller, S. (1975), pp. 40, 44; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of 
International Law (1949), pp. 17-18; Sandoz, Y. (2008). In Bassiouni, M. C., pp. 293-321. 
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Therefore, the Commission expressly considered rape and abduction of girls and 
women for the purpose of enforced prostitution as grave breaches and stated that 
the perpetrators were subject to be criminally prosecuted.32 
 
Nonetheless, since the US and Japan members were against the concept of 
international criminal responsibility for breaches of the “laws of humanity”, this 
basis for international criminal responsibility was no adopted.33  
 
2.1.5. The Treaty of Versailles (28 June 1919) 
 
The Treaty of Versailles (which sealed peace between the Allied and Associated 
Powers and Germany) fixed the punishability of war criminals, ordering the 
German government to34 
 
“hand over to the Allied and Associated Powers … all persons 
accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and 
customs of war”35  
 
to be brought before military tribunals (Article 228), and allowing the Allies to set 
up national war crimes tribunals (Article 227). Additionally, the treaty stated that 
an international tribunal would be constituted for the purpose of trying the Kaiser 
Wilhelm II (Article 227).36 
 
In spite of these provisions, Article 228 was ineffective since Germany refused to 
extradite its nationals and the Netherlands firmly refused to extradite Kaiser 
Wilhelm II to the Allies. Moreover, very few people were prosecuted by Germany 
(only 12 people were tried before the Supreme Court of the Reich in Leipzig, and 
half of them were acquitted).37  
 
Although Max Ramdahr was charged with Mistreatment of Belgian Children (and 
found not guilty), none of the defendants were charged with rape or abduction of 
girls and women for the purpose of enforced prostitution.38 
 
2.1.6. Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed to 
the London Agreement (London, 8 August 1945), Allied Control 
Council Law No. 10 Punishment of Persons Guilty of War 
Crimes, Crimes against Peace and Against Humanity (20 
December 1945) and the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo, 19 January 1946)  
 
The atrocity and amplitude of crimes committed during the World War II were 
unparalleled. When the war ceased, the Allied leaders concluded that the 
 
32 Sandoz, Y. (1999). In Bassiouni, M. C. (ed.), p. 409  
33 Bassiouni, M. C. (1994 b), pp. 784-805 
34 Bassiouni, M. C. (1980), pp. 8-9.  
35 The Treaty of peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (the treaty of 
Versailles) (28 June 1919). Versailles. 
36 Bassiouni, M. C. (1980), p. 9 




responsible for such horrendous and despicable crimes should be held liable for 
them.39 
 
In this context, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (also known as 
the London Charter) complementing the Agreement for the prosecution and 
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis (London, 8 August 
1945) stated that  
 
“there shall be established an International Military Tribunal … 
for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war 
criminals of the European Axis”40  
 
who committed crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against humanity41. 
 
For the first time in positive international criminal law, the precise terms “crimes 
against humanity” were used. The London Charter also provided the first 
definition of this international criminal category. According to its Article 6 (c), 
“crimes against humanity” comprised:42 
 
“murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before 
or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious 
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the 
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.”43 
 
The London Charter established the model and set up the legal basis for the 
subsequent formulations of “crimes against humanity” in the Article 5 (c) of the 
Tokyo Charter and Article II (c) of the Allied Control Council Law No.10.44 
 
According to Bassiouni, rape is subsumed within the expression “other humane 
acts” and, as a result, is considered as a crime against humanity in the London 
and Tokyo Charters. However, Article II 1 (c) of the Allied Control Council Law 
No.10 goes beyond the reference to “other humane acts” and explicitly lists rape 
as a crime against humanity. It is relevant to stress that, unlike the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo Charts, which are international instruments, the Allied Control Council 
Law No.10 is a national instrument, applied solely territorially (it was intended to 
serve as the legal basis for criminal trials conducted by the Allies’ in Germany).45 
 
Moreover, the term “ill treatment” that appears in the definition of war crimes in 
both the London Charter (Article 6(b)) and the Allied Control Council Law No.10 
(Article II (b)) encapsulates rape, so this kind of sexual crime would also be 
 
39 Mettraux, G. (2011), pp. 5-16 
40 United Nations. Charter of the International Military Tribunal Art. 1 
41 United Nations. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Art. 6  
42 Bassiouni, M. C. (1992), pp. 1-2 
43 United Nations. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Art. 6 (c) 
44 Bassiouni, M. C. (1992), p. 1; Control Council Law No.10, Art. II 1 (c); United Nations. Charter 
of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Art. 5 (c)   
45 Bassiouni, M. C. (1992), pp. 35-36; von Knierrem, A. (1959). The Nuremberg Trials. Chicago: 
Henry Regnery Co. cited in Bassiouni, M. C. (1992) pp. 35-36 
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rendered as a war crime on these grounds (the Tokyo Charter simply refers to 
Conventional War Crimesas “violations of the laws or customs of war” in its Article 
5 (b) and does not make use of the expression “ill treatment”).46 
 
2.1.7. The Nuremberg Trial 
 
The Nuremberg Tribunal was constituted as to implementthe London Charter´s 
provision of the establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the 
prosecution and penalisation of major war criminals of the European Axis who 
incurred in crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against humanity during 
the World War II.47   
 
The trial took place in Nuremberg between 20 November 1945 (indictment) and 
1 October 1946 (final day of the Tribunal´s judgment). Charges were brought 
against 24 defendants under four counts: Common Plan or Conspiracy, Crimes 
against Peace, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.48 
 
The judges of the International Military Tribunal demonstrated to be conscious 
that barbarous crimes had been committed against women and children during 
the World War II. For instance, in count three - War Crimes (Charter, Article 6, 
especially 6 (b)) of the indictment, the Tribunal addressed Murder and Ill-
treatment of civilian populations of or in occupied territory and on the high seas, 
and among the particulars set out by way of example included the following:49 
  
“Methods used for the work of extermination in concentration 
camps were:  
 
Bad treatment, pseudo-scientific experiments (sterilization of 
women at Auschwitz and at Ravensbrück, study of the evolution 
of cancer of the womb at Auschwitz …)”50   
 
“In the Stalingrad region … [o]ne hundred and thirty-nine women 
had their arms painfully bent backward and held by wires. From 
some their breasts had been cut off and their ears, fingers, and 
toes had been amputated.”51 
 
Further, while addressing Slave Labor Policy, the Tribunal referred to Heinrich 
Himmler´s (who, among other duties, was the Reich Commissioner for the 
"strengthening of Germanism") affirmation:52   
 
 
46 Bassiouni, M. C. (1992), p. 348; Control Council Law No.10, Art. II (b); Tompkins, T. L. (1999), 
pp. 845-890; United Nations. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Art. 6 (b) 
47 Sunga, L. S. (1997), p. 281  
48 International Military Tribunal - Nuremberg (1947), pp. 27-92; Mettraux, G. (2011).  In Schabas, 
W. A., & Bernaz, N. (eds.), pp. 5-16 
49 International Military Tribunal - Nuremberg (1947), p. 43 
50 International Military Tribunal - Nuremberg (1947), pp. 45-46 
51 International Military Tribunal - Nuremberg (1947), p. 49 
52 International Military Tribunal - Nuremberg (1947), p. 242 
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"Whether ten thousand Russian females fall down from 
exhaustion while digging an anti-tank ditch interests me only 
insofar as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished…”53 
 
The Germans had clearly adopted a general sado-sexual humiliation upon the 
Jews. Brownmiller ponderates that rape had a relevant and logical role in fulfilling 
the Germans´ final goal of humiliating and annihilating people they considered 
inferior and establishing their superior race.54  
 
Apart from the recurring rape, the German and Japanese set up military brothels 
in which conquered women were forced into prostitution. In this context, the same 
author states:55  
 
“Concentration-camp rape and institutionalized camp brothels in 
which women were held against their will for the pleasure of the 
soldiery were a most sinister aspect of the abuse of women in 
World War II, since acceptance of continuous rape without 
protest was held out as a possible chance for survival."56  
 
And adds:  
 
“Jewish women alone did not suffer rape as the German Army 
advanced into Russia. All women were prey. From evidence 
presented to the Nuremberg tribunal the pattern becomes 
clear.”57 
 
Indeed, reports of sexual violence and “the routine use of rape as a terror weapon 
of terror” were submitted to the Tribunal. The French prosecutor, although sparing 
the heinous details, sustained that rape had been employed "as a method of 
military retaliation or reprisal”. The Soviet prosecution, by its turn, endeavoured 
to present the rape of Russian women as a component of the Nazi´s terror and 
genocide crusade.58 
 
Despite allegations of rape being included in affidavits and presented as 
evidence, there was no express mention of rape in the indictment and none of 
the defendants was expressly tried or condemned for committing sexual crimes 
in the Nuremberg Trials (nor were there the defendants prosecuted or convicted 
for gender-based crimes).59   
 
Still is Askin who explains: 
 
“Whether it was out of shyness, prudishness, reserve, ignorance, 
revulsion, confusion, or intentional omission, the lack of both 
 
53 International Military Tribunal - Nuremberg (1947), p. 244 
54 Brownmiller, S. (1975), pp. 49, 52 
55 Brownmiller, S. (1975), p. 76 
56 Brownmiller, S. (1975), p. 63 
57 Brownmiller, S. (1975), p. 54  
58 Brownmiller, S. (1975), pp. 53, 56, 69; Askin, K. D. (1997), p. 97 
59 International Military Tribunal - Nuremberg (1947), pp. 27-95; Lupig, D. (2009), pp. 433-491; 
Meron, T. (1993), pp. 424-428; Tompkins, T. L. (1999), pp. 845-890 
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public documentation and official prosecution gave impetus to 
the notion that sexual assaults were less important crimes. 
Indeed, the comprehensive, 732-page Index to the forty-two 
volume set reporting the proceedings of the Nuremberg Trial 
does not even bother to include "rape", "prostitution", or "women" 
among their headings or subheadings. In contrast, "looting" 
warrants three and one half pages in the Index alone.”60  
 
It is necessary to highlight, though, that the Nuremberg Tribunal, in its judgment, 
under the head War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, Murder and Ill-
treatment of Civilian Population, affirmed: 
 
“Article 6 (b) of the Charter provides that “ill-treatment ... of 
civilian population of or in occupied territory ... killing of hostages 
... wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages" shall be a war 
crime. In the main, these provisions are merely declaratory of the 
existing laws of war as expressed by the Hague Convention, 
Article 46, which stated: "Family honour and rights, the lives of 
persons and private property, as well as religious convictions and 
practice must be respected.””61 
 
Meron considered rape to be subsumed by “family honour and rights”, thus, it can 
be argued that rape was covered when the Nuremberg Tribunal dealt with the 
commitment of the war crime ill-treatment and the crime against humanity of 
inhumane treatment.62 
 
In conclusion, the Nuremberg Tribunal merely considered the sexual violence 
that had taken place during the armed conflict as contingent to the war crimes or 
crimes against humanity, not dispensing specific attention to the sexual and 
gender-based offences perpetrated during the World War II. 
 
2.1.8. Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita by the U.S. Military 
Commission, 8 October- 7 December 1945 
 
The trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, even though not being part of the major 
war crimes trial of the Japanese, is relevant for humanitarian law.63 
  
Between 9 October 1944 and 2 September 1945, Yamashita served as 
Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial Japanese 
Army in the Philippine Islands and was prosecuted by the United States Military 
Commission (composed by American officers who did not have legal training) in 
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The Prosecution stated that  
 
“the accused knew or must have known of, and permitted, the 
widespread crimes committed in the Philippines by troops under 
his command (which included murder, plunder, devastation, 
rape, lack of provision for prisoners of war and shooting of 
guerrillas without trial), and/or that he did not take the steps 
required of him by international law to find out the state of 
discipline maintained by his men and the conditions prevailing in 
the prisoner-of-war and civilian internee camps under his 
command.”65 
 
The judgment of the Commission was historical:  
 
“This is the first time in history of the modern world that a 
commander has been held criminally liable for acts committed by 
his troops. It is the first time in modern history that any man has 
been held criminally liable for acts which … do not involve 
criminal intent or even gross negligence.”66  
 
The Commission found Yamashita guilty on all the accounts including rape and 
sentenced him to death by hanging. In spite of an appeal for clemency, and the 
filing of petitions before the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands and the 
Supreme Court of the United States, the findings of the Military Commission were 
maintained and Yamashita was hanged on 23 February 1946.67 
 
2.1.9. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo 
Tribunal) 
 
The International Military Tribunal in Tokyo was set up by the Tokyo Charter for 
the trial and punishment of the major war criminals in the Far East for incurring in 
Crimes against Peace, Conventional War Crimes (restricted to “violations of the 
laws or customs of war” without mentioning rape), and Crimes against Humanity 
(including “other inhumane acts”) during World War II.68  
 
After the Trial at Nuremberg, the Tokyo Trial constituted the other important post-
war trial supported by the Allies. The trial took place from 29 April 1946 to 10 
November 1948. 11 prosecutors of different nations brought charges against 28 
defendants (who were an exemplificative sample of Japanese leaders involved 
at distinct levels of Japan´s military expansion between 1932 and 1945) and 25 
were convicted on 10 counts.69 
 
Although at Tokyo the crimes against peace were preponderant (in the indictment 
the first 36 counts of a total of 56 charged this type of crimes, while conventional 
 
65 United Nations, War Crimes Commission. (1948 a), p. 1 
66 United Nations, War Crimes Commission. (1948 a), p. 37 
67 United Nations, War Crimes Commission. (1948 a), pp. 2, 35-37, 75 
68 United Nations. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East Arts. 1, 5 (a) (b) 
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69 Boister, N. (2011). In Schabas, W. A., & Bernaz, N. (eds.), pp. 17-32 
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war crimes were merely charged in counts 53-55), charges of rape were brought 
against Japanese defendants as war crimes, especially in relation to the "Rape 
of Nanking" (a systematic mass rape that was remarkably continuous).70  
 
In fact, in Nanking, from December 1937 to February 1938,71 
 
“[t]here were many cases of rape. Death was a frequent penalty 
for the slightest resistance on the part of a victim or the members 
of her family who sought to protect her. Even girls of tender years 
and old women were raped in large numbers throughout the city, 
and many cases of abnormal and sadistic behavior in connection 
with these rapings occurred. Many women were killed after the 
act and their bodies mutilated. 
 
Approximately 20,000 cases of rape occurred within the city 
during the first month of the occupation.”72 
 
2.2.9.i. Trial of Foreign Minister Koki Hirota, General Iwane 
Matsui and Admiral Soemu Toyoda  
 
Koki Hirota, Foreign Minister in the First Konoye Cabinet from June 1937 until 
May 1938, received reports of the atrocities in Nanking immediately after the entry 
of the Japanese forces into the city. He took up the subject with the War Ministry 
who assured him that atrocities would cease. Nonetheless, after such 
assurances, for at least one month, there were further reports of atrocities.73  
 
In view of that, the Tribunal understood that Koki Hirota was negligent in his duty 
when he failed to insist before the Cabinet that it was necessary to adopt urgent 
measures to stop the atrocities (as well as take any other action available to him 
to achieve such termination). Hirota was satisfied to wait on assurances, which 
he was aware that were not being put into action, while several murders, rapes 
of women, among other atrocities were perpetrated every day. To Hirota, the 
extension of liability was especially important because he exerted influence 
(instead of formal authority) over the military. Finding that his inaction constituted 
criminal negligence, the Tribunal sentenced him to death by hanging.74  
 
Iwane Matsui assumed the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Central China 
Area Army, that encompassed the shanghai Expeditionary Force and the Tenth 
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“Then followed a long succession of most horrible atrocities 
committed by the Japanese Army upon the helpless citizens. 
Wholesale massacres, individual murders, rape, looting and 
arson were committed by Japanese soldiers. (...) In this period of 
six or seven weeks thousands of women were raped, upwards of 
100,000 people were killed and untold property was stolen and 
burned.”76 
 
The Tokyo Tribunal found that Matsui was guilty. It understood that he 
commanded the Army that had carried out such despicable acts, and, being 
aware of them, failed to discharge his duty to tame the troops and protect the 
defenseless townspeople of Nanking. He was convicted to death by hanging.77  
 
Hirota and Matsui were executed on 23 December 1948 amidst the other 
defendants also sentenced to the Capital Punishment.78 
 
The Military Tribunal in Tokyo prosecuted Admiral Soemu Toyoda in a trial that 
began on 29 October 1948. Inter other counts, Toyoda was charged with 
 
"willfully and unlawfully disregarding and failing to discharge his 
duties by ordering, directing, inciting, causing, permitting, 
ratifying and failing to prevent Japanese Naval personnel of units 
and organizations under his command, control and supervision 
to abuse, mistreat, torture, rape, kill and commit other 
atrocities;"79 
 
However, Toyoda was acquitted on 6 September 1949 because the tribunal 
understood that General Yamashita had the command, control, and responsibility 
for the naval troops in Manila, instead of Toyoda.80 
 
Despite the explicit charges of rape, none of the women who had been victims of 
this crime was summoned to provide the Tokyo Tribunal with evidence. In 
addition, the Tokyo Tribunal did not receive evidence regarding the sexual 
enslavement of thousands of Korean, Chinese, Indonesian, Filipina, Dutch, 
Burmese and Japanese "comfort women" in military brothels by the Japanese.81 
 
All and all, even though the prosecution of rapes of civilian women and nurses 
before the Tokyo Tribunal was successful, rape was regarded as auxiliary to the 
other war crimes, forming part of the broader charges of command responsibility 
for the commitment of atrocities in Nanking In spite of that, the trial was a big step 
towards the protection of women against rape during wartime since, as stated by 
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Brownmiller “[h]ad it not been for the Tokyo war-crimes tribunal, who would have 
believed the full dimensions of the Rape of Nanking?”82 
 
2.1.10. Trial of Takashi Sakai by the Chinese War Crimes Military 
Tribunal of the Ministry of National Defence, 29 August 1946 
 
It is important to stress that, apart from the Tokyo Tribunal, several military 
tribunals established by the Allied also tried cases of rape.83 
  
For instance, Takashi Sakai (a military commander during the war of 1939-1945 
and one of the leaders of the Japanese aggression against China) was 
prosecuted before the Chinese War Crimes Military Tribunal of the Ministry of 
National Defense in Nanking.84 
 
As Regimental Commander of 29 Infantry Brigade in China, between November 
1941 and March 1943, in Kwantung and Hainan, he incited or allowed his 
subordinates to incur in numerous atrocities acts, such as massacring over one 
hundred civilians by shooting and bayoneting, drowning women after severely 
beating them, torturing a pregnant woman, and raping and mutilating two women 
and then feeding their bodies to dogs.85  
 
Sakai was found guilty of the crime against peace of "participating in the war of 
aggression", as well as the war crimes and crimes against humanity 
 
"of inciting or permitting his subordinates to murder prisoners of 
war, wounded soldiers and non-combatants; to rape, plunder and 
deport civilians; to indulge in cruel punishment and torture; and 
to cause destruction of property."86   
 
For these crimes he was convicted to death.87  
 
2.1.11. Affirmation and formulation of the Principles of 
International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal 
 
The United Nations General Assembly did not present any express reference to 
sexual crimes in the 1946 Affirmation of the Principles of International Law 
Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal. In the following year, the 
General Assembly assigned to the International Law Commission the 
responsibility of formulating the Principles of International Law Recognized in the 
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal. The 
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referred Commission also failed to include sexual offences in its Formulation of 
the Nuremberg Principles.88 
 
2.1.12. Batavia Military Tribunal, 1948  
 
A Netherlands court with seat in Batavia (known nowadays as Jakarta) was 
established in 1948 to prosecute the abduction of Dutch girls and women for the 
purpose of enforced prostitution carried out by the Japanese during World War II 
in the Dutch Indonesia (enforced prostitution was regarded as a war crime by 
both municipal law and the war crimes list established by the 1919 "Commission 
of Fifteen").89  
 
The Batavia Military Tribunal prosecuted Washio Awochi, a Japanese hotel-
keeper, and found him guilty of the “war crime of enforced prostitution” for 
compelling Dutch girls (as young as 12 and 14 years old) and women to practice 
prostitution from 1943-1945 in the premises of a club-restaurant that he ran in 
Batavia. Awochi was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.90  
 
According to Lupig, this was “[t]he first known international criminal law 
prosecution for “forced prostitution””, albeit the trial was conducted in secrecy and 
quietude.91 
 
It is relevant to note that several other Chinese, Indian, and Indonesian women 
as well as thousands of women from distinct Asian countries were also seized 
and forced into prostitution in the Dutch Indonesia at that time. Nevertheless, the 
Batavia Military Tribunal only prosecuted crimes committed against Dutch 
women.92 
 
2.1.13. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948  
 
In Article 2 of the Convention, genocide is defined as any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group:  
 
“(a) Killing members of the group;  
 
 
88 Boot, M. revised by Hall, C. K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 206-216; Lupig, 
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International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal (11 December 1946); 
United Nations, General Assembly. Formulation of the Principles of International Law Recognized 
in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal (21 November 1947); 
United Nations, International Law Commission. Report of the International Law Commission to 
the General Assembly. Report of the International Law Commission covering its second session, 
5 June - 29 July 1950. Formulation of the Nürnberg Principles, pp. 374-378.  
89 Askin, K. D. (1997) p. 85; Demleitner, N. V. (1994), pp. 163-197; United Nations, War Crimes 
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90 United Nations, War Crimes Commission (1949), Case No. 76, Trial of Washio Awochi, pp. 
122-123 
91 Askin, K. D. (1997), p.87; Lupig, D. (2009), pp. 433-491 
92 Askin, K. D. (1997), p.87 
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 (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group;  
 
 (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 
part;  
  
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group;  
  
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”93 
 
Gender is not included in one of the singled out protected groups, and, 
consequently, genocide grounded in gender cannot be sheltered under the 
traditional genocide definition.94 
 
Rape and other sexual assaults, in turn, can amount to genocidal acts despite 
not being expressly listed in the Genocide Convention. However, so that rape 
and other sexual crimes can be considered genocidal acts, there must be proof 
of the “dolus specialis” to “destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial 
or religious group”.95  
 
Consequently, it is imperative to analyse if, in the concrete case, there was 
intention to cause the destruction, in whole or in part, of one of the groups outlined 
by Article 2 since rape and other acts of sexual violence cannot be regarded as 
genocidal only because they were perpetrated concomitantly or in the same 
context of a genocide.96 
 
2.1.14. The Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949; 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (8 June 1977); Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II) (8 June 1977) 
 
In 12 August 1949, four Conventions were adopted in Geneva as to give an 
answer to the pressing lack of international instruments to safeguard the civilians 
during war.97 
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The four Geneva Conventions constitute the structure of the humanitarian law 
(per times also denominated as the law of armed conflict). Notwithstanding the 
fact that rape is considered a war crime, the Geneva Conventions and successive 
Protocols do not particularly include it among the war crimes.98   
 
The Fourth Geneva Convention, in its Article 27, disposing about the status and 
treatment of protected persons in both the territories of the parties to the conflict 
and occupied territories, provides:  
 
“Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their 
honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any 
form of indecent assault.”99  
 
This prohibition of rape and enforced prostitution constituted the most relevant 
progress in humanitarian law in relation to the forbiddance of violence against 
women during war. Nevertheless, none of the four Geneva Conventions and the 
subsequent Protocols lists rape among their grave breaches and war crimes.100  
 
It is important to state that the International Committee of the Red Cross (that had 
a prominent role in the formulation of the Conventions) has regarded, within the 
framework of the reach of a grave breach of international humanitarian law, that 
the grave breach of “willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or 
health” includes rape and any other attack on a woman’s dignity. Further, the 
United States Department of State has acknowledged that it regards rape as a 
war crime or a grave breach under customary international law and the Geneva 
Conventions.101 
 
On 8 June 1977, two Additional Protocolsto the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 were adopted at Geneva.102 
 
In its Article 76, Protocol I addresses the issue of protection of women stating that 
 
“[w]omen shall be the object of special respect and shall be 
protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution and any 
other form of indecent assault.”103 
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Buy its turn, Protocol II Additional, disposing about internal armed conflicts, in its 
Article 4, paragraph 2 (e) establishes that  
 
“outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of 
indecent assault”104  
 
“are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever”.105 
 
As a consequence, although the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional 
Protocols undoubtedly forbid rape, they did not follow the Allied Control Council 
Law No. 10 antecedent, and left rape out of the grave breaches that are under 
universal jurisdiction.106   
 
2.1.15. United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the 
Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed 
Conflict, Resolution 3318 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974 
 
Much as this instrument was designed to defend women and children in cases of 
emergency and armed conflict, it fails to address rape in wartime.107 
 
There is no explicit mention to rape or other sexual crimes although the 
declaration expresses in the preamble  
 
“its deep concern over the sufferings of women and children 
belonging to the civilian population who … are too often the 
victims of inhuman acts and consequently suffer serious 
harm”.108  
 
The instrument also states in its paragraph 4 that  
 
“[a]ll the necessary steps shall be taken to ensure the prohibition 
of measures such as … degrading treatment and violence, 
particularly against that part of the civilian population that 
consists of women and children”109   
 
and in paragraph 5 that “[a]ll forms of repression and cruel and inhuman treatment 
of women and children … shall be considered criminal.”110   
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Consequently, the cruel and inhuman treatment of women is rendered a criminal 
act. Nonetheless, the fact that these provisions to shelter women and children in 
wartime were inserted in a declaration (which is a non-binding instrument) is 
another demonstration of the historical hesitation to penalise those who incur in 
gender-based war crimes.111 
  
2.1.16. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 25 May 1993, and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia  
 
Over forty years after the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials took place, two other "ad 
hoc" international war crimes tribunal were established: the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR), both of which tried sexual and gender-based crimes.112  
 
Since 1991 there were conflicts in the area of the former Yugoslavia. There were 
accounts attesting the propagated transgression of international humanitarian 
law and disregard of fundamental human rights in this conflict, notably in the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact, reports, such as the 1993 “European 
Community Investigative Mission into the Treatment of Muslim Women in the 
former Yugoslavia” Report on Rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina (also known as the 
“Warburton Mission Report” as the mission was led by Dame Anne Warburton), 
portraited systematic or widespread sexual violence against women in the conflict 
in Yugoslavia.113  
 
The Commission on Human Rights asserted in aforementioned report that rape 
of Muslim women was being carried out on a wide scale and in such a manner 
as to constitute part of a consciously adopted policy, sufficient to amount to a 
relevant component of war strategy. And also affirmed that114 
 
“[i]ndications are that at least some of the rapes have been 
committed in particularly sadistic ways, so as to inflict maximum 
humiliation on the victims, on their family, and on the whole 
community.  In many cases there seems little doubt that the 
intention is deliberately to make women pregnant and then to 
detain them until pregnancy is far enough advanced to make 
termination impossible, as an additional form of humiliation and 
constant reminder of the abuse done to them.”115 
 
The wars of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda inaugurate a new type of war 
action in which sexual aggression assumes a central position as a weapon of war 
which produces cruelty and lethality, within a form of mortal damage that is 
concomitantly material and moral. Indeed, gender specific war crimes in the 
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Balkan conflict abounded. The military tactics included an “ethnic cleansing” 
policy whose elements involve rape, forced impregnation, and forced maternity, 
apart from torture, humiliation, murder, genocide, and forced displacement “inter 
alia”.116  
 
The destruction of the undesired group in the “ethnic cleansing” goes beyond the 
physical annihilation. It can comprehend, for instance, sexual abuse in order to 
cause emotional degradation, humiliation, and submission, constituting a 
demonstration of the power of the invading forces. Another example is the rape 
of women as to forcibly impregnate them with a diverse ethnic gene or 
perpetrated with the clear intention of demoralising and terrorising communities, 
prompting people to run away to escape. Rape was so inherent the Yugoslav 
conflict that there were rape facilities and soldiers who refused to perpetrate it 
could be either castrated or killed. Muslim women represented the largest part of 
victims. Thousands of Muslim women who were forcedly impregnated, after 
giving birth to unwanted babies (palpable reminders of the horror and the violence 
suffered) no rarely abandoned them.117 
 
Apart from enduring the consequences of the violation of their physical integrity 
(rape can be used to purposely infect women with HIV or cause women from the 
undesirable community to be unable to have children), women who survive rape 
experiment terror and suffer different psychological reactions. Nonetheless, the 
psychological impact of rape and the social stigma attached to this crime can be 
especially severe for Muslim women victims of rape since they are often socially 
marginalised and rejected by their former communities.118  
 
Likewise, Muslim and Croatian women, Serbian women were reproductively 
abused by means of sexual mutilation, forced sterilization, forced impregnation 
and forced maternity.119  
 
Forced sexual slavery took place during the Yugoslavian conflict and women who 
were forced into sexual slavery were kept in brothels where they suffered both 
rape and forced prostitution, having, thus, the same fate as the called “comfort 
women” during World War II. Men were also victims of sexual abuse.120 
 
According to the 1994 Final Report of the Commission of Experts pursuant to 
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“to provide a comprehensive record of all reported grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of 
international humanitarian law”121  
 
during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, it was possible to identify 5 patterns 
of rape and sexual assault during the Yugoslavian conflict, without taking into 
account the ethnic background of the perpetrators or the victims.122 
 
This Yugoslavian situation threated the international peace and security. The 
Security Council of the United Nations was determined to halt these infringements 
of international humanitarian law (“mass killings, massive, organized and 
systematic detention and rape of women, and "ethnic cleansing"”) and to take 
effective actions to bring to justice those responsible for such misdeeds.123  
 
Thus, in its Resolution 827 (dated 25 May 1993), the Security Council decided to 
set up an international tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law perpetrated in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia. This Resolution also incorporated the Security Council of the 
United Nations´ first condemnation of rape in wartime.124  
 
In the Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, in the Appeals Chamber 
Judgment, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Appeals 
Chamber refers to the systematic rape and detention of women in the former 
Yugoslavia and subsequently affirms that  
 
“[t]he general question of bringing to justice the perpetrators of 
these crimes was, therefore, one of the reasons that the Security 
Council established the Tribunal.”125 
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s Statute is 
annexed to Resolution 827 and has given jurisdiction to the Tribunal over crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and genocide. In its Article 5, (g), the Statute 
specifically provides that rape can be prosecuted as crime against humanity by 
the ICTY. Moreover, several of the provisions of the Statute related to the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction to try war criminals of the Balkan conflict confer protection 
against gender abuses.126  
 
The ICTY has its seat in the Hague (the Netherlands). It has prosecuted more 
than 160 persons, including prominent police, military and political leaders. The 
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indictments concern crimes committed between 1991 and 2001 against members 
of distinct ethnicities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia.127  
 
The Tribunal contributed to the progress of international justice in the gender-
based crimes field by permitting sexual violence to be the tried “as a war crime, 
a crime against humanity and genocide”. Certainly, since 1995 the ICTY has 
charged and prosecuted over seventy people with sexual violence crimes 
(inclusive of rape and sexual assault). As of the beginning of 2011, almost a third 
was found guilty.128  
 
“Sexual violence takes on various forms in the judgments. These 
include: rape, torture, enslavement, and persecution as crimes 
against humanity; and rape, torture, outrages upon personal 
dignity, and inhuman treatment as war crimes. Rape and/or other 
sexual violence amounted to torture in several cases.”129  
 
The most relevant judgments involving sexual offences are the following: 
 
2.1.16.i. Case The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić a.k.a. “Dule” 
(IT-94-1), related to crimes committed in "Prijedor" 
 
Apart from being the first international war crimes trial since Nuremberg and 
Tokyo, the Duško Tadić case was both the first international war crimes trial 
involving charges of sexual violence and the first-ever international trial for sexual 
violence against men.130 
 
In the Omarska Camp, uniformed men, among them Tadić, compelled one of the 
detainees to suck the penis and bite off the testicles of another detainee. In May 
1997, the Trial Chamber found Tadić guilty of cruel treatment (violation of the 
laws and customs of war) and inhumane acts (crime against humanity) for his 
participation in this and other crimes.131  
 
On appeal, Duško Tadić was also found guilty of grave breaches of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions (inhumane treatment and willfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury to the body or health), being convicted to 20 years imprisonment in 
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2.1.16.ii. Case the Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko 
Mucić also known as “Pavo”, Hazim Delić, and Esad Landžo 
also known as “Zenga”, (IT-96-21), in relation to offences 
perpetrated in the "Čelebići Camp" (IT-96-21) 
 
The Trial Chamber dealt with a number of sexual violence charges during the 
trial. Hazim Delić and Esad Landžo were charged with individual criminal 
responsibility, as direct participants in certain offences, including acts of torture, 
murder and rape (rape was charged as torture or cruel treatment). Delić, the 
deputy camp commander, was charged as well in his capacity as a superior with 
command responsibility. Zejnil Delalić and Zdravko Mucić were charged as 
superiors with responsibility for crimes perpetrated by their subordinates, 
including those carried out by the other two accused.133  
 
Among other crimes, Hazim Delić was found guilty of torture by way of the horrific 
rapes of two women who were detained in the camp, being convicted to 18 years 
imprisonment. The trial was a landmark in international justice: for the first time a 
judgment of an international criminal tribunal regarded rape as a form of torture 
and, consequently, a grave breach (punishable under Article 2 (b) (torture) of the 
Statute of the Tribunal) and a violation of the laws or customs of war (punishable 
under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and recognised by Article 3 (1) (a) 
(torture) of the Geneva Conventions; or alternatively punishable under Article 3 
of the Statute of the Tribunal and recognised by Article 3 (1) (a) (cruel treatment) 
of the Geneva Conventions).134  
 
Additionally, the Trial Chamber understood that the sexual violence endured by 
the two women was permeated by discrimination, being employed on them 
because of their gender. In fact, the judges stressed that it had been recognized 
that135 
 
“violence directed against a woman because she is a woman, 
including acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or 
suffering, represent a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits 
the ability of women to enjoy human rights and freedoms”136 
 
and affirmed:  
 
“it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which rape, by, or at 
the instigation of a public official, or with the consent or 
acquiescence of an official, could be considered as occurring for 
a purpose that does not, in some way, involve punishment, 
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coercion, discrimination or intimidation.  In the view of this Trial 
Chamber this is inherent in situations of armed conflict.”137 
 
As Landžo was a camp guard, it is notable that the ICTY held him responsible for 
criminal acts he had incurred in, such as obliging two brothers to commit fellatio 
on each other in full view of other detainees, and then putting a burning fuse 
around their genitals. Landžo was convicted to 15 years imprisonment.138 
  
The camp commander Zdravko Mucić was convicted of these and other crimes 
carried out by his subordinates and punished with 9 years imprisonment. The 
offences were considered grave breaches and violations of the laws and customs 
of war. Zejnil Delalić was found not guilty for lack of evidence.139 
 
2.1.16.iii. Case the Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija (IT-95-17/1) 
regarding the crimes carried out in the Lašva Valley   
 
This was the first ICTY case totally focused on charges of sexual violence- the 
commitment of multiple rapes of a Bosnian Muslim woman during interrogations 
led by Furundžija, at time the commander of a special unit of the Croatian 
Defence Council.140 
 
The Tribunal stated that while Furundžija proceeded with the interrogation of a 
Muslim woman, 
 
“a subordinate soldier threatened her by rubbing his knife on her 
inner thighs and saying that he would cut out her private parts.   
  
• In another room the victim and her friend, a Croatian soldier, 
were interrogated and beaten on their feet with a baton. The 
woman was then repeatedly raped before a group of soldiers. 
The Croatian soldier was forced to watch the sexual attacks 
against his friend.”141 
 
However, the accused  
 
“did nothing to stop or curtail these actions in his presence, and 
the continued interrogation substantially contributed to the 
criminal acts committed upon the woman and her friend.” 142 
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Thus, Anto Furundžija was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for committing 
torture (“violations of the laws or customs of war”) and outrages upon personal 
dignity, inclusive of rape (constituting “violations of the laws or customs of 
war”).143  
 
“In the Tribunal’s Statute, the only explicit reference to rape is as 
one of the crimes constituting crimes against humanity. The Trial 
Chamber widened that scope and stated that rape may also be 
prosecuted as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions and 
as a violation of the laws and customs of war.”144 
 
In this case the ICTY’s judges confirmed the finding that rape can amount to 
genocide, following the 1998 landmark precedent set by the ICTR Akayesu case 
judgment, which established that rape may constitute genocide.145 
 
2.1.16.iv. Case the Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, 
Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković  (IT-96-23 & 23/1) 
concerning the offences perpetrated in Foča  
 
On 26 June 1996 Dragoljub Kunarac was indicted along Radomir Kovač and 
Zoran Vuković for taking part in the subjugation of Muslim women in Foča to a 
merciless scheme of gang rape (including oral, anal and vaginal rape and use of 
ejaculation to degrade victims), enslavement and torture by Bosnian Serb 
soldiers, members of paramilitary groups and policemen after Bosnian Serb 
forces occupied the city in April 1992. In the conduction of the attack against 
civilians, rape was deployed as a strategic “tool” to expel the Muslims from the 
Foča region.146 
 
This was the second ICTY case exclusively with charges of sexual violence and 
its judgment constituted  
 
“another significant contribution to international criminal law. The 
judgement broadened the acts that constitute enslavement as a 
crime against humanity to include sexual enslavement and 
determined the relationship of gender crimes to customary 
law.”147 
 
The three criminals were Bosnian Serb army officers who had an important role 
in the organization and maintenance of the despicable rape camps scheme in 
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Foča. In fact, as demonstrated by the evidence, the members of the Bosnian Serb 
armed forces used rape as an instrument of terror, which was employed against 
whomsoever and whenever they wanted.148 
 
In addition, the accused persons were involved in the enslavement of several 
women in apartments and hotels run as brothels for Serb soldiers. Women were 
treated like properties, been forced to perform household chores, and to comply 
with all the demands of their abusers. Moreover, they were unable to move with 
freedom and were bought and sold like goods.149  
 
The judges’ finding that the nature of the enslavement was sexual was important 
because previously international law had linked enslavement to compulsory 
labour and servitude. The reach of the crime was increased as to include sexual 
slavery.150 
 
“All three accused were also found guilty of rape as a crime 
against humanity. This was the first such conviction in the ICTY’s 
history, closely following on the historical precedent set by the 
ICTR’s judgement in the Akayesu case in 1998.”151  
 
Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković were penalized with, respectively, 28, 20, and 12 
years imprisonment.152  
 
2.1.16.v. Case the Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić (IT-98-33) 
related to the crimes carried out in Srebrenica 
 
While the Kunarac et al. judgment established that rape was employed as a “tool 
of war”, the case of Radislav Krstić demonstrated the connection between rape 
and ethnic cleansing, which was intimately linked to genocide in the panorama of 
the crimes committed in Srebrenica in July 1995.153 
 
In July 1995, Krstić commanded an operation in Srebrenica that culminated in the 
killing of over seven thousand Bosnian Muslim boys and men, regarded by the 
judges as genocide.154  
 
As a result, around 20-30,000 of the Muslim residents (mainly women, children 
and the elderly) escaped to Potočari, a nearby village. Several thousands looked 
for protection inside the UN military camp, but Serb soldiers invaded the 
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compound and attacked people, threatening, beating, raping and killing them. 
Subsequently, Muslim women, children and the elderly were forcibly transferred 
from Potočari.155 
 
Krstić was held responsible for the crime of forcibly transferring women, children 
and the elderly, including the incidental murders, beatings, abuses and rapes that 
took place in Potočari. Such crimes were regarded as “natural and foreseeable 
consequences of the ethnic cleansing campaign.”156  
 
It was observed by the Judges that “although “ethnic cleansing” was not a legal 
term, it had been used in various legal analyses before.” The Trial Chamber also 
stressed that it presents many similarities with genocide.157  
 
However, the rapes carried out in Potočari did not integrate the conviction of 
Krstić for the crime of aiding and abetting genocide because the crimes in 
Potočari were regarded as constituting a prologue to the consecutive 
genocide.158 
 
The Appeals Chamber confirmed the sexual violence convictions amid other 
crimes, and Krstić was convicted to 35 years imprisonment.159 
 
2.1.17. Other instruments protecting women  
 
Around the same time of the establishment of the ICTY in 1993, further 
international declarations largely augmented the awareness and boosted the 
amelioration of women´s situation in the world. These declarations reckoned that 
crimes of sexual violence (comprising rape, sexual slavery, and forced 
pregnancy) should be handled as war crimes and crimes against humanity.160 
 
Indeed, the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, addressing the 
equal status and human rights of women in the Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action (25 June 1993), asserts:  
 
“Violations of the human rights of women in situations of armed 
conflict are violations of the fundamental principles of 
international human rights and humanitarian law. All violations of 
this kind, including in particular murder, systematic rape, sexual 
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Whereas the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing, China, in 
September 1995, states:  
 
“Massive violations of human rights, especially in the form of … 
rape, including systematic rape of women in war situations ...are 
abhorrent practices that are strongly condemned and must be 
stopped immediately, while perpetrators of such crimes must be 
punished.”162 
 
Also, as a result of the Cairo Population Conference, which took place in Egypt 
in 1994, a Programme of Action of the United Nations International Conference 
on Population & Development was adopted. The Programme tackled in its 
chapter IV issues of gender equality, equity and empowerment of women, and its 
article 4.4 preamble and (c) preconizes that  
 
“[c]ountries should act to empower women and should take steps 
to eliminate inequalities between men and women as soon as 
possible by … eliminating all practices that discriminate against 
women; assisting women to establish and realize their rights, 
including those that relate to reproductive and sexual health;”163 
 
2.1.18. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
8 November 1994, and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda  
 
After assigning the elaboration of reports about the situation in Rwanda, which 
concluded “that genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant 
violations of international humanitarian law have been committed in Rwanda”, the 
Security Council of the United Nations established the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in its Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994.164  
 
Certainly, the Rwandan civil war and genocide started just after the murder of 
Hutu President Juvenal Habyarimana on 6 April 1994, and when it was over on 
19 July 1994, a minimum of 800.000 people had been killed. The extremist Hutu 
militia (in association with the Rwandan Army Forces and others) started an 
extermination policy against both the whole Tutsi ethnic minority and the 
moderate Hutu.165  
 
The estimative is that over this period the number of rapes was between 250.000 
and 500.000. As it has been affirmed in the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights’ Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda, “rape was the 
rule and its absence the exception.” The purpose to completely annihilate the 
Tutsi was further demonstrated by the killing of even newborn babies and 
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pregnant women (comprehending those of Hutu ethnicity) whose foetuses were 
fathered by Tutsi.166   
 
In order to penalise those who held responsibility for the Rwandan genocide, the 
United Nations set up the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda167   
 
“for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for 
genocide and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and 
Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such 
violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, 
between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.”168 
 
Article 2 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (annex 
to Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994) provided a definition of genocide. It 
stated: 
 
“Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such: 
 
(a) Killing members of the group;  
 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group;  
 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated 
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;  
 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group;  
 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group.”169  
 
In the Prosecutor v. Akayesu case, when the Trial Chamber dealt with causing 
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, it underscored that  
 
”rape and sexual violence … constitute genocide in the same 
way as any other act as long as they were committed with the 
specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, 
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targeted as such. Indeed, rape and sexual violence certainly 
constitute infliction of serious bodily and mental harm on the 
victims and are even, according to the Chamber, one of the worst 
ways of inflict harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily 
and mental harm. ... These rapes resulted in physical and 
psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families and their 
communities. Sexual violence was an integral part of the process 
of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically 
contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi 
group as a whole.”170   
 
In what concerns “[d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated 
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”, in the Prosecutor v. 
Kayishema and Ruzindana case, the judges determined that actions which did 
not instantly caused death were subsumed under this head of charges and 
asserted that171  
  
“the conditions of life envisaged include rape, the starving of a 
group of people, reducing required medical services below a 
minimum, and withholding sufficient living accommodation for a 
reasonable period, provided the above would lead to the 
destruction of the group in whole or in part.”172  
 
Further, in paragraphs 507-508 of the Prosecutor v. Akayesu case, the judges 
held that  
 
“the measures intended to prevent births within the group, should 
be construed as sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilization, 
forced birth control, separation of the sexes and prohibition of 
marriages. In patriarchal societies, where membership of a group 
is determined by the identity of the father, an example of a 
measure intended to prevent births within a group is the case 
where, during rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately 
impregnated by a man of another group, with the intent to have 
her give birth to a child who will consequently not belong to its 
mother's group. 
 
… measures intended to prevent births within the group may be 
physical, but can also be mental. For instance, rape can be a 
measure intended to prevent births when the person raped 
refuses subsequently to procreate, in the same way that 
members of a group can be led, through threats or trauma, not to 
procreate.”173   
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Likewise, Article 5 (g) of the ICTY statute, the ICTR Statute established in its 
Articles 3 (g) that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to “prosecute persons responsible 
for” the crime of rape (as a crime against humanity) 
 
“when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial 
or religious grounds”.174 
 
The relevance of identifying rape as an act of genocide lays on the fact that, by 
giving express recognition to the particular hardship inflicted on women, it 
prompts the crime of rape to occupy a more important role in international 
humanitarian law, instead of remaining relegated to its margins, as it happened, 
for example, in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters.175  
 
Additionally, in its Article 4 (e), the Statute gives jurisdiction to the ICTR  
 
“to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed 
serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, 
and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977”.176  
 
Both Tribunals, employing constructive interaction, worked towards the 
establishment of a definition of rape that was internationally accepted. In the 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu case, the ICTR judges decanted themselves towards a 
conceptual definition (instead of a technical one).177  
 
Indeed, the Trial Chamber asserted that  
 
“[w]hile rape has been defined in certain national courts as a non-
consensual intercourse, variations on the act of rape may include 
acts which involve the insertion of objects and/or the use of bodily 
orifices not considered to be intrinsically sexual.”178  
 
By the same token, it defined “rape as a physical invasion of a sexual nature, 
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The judges went farther and differentiated rape from sexual violence, affirming 
that  
 
“[s]exual violence which includes rape, is considered to be any 
act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive.”180  
 
Consequently, the latter is wider than the former and subsumes all acts of sexual 
nature carried out under circumstances that are coercive.181 
 
Finally, in the case the Prosecutor v. Semanza, the ICTR applied the wider 
definition of torture set up in the ICTY "Čelebići" case, and held that instigating 
rape for a discriminatory purpose is legally considered torture and, thus, can be 
rendered a genocidal act.182 
 
It is important to note that rape and enforced prostitution were not defined as war 
crimes and that there were no express references to other sexual violence 
offences in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes.183 
 
In spite of that, the inclusion of rape in the list of acts that could amount to a crime 
against humanity in the Statutes of both “ad hoc” Tribunals and to install the 
juridical debate on the rape definition under international is a valuable 
achievement because, as seen, rape was out of the mainstream of international 




As seen throughout the chapter, the prosecution of sexual and gender-based 
crimes had virtually no place in the international scenario up to the previous 
century. 
 
Except for very few pinpointed actions (specifically, the 1474 Peter von 
Hagenbach’s conviction for rape among other crimes, the 1863 Lieber Code rape 
forbiddance, and the introduction of the Martens Clause and the respect to the 
“laws of humanity” by the 1899 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land), the main legal developments in relation to the 
criminalisation and punishment of the sexual and gender-based crimes in the 
International Criminal Law scenario only started in the 20th century. Thus, it 
constitutes a relatively new subject. 
 
Along the last century, such crimes progressively started to occupy a more 
prominent role in International Criminal Law. The enacted international 
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documents (such as the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and 
Additional Protocols) reflected the increase in the attention dispensed by the 
International Community towards sexual and gender-based crimes, contributing 
to the protection of women.  
 
This process led to the incorporation of sexual and gender-based crimes among 
the offenses over which the “ad hoc” International Tribunals have jurisdiction. The 
statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR rendered the crime of rape as a crime against 
humanity. Furthermore, the cases of these tribunals were of great importance for 
the prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes in the international scenario.  
 
This legal and historical background has to be taken into account in the analysis 








































3. The Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court 
 
3.1. Antecedents and the construction process of the International 
Criminal Court  
 
3.1.1. The Breisach “ad hoc” tribunal, 1474  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the first international criminal tribunal was the “ad hoc” 
tribunal that prosecuted Peter von Hagenbach in Breisach in 1474.185  
 
In spite of that, almost 400 years passed before the concept of a permanent 
international criminal court was formally considered.186 
 
3.1.2. The Geneva Red Cross Convention, 22 August 1864  
 
In accordance with Hall, “it is not widely known that the first serious such 
proposal” to establish a permanent international criminal court was made by 
Gustave Moynier (one of the founders and President of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross) in 1872. The proposal followed his disappointment 
with the failure of the adversary powers in the 1870-1871 Franco- Prussian War 
to respect the provisions of the Geneva “Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field” of 22 August 1864.187 
 
In fact, in Moynier’s 1870 commentary on the 1864 Geneva Convention, he 
deemed that an international criminal court was not necessary to enforce the 
Convention and believed that public criticism of infringements would suffice to 
States parties to impose penalties for criminal offences in their national 
legislations. However, the Franco-Prussian War proved him wrong.188 
 
In view of that, on 3 January 1872 at a meeting of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC), Moynier submitted a proposal for the creation of a 
permanent international criminal tribunal, by treaty. His proposal was published 
on 11 April of the same year under the title “Note on the creation of a specific 
international judicial institution to prevent and punish violations of the Geneva 
Convention” and stated:189 
 
"Therefore I would like [to propose] a tribunal to 
which contentious cases could be submitted. The tribunal would 
conduct an investigation of each case, would hear as required 
the pleadings of the plaintiff and the accused, would condemn 
the guilty according to future international law concerning 
infractions of the Geneva Convention."190 
 
 
185 Bassiouni, M. C. (2010), p. 298; Scharf, M. P., & Schabas, W. A. (2002), p. 39 
186 Hall, C. K. (1998), pp. 57-74 
187 Ibidem; Shabtai, R. (2000). In Schmitt, M. N. (ed.), pp. 387-420 
188 Moynier, G. (1870), pp. 58-59; Hall, C. K. (1998), pp. 57-74 
189 Moynier, G. (1872), pp. 122-131; Hall, C. K., (1998), pp. 57-74 
190 Moynier, G. (1872), pp. 122-131; Hutchinson, J. F. (1996), p. 131 
48 
 
The 1872 Note included a Draft convention for the establishment of an 
international judicial body suitable for the prevention and punishment of 
violations of the Geneva Convention containing 10 articles.191 
  
In accordance with the laid in Article 1 of the Draft convention,  
 
“the tribunal would have been … a permanent institution, which 
would be activated automatically in the case of any war between 
the parties.”192  
 
Moynier (acknowledging that the Geneva Convention terms did not convey the 
necessary strength to back up the establishment of criminal responsibility) 
proposed in Article 5, paragraph 2 to define criminal offences and penalties in 
a different instrument. Nevertheless, he did not try to establish the violations 
and respective punishments himself.193 
Moynier´s proposition of an international criminal jurisdiction was a major shift. 
Despite the concept of a permanent international court to settle inter-State 
disputes had been addressed before 1872 by a few politicians, legal experts, and 
writers (often briefly and to regard it unfeasible), Moynier´s proposal seems to be 
“the first serious such proposal” “to establish a permanent international court” 
which would have jurisdiction over humanitarian law infringements. The 
model that inspired him was of the arbitral tribunal established by the Washington 
Treaty in the Alabama case. However, in the Draft convention, the duties of the 
5 adjudicators (denominated “arbitres”) were more closely related to those 
performed by judges than those carried out by arbitrators.194 
 
Additionally, Moynier´s proposal presented daring innovations, such as the 
possibility of compensation to victims, although exclusively in the cases in which 
the accuser State enclosed a request for damages and interest in its complaint. 
These are advanced concepts which are still ahead of the views of several 
contemporary governments.195 
 
Nonetheless, the proposal was not well received by governments and those 
responsible for the several aid societies. Moreover, many well-known experts in 
international law sent him letters criticising several elements of the proposal. 
Some sustained that the idea to set up an international criminal court would be 
less effective than other methods, whereas others disapproved the precise 
concept of an international criminal court, favouring other means.196 
 
At a meeting of the “Institut de droit international”, in Cambridge, in 1895, there 
was a discussion about the creation of an international tribunal to address 
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offences of the laws of war, but it was not followed up. Except for this 
discussion, Moynier´s initiative was mostly forgotten.197  
 
“One can only speculate on the impact that an international 
criminal court with jurisdiction over the the Geneva Convention 
of 1864 and the 1907 Hague Conventions would have had on the 
behaviour of troops in the Russo-Japanese war, the Balkan Wars 
and the First World War, and the development of humanitarian 
law in civil wars and other national armed conflicts.” 198 
 
3.1.3. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes (First Hague, I), 29 July 1899, and Convention Relative 
to the Establishment of an International Prize Court (Second 
Hague, XII), 18 October 1907  
 
The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, establishing several rules 
regarding the mechanisms and methods of warfare, set up consistent ways for 
the pacific settlement of disputes to permit the parties to overcome the threat of 
war, in case and when war arises.199  
 
In this context, the Hague Convention (XII) relative to the Creation of an 
International Prize Court (1907) stated:  
 
“Animated by the desire to settle in an equitable manner the 
differences which sometimes arise in the course of a naval war 
in connection with the decisions of national prize courts; 
Considering that … it is desirable that in certain cases an appeal 
should be provided under conditions conciliating, as far as 
possible, the public and private interests involved in matters of 
prize; Whereas, moreover, the institution of an International 
Court, whose jurisdiction and procedure would be carefully 
defined, has seemed to be the best method of attaining this 
object.”200  
 
The aforementioned Convention proposed the creation of an International Prize 
Court with jurisdiction to decide appeals brought against national prize courts´ 
judgments. Nonetheless, the debates at the Hague demonstrated that there were 
serious disagreements in relation to the rules of law that would have been applied 
by the Court, what ultimately led to the non-implementation of this proposal.201 
 
Certainly, as to reach an agreement regarding such rules, a Naval Conference 
was held in London in 1908 and 1909, producing the Declaration of London, 
which was never ratified. Subsequently, the proposal was modified by the 1910 
Additional Protocol to the Convention Relative to the Creation of an International 
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Prize Court because some of the States considered that there were difficulties of 
a constitutional nature which prevented the acceptance of the 1907 Convention, 
as it stood. Nevertheless, these efforts were fruitless, and, failing the ratification 
of the 1907 convention and the 1910 protocol, the proposal for an International 
Prize Court was not put into action.202  
 
In spite of that, the proposal was important. It consisted in the first provision for a 
genuinely international court, distinct of a court of arbitration, with superior 
jurisdiction over the courts of the signatory States. Further, the Convention 
allowed individuals to have access to the court, in a period in which, in 
accordance with the dominant doctrine, solely States enjoyed rights and had 
duties under international law. Finally, said Convention conveyed the feasibility 
of the establishment of other courts with broader authority.203   
 
3.1.4. Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), 28 
June 1919 
 
The drafters of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles were behind the following urge for 
formulating an international justice system.204  
 
As stated in the previous chapter, the Treaty of Versailles determined in its Article 
227 the creation of an “ad hoc” international criminal court to try Germany’s Kaiser 
Wilhelm II for the commencement of the war.The Treaty further provided in its 
Articles 228 and 229 for the trial of German military personnel accused of having 
committed acts against the laws and customs of war before Allied Military 
Tribunals or before the Military Courts of one of the Allies.205  
 
Although these two articles constituted the Treaty of Versailles’ main provisions, 
they were not put into action because geopolitical considerations prevailed in the 
period after World War I. In relation to the prosecution of the Kaiser under Article 
227, the Allies blamed the government of the Netherlands for refusing to extradite 
him, fact interpreted by some as a form to avoid establishing a tribunal in 
accordance with Article 227. The Allies were not prepared to set up the precedent 
of trying a Head of State for a novel international crime, as demonstrated by the 
words employed by them when drafting Article 227:206 
 
“The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of 
Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence 
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.”207 
 
Therefore, the drafters did not refer to a known international crime, and instead 
preferred to regard the crime of aggression as being a “political” crime. In view of 
that, the Netherlands had a valid legal ground to repel the Allies' eventual formal 
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submission for the surrender of the Kaiser’ for prosecution, request that was 
made. It is possible that Article 227 was deemed to fail, representing more a 
response to both the European masses (which regarded the Kaiser as 
despicable) and to the French and Belgian Governments (that yearned to see 
Germany humiliated for beginning the war).208 
 
In relation to the prosecutions contemplated by Article 228, the energy of the 
Allies to create joint or even separate military tribunals had subsided by 1921, 
and it was necessary to refrain of further humiliate Germany as not to cause the 
already instable Weimar Republic to become even more fragile. Thus, instead of 
establishing an Allied Tribunal in the terms of Article 228, the Allies requested 
Germany to undertake the trial of a constrained number of war criminals before 
its Supreme Court, in Leipizig.209 
 
The Leipzig trials represented the prevalence of international and domestic 
politics of the Allies in detriment of justice. The commitment disposed in Treaty of 
Versailles to prosecute and penalize offenders in case Germany failed to do it 
was not implemented.210  
 
It was a common ground that the League of Nations, created “to promote 
international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security” (its 
Covenant was included in the Treaty of Versailles), would establish a new order 
of universal peace with a deterrent effect over future wars. Nevertheless, the 
Allies missed the chance to establish an internationalized system of justice free 
of political considerations that would have worked to guarantee impartial 
justice.211 
 
The weakness of the international criminal justice processes subsequent to World 
War I, apart from generating a feeling of impunity, failed to deter the military 
leaders who started World War II.212 
 
In spite of its tenuous results, the Treaty of Versailles acknowledged “a priori” that 
war crimes and crimes against the peace should be penalized, and that 
international tribunals should be established for the trial of these criminal 
offences. Certainly, however serious were the divergences of viewpoint among 
the members of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War 
and on Enforcement of Penalties, the Commission stated, amidst its conclusion, 
that it was213 
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“desirable that for the future penal sanctions should be provided 
for such grave outrages against the elementary principles of 
international law."214  
 
3.1.5. The Geneva Conventions for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Terrorism and for the Creation of an International 
Criminal Court, 16 November 1937 
 
After the murder of the King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Mr. Barthou, at 
Marseilles on 9 November 1934, the French Government sent a letter to the 
Secretary-General of the League of Nations stressing the necessity to enact an 
international convention against terrorism and suggesting the creation of an 
international court to prosecute perpetrators of terrorism acts that would be 
disposed in the Convention.215 
3.1.2 
The Council of the League followed up the subject and the International 
Conference on the Repression of Terrorism was held in Geneva, on 16 November 
1937. At the Conference, following the adoption of the Convention for the 
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, the Convention for the Creation of an 
International Criminal Court envisaged the establishment of an international 
criminal court to prosecute the accused of committing the crimes enlisted in the 
Terrorism Convention.216  
 
This was the first time in which States agreed on the creation of international 
criminal tribunal invested with a permanent character (although it only would sit 
when seized of proceedings for a crime within its jurisdiction), and that the 
possibility and practicality of jurisdiction over crimes of an international nature 
and liable to perturb international peace were officially acknowledged.217 
 
Nevertheless, due to a lack of a sufficient number of ratifications and accessions, 
none of these Conventions has ever entered into force (the Terrorism Convention 
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3.1.6. The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal and the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East  
 
After the barbaric criminal offences and atrocities perpetrated by the Germans 
and their allies during World War II, jurists and political leaders realised that if 
they re-incurred in the failure to uphold the law (as it had happened in the post-
World War I period), it would ultimately jeopardise their capacity to advance and 
invigorate the future international law.219    
 
On 8 August 1945, the Governments of Great Britain, the United States, France, 
and the Soviet Union concluded the Agreement for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis in London, which 
provided for the establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the 
prosecution of war criminals whose crimes did not have particular geographical 
location (namely, crimes against the peace, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity). A Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed to the 
Agreement (The Nuremberg Charter) disposed about the Tribunal’s constitution, 
general principles, jurisdiction and functions.220  
 
At last official action left behind the purely theoretical sphere and substantiated 
its objectives when this established Tribunal, with sit in Nuremberg, Germany, 
prosecuted the major criminals of World War II, convicting nineteen of the 
accused (there condemnations varied from death to prison terms ranging from 
ten years to life) and absolving three of them.221 
 
Following the Special Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers ordering and providing that it should be established an International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (in order to prosecute persons charged with 
offences which encompassed Crimes against Peace), the Charter set up the 
Tribunal and detailed its constitution, jurisdiction, general principles and 
functions.222  
 
The Tribunal had its seat in Tokyo, and convicted twenty-five accused (seven of 
the defendants were sentenced to death by hanging, sixteen others were 
sentenced to life imprisonment, a further accused was convicted to a twenty-year 
sentence and the last one was punished with seven years imprisonment). 
Therefore, the prosecutions before the Tokyo Tribunal represented the 
affirmation of the model set up by the Nuremberg Tribunal of trying war criminals.   
In this sense, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals set up the path for the future 
establishment of the International Criminal Court. For the first time ever, two 
international tribunals invested with criminal jurisdiction and formed by judges 
from different countries prosecuted persons accused of perpetrating crimes 
against peace and the humanity. Furthermore, the trials consisted in judicial 
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proceedings in which the accused (who had the assistance of counsel and all the 
guarantees needed to prove their innocence) were given a just judgment.223 
 
3.2. The efforts of the United Nations to create an International 
Criminal Court 
 
The Charter of the United Nations (signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, 
upon the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on International 
Organization) disposed that the General Assembly should begin studies and 
make recommendations related to 
 
“promoting international cooperation in the political field and 
encouraging the progressive development of international law 
and its codification.”224  
 
As to put this provision into action, the United Nations General Assembly, in its 
Resolution 94 (I) of 11 December 1946, constituted a Committee composed of 
seventeen members of the United Nations and directed it to study, “inter alia”, the 
approaches whereby the General Assembly should boost the progressive 
development of international law and its eventual codification.225  
 
This Committee on the Progressive Development of International Law and its 
Codification (also known as the “Committee of Seventeen”) held meetings from 
12 May to 17 June 1947 in New York. On 13 May 1947, France’s representative 
on the Committee, Henri Donnedieu de Vabres (who also served as a judge in 
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg) proposed the creation of 
permanent international criminal court and subsequently submitted a 
Memorandum to the Committee containing a draft proposal for the establishment 
of an international criminal court:226 
 
“The repression, pursuant to the principles of the Nürnberg 
judgment, of international crimes against peace and humanity, 
which the General Assembly of the United Nations confirmed by 
its resolution of 11 December1946, can only be ensured by the 
establishment of an international criminal court.  
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This would avoid any future recurrence of the criticism often 
levelled against the International Military Tribunal for the trial of 
major war criminals, that it was an ad hoc court which only 
imperfectly represented the international community.”227 
Further, in its Resolution 174 (II) of 21 November 1947, the United Nations 
General Assembly resolved to establish the International Law Commission (its 
subsidiary organ formed by persons of indisputable competence in the 
international law field and representing the world’s leading forms of civilization 
and main legal systems, all of them elected by the General Assembly), whose 
purpose was to advance both the progressive development of international law 
and its codification, and that would actuate in accordance with the terms of the 
Statute annexed to such Resolution.228  
 
The proposal of creating an international criminal cort was resumed in 1948. 
However, in spite of these efforts, the United Nations General Assembly 
abstained itself of creating an international criminal court in the enactment of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Resolution 260 (III), A, 9 December 1948), solely stating that persons accused 
of genocide shall be prosecuted by a competent domestic tribunal229 
 
“or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction 
with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have 
accepted its jurisdiction.”230  
 
Thus, the reluctancy of carrying out prosecutions in international courts once 
more prevailed, and the drafters of this Convention committed to the suppression 
of genocide without concomitantly establishing an international jurisdiction. The 
General Assembly purportedly limited its efforts towards the establishment of 
international criminal court and merely called the International Law Commission 
to analyse the opportuneness and feasibility of creating an organ of international 
justice to try persons accused of genocide and other criminal acts.231 
 
Certainly, the General Assembly invited the International Law Commission 
 
“to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an 
international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with 
genocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction will be conferred 
upon that organ by international conventions;”232 
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and requested it “to pay attention to the possibility of establishing a Criminal 
Chamber of the International Court of Justice” when implementing such task.233 
 
In spite of its downside, the Convention represented a universal awareness that 
genocide could not remain unpunished anymore and that an impartial judicial 
enforcement system was necessary in order to adequately enforce the law.234  
 
In view of the General Assembly’s invitation, at its first session, held in 1949, the 
International Law Commission assigned two joint Special Rapporteurs to submit 
working papers on the matter: Ricardo J. Alfaro of Panama, who supported the 
establishment of an International Judicial Organ (he found that such an organ 
was possible, and, even more than desirable, desired), and A.E.F. Sandström of 
Sweden, who favoured a Criminal Chamber of the International Court of Justice. 
Although Judge Sandström was expected to defend the establishment of an 
international criminal court, his report represented the common position of the 
international community that it was not appropriate the moment to set up an 
international criminal court.235 
 
The reality was that the member-states countries were not prepared for the 
establishment of an international criminal court, but, at the same time, none of 
them wanted to be the blamed for aborting the idea. Further, to go against the 
concept of an international criminal court would jeopardize the credibility of the 
Allied powers after the Tokyo and Nuremberg trials.236 
 
At its second session, in 1950, the International Law Commission analysed the 
“possibility” of237  
 
“the establishment of an international judicial organ for the trial of 
persons charged with genocide or other crimes over which 
jurisdiction will be conferred upon that organ by international 
conventions” 238 
 
and, paying regard to the two opposite reports on the subject, decided that such 
court was “desirable” and “possible”. Amidst concerns of national sovereignty and 
ripeness, the Commission upheld Alfaro’s reported findings, but did not follow 
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Sandström’s opinion (it did not recommend “establishing a criminal chamber of 
the International Court of Justice”).239 
 
Therefore, the debate on the sensibility, legality and convenience of an 
International Criminal Court continued, disguising the fact that the moment of 
establishing this court had not come yet. A Special Committee for the 
Development of a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, formed by 
seventeen states, was constituted by the General Assembly in its Resolution 489 
(V), adopted on 12 December 1950. In August 1951 this Special Committee 
presented a report containing a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court 
so that Governments could make comments. However, only a few Member-
States made observations on the draft and the recurrent criticisms in relation to 
national sovereignty and readiness led to the appointment of a Second Special 
Committee (resolution 687 (VII) of 5 December 1952) which, having the States’ 
suggestions and comments as foundation, would re-examine the draft to enable 
the constitution of the court.240 
 
In 1953 the Second Special Committee’s Revised Draft Statute for an 
International Criminal Court completed the alterations to the 1951 Draft Statute, 
and presented the respective report to the General Assembly in its first 1954 
session. Nonetheless, the General Assembly understood that the appreciation of 
the 1953 Revised Draft Statute was conditioned to the conclusion by the 
International Law Commission of the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind containing the international crimes over which the 
eventual International Criminal Court would have jurisdiction, what followed 
shortly, still in the same year.241  
 
Nevertheless, another problem prevented the continuity of the project of the 
formation of an international criminal court. Although dealing with aggression, the 
1953 Draft Code of Offences could not define this crime since another Special 
Committee had been assigned to meet in 1956 in order to arrive at a definition of 
aggression and report to the General Assembly. In fact, in its Resolution 897 (IX), 
adopted on 4 December 1954, the General Assembly resolved to suspend the 
consideration of the Draft Code of Offences and wait for the submission of the 
new Special Committee’s report on the definition of the crime of aggression. 
Ultimately, this resulted in the impossibility of the analysis of the 1953 Revised 
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Draft Statute by the General Assembly until the issue of the pendent aggression 
definition was resolved.242 
 
The debates were lengthy, and in 1974 the last of the four Special Committees 
on the Question of Defining Aggression arrived at a definition of aggression, 
which was adopted by consensus by the General Assembly in its resolution 3314 
(XXIX) of the same year.243 
 
In spite of that, it was not until 1978 that the General Assembly decided to 
reconsider the 1954 Draft Code of Offences, not making any mention to the 1953 
Revised Draft Statute for the Court, though. The actions in this respect were 
further delayed until 1981 when the International Law Commission, upon the 
General Assembly’s invitation, finally resumed “its work with a view to elaborating 
the draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind”, 
producing seven reports until 1989. In December of 1989, the General Assembly 
asked the International Law Commission to244 
 
“address the question of establishing an international criminal 
court or other international criminal trial mechanism with 
jurisdiction over persons alleged to have committed crimes which 
may be covered under such a code, including persons engaged 
in illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs across national frontiers”.245 
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The General Assembly’s request followed extensive actions by non-
governmental organizations (in particular the International Association for Penal 
Law and the World Federalist Movement) and reiterated efforts of independent 
experts to show the possibility of implementing this court. Moreover, two political 
initiatives contributed to the reassessment of the issue. There were246  
 
“initiatives by President Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR in 1987 
calling for an international criminal court to try cases of 
terrorism”247 
 
and in 1989 the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, A.N.R. Robinson, called 
for the establishment of an international criminal court with jurisdiction to try 
persons and entities engaged in, “inter alia”, the international drugs trafficking.248 
 
At its 42nd session (that took place between 1 May and 20 July 1990), the 
International Law Commission set up a Working Group to consider General 
Assembly´s 1989 request on the issue of creating an international criminal court 
or other international criminal trial mechanism with jurisdiction over persons 
accused of committing determined crimes.249 
 
On 28 November 1990, the General Assembly reiterated its posture, and, after 
stating that the International Law Commission continued its work on the 
elaboration of the draft Code of Offences, invited the Commission to 
 
“consider further and analyse the issues raised in its report 
concerning the question of an international criminal jurisdiction, 
including the possibility of establishing an international criminal 
court or other international criminal trial mechanism.”250 
 
At its 43th session (1991), the Commission, arguing that the General Assembly 
had not yet decided if it was on favour of establishing an international criminal 
court or another trial mechanism, solely tackled the issue of the jurisdiction of an 
international criminal court and the requirements for the institution of criminal 
proceedings.251  
 
At its 44th session, held on 20 March 1992, the International Law Commission 
addressed the question of the potential creation of an international criminal 
jurisdiction, inclusive considering certain objections to the establishment of such 
 
246 Amnesty International (1997), p. 6, footnote 17; Quigley, J (1988), pp. 788-797; Schloenhardt, 
A. (2005); pp. 93-122; United Nations, General Assembly. Letter dated 21 Aug 1989 from the 
Permanent Representative of Trinidad and Tobago to the UN Secretary-General  
247 Amnesty International (1997), p. 6 
248 Amnesty International (1997), p. 6, footnote 17; Quigley, J (1988), pp. 788-797; Schloenhardt, 
A. (2005); pp. 93-122; United Nations, General Assembly. Letter dated 21 Aug 1989 from the 
Permanent Representative of Trinidad and Tobago to the UN Secretary-General  
249 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-second session (1 May-20 
July 1990), pp. 8, 19-25, paras. 12, 93-157 (1990).  
250 United Nations, General Assembly. Report of the International Law Commission on the work 
of its forty-second session, para. 3. (28 November 1990).  
251 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-third session (29 April-19 
July 1991), p. 80, paras. 67-68 (1981).  
60 
 
jurisdiction, and provided two versions of a possible draft provision (regarding the 
jurisdiction of the court, criminal proceedings, the law that should be applied by 
the court, proceedings related to compensation for injury, the handing over of an 
accused person to the court, as well as the double-hearing principle).252  
 
Up to this point, the goal of the International Law Commission`s session, 
regarding the establishment of an international criminal court, was to launch a 
thorough debate in relation to relevant aspects of the creation of such a court, so 
that the discussion of these issues could provide the foundation for draft a 
statute.253  
 
On 28 November 1992, the General Assembly explicitly requested the 
International Law Commission to 
 
“continue its work on this question by undertaking the project for 
the elaboration of a draft statute for an international criminal court 
as a matter of priority as from its next session.”254 
 
As a result, the eleventh report on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace 
and the Security of Mankind offered a Draft Statute for an International Criminal 
Court to the International Law Commission, at the latter´s 45th session, held on 
25 March, 1993.255  
 
Still in 1993, the “ad hoc” International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
was established. In December of that year, the General Assembly, after 
considering the International Law Commission’s report on the work of its 45th 
session and expressing its appreciation for the progress achieved in the 
elaboration of the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, requested the 
Commission to “continue its work as a matter of priority on this question with a 
view to elaborating a draft statute, if possible at its forty-sixth session in 1994."256 
 
The International Law Commission did elaborate a draft statute by July 1994 
(46th session), and  
 
“decided to recommend to the General Assembly that it convene 
an international conference of plenipotentiaries to study the draft 
statute and to conclude a convention on the establishment of an 
international criminal court.”257 
 
 
252 Tenth report on the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, by Mr. 
Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur, p. 52, paras. 1-4 (20 March 1992). 
253 Eleventh report on the draft code of Crimes Against the Peace and the Security of Mankind, 
by Mr Dodou Thiam, Special Rapporteur, p. 113, para. 1 (25 March 1993). 
254 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-fourth session, GA Res. 
47/33, GAOR Forty-seventh session, Supp. No. 49, para. 6 (1992). 
255 Eleventh report on the draft code of Crimes Against the Peace and the Security of Mankind, 
p. 113, para. 2 
256 United Nations, General Assembly. Report of the International Law Commission on the work 
of its forty-fifth session, para. 6 (9 December 1993).  
257 United Nations, International Law Commission. Report of the International Law Commission 
on the work of its forty-sixth session, para. 17 (2 May -22 July 1994). 
61 
 
Although the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda had been set up recently, 
the Commission´s recommendation was defeated in the Sixth Committee of the 
General Assembly. The General Assembly, in its resolution 49/53 of 9 December 
1994, decided to258 
 
“establish an ad hoc committee, open to all States Members of 
the United Nations or members of specialized agencies, to 
review the major substantive and administrative issues arising 
out of the draft statute prepared by the International Law 
Commission and, in the light of that review, to consider 
arrangements for the convening of an international conference of 
plenipotentiaries”259 
 
Following the General Assembly´s decision, this ““Ad hoc” Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court” met from 3 to 13 April and from 
14 to 25 August 1995. It reviewed the issues that had arisen out of the 1994 draft 
statute and made arrangements for assembling an international conference.260  
 
In the resolution 50/46 of 11 December 1995, the General Assembly took the 
decision of establishing  
 
“a preparatory committee ... to discuss further the major 
substantive and administrative issues arising out of the draft 
statute prepared by the International Law Commission and, 
taking into account the different views expressed during the 
meetings, to draft texts, with a view to preparing a widely 
acceptable consolidated text of a convention for an international 
criminal court as a next step towards consideration by a 
conference of plenipotentiaries.”261 
 
The Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court met from 25 March to 12 April and from 12 to 30 August 1996. It deeply 
analysed the problems related to the draft statute and started to work on a broadly 
acceptable consolidated text of an international criminal court convention.262 
 
In 1996 the General Assembly decided in its resolution 51/207 that the 
Preparatory Committee would meet in 1997 and 1998. The task would be to finish 
“the drafting of a widely acceptable consolidated text of a convention for an 
international criminal court”. Moreover, the Assembly decided that a diplomatic 
conference of plenipotentiaries would be held in 1998.263  
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In accordance with the General Assembly’s decision, the Preparatory Committee 
held three meetings in 1997 (from 11 to 21 February, from 4 to 15 August and 
from 1 to 12 December). It worked and elaborated “a widely acceptable 
consolidated text of a convention for an international criminal court”.264  
 
In its resolution 52/160 of 15 December 1997, the General Assembly accepted 
the offer of the Government of Italy to be the host country of the “United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court”. The Conference would be held at Rome between 
15 June and 17 July 1998.265 
 
The Preparatory Committee met from 16 March to 3 April 1998. It completed the 
elaboration of the draft Statute of an International Criminal Court.266   
 
The Conference took place in Rome from 15 June to 17 July 1998. The 
Preparatory Committee’s draft Statute was presented. The Conference entrusted 
the Committee of the Whole with considering the draft Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court adopted by the Preparatory 
Committee, and assigned the267 
 
“the Drafting Committee, without reopening substantive 
discussion on any matter, with coordinating and refining the 
drafting of all texts referred to it without altering their substance, 
formulating drafts and giving advice on drafting as requested”.268  
 
On 17 July 1998, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was 
adopted by the Conference (120 states voted in favour, 7 against, while 21 
abstained). It was opened for signature on 17 July 1998 until 17 October 1998 at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy. Afterwards, it remained opened up to 31 
December 2000, but at United Nations Headquarters in New York.269  
 
The Rome Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002, following the terms of its 
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The use and definition of the term “gender” in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court was an achievement. It constituted the first instance 
in which such term appeared defined in an international criminal law treaty.270 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of “gender” in the Statute did not come easily.  
 
In fact, although the final version of the Rome Statute refers to “gender” nine 
times, the 1994 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court by the 
International Law Commission did not include the word “gender”. The final text 
was adopted due to an intense lobbying effort by non- governmental 
organizations (in special the Women's Caucus for Gender Justice in the 
International Criminal Court) and the fact that many delegations recognized that 
the Statute had to be gender-sensitive if the International Criminal Court was to 
effectively prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.271  
 
It was a good time to lobby for an "engendered" statute for an international 
criminal tribunal: the issue of sexual violence in war had being object of plenty of 
attention by the time of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, and, resultantly, the 
majority of states at the Rome Diplomatic Conference was on favour of including 
gender provisions in the Statute.272  
 
Nevertheless, there was a well-organized minority opposition (constituted by 
collusion between some anti-choice groups, mainly from the USA and Canada, 
and some delegations of states where religion is used as a basis to discriminate 
the treatment dispensed to women, including the Vatican and an Islamic States 
group) that aimed to obstruct the Court's ability to appropriately handle sexual 
and gender crimes.273  
 
As a consequence of this antagonism, the negotiations on the inclusion of the 
term “gender” were tough and very belligerent. Moreover, the debate around the 
term “gender” triggered the alarm of conservative delegations in relation to the 
potential raise of issues connected to sexuality. Contrarily, other terms such as 
“political,” “racial,” “national,” “ethnic,” “cultural,” “religious,” “age,” “wealth,” and 
“birth” were smoothly included in the enlisted forbidden basis of persecution and 
discrimination.274 
 
The provision defining “gender” resulted “oddly worded and circular” and was 
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3.3.2. The discussions regarding the inclusion of the term 
“gender”   
 
In 1996 the term “gender” was used for the first time: many States recommended 
to include a remark on gender balance in the International Law Commission’s 
article regarding the qualifications and election of judges.276  
 
At the February 1997 Preparatory Committee meeting, the Committee stated that 
“persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural or religious [or gender]” constituted grounds for incurring 
in crimes against humanity.277  
 
Nevertheless, the fact that the term “gender” was included in brackets signalised 
that the text had not been accepted consensually (as it is the use in international 
negotiations).278  
 
Another five references to “gender” were included in the draft International 
Criminal Court Statute in the Preparatory Committee negotiations, which took 
place in August 1997. Two appeared in Art. 26, 2, [(iii)], [(d) bis]:279 
 
“The Prosecutor shall take appropriate measures to ensure the 
effective investigation and prosecution of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court, and in so doing, respect the interests 
and personal circumstances of victims and witnesses, including 
age, gender and health, and take into account the nature of the 
crime, in particular, but not limited to, where it involves sexual or 
gender violence or violence against children;]”280 
 
Another two were added in Art. 43(2):  
 
“[The Prosecutor shall, in ensuring the effective investigation and 
prosecution of crimes, respect and take appropriate measures to 
protect the privacy, physical and psychological well-being, dignity 
and security of victims and witnesses, having regard to all 
relevant factors, including age, gender and health, and the nature 
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of the crime, in particular, whether the crime involves sexual or 
gender violence …]”281 
 
The final mention to gender appeared in art. 43(3): 
 
“The Court shall take such measures as are necessary to ensure 
the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and 
privacy of victims and witnesses, at all stages of the process, 
including, but not limited to, victims and witnesses of sexual and 
gender violence.”282 
 
Although at this point no State contested (at least in public) the use of the term 
“gender” in such provisions, the first two provisions were bracketed due to the 
debated of the delegates on whether or not the mention of the role of the 
Prosecutor in protecting victims and witnesses should be separately mentioned 
in the text. Article 43 (3), on the other hand, was broadly accepted and was not 
bracketed.283  
 
At the December 1997 round of negotiations, it was proposed the inclusion of a 
provision establishing that the application and interpretation of general sources 
of law by the International Criminal Court must be consistent with, “inter alia”, 
norms of nondiscrimination founded on gender.284 
 
This idea, which received increasing support, was incorporated in an unbracketed 
article of the March 1998 draft statute, despite the fact that, in corridor 
discussions, determined conservative states still questioned why this article did 
not refer instead to non-discrimination on the grounds of sex.285 
 
Also, in these 1998 negotiations, the Preparatory Committee included provisions, 
which were bracketed, urging the Prosecutor to  
 
“appoint advisers with legal expertise on specific issues, 
including, but not limited to, sexual and gender violence and 
violence against children”286   
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and stating that the Office of the Prosecutor should “include staff with expertise 
in trauma, including trauma related to crimes of sexual violence.”287  
 
Revisiting the question of the qualifications of judges, the delegates added a draft 
text in brackets providing that both “gender balance” and288 
 
“[t]he need, within the membership of the Court, for expertise on 
issues related to sexual and gender violence, violence against 
children and other similar matters” 289 
 
should be considered in the election of the International Criminal Court’s 
judges.290 
 
It was further agreed that in the employment the staff of the Court, the Registrar 
and the Prosecutor should use the same criteria.291  
 
In the Rome Diplomatic Conference (15 June-17 July 1998), it seemed that a 
partial agreement on the use of the term “gender” in the Statute had been 
reached: two provisions containing such term were consensually agreed and four 
others were bracketed and, thus, subject to discussion.292  
 
Negotiations at the Diplomatic Conference started calmlywith the adoption of the 
provision that urged the appointment by the prosecutor of293 
 
“advisers with legal expertise on specific issues, including, but 
not limited to, sexual and gender violence and violence against 
children.”294  
 
Nevertheless, soon it emerged resistance to the use of “gender” in the 
negotiations on the judicial qualifications. Concomitantly, conservative 
nongovernmental organizations circulated lobby papers supporting the removal 
of both “gender balance” and the requirement of judges’ qualifications.295  
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States that played an important role on the defense of the gender issues, (as, for 
instance, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Samoa) faced procedural 
obstacles in the negotiations. Certainly, since in the Rome Treaty Conference the 
statute's provisions were adopted by consensus, whenever group of opponents 
did not agree with the wording favored by the majority, the efforts to approve 
provisions addressing gender issues were fruitless.296  
 
As a result of an extended process of negotiation, the delegates decided to put 
an end to the impasse by deleting the term “gender” from the part regarding 
judicial expertise. Although a number of States wanted to follow the precedent 
established by the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and preserve 
the reference to “gender” in “gender balance”, the delegates conceded to replace 
such reference by “female and male” (in this specific point, the meaning 
concerned biological sex, therefore it made sense to make such alteration it for 
the sake of terminological clarity, in spite of the Beijing Platform for Action’s usage 
of “gender balance”).297  
 
Negotiations on whether some judges should be specialised on questions 
concerning sexual and gender violence had a similar outcome, and the final text 
adopted only mentioned expertise “on specific issues, including, but not limited 
to, violence against women or children.” Nonetheless, the fact that the list which 
described the judicial qualifications is merely illustrative (instead of exhaustive), 
and the partial overlap between expertise on violence against women or children 
and expertise on gender issues, tempered the defeat of the supporters of the 
maintenance of the reference to “gender” on judicial qualifications.298  
 
Following the exclusion of two references to “gender” in order to sort out the 
impasse on the judicial qualifications, several countries felt that the remaining 
references to “gender” had to be ultimately adopted.299 
 
The discussion regarding whether or not the term should be removed from the 
provision concerning persecution was postponed (after the inclusion of a footnote 
stating that “gender” “referred to male or female”) and opened space for the 
debate on the applicable law provision, the instance in which a solution for the 
question was found.300  
 
Apart from defining the law that the Court should apply, such provision finished 
with a “no adverse distinction” clause. The initial draft set out that301 
 
 
of the Whole, 15th mtg., Agenda Item 11, para. 11 (1998)  
296 Bedont, B., & Martinez, K. H. (1999), pp. 65-85 
297 Oosterveld, V. (2005), pp. 55-84; Rittich, K., Charlesworth, H., Cossman, B., Obiora, L., & 
Romany, C. (1999), pp. 206-209; United Nations. Report of the Fourth World Conference on 
Women, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, p. 58, para. 142 (b) (1995). 
298 Oosterveld, V. (2005), pp. 55-84; Rome Statute, Art. 36 (8) 
299 Oosterveld, V. (2005), pp. 55-84 
300 Ibidem; Rome Statute, Art. 21 (3) (correspondent to Art. 20(3) of the draft statute); United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court. Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court, Art. 5, p. 2, n.2. (1998). 
301 Oosterveld, V. (2005), pp. 55-84 
68 
 
“[t]he application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article 
must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, 
which include the prohibition on any adverse distinction founded 
on gender, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political 
or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or 
other status, or on any other similar criteria.”302     
 
Even though the text of this paragraph had been agreed during the Preparatory 
Committee’s March 1998 meeting, many States started to defend the idea that 
the term “gender” should be either removed from the enlisted grounds or that the 
clause should stop at “internationally recognized human rights” (fact that 
demonstrates that the Catholic and Islamic delegations were so committed to 
oppose gender issues, that they were even willing to jeopardize basic rights, such 
as clearly protecting people from religious discrimination).303  
 
A polarized debate aroused and numerous countries advocated for, or opposed 
to, the maintenance of the term “gender.”304 
 
The opposition argued that the use of “gender” ("gender" encompasses the 
distinctions between men and women due to their socially constructed roles, 
whereas "sex" is limited to their biological differences) could denote rights 
broader than those then recognised in several countries, and could lead to the 
approval of rights founded on sexual orientation. Indeed, some Arab states 
justificative was that term "gender" covered sexual orientation, but their position 
on this topic served as well as a justification for undermining several provisions 
throughout the statute that were promoting women's rights.305 
 
Additionally, some delegations argued that “gender” could not be properly 
translated into the six official UN languages, and conservative non-governmental 
organizations hand out lobby papers containing similar, although further detailed, 
arguments.306 
 
It became patent that the discussion on the term “gender” had come to a 
deadlock, so the Chair of the Working Group on Applicable Law asked if the use 
of the same solution adopted at the 1995 World Conference on Women might 
possibly bring together the different opinions. In that case, in the “Statement by 
the President of the Conference on the Commonly Understood Meaning of the 
Term “Gender" (Annex IV to the Beijing Platform for Action, that was included in 
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the conference report), the President noted that the word "gender" was “used and 
understood in its ordinary, generally accepted usage” in many United Nations 
forums and conferences and reaffirmed that “gender” should be interpreted and 
understood in the same manner in the Platform for Action.307  
 
Numerous delegations regarded this solution acceptable, however those against 
the use of the term “gender” argued that the Beijing solution was equivocal 
because it did not provide a definition for “gender” and this lack of definition would 
infringe criminal law’s requirement of certainty.308  
 
Since in bilateral and corridor discussions the delegations that were against the 
inclusion of the term “gender” insisted that adopting a suitable definition was the 
only form in which such term could be maintained, negotiations changed towards 
drafting a definition that could be approved by all States.309 
 
Those which opposed the use of the term “gender” demanded the maintenance 
of “two sexes” and agreed on including a reference to “society”, proposing:310 
 
“For the purposes of this Statute, it is understood that the term 
‘gender’ refers to the two sexes, male and female, [and their 
roles] within society [in the con- text of society]. The term does 
not imply the existence of more than two sexes.”311  
 
Those that wished to retain “gender” responded that the last sentence should at 
least reproduce the Beijing approach and state: “The term does not imply any 
new meaning or connotation of the term different from accepted prior usage.”312 
 
Finally, references to “in the context of their society” or “in the context of society 
and the traditional family unit” were suggested by those against “gender”. 
Nevertheless, such expressions were rejected and rendered very restrictive by 
those on favour of the term “gender”, whereas “in the context of society” was 
welcomed by both sides and considered to be sufficiently flexible and precise.313 
 
Subsequently, those against “gender” expressed that they demanded something 
else, and the product was the employment in the last sentence of the words that 
had already been proposed, but written in a redundant form: “The term ‘gender’ 
does not indicate any meaning different from the above.”314 
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The provision ultimately adopted was: 
 
"it is understood that the term 'gender' refers to the two sexes, 
male and female, within the context of society. The term 'gender' 
does not indicate any meaning different from the above."315 
 
Even though it constituted an uncommon solution, this sentence comforted both 
those delegations against “gender” (from their perspective, the definition 
reaffirmed the “two sexes, male and female”) and those supportive (they 
perceived the definition as harmless since it reaffirmed the important reference 
to “context of society, which covers the sociological distinctions between men and 
women).316  
 
Moreover, such definition allowed the adoption of the terms "gender" and "gender 
crimes" elsewhere in the Statute. In fact, these terms were used as substitutes to 
"sex" and "sexual violence”, respectively, which are more restrict. It was an 
important victory since it continued the well-established practice of using this 
wider concept, “gender”, in international instruments. Additionally, the second 
sentence suggests that the concept can not be enlarged beyond its current 
understanding as established in the first sentence. The definition's acceptance 
facilitated the inclusion of many other provisions. Undoubtedly, following further 
discussion on how the definition should be incorporated into the Rome Statute, 
the delegates included the words “as defined in article 7(3)” after each time that 
the term “gender” appeared in the Statute.317  
 
For instance, the adopted non-discrimination provision states:  
 
“The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article 
must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, 
and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such 
as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, 
language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, 
ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status.”318  
 
Such clause was essential to guarantee the fair treatment of individuals involved 
in the International Criminal Court process by registrars, investigators, 
prosecutors, and chambers of the Court.319 
 
Although the level of combativeness of the negotiations on “gender” at the Rome 
Diplomatic Conference surprised many, it had precedents. The Holy See, 
conservative organizations, and determined Arab states had previously made 
clear their opinion on the term “gender” in other international fora as, for instance, 
during the discussions of the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. 
Certainly, after the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action was adopted, 
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the Holy See stated that it understood that the term “gender” was based “in 
biological sexual identity, male or female” and therefore excluded320   
 
“dubious interpretations based on world views which assert that 
sexual identity can be adapted indefinitely to suit new and 
different purposes.”321  
 
Unfortunately, the obstacles in the negotiations concerning the gender provisions 
in the Rome Statute reflect the continuous struggle to advance women's rights.322  
 
3.4. The International Criminal Court 
 
The Rome Statute is mainly known as the treaty that set up the International 
Criminal Court. Nevertheless, more than half of the Statute disposes about the 
creation of a system of international criminal justice.323  
 
As seen above, the Statute is the product of several laboriously achieved 
compromises, and constitutes a long and intricate document. Although its 
provisions derived from different legal traditions of the main legal systems of the 
world, they were formulated as to form a rounded one piece.324 
 
In fact, apart from its preamble, the Rome Statute contains 128 articles that are 
interdependent and divided in 13 parts, disposing about the establishment of the 
Court; the Court’s jurisdiction, admissibility and applicable law; general principles 
of criminal law (eleven in total); composition and administration of the Court; 
investigation, prosecution and trial stages; the penalties; the possibility of appeal 
and apply for revision; international cooperation and judicial assistance; 
enforcement; the regulation of the Assembly of States Parties; financing issues; 
and final clauses.325 
 
Many of the general principles of law, fundamental legal provisions, and rules of 
procedure regulating the Court’s judicial functions were included for the first time 
in an international treaty.326  
 
Furthermore, the fundamental criminal laws and procedures established in the 
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Therefore, the Rome Statute, which is “part legislation and part constitution”, goes 
beyond the establishment of the International Criminal Court, and sets up the 
basis of “a system of international criminal law”.328  
 
The International Criminal Court is a “treaty-based tribunal". It means that it was 
established (and is also determined) by the Rome Statute, adopted by the UN 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998. States ratify or accede to this 
document, and, under it, they have determined prerogatives and are committed 
to carry out certain obligations.329 
 
The objective of the States when they instituted the International Criminal Court 
was to eradicate the impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious offences of 
international concern, thus, contributing to prevent these crimes, and to maintain 
international peace and security, in accordance with the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations.330  
 
An overview of the Court will be succinctly provided.  
 
3.4.1. Status, characteristics and inherent powers  
 
The International Criminal Court is a permanent body, with power to exercise its 
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, 
namely, the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the 
crime of aggression.331  
 
The International Criminal Court has its seat at the Hague in the Netherlands and 
is an independent judicial institution with international legal personality. In fact, 
the Court is not a constituting part of the United Nations (contrarily to the 
International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda that were 
established by and consist in organs of the Security Council of the United 
Nations). It was rather brought into relationship with the United Nations through 
a Relationship Agreement approved by the United Nations Resolution 58/318 
(following the preconised by art. 2 of the Rome Statute).332  
 
This United Nations - International Criminal Court Relationship Agreement 
established the institutional relation, cooperation and judicial assistance between 
them. Moreover, it confirmed the special role that the Security Council plays in 
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the operations of the Court. In spite of that, the International Criminal Court’s 
independence is one of the main features of such institution.333 
 
3.4.2. Jurisdiction, admissibility and applicable law 
 
3.4.2.(i). Fundamentals of the International Criminal Court’s 
jurisdiction  
 
The International Criminal Court’s was established with the agreement of the 
States that are subject to its jurisdiction (unlike the four precedent international 
criminal tribunals). These States have accorded that crimes perpetrated in their 
territory or by their nationals can be tried by the Court.334  
 
3.4.2.(ii). Personal (“ratione personae”) jurisdiction 
 
As previously stated, the subjects of the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction 
are the individuals responsible for the most serious crimes of international 
concern.335  
 
For the first time in history it was set up a court with jurisdiction over persons all 
over the world, regardless of their colour, race, nationality, place of residence, or 
social position. No one has immunity before the International Criminal Court 
because of his/her status, and, consequently, Presidents, Members of 
Parliament, government officials and leaders of rebel movements can be 
prosecuted. It is necessary to stress that the Court does not try persons who were 
under the age of 18 at the time in which a crime under the ICC’s jurisdiction was 
allegedly perpetrated.336 
 
Furthermore, under determined circumstances, a person in authority can be 
regarded responsible for the crimes perpetrated by those working under his order 
or command.337  
  
3.4.2.(iii). Subject matter jurisdiction 
 
Article 5 “Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court” of the Statute enlists the most 
serious crimes of international concern, expressly, crime of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression, establishing the 
International Criminal Court’s material jurisdiction.338  
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Sexual and gender-based crimes appear expressly under the head of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, and implicitly under the head genocide.339   
 
3.4.2.(iv). Territorial (“ratione loci”) jurisdiction  
 
Article 12 of the Rome statute, disposing about the preconditions to the exercise 
of jurisdiction, establishes the Court´s competence by stating the instances in 
which it has the right to take the case.340  
 
In accordance with such article, the International Criminal Court is empowered to 
exercise jurisdiction if the State on the territory of which the act or omission 
happened or the State of nationality of the person suspect either is party to the 
Statute or has acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the Court.341  
 
In a nutshell, the Court has jurisdiction over crimes that were perpetrated within 
the territory of a State party (extended to crimes carried out on a sea vessel or 
aircraft registered in the country) or by nationals of a State party.342 
 
3.4.2.(v). Temporal (“ratione temporis”) jurisdiction 
 
Contrarily to the four precedent “ad hoc” international criminal tribunals, the 
International Criminal Court does not have a retroactive effect.343  
 
The Court can assume jurisdiction solely over facts ulterior the entry into force of 
the Rome Statute (that took place on 1 July 2002, in accordance with the terms 




“[i]f a State becomes a Party to this Statute after its entry into 
force, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to 
crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute for that 
State, unless that State has made a declaration”345 
 




The jurisdiction conferred to International Criminal Court by the international 
community is narrower and more limited than the jurisdiction that the individual 
nations have over the same crimes.347  
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Surely, the International Criminal Court´s jurisdiction is complementary to 
national criminal jurisdictions. States retain the incumbency of trying persons who 
allegedly committed war crimes before their national courts. The Court´s 
jurisdiction is ancillary to the jurisdiction of countries, which, for the circumstances 
of the crime, can prosecute it.348  
 
Therefore, the International Criminal Court is only vested with jurisdiction to 
investigate or conduct a prosecution where the States are unwilling, or are 
genuinely unable to do so.349   
 
3.4.2.(vii). Applicable law 
 
The International Criminal Court determines the law that should be applied to 
case following a “cascading priority of sources”.350  
 
Article 21 of the Rome Statute determines that 
 
“The Court shall apply: 
 
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence; 
 
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties 
and the principles and rules of international law, including the 
established principles of the international law of armed 
conflict;  
 
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court 
from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as 
appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime.”351 
 
Furthermore, the Court can use “principles and rules of law as interpreted” in its 
preceding decisions.352 
 
3.4.3. Structure and Organization 
 
The Rome Statute presents several organizational rules that mould the work of 
the Court. The International Criminal Court’s organizational design permits a 
division and allocation of different powers and duties, hence allowing that the 
functioning of the Court obeys the established procedural provisions.353    
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The structure of the International Criminal Court is multipart: it encompasses 
administrative, prosecutorial and judicial authorities.354  
 
The organs of the Court are the Presidency (which commands the Court); an 
Appeals Division, a Trial Division and a Pre-Trial Division (that guarantee that the 
trial is fair); the Office of the Prosecutor (in charge of proceeding with 
investigations and prosecutions); and the Registry (whose mission is to support 
the Court).355 
 
As of 5 July 2019, there are 800 staff members (from around 100 States). The 
court has 6 official languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and 
Spanish) and 2 working languages (English and French).356  
 
3.4.3.(i). Judicial sector 
 
The Assembly of States Parties (composed by all the countries that have ratified 
or acceded to the Rome Statute, is in charge of the International Criminal Court’s 
management oversight and constitutes its legislative body) elects 18 judges, by 
majority of votes, for nine-year terms (in the beginning of the Court some judges 
had shorter terms). As a rule, the judges should not be re-elected.357   
 
The judges are individuals of high moral character, impartiality and integrity. All 
the judges must have a different nationality, be citizens of a State party, and 
present experience in criminal law or international law. Additionally, they should 
be independent to carry out their functions.358 
 
The Rome Statute expressly determined that, when selecting the judges, the 
nations parties should take into consideration the need for a fair representation 
of female and male judges within the membership of the Court (“inter alia”). It also 
established that the States Parties should359  
 
“take into account the need to include judges with legal expertise 
on specific issues, including, but not limited to, violence against 
women or children.”360 
 
The Presidency is formed by the President, together with the First and Second 
Vice-Presidents. The three of them are chosen “by an absolute majority of the 18 
judges of the Court for a maximum of two, three-year terms.” 361   
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The Presidency is in charge of  
 
“the administration of the Court, with the exception of the Office 
of the Prosecutor. It represents the Court to the outside world and 
helps with the organization of the work of the judges., and ensure 
that the sentences rendered by the Court are enforced. The 
Presidency is also responsible for carrying out other tasks, such 
as ensuring the enforcement of sentences imposed by the 
Court.”362 
 
“The 18 judges, including the three judges of the Presidency, are 
assigned to the Court´s three judicial divisions: the Pre-Trial 
Division (composed of seven judges), the Trial Division 
(composed of six judges), the Trial Division (composed of five 
judges).”363    
 
The judicial functions of the Court are implemented in each division by Chambers. 
Therefore, the judges are assigned in the following Chambers: Pre-Trial 
Chambers (each formed by one or three judges), the Trial Chambers (each of 
them constituted of three judges) and the Appeals Chamber (which is composed 
of all the five judges of the Appeals Division).364  
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber has authority to deal with pre-trial questions, including the 
authorization of investigations (and contingent issues), the arrest and detention 
of the person summoned before the Court, drawing out evidence and disclosure 
to the counterparty before the confirmation hearing, and holding the confirmation 
of charges hearing. Further, it has power to authorize the adoption of measures 
with views of protecting the victims, witnesses and members of their families, in 
accordance with the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.365  
 
The Trial Chamber has competence to try the individuals committed to trial after 
the confirmation of charges, and, in case of conviction, is responsible for dealing 
with the subsequent matters, as, for example, imposing sentence on a person 
rendered guilty, awarding reparations that are owned to victims, holding a re-trial 
of a case in situations in which the Appeal Chamber directs so, and revising 
conviction or sentence in cases in which such matter is remitted to it by the 
Appeals Chamber.366   
  
The Appeals Chamber, which is the second and last tier of the International 
Criminal Court, presents appellate jurisdiction. Certain decisions of the Pre-Trial 
and Trial Chambers (that constitute the first instance courts) are appealable 
before the Appeals Chamber, following the proceedings set up by the Statute, 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Regulations of the Court.367  
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3.4.3.(ii). Prosecutorial sector 
 
The Office of the Prosecutor should “act independently as a separate organ of 
the Court”. In fact, the judicial and prosecutorial sectors of the Court work 
separately within the institution, each one having its own functions.368 
 
“The Office of the Prosecutor is an independent organ of the 
Court. Its mandate is to receive and analyse information on 
situations or alleged crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, to 
analyse situations referred to it in order to determine whether 
there is a reasonable basis to initiate an investigation into a crime 
of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or the crime of 
aggression, and to bring the perpetrators of these crimes before 
the Court.”369 
  
“As an independent and impartial body, the Prosecutor was granted the power to 
investigate and prosecute ex officio.” Thus, his/ her central task has an executive 
character. His/her position under the International Criminal Court’s procedure 
lays on three features: independence to carry out an investigation, judicial control 
of his/her important decisions, and obligation to act with objectivity.370 
 
In the terms of Article 42, paragraph 4 of the Statute, 
 
“[t]he Prosecutor shall be elected by secret ballot by an absolute 
majority of the members of the Assembly of States Parties. The 
Deputy Prosecutors shall be elected in the same way from a list 
of candidates provided by the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor shall 
nominate three candidates for each position of Deputy 
Prosecutor to be filled. Unless a shorter term is decided upon at 
the time of their election, the Prosecutor and the Deputy 
Prosecutors shall hold office for a term of nine years and shall 
not be eligible for re-election.”371 
 
3.4.3.(iii). Administrative sector 
 
By providing administrative and operational support, the Registry assists the 
Court to conduct impartial, fair, and public trial. The Registry is in charge of the 
non-judicial elements concerning the Court´s administration and servicing, 
without prejudice to the Prosecutor´s functions and powers over the Office of the 
Prosecutor. Therefore, the administrative structure of the International Criminal 
Court is dual. Certainly, as head of the Office of the Prosecutor, the Prosecutor 
has total authority over this office´s management and administration, inclusive of 
staff, facilities and further resources.372 
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The Registrar, by his turn, is the main administrative officer of the International 
Criminal Court, heads the Registry, and carries out his duties under the authority 
of the President of the Court. He is elected by an absolute majority of the judges 
(taking into consideration any recommendation by the Assembly of States 
Parties) for a term of five years, and is eligible for reelection once. Should the 
need arise, and paying regard to the recommendation of the Registrar, the judges 
will choose a Deputy Registrar in the same way, for a five-year term of or a briefer 
term as decided by an absolute majority of the judges, as disposed by Article 43, 
paragraph 5 of the Statute.373  
 
In accordance with article 43, paragraph 6 of the Rome Statute, and with the goal 
of providing  
 
“protective measures and security arrangements, counselling 
and other appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims who 
appear before the Court, and others who are at risk on account 
of testimony given by such witnesses,”374  
 
the Registrar has established a Victims and Witnesses Unit (VWU) within the 
Registry.375  
 
The VWU should incorporate in its staff people with specific knowledge in trauma 
(inclusive of trauma connected to sexual violence crimes) and gender and cultural 
diversity, among other types of expertise.376 
 
The Court has established as well the Trust Fund for Victims, and the Victims 
Participation and Reparation Section. The Victims Participation and Reparation 
Section was set up within the Registry in order to help victims with their 
applications for participation in the proceedings and/or for reparations. It is also 
the Section´s duty to assist victims in the obtainment of legal advice and 
organization of their legal representation.377 
 
3.4.4. Investigation and procedure 
 
When designing the International Criminal Court’s procedure, the international 
community endorsed several relevant decisions taken by of the UN Security 
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The International Criminal Court directs its investigations and trials in accordance 
with the rules established in the Rome Statute, the Elements of Crimes and the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The Regulations of the Court and the 
Regulations of the Registry complement the list of basic documents of the 
Court.379  
 
3.4.4.(i). The International Criminal Court’s procedure 
 
The International Criminal Court’s proceedings cover four main stages: 
Preliminary Examination Stage, Pre-Trial Stage, Trial Stage, and Appeal 
Stage.380  
 
3.4.4.(i).(a). Preliminary Examination stage 
 
Article 13 of the Rome Statute establishes three mechanisms to trigger the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. The first one is when a State Party 
refers to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more of the crimes under the 
Court’s jurisdiction seem to have been perpetrated. The second consists in a 
referral to the Prosecutor by the United Nations Security Council of the same kind 
of situation. The last possibility is the initiation of investigations “proprio motu” by 
the Prosecutor grounded on information regarding crimes that are under the 
ICC´s jurisdiction.381  
 
After receiving a referral of a situation from either a State Party or the Security 
Council, the Prosecutor will analyse the available information and begin an 
investigation, except if he concludes that there are no justifiable grounds to 
proceed.382 
 
In the “proprio motu” investigations, the Prosecutor will consider the seriousness 
of the information received, and may seek additional information from several 
trustful sources. Upon considering that there is a reasonable basis to start an 
investigation, the Prosecutor will present to the Pre-Trial Chamber383  
 
“a request for authorization of an investigation, together with any 
supporting material collected.”384 
 
Therefore, the central objective during this preliminary examination stage is to 
decide whether the Prosecutor will investigate a determined situation in which 
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criminal offences within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court may 
have been perpetrated, and then conduct the investigation of the situation as to 
establish which crimes have actually been committed and who should be held 
responsible for them.385  
 
3.4.4.(i).(b). Pre-Trial stage  
 
In the course of the investigation, the situation is assigned to one of the Pre-Trial 
Chambers, which is responsible for the proceedings’ judicial aspects.386 
  
At any moment of the investigation, the Prosecutor can apply for an issuance of 
a warrant of arrest by the Pre-Trial Chamber. After examining “the application 
and the evidence or other information submitted by the Prosecutor,” the Pre-Trial 
Chamber will issue a warrant of arrest if it considers that there are justifiable basis 
to believe that the person has incurred in “a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court”, and that “the arrest of the person seems necessary”, in the terms laid in 
Article 58 (1) (b) of the Rome Statute.387 
 
The surrender of a person to the International Criminal Court or his/her 
appearance before it constitutes the beginning of the judicial process regarding 
the offences that the individual is believed to have perpetrated.388 
 
Within a reasonable time following the surrender or voluntary appearance of the 
accused before the Court, the Pre-Trial Chamber will hold a hearing to confirm 
the charges put forward by the Prosecutor. If the charges are sustained in the 
confirmation hearing, they will constitute the foundation of the trial. 389 
 
3.4.4.(i).(c). Trial stage 
 
Subsequently to the confirmation of charges, the Presidency will constitute a Trial 
Chamber to conduct the ulterior proceedings. The Trial Chamber is responsible 
for dealing with the case should ensure the fairness and celerity of the trial. 
Moreover, this organ should guarantee both the respect to the accused 
individual’s rights and the protection of victims and witnesses.390   
 
The charged person is presumed to be innocent until the Prosecutor proves, 
beyond reasonable doubt, his/her guilt. Among the accused’s right is the 
prerogative to conduct the defense either in person or through legal assistance 
of his/her choice.391  
 
In cases in which the victims’ personal interests are affected, the Court can 
permit, in determined stages of the proceedings, the presentation of the victims’ 
 
385 International Criminal Court (2010). Booklet, Victims before the International Criminal Court, A 
Guide for the Participation of Victims in the Proceedings of the Court, p. 6; Rome Statute, Arts. 
53-56 
386 International Criminal Court’s website, How the Court works; Rome Statute, Art. 57 
387 Rome Statute, Art.  58 (1) (a) (b) (i) (ii) (iii) 
388 Pikis, G. M. (2010), p. 122; Rome Statute, Art. 60 
389 Rome Statute, Art.  61 (1); International Criminal Court’s website, How the Court works 
390 Rome Statute, Arts. 61 (11); 64 (2) 
391 Rome Statute, Arts. 66, 67 (1) (d) 
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views and concerns by their legal representatives (as long as it is not prejudicial 
to or inconsistent with the accused person’s rights, and a fair and impartial 
trial).392 
 
After the proceedings are concluded, the Trial Chamber renders a decision of 
acquittal or conviction. In the cases in which the accused is convicted, the Trial 
Chamber will ponder which is the appropriate penalty and issue a sentence. In 
accordance with the Rome Statute, the penalties to be imposed are imprisonment 
for a determined number of years (the period of imprisonment cannot exceed 30 
years, though), or a term of life imprisonment (“when justified by the extreme 
gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person”).393  
 
Additionally, the Trial Chamber can order reparations to victims, including 
restitution, rehabilitation and compensation.394 
  
3.4.4.(i).(d). Appeal stage  
 
During the Pre-Trial and Trial stages, the accused, the Prosecutor or a concerned 
State can appeal decisions rendered by the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers, in the 
terms of the Rome Statute.395 
 
Subsequently to the Trial Chamber’s decision, the convicted person or the 
Prosecutor can appeal against the decision of acquittal or conviction or against 
the sentence. Legal representatives of victims, the convicted individuals or bona 
fide owners of adversely-affected property are entitled to appeal orders of 
reparations issued by the Trial Chambers.396 
 
Moreover, a conviction or sentence could be revised by the Appeals Chamber, if, 
for example, new evidence emerges or it is found out that decisive evidence was 
actually was false, forged or falsified. The Appeals Chamber is responsible of 
deciding all appeals, issuing the final judgment.397 
 
3.5. The entering into force of the Rome Statute  
 
The Rome Statute established in its Article 126, paragraph 1, that it would  
 
“enter into force on the first day of the month after the 60th day 
following the date of the deposit of the 60th instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.”398 
 
 
392 Rome Statute, Art. 68 (3) 
393 International Criminal Court’s website, How the Court works; Rome Statute, Arts. 74, 76 (1), 
77 (1) (a) (b) 
394 Rome Statute, Art. 75 (2) 
395 International Criminal Court’s website, How the Court works; Rome Statute, Art. 82 
396 Rome Statute, Arts. 81, 84 (2) 
397 International Criminal Court’s website, How the Court works; Rome Statute, Art 84 (2) 
398 Rome Statute, Art. 126 (1) 
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Signing started on the adoption of the Rome Statute on 17 July 1998. The first 
State to ratify the Rome Statute was Senegal on 2 February 2009, while Trinidad 
and Tobago was the following one, in April of the same year.399 
 
The speed of ratification was faster than it had been expected, and by 31 
December 2001, forty-eight ratifications had been obtained. On 11 April 2002 
there was a special treaty ratification event, in which 10 States submitted in 
conjunction their ratifications to the Secretary General of the United Nations, 
increasing the total number of ratifications to 66 (in a special arrangement, the 
UN Treaty Office rendered all of the nations that ratified simultaneously on that 
day as being among the first 60). For this reason, and in accordance with 
Article125 (2) of the Rome Statute, the latter entered into force on 1 July 2002.400  
 
Also, on 17 July 1998, the Preparatory Commission for the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court was created, and all States were invited to 
participate.401 
 
“The Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) was charged with 
completing the establishment and smooth functioning of the 
Court by negotiating complementary documents, including the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Elements of Crimes, the 
Relationship Agreement between the Court and the United 
Nations, the Financial Regulations, the Agreement on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the Court.”402 
 
As of 5 July 2019, 
 
“123 countries are parties to the Rome Statute (effective as of 27 
October 2017). Of these, 33 are from Africa, 19 from the Asia 
Pacific, 18 from Eastern Europe, 28 from Latin America and the 
Caribbean, as well as 25 from Western Europe and North 
America.”403 
 
3.6. The beginning of the International Criminal Court’s functioning 
 
Subsequently to the entry into force of the Rome Statute and the 10th and last 
session of the Preparatory Commission (1-12 July 2002), the Assembly of States 
Parties´ held its first meeting between 3-10 September 2002, and, without further 
substantive discussion, adopted the documents that had been consensually 
 
399 Schabas, W. A. (2011), p. 24; Sekuloski, B. (2013), pp. 144-167 
400 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, History of the ICC; The Electronic Newsletter of 
the Women's Caucus for Gender Justice (2002); Schabas, W. A. (2011), p. 24; Song, H. E. J. S.-
H. (2010). In Bassiouni, M. C. (ed.) (2010 b), pp. 142-143; Verweij, H. (2001), pp. 737-749. 
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approved by the Preparatory Commission two years before. Also at this session 
were made arrangements for the election of the 18 judges and the prosecutor 
positions.404 
 
In November 2002 the nomination of candidates to the elections was closed, and 
even though there were more than 40 candidates for the judge positions, there 
were no candidates to the prosecutor position. In the first week of February 2003, 
the Assembly of States concluded the election of the 18 judges. 7 of the total 
number of judges were women (thus, more than one third of the total number of 
judges), an achievement unparalleled in the history of international courts and 
tribunals. On 11 March 2013 the inaugural meeting of judges of the International 
Criminal Court took place. In April 2003 the first Prosecutor to the International 
Criminal Court was elected.405  
 
On 18 April 2003 the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire issued a declaration under article 
12-3 of the Rome Statute accepting the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction 
over the authors and accomplices of acts committed in its territory subsequently 
to the events of 19 September 2002 (nevertheless, only on 14 December 2010 
that State wrote a letter reconfirming the acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction, 
and, on 03 October 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber authorised the opening of an 
investigation into the situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, in the terms of 
article 15 of the Rome Statute).406 
 
Upon receiving many communications from both persons and non-governmental 
organisations, in July 2003 the Prosecutor announced that he would carefully 
follow the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and indicated that 
such situation would be one of the first concerns of his Office. Two months later, 
the Prosecutor informed the Assembly of States Parties that he would be 
prepared to open a “proprio motu” investigation subject to the authorisation from 
a Pre-Trial Chamber, but pointed out that a referral and cooperation from 
Democratic Republic of the Congo would facilitate his Office’s work.407 
 
In April 2004 the Prosecutor  
 
“received a letter signed by the President of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) referring to him the situation of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed anywhere 
in the territory of the DRC since the entry into force of the Rome 
Statute, on 1 July 2002.”408 
 
 
404 Dörmann, K., & Maresca, L. (2004); pp. 217-232; Schabas, W. A. (2011), p. 24; The Electronic 
Newsletter of the Women's Caucus for Gender Justice (2002) 
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Two months later, the Prosecutor installed an investigation on the situation of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. This was the first investigation opened at the 
International Criminal Court. 409   
 
In December 2003 the President of Uganda referred the situation regarding the 
Lord’s Resistance Army to the Prosecutor. This was the first referral of a situation 
to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. Subsequently, the 
Prosecutor’s decision to start an investigation on the situation was taken in July 
2004.410 
 
3.7. Ongoing preliminary examinations, situations and cases  
 
As of 5 July 2019, the Office of the Prosecutor is conducting 10 preliminary 
examinations. In fact, the Office of the Prosecutor has been monitoring the 
situations of Afghanistan, Colombia, Guinea, Iraq/UK, Nigeria, Palestine, the 
Philippines, Bangladesh/Myanmar, Ukraine and Venezuela.411  
 
Apart from the investigations on the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and 
Republic of Côte d'Ivoire situations, there are ongoing investigations on other 8 
situations: situation in the Central African Republic (referral on 7 January 2005, 
decision to open investigation on 22 May 2007), situation in Darfur, Sudan (not a 
State Party to the Rome Statute, referral by the United Nations Security Council 
on 31 March 2005, decision to open investigation on 6 June 2005), situation in 
the Republic of Kenya (Pre-Trial Chamber II authorised the Prosecutor to open 
an investigation on 31 March 2010), situation in Libya (not a State Party to the 
Rome Statute, referral by the United Nations Security Council on 26 February 
2011, decision to open investigation on 3 March 2011), situation in the Republic 
of Mali (referral on 13 July 2012, decision to open investigation on 16 January 
2013), situation in the Central African Republic II (referral on 30 May 2014, 
decision to open investigation on 24 September 2014), situation in Burundi (the 
Prosecutor of the ICC authorised to open “proprio motu” investigation on 25 
October 2017 ) and situation in Georgia (the Prosecutor of the ICC authorised to 
open “proprio motu” investigation on 27 January 2016).412 
 
As of 5 July 2019, a total of 27 cases (in the foregoing 11 situations) have been 
brought before the International Criminal Court. This work will focus on three 
cases involving sexual and gender-based crimes in which the International 
Criminal Court has rendered its final judgment: the Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, and the Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo.413 
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4. Sexual and gender-based crimes in the Rome Statute 
 
4.1. The relevance of the Rome Statute for the sexual and gender-
based crimes  
 
As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, during the last few decades, the 
international community has adopted various effective measures in order to 
respond to surging demands to recognise sexual and gender-based crimes as 
grave crimes at both national and international levels.414  
 
The apex of these efforts was when States participating of the Rome Conference 
agreed to include in the Rome Statute specific provisions regarding several forms 
of sexual and gender-based crimes, uplifting these crimes and at last including 
them amidst “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community”, 
(namely, “war crimes”, “crimes against humanity”, and “genocide”).415  
 
In fact, the drafters of the Rome Statute attached great importance to the 
relevance of gender in the commission of criminal offences under the Statute. As 
a result, the Rome Statute was the inaugural instrument in international law to 
present a broad roster of sexual and gender-based crimes and regard them as 
war crimes (in both international and non-international armed conflicts).416   
 
Although both the statute of the ICTY and the statute of the ICTR included the 
crime of rape amidst the “crimes against humanity”, the Rome Statute was an 
important development since it went further and extended the list of sexual and 
gender-based crimes which constitute crimes against humanity. Surely, the 
Rome Statute presents a more detailed provision: apart from rape, other kinds of 
sexual violence (sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity) 
and persecution on the grounds of gender were enlisted under the head crimes 
against humanity.417 
   
In addition, the commission of sexual and gender-based crimes with intent to 
destroy, either in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group can 
amount to genocidal acts, albeit there is no explicit mention to sexual and gender-
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Furthermore, since the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is 
complementary to the States, the Rome Statute indirectly lays the responsibility 
on the States of investigating and prosecuting such crimes. Certainly, as an 
outgrowth of the Rome Statute, and in order to diminish the impunity gap, the 
States are bound to adhere to the effective investigation and prosecution of the 
most serious international crimes, amongst which are sexual and gender-based 
crimes.419 
 
Sexual and gender-based crimes can be committed in a variety of contexts, which 
go beyond those covered by the Rome Statute (fact which demands all relevant 
actors to commit, adopt a united line of action and dedicate efforts).420  
 
Nevertheless, the advent and the entry into force of the Statute went a long way 
in the fight against and accountability for such crimes. Indeed, in conformity with 
the Rome Statute, the sexual and gender-based crimes perpetrated in the 
situation of armed conflict or mass violence are prosecutable by the International 
Criminal Court as crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.421 
 
It is necessary to clarify, though, that Rome Statute is a landmark not only for 
establishing the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over sexual and 
gender-based crimes, but also for setting up procedures to guarantee that such 
crimes and their victims receive adequate treatment, as it will be discussed later 
in this chapter and chapter 5.422 
 
Therefore, from the terms of the Rome Statute, it should result the utmost 
rejection and condemnation of the perpetration of sexual and gender-based 
crimes in international and non-international armed conflicts, and, as an outreach 
of the values underlying the Statute, in any situation.  
 
4.2. The extent of sexual and gender-based crimes under the Rome 
Statute 
 
4.2.1. Article 6- Genocide 
 
Even though the “ad hoc” International Criminal Tribunals had established 
relevant precedents for prosecuting gender-based violence as genocide, the 
Rome Statute enlisted neither rape nor sexual violence as particular elements of 
the crime of genocide.423  
 
The drafters of the Rome Statute achieved a remarkable reinvigoration when 
defining crimes against humanity and war crimes. Nonetheless, they did not strive 
to update the genocide definition, and rather limited themselves to reproduce the 
terms of Article 2 of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
 
419 Rome Statute, Article 1; International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor. Policy Paper 
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the Crime of Genocide. Certainly, the only country which proposed to amend the 
definition of genocide (so as to expand it by the inclusion of social and political 
groupings) was Cuba.424    
 
As a result, Article 6 of the Rome Statute does not include gender, rape or any 
other form of sexual violence among the basis for the crime of genocide. 
 
This article preconizes that the acts which can amount to genocide (if carried out 
with the aim of “destroying, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group”) are: “killing members of the group”; “causing serious bodily or 
mental harm to members of the group”; “deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 
part”; “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and 
“forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”.425  
 
Following the path set up by the ICTY and the ICTR, the ICC has understood that 
rape can be regarded as a genocidal act for it can be used to achieve the 
purposes enlisted in subparagraphs (b), (c), and (d) of Article 6 of the Rome 
Statute (namely, cause serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, 
to purposefully inflict on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part, and as a measure intended to prevent 
births within the group). Consequently, the International Criminal Court has been 
prosecuting the crime of rape under such subparagraphs, as it will be seen in 
detail within the analysis of the cases tried before the Court.426   
 
4.2.2. Article 7- Crimes against humanity 
 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute enlists the crimes against humanity. In this context, 
such article disposes that, for the scope of the Statute, rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form 
of sexual violence of comparable gravity, as well as persecution against any 
identifiable group or collectivity on gender grounds constitute ‘crime against 
humanity’ when carried out as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.427  
 
This relevant list of sexual and gender-based crimes vividly consubstantiates the 
objective of the drafters of the Statute of extending the reach of the crimes against 
humanity. Indeed, apart from rape, Article 7 (1) (g) expressly brings four other 
types of sexual violence (sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization) and finishes with a generic formula “or any other form of 
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sexual violence of comparable gravity”, thus, leaving margin to interpretation for 
the judges of the International Criminal Court.428 
 
Additionally, Article 7 (1) (h) establishes that it is a crime against humanity the 
persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on gender (as defined in 
paragraph 3) grounds in connection with any act referred to in paragraph 1or any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.429 
 
As explained in chapter 3 (3.3), after intense negotiations on the gender issue, 
the Rome Statute drafters finally agreed to state in paragraph 3 of Article 7 that 
for the ends of the Statute 
 
“it is understood that the term ‘gender’ refers to the two sexes, 
male and female, within the context of society. The term ‘gender’ 
does indicate any meaning different from the above.”430 
 
Finally, it is important to highlight that in accordance with the preamble of Article 
7, for the purpose of the Rome Statute, the acts enlisted in the subsequent 
subparagraphs (inclusive of subparagraphs (g) and (h) which address sexual and 
gender-based crimes) are considered to be subsumed under the head ‘crime 
against humanity’ (and, consequently, subject to the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court) only when carried out as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack.431 Such requirements will be further expanded on later in this same 
chapter.  
 
4.2.3. Article 8- War crimes 
 
During the drafting of the Rome Statute, the delegates conducted coordinated 
discussions regarding the crimes against humanity provisions related to rape and 
other forms of sexual violence and the war crimes provisions on the same subject. 
In fact, the negotiations of the crimes against humanity and war crimes provisions 
on sexual and gender-based crimes were aligned and their wording only 
assumed a final shape in the Bureau draft that was presented to the Conference 
in the morning of 17 July 1998 (the same day of the adoption of the Statute). 
Therefore, Articles 7 and 8 are pretty much alike when addressing sexual and 
gender-based crimes.432  
 
Accordingly, rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy (the 
unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the goal of 
affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave 
violations of international law) and enforced sterilization are also clearly regarded 
as war crimes.433  
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However, the Statute did not circumscribe the classification of such crimes as 
“war crimes” to when committed during an international armed conflict, but rather 
expanded the “label”  “war crimes” to cover these crimes also when perpetrated 
in armed conflicts not of an international character (following the precedent set 
up by the common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 which extended 
general coverage to conflicts not of an international character).434 
 
Undoubtedly, the crimes of rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, and enforced sterilization appear as species of the genus “other 
serious violations of the laws and customs” within the establishment of the 
meaning and boundaries of war crimes by Article 8 for the purpose of the Rome 
Statute. Such article states that “other serious violations of the laws and customs” 
can amount to war crimes not only in international armed conflict but also armed 
conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework of 
international law.435  
 
After expressly establishing that rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, and enforced sterilization are subsumed under the head “other 
serious violations of the laws and customs” (and, ultimately, under the category 
war crimes), the Rome Statute adopted a generic formula “and any other form of 
sexual violence”. This generic formula slightly differs since the part covering 
international armed conflicts refers to “or any other form of sexual violence also 
constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions”, while the part disposing 
about armed conflicts not of an international character reads  
 
“or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious 
violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions.”436  
 
Article 7 (1) (g), by its turn, after casting the aforementioned sexual and gender-
based crimes as crimes against humanity, ends adding "or any other form of 
sexual violence of comparable gravity". Therefore, in crimes against humanity the 
measure of the comprehensiveness of "and any other form of sexual violence" is 
given by "comparable gravity", while under the head war crimes the "any other 
form of sexual violence” would have also to amount to a grave breach or a serious 
violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions. In the subsequent 
Elements of Crimes, the Preparatory Commission rectified this distortion by 
disposing that sexual violence should be of “a gravity comparable to that of a 
grave breach of the Geneva Conventions" or "of a serious violation of article 3 
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4.3. Defining sexual and gender-based crimes- analysis of the 
sexual and gender violence provisions in the Statute and of the 
elements of crimes   
 
4.3.1. Rape  
 
4.3.1. (i). Introduction 
 
The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court created the Preparatory 
Commission for the International Criminal Court with the task to elaborate 
proposals of functional measures to effectively install the Court and to set in 
motion its activities. Included in the mandate of the Preparatory Commission was 
to prepare draft texts of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Elements 
of Crimes and finalise them prior to 30 June 2000.438  
 
These two documents are subsidiary and assist the Court in the interpretation 
and application of the Rome Statute. The Pre-trial Chamber I of the International 
Criminal Court has debated whether the Elements of Crimes has a “binding” 
nature and the Majority considered439 
 
“that the Elements of Crimes and the Rules must be applied 
unless the competent Chamber finds an irreconcilable 
contradiction between these documents on the one hand, and 
the Statute on the other hand. If such irreconcilable contradiction 
is found, the provisions contained in the Statute must prevail”.440 
 
The Rules of Procedure specified a number of procedural and evidentiary issues, 
whereas the Elements of Crimes developed and refined the definitions of the 
crimes enlisted in Articles 6, 7, and 8 of the Rome Statute.441   
 
Positively, the Rome Statute, when drawing the boundaries of the jurisdiction of 
the International Criminal Court, organized the international crimes into four major 
categories, specifically, the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and the crime of aggression, and divided the first three into various sub-
categories (e.g. rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy). 
The Preparatory Commission was assigned with the function of further defining 
and describing the sub-categories.  As a result, in spite of the fact that the Rome 
Statute presents wide and flexible definitions of the international crimes, these 
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are limited by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Elements of 
Crimes.442  
 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute enlist rape, respectively, as a crime against 
humanity and as a war crime, but do not define it. In accordance with the top-
down approach adopted by the Statute drafters, it is the Elements of Crimes 
which provides a definition of rape, establishing the reach of this offence and 
outlining it with rather significant minuteness.443  
 
4.3.1. (ii). Background to the rape definition in the Elements 
of Crimes 
 
The term “rape” is largely used in municipal law systems, but each State adopts 
its own concept and, consequently, the definitions vary significantly. This crime 
has been substantially reshaped along the years as a result of the evolving 
notions of the nature and seriousness of sexual violence. Indeed, the traditional 
concept of rape has been reformed in civil and common law legislations as a 
consequence of the developing comprehension of both the nature of the crime 
and the way in which the victim experiences it.444  
 
Further, before the adoption of the Rome Statute, international humanitarian and 
human rights law lacked an established definition of rape. The Elements of 
Crimes consisted in the first document to provide a definition of the elements of 
the international crime of rape.445  
 
To weave the definition of the sexual and gender-based crimes brought in Article 
8 (2) (b) (XXI) was a time-consuming task. The formulation of the sexual offences 
was defying, being in the middle of the most contentious provisions of the 
Elements of Crimes in virtue of the drafters´ distinct legal, cultural and 
philosophical traditions. Surely, the work of defining rape was a lengthy process 
conducted by delegates of the Preparatory Commission who derived from 
different legal models and had divergent points of views.446 
 
What is more, it presented a challenge to the Commission for the then available 
case law on the question was both scarce and heterogeneous. Significantly, the 
“ad hoc” International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) had distinct understandings 
regarding which were the elements of rape. The divergence of interpretations of 
 
442 Eriksson, M. (2011), pp. 405-406; McGoldrick, D. (2004). In McGoldrick, D., Rowe, P., & 
Donnelly, E. (eds.), p. 464 
443 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g)-1; 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-1, (e) 
(vi)-1; Rome Statute, Arts. 7 (1) (g), (2) (b) (xxii), (e) (vi); Schabas, W. A. (2010) p. 171 
444 ECHR, Case M.C. v. Bulgaria (2003), paras. 126-128 (4 December 2003); Schabas, W. A. 
(2010), p. 171 
445 Boot, M. revised by Hall, C. K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 206-216; 
Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g)-1; 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-1, (e) (vi)-
1; Eriksson, M. (2011), pp. 405-406 
446 Boon, K. (2001), pp. 625-775; Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 428; Steains, C. (1999). In Lee, R. S. K. 
(ed.), pp. 357-390; Schabas, W. A. (2011), pp. 122-155; Dörmann, K. (2001), pp. 461-487. 
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the two “ad hoc” tribunals was particularly accentuated with regards to rape as a 
crime against humanity.447   
 
The ambit of rape in the Rome Statute was determined while the jurisprudence 
of the ICTY and ITCR was still evolving. In fact, the codification of the concept of 
rape in the Elements of Crimes took place, from a chronological point of view, in 
the midst of the development of the “ad hoc” tribunals´ jurisprudence.448 
 
The Commission used three legal approaches as chief foundation sources when 
delimitating the crime of rape:  the Prosecutor v. Akayesu case (tried before the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), the Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija 
case (prosecuted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) 
and the common law definition of rape (found in a number of national laws).449  
 
4.3.1.(ii).(a). The Prosecutor v. Akayesu case of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 
In the judgment of the Prosecutor v. Akayesu case, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, after acknowledging that there was no commonly accepted 
definition of rape in international law, provided a conceptual definition of the 
term.450  
 
The Tribunal, taking a broad approach affirmed that451   
 
“rape is a form of aggression and that the central elements of the 
crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of 
objects and body parts”452   
 
and subsequently defined this crime as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, 
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive.” It constituted a 
significant departure from the classic attainment to the lack of consent of the 
victim to sexual intercourse and parts of the body of the criminal and the victim.453   
 
4.3.1.(ii).(b). The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia 
 
Three months later, in the Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija case (already analysed 
in Chapter 2, 2.2.16.iii. Case the Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija (IT-95-17/1) 
 
447 Dörmann, K. (2001), p. 479; Dörmann, K. (2003 a). In Bogdandy, A., & Wolfrum, R. (eds.), pp. 
341-407; Maire, N. B. (2011), pp. 146-159; Schabas, W. A. (2011), pp. 122-155 
448 ECHR, Case M.C. v. Bulgaria (2003), paras. 126-128; Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 430 
449 Boon, K. (2001), pp. 625-775; de Brouwer, A.-M. L.M. (2005), p. 130; Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 
424 
450 Chenault, S. (2008), pp. 221-237; ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. 
ICTR-96-4. Chamber I, Judgment, paras. 685-695 (2 September 1998) 
451 Schabas, W. A. (2010), p. 171 
452 ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4. Chamber I, Judgment, 
para. 688 (2 September 1998). 
453 Chenault, S. (2008), pp. 221-237; ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. 
ICTR-96-4. Chamber I, Judgment, para. 688 (2 September 1998) 
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regarding the crimes carried out in the Lašva Valley), the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia also provided a rape definition in its judgment. 
Nevertheless, the ICTY was worried about an eventual violation of the “nullum 
crimen sine lege” principle and stuck to a more positivistic concept. In fact, upon 
concluding the examination of national laws on rape, the Trial Chamber 
determined the objective elements of rape to be:454 
 
“(i) the sexual penetration, however slight: 
 
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the 
perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or 
 
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; 
 
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a 
third person.”455 
 
Even though it went back to the mechanical model (anteriorly criticised by the 
ICTR in the Akayesu case), the ICTY regarded its concept of rape as being more 
ample and embodying the principle of protecting human dignity, for it expressly 
encompassed forcible oral sex, that is not covered in the definition of rape in 
certain national jurisdictions. Further, the view of rape incorporated in Furundžija 
case was grounded on force and provided a concrete concept, thus, favouring 
legal security.456 
 
The two aforementioned judgments were rendered shortly after the adoption of 
the Rome Statute. They offer an interesting view not only of the relationship 
between the ICTY and the ICTR, but also of the strain between the need to 
guarantee the observance to the “nullum crimen sine lege” principle, on the one 
hand, and the adoption of malleable definitions (which can encompass the whole 
spectrum of situations that have brought about the cases under the jurisdiction of 
the “ad hoc” tribunals), on the other hand.457 
 
These cases served as a basis to the Preparatory Commission because eventual 
future cases tried by the International Criminal Court would presumably present 
some closeness to them. Moreover, both the ICTR and the ICTY had conducted 
research on the concept of rape in the international law field. France suggested 
to insert commentaries in the Elements of Crimes that would make more 
comprehensive references to the case law of the ICTR and ICTY, aligning the 
interpretations of the criminal offences defined in the Elements of Crimes with the 
jurisprudence of such “ad hoc” tribunals.458  
 
454 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T. Trial Chamber, Judgment, 
pp. 68-73, paras. 174-186 (10 December 1998); Schabas, W. A. (2010), p. 171 
455 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T. Trial Chamber, Judgment, 
p. 73, para. 185 (10 December 1998) 
456 Boas, G., Bischoff, J. L., & Reid, N. (2010), p. 86; Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 390; ICTY. The 
Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Trial Chamber, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T. Judgment, pp. 72-73, para. 
184 (10 December 1998) 
457 Schabas, W. A. (2010) pp. 84-85; Schabas, W. A. (2011), pp. 122-155 
458 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 130; Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 430; Preparatory Commission 




In relation to the common law definition of rape, it has been historically conceived 
as "the carnal knowledge of a woman by force and against her will”. Even though 
contemporarily it has been largely recognized that men can also be victims of 
rape (as discussed below), such definition, whose elements comprehend sexual 
intercourse, the use of force, and the lack of consent, is present in several 
municipal laws and also reverberated on the negotiations.459  
 
It is important to stress that, apart from these fundamental models followed by 
the Preparatory Commission, other sources have also impacted the negotiations 
on the rape definition. Surely, the Special Rapporteur of the Working Group on 
Contemporary Forms of Slavery, on Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and 
Slavery-Like Practices During Armed Conflict, and the ICTY Čelebići case (in 
which rape was regarded as a form of torture) were invoked during the 
discussions. The ICTY Kunarac case, which progressively discussed the issue of 
sexual autonomy and adopted an approach based on non-consent, was not taken 
into consideration since its judgments had not been rendered yet. Likewise, the 
ICTR Musema judgment still had not been issued.460 
 
4.3.1.(ii).(c). The negotiations within the Preparatory 
Commission 
 
The mechanical definition of rape provided in the Furundžija case by the Trial 
Chamber of the ICTY was the beginning point for the discussions on the concept 
of rape.461  
 
Indeed, in the Proposal submitted by the United States of America, Draft 
elements of crimes, Addendum, (PCNICC/1999/DP.4/Add.1), when addressing 
the crime against humanity of rape, it was suggested to adopt the following 
elements: 
 
“1. That the accused intended to attack one or more persons 
through acts of a sexual nature.  
 
 
by France, Comments on the proposal submitted by the United States of America concerning 
article 6, Crime of genocide (18 February 1999) 
459 Boon, K. (2001), pp. 625-775; Co. Lit. 123 b.2 Inst. 180 quoted in Commonwealth v. John 
Burke, 105 Mass. 376, October 1870, Bristol County; Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 424; ICTR. The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4. Chamber I, Judgment, para. 686 (2 
September 1998); Sivakumaran, S. (2007), pp. 253-276; Spitzberg, B. H. (1999), pp.  241-260; 
Stemple, L. (2008), pp. 605-647 
460 Boon, K. (2001), pp. 625-775; de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 130- body text and footnote 
203; Eriksson, M. (2011), pp. 390, 424; ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-A, Trial 
Chamber, Judgment (27 January 2000); ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al., Case 
No. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T. Trial Chamber, Judgment (22 February 2001); ICTY. The 
Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T. Trial Chamber, Judgment (16 November 
1998); La Haye, E. (2001). In Lee, R. S. K. & Friman, H. (eds.), pp. 184-189; Rückert, W., & 
Witschel, G. (2001). In Fischer, H., Kress, C., Lüder, S. R. (eds.), pp. 59-93; United Nations, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices 
during armed conflict (1998) 
461 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 130 
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2. That the accused penetrated any part of the body of another 
person with the accused´s sexual organ, or penetrated the anal 
or genital opening of another person with any object or other part  
of the accused´s body.  
 
3. That the penetration was committed by force. 
 
4. That the assault was part of, and the accused knew it was part 
of, a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian 
population.”462 
 
This proposed definition of rape was also mechanical, albeit encompassing more 
acts than the definition of the Furundžija case.463 
 
In the Proposal submitted by Costa Rica, Hungary and Switzerland on certain 
provisions of Article 8, paragraph 2(b), of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: (viii), (x), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xxi), (xxii) (xxvi) (dated 19 July 
1999), the crime of rape was defined in these terms: 
 
“1. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated 
with an international armed conflict. 
 
2. The perpetrator committed an act of sexual penetration, 
however slight: 
 
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the 
perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or 
 
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; 
 
1. The perpetrator committed this act by coercion or force or 
threat of force against the victim or a third person.”464 
 
This definition covered the same acts enlisted in the definition of rape adopted in 
the Furundžija case judgment, and, consequently, was narrower than the one 
proposed by the US.465 
 
Colombia commented on the proposal by the delegations of Costa Rica, Hungary 
and Switzerland concerning article 8, paragraph 2 (b) of the Rome Statute 




462 Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Working Group on Elements of 
Crimes, Proposal submitted by the United States of America. Draft elements of crimes, 
Addendum, p. 5 (4 February 1999). 
463 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), pp. 130-131, footnote 205 
464 Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Working Group on Elements of 
Crimes. Proposal submitted by Costa Rica, Hungary and Switzerland on certain provisions of 
Article 8, paragraph 2(b), of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: (viii), (x), (xiii), 
(xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xxi), (xxii) (xxvi), p. 4. (19 July 1999) 





(a) The conduct takes place in the context of and is associated 
with an international armed conflict. 
 
(b) The agent has sexual access to the victim. 
 
(c) The agent commits the act through violence or the use of 
coercion or force or intimidation or the threat of force against the 




(a) The expression “penetration” and paragraph 2 (a) and (b) are 
eliminated, since the expression “to have sexual access to” 
indicates clearly what the act consists of, without the need for 
specification which could lower the threshold of protection. 
 
(b) In paragraph (c) the word “intimidation” is added so as to 
include cases in which psychological pressure is exerted on the 
victim to obtain his or her consent to sexual relations. Also 
included, with a view to complete protection, is the expression 
“violence”, a generic term which indicates what the act consists 
of.” 466 
 
Nevertheless, this Colombia´s proposal supporting a far-reaching concept of rape 
was not actively embraced in the subsequent negotiations.467   
 
In fact, determined States were reluctant to accept a broad definition of rape for 
they were afraid of the potential influence on their municipal legislation (as, for 
instance, criminalisation of sexual comportment inside marriage). Eleven Middle 
Eastern nations suggested the exclusion of certain offences that could be 
rendered as crimes against humanity in case they were at odds with religious or 
familiar cultural rules. Certainly, it was suggested to include a proviso in Article 7 
(1) (g): Forced pregnancy stating  
 
“[t]hese acts do not include acts related to natural marital sexual 
relations or the bearing of children in different national laws in 
accordance with religious principles or cultural norms.”468  
 
 
466 Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Working Group on Elements of 
Crimes. Proposal submitted by Colombia, Comments on the proposal by the delegations of Costa 
Rica, Hungary and Switzerland concerning article 8, paragraph 2 (b) of the Rome Statute, p.  3. 
(29 July 1999). 
467 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), pp. 130-131, footnote 205 
468 Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Working Group on Elements of 
Crimes. Proposal concerning the Elements of Crimes Against Humanity submitted by Bahrain, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the 
Syrian Arab Republic, and the United Arab Emirates concerning the elements of crimes against 
humanity, Art. 7 (1) (g) (4). (3 December 1999)                                              
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Likewise, in regard to rape and any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity, such countries proposed to include  
 
“[n]othing in these elements shall affect natural and legal marital 
sexual relations in accordance with religious principles or cultural 
norms in different national laws”469  
 
so that these sexual crimes would be subordinate to cultural rules and religious 
norms in national legislations. If such proposals were accepted, rape between 
husband and wife (conduct not regarded an offence in determined States) and 
forced pregnancy within the marriage would have rested excluded, among other 
behaviours.470 
 
It is noteworthy that it was especially hard to achieve a consensus regarding the 
non-consent issue. Several States required more advanced requirements of 
proof (as, for example, physical or verbal opposition). Some countries supported 
the express inclusion of non-consent definition because frequently it is used as 
the main element to assess to culpableness of unlawful sexual conduct between 
adults. Conversely, other delegates were against such approach, arguing that the 
non-consent cannot be regarded as an element of rape in an armed conflict 
situation, or yet that lack of consent is actually inbuilt in the elements force or 
threat of force.471   
 
During the Rome Conference it preponderated the perspective that there was an 
important aspect weighing against a definition of rape grounded on non-consent: 
the underlying idea that women could consent in spite of coercive circumstances 
(substantiated in the armed conflicts). It was regarded that a model of rape 
definition based on the lack of consent would result humiliating for the victims in 
so far as attention would be directed to their behavior anteriorly to the rape.472 
 
Ultimately, the Preparatory Commission formulated a definition of rape merging 
invasion and penetration, and force and coercive circumstances, hence, 
reflecting the elements of the case law of the ICTY and the ICTR, as it will be 
subsequently seen.473  
 
Even though there was not a clear option for any of the legal models used as 
basis, it is mainly understood that the elements of the “actus reus” adopted in the 
Elements of Crimes were closer to the ones favored by the ICTY in the Furundžija 
case. Nevertheless, there are some authors who support that the definition of 
rape that the Preparatory Commission came up with tends more towards the 
Akayesu case prosecuted by the ICTR.474 
  
 
469 Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Working Group on Elements of 
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In the Elements of Crimes, rape does not present a univocal definition. Surely, 
the elements of the crime against humanity of rape and the war crime of rape do 
not coincide altogether.475  
 
What sets apart the definition of rape as a crime against humanity and as a war 
crime are the context elements. Indeed, the contextual elements vary because 
they reflect the specificities of each of the two broader categories of international 
crimes in which the crime of rape is inserted. Nonetheless, there are elements 
held in common:476  
 
“1. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct 
resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of 
the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal 
or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part 
of the body. 
 
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or 
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, 
detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against 
such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a 
coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a 
person incapable of giving genuine consent.”477 
 
In fact, the elements of the “actus reus” of the crime of rape are the same 
regardless if rape is charged as a war crime, a crime against humanity or even 
as a genocidal act.478  
 
4.3.1.(iii).(b). “Actus reus” 
 
4.3.1.(iii).(b)-1. Element 1 
 
“The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct 
resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of 
the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal 
or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part 
of the body.”479 
 
 
475 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g)-1, 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-1, (e) 
(vi)-1  
476 Amnesty International (2011), p. 11; Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, 
General Introduction, (7) (c), Art. 7, Introduction (2); Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 424 
477 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts.  7 (1) (g)-1 (1) (2), 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-
1 (1) (2) 
478 Boas, G., Bischoff, J. L., & Reid, N. (2010) p. 280 




The first element starts focusing on the invasion of the body of a person, likewise 
the definition of rape in the Akayesu case. The fact that Preparatory Commission 
initially refers to “invasion” echoes the pursuit of making usage of broad and 
genderless terminology. The goal was to reach female perpetrators of rape and 
those cases in which the victim is compelled to penetrate the perpetrator. 
Undoubtedly, the Elements of Crimes clearly established that the concept of 
“invasion” was built with an extensive significance so as to be gender-neutral.480 
 
Nevertheless, the “invasion” must result in penetration, even if slight. This 
requirement followed the compromise reached in the Preparatory Commission: 
although twenty-four States clearly favoured the inclusion of “invasion” (term 
regarded more neutral), an expressive minority, composed by States such as 
France, the Netherlands, and the United States, supported the use of 
“penetration”. They considered “invasion” too imprecise and argued that it could 
give rise to incompatibility with their municipal laws.481  
 
As a result, the concept of “invasion” was coupled with “penetration” despite the 
fact that the latter limits the former (not all invasions necessarily involve 
penetration, but all penetrations configure invasions). In the Akayesu case, the 
Trial Chamber of the ITCR employed “invasion” in its definition of rape exactly so 
as to cover sexual acts which do not comprise penetration. This exemplifies that, 
instead of being a state-of-art work, the rape definition of the Elements of Crimes 
per times perspires incoordination. Indeed, following the precedent set up in the 
Rome Statute, the Preparatory Commission combined the common law and civil 
law systems when elaborating the definitions and the rules on procedure, 
repercussion of the distinct legal traditions of the States involved in the task.482 
 
The body parts that subject to penetration are left open by virtue of the use of the 
term “any part of the body”. Surely, the first element initially contemplates the 
penetration of “any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual 
organ”. The option for a malleable concept (which presumably includes the 
“standard” vaginal, anal or oral penetration with the penis) leaves room for a wider 
interpretation, which could encompass the penetration of the ears, eyes or nose 
of the person with the sexual organ. The last part of the first element, by its turn, 
refers to cases in which the anus or vagina of the victim is penetrated with either 
an object or “any other part of the body”, term which could be understood, in such 
situation, as covering the tongue, fingers, or hands of the perpetrator.483  
 
All and all, the first element of the “actus reus” of rape is primarily grounded on 
the mechanical definition of rape of the Furundžija case: even though it starts 
concentrating on the “invasion” (in the Akayesu case fashion), this invasion 
necessarily entails the penetration of any part of the body of the victim or of the 
offender with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with 
 
480 Dörmann, K. (2003), p. 327; Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8 (2) 
(b) (xxii)-1, Element 1, footnote 50; Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 425 
481 Boon, K. (2001), pp. 625-775; de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 131; Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 
425 
482 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 131; Eriksson, M. (2011), pp. 424-36, 430 
483 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 133; Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, 
Arts. 7 (1) (g)-1, 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-1; Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 425 
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either an object or any other part of the body (resembling the more restricted 
definition of rape of the Furundžija case, which is also adopted by several national 
laws on rape). Therefore, the act of touching a person in a sexual way which does 
not involve penetration (as, for example, sexual mutilation or forced 
masturbation) is not subsumed in the rape definition established by the Elements 
of Crime.484 
 
4.3.1. (iii).(b)-2. Element 2 
 
“The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or 
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, 
detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against 
such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a 
coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a 
person incapable of giving genuine consent.”485 
 
The second element of the “actus reus” disposes the context in which the invasion 
(resulting in penetration, albeit slight) of a sexual nature can be regarded as 
rape.486 
 
In fact, it is the context that undermines the individuals’ sexual autonomy (“the 
right to choose freely whether and when to be sexually intimate with another 
person”), and, thus, renders the sexual activity unlawful.487  
 
Regarding this subject, the ICTY stated in the Kunarac case that 
 
“serious violations of sexual autonomy are to be penalised.  
Sexual autonomy is violated wherever the person subjected to 
the act has not freely agreed to it or is otherwise not a voluntary 
participant. 
 
458. In practice, the absence of genuine and freely given consent 
or voluntary participation may be evidenced by the presence of 
the various factors specified in other jurisdictions – such as force, 
threats of force, or taking advantage of a person who is unable 
to resist.  A clear demonstration that such factors negate true 
consent is found in those jurisdictions where absence of consent 
is an element of rape and consent is explicitly defined not to exist 
where factors such as use of force, the unconsciousness or 




484 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 131; Eriksson, M. (2011), p.425 
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488 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T. 
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Along the samelines, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action affirmed 
that489 
   
“[t]he human rights of women include their right to have control 
over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their 
sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of 
coercion, discrimination and violence. Equal relationships 
between women and men in matters of sexual relations and 
reproduction, including full respect for the integrity of the person, 
require mutual respect, consent and shared responsibility for 
sexual behaviour and its consequences.”490 
 
Although it has been sustained that the sexual autonomy of the individual consists 
in an element of physical and mental integrity, sexual autonomy is actually 
safeguarded “per se”, not being necessary to demonstrate damage to the 
person´s physical or mental integrity.491   
 
Element 2 established four conditions that compromise the exercise of sexual 
autonomy (thus, causing the sexual acts to constitute criminal offences):492  
 
“(1) Situations where the perpetrator uses force or threatened to 
use force;  
(2) The perpetrator used coercion, or where he or she creates 
fear of violence, applies duress (including detention), 
psychological oppression, or abuses his or her power;  
(3) Coercive environments, from which a perpetrator takes 
advantage of a victim; or  
(4) Other conditions, including age, where various forms of 
natural incapacity or reduced capacity exist which affect the 
individual’s ability to give genuine consent.”493 
 
Once more, it is patent that the Preparatory Commission fused the Furundžija 
case, the Akayesu case and national legislations when establishing the first three 
conditions (force or threat of force, coercion, by taking advantage of a coercive 
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492 Amnesty International (2011), p. 17 
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494 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), pp. 130, 134; Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 426; La Haye, E. (2001). 
In Lee, R. S. K. & Friman, H. (eds.), pp. 184-189; Rückert, W., & Witschel, G. (2001). In Fischer, 
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1-) The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion 
 
These circumstances resemble the approach of the ICTY in the Furundžija case 
which, when fixing the elements of its mechanical concept of rape, included 
“coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.”495 
 
Expanding on the issue, the ICTY stated that its definition of rape seemed to 
embrace  
 
“all serious abuses of a sexual nature inflicted upon the physical 
and moral integrity of a person by means of coercion, threat of 
force or intimidation in a way that is degrading and humiliating for 
the victim’s dignity.”496 
 
Also, in Austria, Brazil, China, Korea, Norway and Spain, the definitions of rape 
demand force, threat of force or violence. Specifically, in Spain the crime of 
sexual aggression demands “violence or intimidation”, whereas in Brazil for the 
configuration of rape it is necessary “violence or serious threat”.497 
 
The Elements of Crimes provides an illustrative list of “force”, “threat of force” and 
“coercion”. Certainly, the drafters made use of the expression “such as” followed 
by the elements “fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression, 
and abuse of power”, which exemplify forms in which force, threat of force and 
coercion can materialise.498  
 
It is indisputable that the employment of force, or its threat, or coercion inhibits 
the exercise of sexual autonomy.499  
 
In accordance with the Appeal Chamber in the ICTY Kunarac case, “[f]orce or 
threat of force provides clear evidence of non-consent” (the consent issue will be 
analysed later on).500 
 
Force should be regarded as “force” in the ordinary use of the term, rather than 
as “excessive”, “life-threatening”, or “overwhelming” physical force (although 
jurisprudence in domestic jurisdictions have frequently described it).501  
 
Furthermore, albeit deeply rooted in “physical power or strength”, the concept of 
force goes beyond the physical aspect. Indeed, force is ordinarily defined as 
 
 
495 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T. Trial Chamber, Judgment, 
p. 73, para. 185 (ii) (10 December 1998); Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 426 
496 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T.  Trial Chamber, Judgment, 
p. 73, para. 186 (10 December 1998) 
497 Brazilian Criminal Code, Art. 213; Spanish Criminal Code, Art. 178; ICTY. The Prosecutor v. 
Dragoljub Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T. Trial Chamber, Judgment, para. 
444 (22 February 2001) 
498 Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 426 
499 Amnesty International (2011), p. 17; ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al. The 
Appeals Chamber, Judgment, p. 38, para. 126 (12 June 2002) 
500 Ibidem; Ibidem 
501 Amnesty International (2011), p. 18; Schulhofer, S. J. (1998), p. 4; 
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“1. physical power or strength possessed by a living being … 
 
2. strength or power exerted upon an object; physical coercion; 
violence … 
 
4. power to influence, affect, or control; efficacious power … 
 
6. persuasive power; power to convince … 
 
7. mental or moral strength”502  
  
The drafters of the Elements of Crimes intended force to have such a broad 
reach. Certainly, they inserted footnotes in the definitions of other crimes (namely, 
the crime of genocide by forcibly transferring children and the crime against 
humanity of forcible transfer of population) clarifying that “[t]he term “forcibly” is 
not restricted to physical force”503and can encompass 
 
“threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of 
violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse 
of power, against such person or persons or another person, or 
by taking advantage of a coercive environment.”504  
 
In the same path, the Appeals Chamber of the Kunarac case, referring to and 
citing the California Penal Code 1999, Title 9, Section 261(a)(6), noted: 
 
“that in some domestic jurisdictions, neither the use of a weapon 
nor the physical overpowering of a victim is necessary to 
demonstrate force. A threat to retaliate “in the future against the 
victim or any other person” is a sufficient indicium of force so long 
as “there is a reasonable possibility that the perpetrator will 
execute the threat”.”505 
 
Also, Sellers sustains that the employment of the term “such as” “would allow for 
situations of economic or cultural constraints to be viable, comparable factors”.506 
 
In accordance with such line of thinking, the scope of force would be flexible 
(rather than limited to the physical sphere). Also, this not thorough list of 
examples enlightens the conceptualization of coercion, clarifying that it is 
plausible the occurrence of coercion without the employment of physical force. 
 
502 Dictionary.com website, Force, retrieved from http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/force (5 
July 2019) 
503 Amnesty International (2011), pp. 18-19; Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal 
Court, Art. 6 (e), Element 1, footnote 5, Art. 7 (1) (d), Element 1, footnote 12  
504 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 6 (e), Element 1, footnote 5, Art. 7 
(1) (d), Element 1, footnote 12 
505 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al. The Appeals Chamber, Judgment, pp. 39-
40, para. 130 (12 June 2002) 
506 Sellers, P. V. (2008), p. 26, footnote 134 
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Undoubtedly, the utilisation of psychological power on the victim suffices. 
Consequently, force is not an intrinsic part of coercion.507  
 
Regarding the amount of psychological coercion exercised on the victim, the 
threshold is not so easily defined (unlike the physical coercion, which allows 
visual perception and rests unambiguous). Indeed, the psychological coercion 
lies on what the individual perceives to be dangerous, and not obligatorily by what 
actually constitutes a danger.508 
 
Therefore, the extension of the psychological power inflicted on the victim which 
consubstantiates coercion cannot be measured by objective parametres. The 
psychological coercion should be analised in each concrete case, paying regard 
to the peculiarities of the victim and his/her subjective perception. The 
employment of coercion in the form of “psychological oppression” will be detailed 
below. 
 
In the Elements of Crimes, “force, or by threat of force or coercion” appear as 
methods of committing the crimes of rape, enforced prostitution and sexual 
violence. Consequently, force and threat of force should not be considered as the 
required elements of such crimes: coercion is enough for their configuration.509 
 
The recognition of coercion as an indispensable element of rape, enforced 
prostitution and sexual violence is a relevant advancement for it admits the 
inequality that exists between perpetrators and victims.510   
 
The South African Law Commission stated that  
 
“[a] shift from ‘absence of consent’ to ‘coercion’ represents a shift 
in the focus of the utmost importance from the subjective state of 
mind of the victim to the imbalance of power between the parties 
on the occasion in question. This perspective also allows one to 
understand that coercion constitutes more than physical force or 
threat thereof, but may also include various other forms of 
exercise of power over another person: emotional, psychological, 
economical, social or organizational power. One may also add 
here the exercise of power resulting from age difference between 
the perpetrator and victim.”511 
 
Coercion in the form of fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological 
oppression, and abuse of power will be subsequently analysed. Nonetheless, it 
is necessary to keep in mind that these are merely examples of ways in which 
coercion can be deployed in the perpetration of sexual criminal offences. 
 
507 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 134; Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 426; Manenti, M. R. (2013- 
2014), pp. 171-172 
508 The Neurotypical site, Psychological Coercion, Revised from Dr. Margaret Singer, Professor 
Emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley 
509 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g)-1, 3, 6; 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-1, 
3, 6; Amnesty International (2011), p. 18 
510 Amnesty International (2011), p. 19 
511 South African Law Reform Commission. Discussion Paper 85 (Project 107) Part A: Sexual 
Offences: the Substantive Law, p. 114, para. 3.4.7.3.14 (12 August 1999). 
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Certainly, as mentioned above, such elements (which are also examples of force 
and threat of force) are merely illustrative rather than exhaustive.512  
 
a) Fear of violence  
 
The core of fear of violence resides in “threatened violence.” In fact,513 
 
“[f]ear of violence is a more subtle, but equally compelling, form 
of coercion as victims may silently and without complaint 
acquiesce in order to avoid further risk to their safety.”514   
 
The European Court of Human Rights in the M.C. v. Bulgaria case affirmed that  
“rapists often employ subtle coercion or bullying when this is sufficient to 
overcome their victims.”515 
 
In fact, fear of violence is frequently a reaction of the victim to the perpetrator’s 
actions. The victims, afraid of the possible escalation of threats or their 
conversion to the actual use of force, are coerced to subject themselves to sexual 
acts fast and silently in an attempt to halt the perpetrator to pass from a coercive 
conduct to violence.516 
 
The fear of violence excludes any possibility that, in the course of the sexual 
conducts, the victim is exercising sexual autonomy in the condition of an even 
participant. The decision of whether the victim´s fear of violence was “reasonable” 




In national criminal law, duress is normally regarded  
 
“as a defence to conduct or circumstances that threatened the 
life or safety of the defendant or of another. Duress, however, 
should never be a defence to a crime under international law, but 
only a possible ground for mitigation of punishment.”518 
 
Duress as a form of perpetrating crimes of sexual violence has an ample concept, 
and encloses extortion. In the Akayesu, the Trial Chamber asserted that 
  
“threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which 
prey on fear or desperation may constitute coercion.”519 
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Duress also encompasses to make “threats which a person in his [or her] situation 




Detention has an intrinsically coercive nature, and, consequently, sexual acts 
between inmates, or detainees and persons in authority responsible for the 
enforcement of the detention are deemed to be sexual crimes.521   
 
Certainly, detention constitutes an innately coercive environment, independently 
of whether or not the authority who perpetrated the sexual acts was the one in 
charge of the placement of the victim into detention. In the cases in which 
detention is lawful, the authorities assigned with the initiation and supervision of 
the detention bear a duty of protect the individuals in their custody and must not 
abuse them. In the situations in which the detention is rather unlawful, the 
perpetration of sexual acts with a detainee lends support to coercion.522  
 
In the ICTY Kunarac case, the Appeals Chamber stated that cases of  
 
“sexual acts with prisoners and persons in custody of public 
authority” give rise to a “need to presume non-consent.”523    
 
In the context of detention, it is common same-sex violence. When sexual crimes 
are perpetrated by inmates,524   
 
“both the perpetrator and the victim are detained, and the 
perpetrator takes advantage of the coercive environment caused 
by the detention”.525  
 
It is noteworthy that prisoners can develop “de facto” authority in the place of 
detention and incur in abuse of power.526   
 
d) Psychological oppression 
 
In the ICTY Furundžija case, the Trial Chamber, noting that the Prosecutor´s 
statement that rape is a forcible act had been unchallenged by the Defence, 
repeated the terms of the Prosecution's Pre-trial Brief which affirmed that rape is  
 
“accomplished by force or threats of force against the victim or a 
third person, such threats being express or implied and must 
place the victim in reasonable fear that he, she or a third person 
 
520 Amnesty International (2011), p. 20; Schulhofer, S. J. (1998), p. 126 
521 Amnesty International (2011), p. 20 
522 Amnesty International (2011), p. 21; Kaisner, D., & Stannow, L. (2010); Kaisner, D., & 
Stannow, L. (2010 a) 
523 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al. The Appeals Chamber, Judgment, p. 40, 
para. 131 (12 June 2002) 
524 Amnesty International (2011), pp. 21-22 
525 Amnesty International (2011), p. 21 
526 Amnesty International (2011), p. 22 
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will be subjected to violence, detention, duress or psychological 
oppression.”527 
 
This same Chamber asserted that “force is given a broad interpretation and 
includes rendering the victim helpless.”528  
 
In the ICTY Kunarac case,  
 
“the Trial Chamber accepted that the definition of rape in various 
jurisdictions covered situations in which the victim was rendered 
“incapable of resisting.””529  
 
Subsequently, the Appeals Chamber in this case affirmed that a conceivable, 
credible threat of reprisal in the future against the victim or a third person is 
adequate indication of force by stating: 
 
“A threat to retaliate “in the future against the victim or any other 
person” is a sufficient indicium of force so long as “there is a 
reasonable possibility that the perpetrator will execute the 
threat”.”530 
 
Upon defining rape (as well as enforced prostitution and sexual violence), the 
Elements of Crime recognised that psychological oppression can be a 
manifestation of force, threat of force or coercion and be deployed in the 
perpetration of sexual crimes.531   
 
The perpetrator can employ psychological pressure more effortlessly in situations  
 
“where there is a preexisting relationship or psychological bonds 
between the victim and the perpetrator, such as that between 
family members and children, teachers and students, doctors 
and patients, religious leaders and adherents, employer and 
employee and peacekeepers and members of protected 
populations: while sexual contact between people who maintain 
such relationships should not be seen in themselves as 
inherently coercive”. 532 
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When such relationships exist, the International Criminal Court should pay more 
attention to whether the purposed perpetrators employed psychological 
oppression.533 
 
The victim´s shaming or humiliation not rarely integrates the psychological 
oppression. The embarrassment/ disgrace of the victim plays a rather important 
role when the occurrence of sexual violence is made widely known, or if the 
perpetrator menaces to publicise the acts of sexual violence as a way to blackmail 
the victim and guarantee his/her submission.534  
 
In several communities, individuals subjected to sexual violence can suffer 
double victimisation. Indeed, first the victims endure the sexual violence inflicted 
by the perpetrators, and subsequently they are considered as an infamy to the 
“honour” of the family or community. In its harshest form, the re-victimisation can 
be violent and even mortal, however even the potential ostracism and rejection 
from the community can amount to psychological oppression.535 
 
The spotlight is on the judgments on the chastity of the woman or girl victimized- 
“[m]any victims... pointed out that the public perception of rape was preventing 
them from rebuilding their lives and integrating with the society.”536 
 
A victim interviewed by the Amnesty International exposed the stigmatisation 
built-in the crime of rape by saying:  
 
“I do not have any rights. Wherever I go people perceive me – I 
am sorry to use this word – as a whore. But did I choose this 
life?”537 
 
In the case of Karen Tayag Vertido v. the Philippines, the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women included in its recommendations to 
the respondent State to reduce to a minimum the secondary victimisation of the 
complainant/survivor.538 
 
e) Abuse of power 
 
Even though abuse of power and coercion in detention can overlay, the former 
constitutes a broader element and includes situations in which the perpetrator 
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Instances of such an abuse of power encompass  
 
“coercion through promises that the victim will receive better treatment 
and assurances that third parties will be protected from harm in exchange 
for yielding to the perpetrator.”540 
 
In the ICTY Delalić case, 
 
“the Trial Chamber noted that the involvement of a state agent or 
public official was inherently coercive, especially in the context of 
armed conflict” 541 
 
In fact, the Chamber affirmed that  
 
“it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which rape, by, or at 
the instigation of a public official, or with the consent or 
acquiescence of an official, could be considered as occurring for 
a purpose that does not, in some way, involve punishment, 
coercion, discrimination or intimidation. In the view of this Trial 
Chamber this is inherent in situations of armed conflict.”542 
 
Even in cases in which the accused is not invested with official authority or power, 
abuse of power can play an important role. In the ICTR Musema case, the Trial 
Chamber acknowledged (albeit collaterally to the main issue under judgment) 
that coercive power is employed beyond official state or military organisations by 
way of other relations of power and control that are brought before the Court and 
are progressively frequent in situations of armed conflict.543 
 
There were allegations of abuse of power in the peacekeeper or humanitarian aid 
context. Indeed, allegedly United Nations aid workers, despite having the duty to 
protect and aid the populations, were involved in sexual abuse and 
exploitation.544   
 
Such abuse of power causes special concern because of the “de facto” fiduciary 
relationship that exists between the parties and the potential immunity of 
peacekeepers against prosecution.545 
 
In fact, the United Nations Charter established that 
  
“[r]epresentatives of the Members of the United Nations and 
officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges 
and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of 
their functions in connexion with the Organization.”546 
 
540 Ibidem 
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Subsequently, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations determined that 
 
“[o]fficials of the United Nations shall: Be immune from legal 
process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts 
performed by them in their official capacity.”547 
 
However, the same Convention, upon recognising that privileges and immunities 
are not granted to officials for their personal benefit, but rather in the interests of 
the United Nations, stated:548 
 
“The Secretary-General shall have the right and the duty to waive 
the immunity of any official in any case where, in his opinion, the 
immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived 
without prejudice to the interests of the United Nations.”549 
 
The allegations prompted responses from the United Nations in the form of 
investigations, reports, and codes and bulletins containing rules of conduct that 
should be observed by United Nations´ workers.550  
 
In the 2003 Secretary-General's Bulletin on Special measures for protection from 
sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, sexual exploitation was defined as  
 
“any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, 
differential power, or trust for sexual purposes, including, but not 
limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the 
sexual exploitation of another,”551 
 
whereas sexual abuse was regarded as an  
 
“actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, 
whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.”552 
 
These approaches are comprehensive and consider that, within context of 
peacekeeping operations, any type of sexual exploitation constitutes a grave 
misconduct, independently of the victim´s purported consent.553 
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Refraining from sexual activity became part of the professional responsibility and 
duty of care of the aid workers (in the same form that criminal law in determined 
national jurisdictions, like the United States and Germany, considers a criminal 
offence the occurrence of sex between a detention or prison officer and detainee 
or prisoner).554         
 
These rules were established to avoid rape and sexual violence, and, in their 
preventive scope, finished inhibiting abuse of power. Indeed, these rules avoid 
aid workers abusing individuals that lack power. Moreover, the workers are 
prevented of unfairly benefitting people who would be ready to perform sexual 
acts so as to be recompensed with easier access to services, money, goods or 
benefits. Therefore, the aid workers must adhere to their duty of care and justice 
in the distribution of aid, protection, or another form of assistance.555 
 
As it happens in detention, there is a professional relationship between aid 
workers and protected populations that demands respect in order to prevent any 
staining by abuse of power. Also like in detention, the limits are reasonable and 
proportionate constrictions imposed on a professional conduct, and do not 
consist in restrictions to the own expression of sexuality.556    
 
It is noteworthy that the five types of coercion exposed above are also enlisted in 
the Elements of Crimes as examples of force and threat of force, thus, applying 
to the latter “mutatis mutandis”. 
 
f) Final remarks 
 
The fact that the invasion can be “committed by force, or by threat of force or 
coercion” “against such person or another person” reveals that within the concept 
of coercion are included those situations in which the threat involves a third 
person and the victim of rape is pressed to accede in face of such threat.557  
 
Undoubtedly, the term “another person” amplifies the reach of rape so as to 
encompass those circumstances in which a person submits to the performance 
of sexual conducts in order to avoid the victimisation of somebody else.558  
 
In addition, the victim´s resistance to force is not relevant to the perpetration of 
the crime. In fact, Rule 70 of the International Criminal Court Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence establishes that559 
 
“[c]onsent cannot be inferred by reason of the silence of, or lack 
of resistance by, a victim to the alleged sexual violence.”560 
 
554  ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al. The Appeals Chamber, Judgment, p. 40, 
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2-) The invasion was committed by taking advantage of a coercive environment 
 
This term brings to mind the requirement of the Akayesu case "under 
circumstances which are coercive”. In relation to this requirement, the ICTR 
affirmed that  
 
“coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of 
physical force. Threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of 
duress which prey on fear or desperation may constitute 
coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances, 
such as armed conflict or the military presence of Interahamwe 
among refugee Tutsi women at the bureau communal.”561  
 
Along the same lines, the Special Rapporteur on Sexual Slavery, among other 
authorities, has affirmed that the existence of an armed conflict “per se” 
corresponds to an inherently coercive environment as a result of the extensive 
latent violence.562   
 
Therefore, the insertion of “by taking advantage of a coercive environment” in the 
rape definition (and in the enforced prostitution and sexual violence concepts) of 
the Elements of Crimes represents the acknowledgement that in cases of armed 
conflicts or widespread violence, the perpetrator can carry out rape (as well as 
the other two crimes) without needing to make a straightforward use of force or 
threat of force.563  
 
Further, the Elements of Crimes, by inserting the term “taking advantage of a 
coercive environment”, acknowledged that the armed conflict effects have a 
rather ample reach, going further than the battlefield, and lingers to nearly all 
elements of civilian population´s lives.564     
 
The distinctive trace of taking advantage of a coercive environment (in relation to 
other types of coercion) resides in the fact that the perpetrator is not in a direct 
manner responsible for giving rise to the coercive situation.565     
 
Certainly, the existence of the coercive environment is not attached to the actions 
of the perpetrator, but the latter makes use of the already existing coercive 
environment and takes advantage of it (as, for instance, when one detainee, 
taking advantage of the innately coercive environment of the detention, rapes 
another).566       
 
The 1992 Commission of Experts in the former Yugoslavia identified one pattern 
in which civilians had permission to enter the premises of detention camps and 
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chose women to take away and rape, and then take such women back to the 
camp or kill them. In these circumstances, the civilians, albeit not responsible for 
detaining the women, were clearly taking advantage of the coercive environment 
in the detention camps. Contrarily to the case of detention (in which guards have 
determined duties in relation to the detainees), civilians who entered the camp 
did not have any obligations concerning the detainees, but even so could abuse 
them.567 
  
Aid workers can exercise coercion by means of either abuse of power or taking 
advantage of the coercive environment surrounding the population (which has 
not arisen as a direct consequence of the presence of such workers in the 
place).568 
 
In fact, all sort of individuals (from non-combatants and other displaced persons 
to criminals and members of gangs or quasi-independent groups not related to 
the armed conflict) can “take advantage of the situation of disorder, confusion 
and lawlessness to commit rape and other sexual crimes”.569  
 
Both the International Criminal Court (which has “power to exercise its jurisdiction 
over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern”) and the States 
(that have the duty “to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for 
international crimes”) should take into consideration all these possibilities when 
prosecuting sexual and gender-based criminal offences, so as to provide justice 
to as many as possible victims.570  
  
3-) The invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine 
consent  
 
The goal of such provision is to protect a determined group of individuals that do 
not have the ability to take conscious decisions regarding sexual acts, and 
against whom rape can be perpetrated without the employment of force or 
coercion.571   
 





The Elements of Crimes explicitly explains that  
 
“a person may be incapable of giving genuine consent if affected 
by natural, induced or age-related incapacity.”572  
 
567 Amnesty International (2011), pp. 26-27; United Nations. Final Report of the UN Commission 
of Experts, established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) Annex VIII, part 1 of 
10, Prison Camps, preliminary remarks (27 May 1994). 
568 Amnesty International (2011), p. 27 
569 Ibidem 
570 Ibidem; Rome Statute, Preamble, Art. 1  
571 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 134; Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 426; La Haye, E. (2001). In 
Lee, R. S. K. & Friman, H. (eds.), pp. 184-189 




de Brouwer clarifies that such circumstances refer  
 
“to persons who are legally incapable of giving consent, as is 
commonly used in national jurisdictions.”573  
 
This circumstance relates to a category of people who would be unable to 
consent to sexual relations, specifically children, old people, disabled people and 
persons under the influence of drugs and alcohol.574   
 
Indeed, there are people who are not capable of securing their sexual autonomy 
as a result of being impaired by natural incapacity (for instance, mental incapacity 
to comprehend the nature of the act), induced incapacity (for instance, reduced 
capacity resultant from the ingestion of drugs and/or alcohol; deception) or age 
associated incapacity (for instance, children´s capability to give free and 
cognisant agreement to sexual conduct).575 
 
a.i) Age-related incapacity 
 
Many children, especially girls, are targeted for rape and other forms of sexual 
violence. Indeed, the commission of sexual crimes against girls and boys is often 
reported in armed conflict and contexts in which crimes against humanity and 
genocide are being perpetrated (and also in peacetime).576  
 
Children are defenceless preys, being more easily forced, threatened and 
coerced than grownups human beings.577 
 
Professor Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, entrusted by the UN Secretary-General to 
elaborate a global report on violence against children, stated:  
 
“Studies suggest that young children are at greatest risk of 
physical violence, while sexual violence predominantly affects 
those who have reached puberty or adolescence. Boys are at 
greater risk of physical violence than girls, while girls face greater 
risk of sexual violence, neglect and forced prostitution.”578 
 
The United Nations International Children´s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) 
prepared a follow-up report to the one elaborated by Professor Pinheiro and 
noted:579 
 
573 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 134 
574 Ibidem; Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 426; La Haye, E. (2001). In Lee, R. S. K. & Friman, H. (eds.), 
pp. 184-189 
575 Amnesty International (2011), pp. 27-28, footnote 78 
576 Amnesty International (2011), p. 32 
577 Amnesty International (2011), p. 31; United Nations, General Assembly. Convention on the 
Rights of Child, Art. 34 (20 November 1989). 
578 Krug, E. G., Dahlberg, L. L., Mercy, J. A., Zwi, A. B., & Lozano, R. (eds.) (2002). World Report 
on Violence and Health, p. 5; United Nations, General Assembly. Promotion and protection of the 
rights of children, Report of the independent expert for the United Nations study on violence 
against children, para. 30. UN Doc A/61/299 (29 August 2006) 




“Given vulnerabilities associated with their age, physicality and 
lack of negotiating power, it is likely that adolescent girls are 
among the highest of all risk groups for sexual violence 
perpetrated against them by members of their community. 
However, for many girls around the world, sexual aggression by 
boys and men is normative, and therefore not perceived by girls 
(or boys) as criminal unless it crosses the bounds into more 
conformist definitions of rape. [...] Average estimates of coerced 
first sex among adolescent girls around the world range from 10 
percent to 30 percent, but in some settings, such as Korea, 
Cameroon and Peru, the number is closer to 40 percent.”580 
 
Article 34 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child requires States to “protect 
the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse” and prevent:581 
 
“(a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any 
unlawful sexual activity;  
 
(b) The exploitative use of children in prostitution or other 
unlawful sexual practices;  
 
(c) The exploitative use of children in pornographic performances 
and materials.”582 
 
With this aim of protecting children, several national jurisdictions establish that to 
carry out sexual activities with a person under a certain age automatically 
constitutes a crime. An example are statutory rape laws whose purpose is to 
protect children and adolescents under a certain age from sexual intercourse.583 
 
Certainly, the legislators presume that in function of his/her young age, a person 
lacks capacity to exercise sexual autonomy and take conscious decisions 
regarding engaging in sexual acts. Therefore, the age-related incapacity is 
presumed in function of a statutory age limit.   
 
For instance, in Spain whoever perpetrates acts of a sexual nature with a person 
under the age of 16 years incurs at least in sexual abuse of a minor and shall be 
punished with imprisonment from 2 to 6 years. It is noteworthy that the age limit 
for sexual consent was elevated from 13 to 16 years in the modification of the 
Spanish Criminal Code of 28 April 2015. The new redaction of the Spanish 
Criminal Code came into force on 1 July 2015. 584  
 
When the offence is committed by using violence or intimidation, the responsible 
will be punished for the crime of sexual assault of a minor with 5 to 10 years in 
 
580 UNICEF (2008). From invisible to indivisible: promoting and protecting the right of the girl child 
to be free from violence, p. 47  
581 United Nations, General Assembly. Convention on the Rights of Child, Art. 34 
582 United Nations, General Assembly. Convention on the Rights of Child, Art. 34 (a) (b) (c) 
583 Jailbait, C. C. (2004), p. 28.  
584 Spanish Criminal Code (BOE n. 281, 24 November 195), Art. 183, para. 1 
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prison. The same penalties will be imposed when someone, by violence or 
intimidation, compels a person younger than sixteen years to engage in sexual 
acts with a third party or commit them upon himself/herself.585 
 
In the sexual abuse of a minor or sexual assault of a minor, if the attack consists 
of vaginal, anal, or oral sexual access, or introduction of bodily members or 
objects by either the vagina or the anus, the responsible will be punished with 8 
to 12 years in prison, and, in case of use of violence or intimidation, with 12 to 15 
years in prison.586  
 
The following constitute aggravating circumstances: 
 
“a) When the low intellectual or physical development of the 
victim, or the fact of presenting a mental disorder, has placed the 
victim in a situation of utter helplessness and, in any case, when 
the victim is younger than 4 years old. 
… 
d) Where, for the execution of the crime, the responsible has 
taken advantage of a relationship of superiority or kinship, for 
being ascendant, or sibling, by nature or adoption, of the 
victim.”587 
 
Furthermore, a person who, by deception or abuse of a recognised position of 
trust, authority or influence over the victim, performs acts of a sexual nature with 
a person over 16 and under 18 years is perpetrating the crime of sexual abuse.588 
 
Whoever, for sexual purposes, compels a victim under 16 years to engage in 
behavior of a sexual nature, or make him/her witness acts of sexual character, 
even if the author does not participate of such acts, shall be punished with 
imprisonment from 6 months to 2 years. If a victim under 16 years is made to 
witness sexual abuses, even if the author does not participate of such abuses, a 
prison sentence of 1 to 3 years shall be imposed.589 
 
It is noteworthy that the free consent of the minor under 16 years shall exclude 
criminal responsibility for the aforementioned crimes, when the author is a person 
close to the minor by age and degree of development or maturity.590 
 
Therefore, in accordance with the determinations of the Spanish law, any sexual 
conduct with a person under 16 years old is deemed sexual abuse of minor. If 
such sexual conduct is achieved by the use of violence or intimidation, the 
conduct is classified as sexual assault of minor. If the attack consists of vaginal, 
anal, or oral sexual access, or introduction of bodily members or objects by either 
the vagina or the anus, higher penalties apply.  
 
 
585 Spanish Criminal Code, Art. 183, para. 2 
586 Spanish Criminal Code, Art. 183, para. 3 
587 Spanish Criminal Code, Art. 183, para. 4 (a) (d) 
588 Spanish Criminal Code, Art. 182, para. 1 
589 Spanish Criminal Code, Art.183 bis 
590 Spanish Criminal Code, Art.183 quater 
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In these criminal offences, it is an aggravating circumstance the fact that the 
sexual aggression is committed against a person younger than 4 years old, or if 
the low intellectual or physical development of the victim, or the fact of presenting 
a mental disorder, has placed the victim in a situation of utter helplessness. 
 
Sexual acts with a person between 16 and 18 years old amount to sexual abuse 
if they were performed as a consequence of the employment of deception or by 
the abuse of a recognised position of trust, authority or influence over the 
teenager.  
 
All and all, the Spanish Criminal Law confers ample protection against sexual 
crimes to persons younger than 16 years old, and especially to children under 4 
years old. Adolescents between 16 and 18 years old are also object of special 
protection against sexual crimes, albeit such protection is conditioned to either 
the use of deception or the abuse of a recognised position of trust, authority or 
influence by the perpetrator. 
 
In Brazil, it is a crime (“rape of a vulnerable person”) to have sexual intercourse 
or practice another sexual act with a person under 14 years old.591   
 
Further, it is a crime of corruption of minors to induce a person under the age of 
14 years to satisfy somebody else´s lust.592 
 
It is also a criminal offence to practice, in the presence of a person under the age 
of 14 years, or to induce him/her to presence, sexual intercourse or another 
libidinous act, so as to satisfy one´s own lust or a third person´s.593   
 
It is a crime (“favoring prostitution or other form of sexual exploitation of children 
or adolescents or vulnerable”) to submit, induce or attract to prostitution or 
another form of sexual exploitation a person under the age of 18 years (or that, 
for mental illness or disability, does not have the necessary understanding to the 
practice of the act), facilitate it, impede it or make it difficult to abandon it.594  
 
The critic made towards such approach is that if the age limit chosen is too high 
or too low, the statutory rape provisions will inevitably fail to provide the victims 
with justice.595 
 
If the age limit is set on the high side,  
 
“it denies adolescents the right to make their own choices relating 
to sexual activity, as it makes them liable to criminal prosecution 
for exercising their human rights.”596 
 
591 Brazilian Criminal Code (Decree-Law n. 2848, 7 December 1940), Art. 217-A, preamble and 
para. 1, included by Law no 12.015/2009 
592 Brazilian Criminal Code, Art. 218,  included by Law no 12.015/2009 
593 Brazilian Criminal Code, Art. 218-A, included by Law no 12.015/2009 
594 Brazilian Criminal Code, Art. 218-B,  included by Law no 12.015/2009; 
Brazilian Children and Adolescents Statute (Law n. 8.069, 13 July 1990), Art. 244-A, included by 
Law no 9.975/2000 





In fact, Article 5 of the Convention on the Rights of Child refers to “the exercise 
by the child of the rights recognized” in the Convention, which has been 
interpreted seen as permitting adolescents and young people to make choices 
with regards to sexual education and sexual acts under the age of 18.597 
 
On the other hand, where the age cap is lower than appropriate, it leaves 
adolescents, specifically adolescent girls, out of the range of598    
 
“protection of the criminal law. Once girls are over the age 
stipulated in the statutory rape provision, they are frequently 
assumed to have agreed to sexual contact, irrespective of 
whether the evidence indicates that they were forced, 
threatened, or otherwise coerced.”599   
 
Therefore, there is a thin line between safeguarding and punishing adolescent 
sexuality, and the statutory age limit should focus on the protection of children 
and adolescents.600   
 
In spite of determining an age threshold (up to 15 years) when setting up the war 
crime of conscripting or enlisting children into the national armed forces or using 
them to participate actively in hostilities, the drafters of the Rome Statute did not 
provide a statutory age limit concerning the sexual crimes.601 
 
Ulteriorly, the Preparatory Commission, while elaborating the Elements of 
Crimes, did not include either an age threshold which it is assumed that the child 
is unable consent to sexual acts.602 
 
It has been sustained that the concept of rape inserted in the Elements of Crimes, 
by focusing on coercion, force and threat of force, and including age-related 
incapability of giving genuine consent, can be correctly utilised in the evidence 
regarding how children that are victimised experience such crime, and how 
perpetrators make use of coercion and power differentials so as to carry out this 
criminal offence. The core is on the actions of the perpetrator and how such 
actions impacted the victim´s behaviour, thus it would be possible to scrutinise if 
such actions were markedly coercive because of the victim´s young age. As a 
result, the inclusion of an age threshold could be regarded as dispensable.603 
 
However, the International Criminal Court could adopt a statutory age limit to the 
sexual crimes, so that the mere fact of practicing sexual acts with someone below 
an established age “per se” would amount to a criminal offence.    
 
 
597 Ibidem, footnote 87; United Nations, General Assembly. Convention on the Rights of Child, 
Art. 5 
598 Amnesty International (2011), pp. 31-32 
599 Ibidem 
600 Jailbait, C. C. (2004), p. 27 
601 Rome Statute, Art. 8 (2) (b) (xxvi); Amnesty International (2011), p. 31 
602 Amnesty International (2011), p. 31 
603 Amnesty International (2011), pp. 31-33 
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This measure would enhance the protection of children and adolescent against 
sexual violence “lato sensu”. Moreover, there would be no need to analyse the 
employment of power differentials by the perpetrator to commit these sexual 
crimes.604  
 
Further, it would be dispensable to show how the children/adolescents were 
impacted by the perpetrator´s behaviour and experienced the crimes.605  
 
Certainly, by assuming that a sexual contact with a children or adolescent under 
a certain age limit is an invasion “against a person incapable of giving genuine 
consent”, the children/adolescents would be spared of delving in the suffering 
imposed on them by the perpetrator. As a result, their psychological well-being, 
dignity and privacy would be preserved, in consonance with article 68 (1) of the 
Rome Statute which states: 
 
“[t]he Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, 
physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of 
victims and witnesses. In so doing, the Court shall have regard 
to all relevant factors, including age, gender as defined in article 
7, paragraph 3, and health, and the nature of the crime, in 
particular, but not limited to, where the crime involves sexual or 
gender violence or violence against children.”606 
 
Therefore, the presupposition that any sexual conduct carried out with 
children/adolescents below a determined age consists in a sexual crime 
committed “against a person incapable of giving genuine consent” would benefit 
the prosecution of sexual crimes enlisted in the Rome Statute perpetrated against 
children and adolescents. Indeed, it would be enough for the configuration of the 
sexual crime that sexual acts were carried out with a person younger than the 
statutory age limit. 
 
The International Criminal Court, when setting up the age limit for that ends, 
should pay attention and opt for an age threshold that will protect children and 
adolescents, and, concomitantly, will not cause detriment to adolescents` 
sexuality.607   
 
Conceivably, the Court could establish the age of 15 years as the statutory age 
limit, mirroring the war crime of “conscripting or enlisting children under the age 
of fifteen years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively 
in hostilities” (such age would also be a mid-term between the Spanish and 
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a.ii) Natural incapacity and induced incapacity 
 
National legislations also seek to confer special protection against sexual crimes 
to people affected by natural or induced incapacity. As in the age-related 
incapacity, the Spanish and Brazilian criminal laws on the subject will be analysed 
for the sake of exemplifying the approach adopted by the domestic laws. 
 
In accordance with the Spanish Criminal Code, those persons deprived of sense 
or whose mental illness is abused of, as well as those committed by nullifying the 
determination of the victim by the use of medicines, drugs or any other natural or 
synthetic substance that brings about such effect, are particularly protected 
against the crime of non-consented sexual abuse (and even more so when the 
non-consented sexual abuse consists of vaginal, anal, or oral sexual access, or 
introduction of bodily members or objects by either the vagina or the anus).609 
 
Further, the fact that the victim is especially vulnerable in virtue of his/her age, 
illness, disability or situation constitutes aggravating circumstances.610  
 
Moreover, in the crimes of sexual abuse of minor and sexual assault of a minor, 
it constitutes an aggravating circumstance if the low intellectual or physical 
development of the victim, or the fact of presenting a mental disorder has placed 
the victim in a situation of utter helplessness.611  
 
Consequently, persons under 16 years who present low intellectual or physical 
development, or mental disorder (which has placed the victim in a situation of 
utter helplessness) and are victims of these criminal offences (namely, sexual 
abuse of minor and sexual assault of minor) are object of reinforced protection 
by the Spanish law, in virtue of both their age and some mental, intellectual, or 
physical underdevelopment.  
 
In Brazil, it also constitutes the crime “rape of a vulnerable person” to have sexual 
intercourse, or practice of another sexual act with a person that, for mental illness 
or disability, does not have the necessary understanding to practice the act, or, 
for any other reason, cannot offer resistance.612 
 
As stated above, it is a crime (“favoring prostitution or other form of sexual 
exploitation of children or adolescents or vulnerable”) to submit, induce or attract 
to prostitution or another form of sexual exploitation a person under the age of 18 
years, or that, for mental illness or disability, does not have the necessary 
understanding to the practice of the act, facilitate it, impede it or make it difficult 
to abandon it.613  
 
The reference included in the Elements of Crimes to “natural, age-related, or 
induced capacity” implies that a person’s capacity to exercise discernment and 
 
609 Spanish Criminal Code, Art. 181 (1) (2) (4) 
610 Spanish Criminal Code, Arts 178; 179; 180 (1), (3a) (4a); 181 (4) (5) 
611 Spanish Criminal Code, Art. 183 (1) (2) (3) 4 (a) 
612 Brazilian Criminal Code, Art. 217-A (1) included by Law no 12.015/2009 
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reasoning, so as to make decisions about their own interests and desires, should 
be regarded as primordial.614  
 
This understanding is consonant with the affirmation of the European Court of 
Human Rights that  
 
“the development of law and practice in that area reflects the 
evolution of societies towards effective equality and respect for 
each individual's sexual autonomy.”615  
 
The International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and 
Dignity of Persons with Disabilities recognises that for persons with disabilities 
their individual autonomy and independence (including their liberty to choose) is 
relevant. Further, the convention establishes among its principles the616  
 
“respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the 
freedom to make one’s own choices, and independence of 
persons.”617 
 
Therefore, the International Criminal Court should determine, in view of the facts 
of the concrete case under judgment, wether the person had capacity to decide, 
with freedom and genuineness, to participate of sexual acts. In doing so, the 
Court should take into consideration factors as the individual’s abilities of 
perception, understanding, and communication. Also, the International Criminal 
Court should verify the existence of particular developmental, mental health or 
noncognitive problems (in special drugs or alcohol-induced) and if such problems 
had caused the person incapable of genuinely exercising sexual autonomy.618 
 
b) Genuine consent 
 
“The term “genuine consent” is a term used in the Elements of 
Crimes definitions of rape, enforced prostitution, and enforced 
sterilisation; also in Rule 70 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.  In order to be consistent with international human 
rights law, all references to the term ‘consent’ or ‘genuine 
consent’ used in the Court’s practice should be interpreted and 
applied in the light of the treatment of consent in human rights 
law which calls for free consent, free of force, coercion, 
discrimination and violence.”619  
 
The groups of people mentioned above are regarded as unable to give genuine 
consent and, as consequence, the non-consent is assumed.620  
 
614 Amnesty International (2011), p. 15 
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It is noteworthy that the Elements of the Crime did not render non-consent as a 
keystone element of rape, merely regarding it as an addition to the central 
components force and coercion.621 
 
Therefore, in accordance with the rape definition inserted in this supplementary 
agreement to the Rome Statute, consent is not taken into account when force, 
threat of force, coercion, or coercive environment is present in the situation, or if 
the person was not capable of giving genuine consent.622  
 
Certainly, non-consent, in its conventional usage, clearly does not integrate the 
essential elements of the definition of the crime rape imprinted in the Elements of 
Crimes.623  
 
Apart from these persons “incapable of giving genuine consent”, there is no 
mention to the non-consent of further groups of individuals, being left solely the 
lack of consent that is inherent to the elements “force” or “coercion”. This comes 
as an aftereffect of the definition of rape provided by the Elements of Crimes 
being centered in the coercive environment, rather than the victims´ non- 
consent.624  
 
Indeed, the Elements of the Crime did not render non-consent as a keystone 
element of rape, merely regarding it as an addition to the central components 
force and coercion.625 
 
As a consequence, in accordance with the rape definition inserted in this 
supplementary agreement to the Rome Statute, consent is not taken into account 
when force, threat of force, coercion, or coercive environment is present in the 
situation, or if the person was not capable of giving genuine consent. Certainly, 
non-consent, in its conventional usage, clearly does not integrate the essential 
elements of the definition of the crime rape imprinted in the Elements of 
Crimes.626 
 
b.i) “Mens rea” and consent as a defense of mistake of fact 
 
The question of consent, especially in cases of sexual violence, was further 
expanded in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Rule 70 brings principles of 
evidence in cases of sexual violence versing about consent and establishes that 
“[i]n cases of sexual violence, the Court shall be guided by and, where 
 
621 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), pp. 130,134; Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 426; La Haye, E. (2001). 
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appropriate, apply” them. As a result, the judges are not bound to the application 
of the principles on consent, and their use is only a faculty. The aforementioned 
principles are:627 
 
“(a) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or 
conduct of a victim where force, threat of force, coercion or taking 
advantage of a coercive environment undermined the victim’s 
ability to give voluntary and genuine consent; 
(b) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or 
conduct of a victim where the victim is incapable of giving 
genuine consent;  
 
(c) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of the silence of, or lack 
of resistance by, a victim to the alleged sexual violence;  
 
(d) Credibility, character or predisposition to sexual availability of 
a victim or witness cannot be inferred by reason of the sexual 
nature of the prior or subsequent conduct of a victim or 
witness.”628 
 
In this instrument for the application of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, consent is clearly regarded as a possibility of defence and the 
“onus probandi” lies on the Defence.629 
 
The possibility of consent being a form of defence arises from the “mens rea” of 
the crime of rape.  
 
Article 30 of the Rome Statute disposes: 
 
“1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally 
responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are 
committed with intent and knowledge. 
 
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where: 
 
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the 
conduct; 
 
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that 
consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course 
of events. 
 
3. For the purposes of this article, ‘knowledge’ means awareness 
that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the 
 
627 Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 426; Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal 
Court, Rule 70 
628 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 70 
629 Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 426 
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ordinary course of events. ‘Know’ and ‘knowingly’ shall be 
construed accordingly.”630 
  
The mental element brought by this article of the Statute applies to all the criminal 
offences under the ICC jurisdiction. Specifically, in regard to the crime of rape, 
“the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge” entails that the 
perpetrator intended to invade the victim´s body, resulting in penetration, and 
knew that the invasion was perpetrated 631   
 
“by force, or by threat of force or coercion, … or by taking 
advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was 
committed against a person incapable of giving genuine 
consent.” 632   
 
Thus, even though the definition of rape of the International Criminal Court did 
not expressly include the non-consent of the victim among the elements which 
constitute the crime of rape, the “mens rea” requirement that the material element 
is committed with “intent and knowledge” (specific mental state) enables a 
defense of mistake of fact (“[w]here an offence requires a particular mental state, 
such as knowledge or purpose, an honest and reasonable belief that precludes 
a defendant from forming or maintaining that mental state will preclude 
conviction”).633 
 
There is a procedural mechanism so as to determine if the question of consent is 
important: after the Defence files a submission requesting to produce evidence 
regarding the victim´s non-consent, the Court will hold an “in camera" procedure.  
Rule 72 (2) states that 
 
“[i]n deciding whether the evidence…is relevant or admissible, a 
Chamber shall hear in camera the views of the Prosecutor, the 
defence, the witness and the victim or his or her legal 
representative, if any, and shall take into account whether that 
evidence has a sufficient degree of probative value to an issue in 
the case and the prejudice that such evidence may cause.”634 
 
According to such provision, the use of consent as a defence is expressly ruled 
out in certain circumstances, issue that caused controversy among the delegates 
during the negotiations of the agreement. Those opposing such rule defended 
that it would needlessly pose as a barrier to the presentation of evidence in 
respect of consent. This view was backed by the argument that it is not possible 
to render as coercive all sexual activity that is carried out in the periods of civil 
unrest or armed conflict, in particular when the circumstances permit civilians to 
continue with their regular routines. It was also argued that the fact that there is 
a spread sense of coercion in a determined area does not necessarily mean that 
it has affected the victim in question. A mid-term was found and the defence of 
 
630 Rome Statute, Art. 30 
631 Eriksson, M. (2011), pp. 427-428 
632 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Article 7 (1) (g)-1 (2) 
633 Cavallaro, R. (1996), pp. 815-860; Weiner, P. (2013), pp. 1207-1237 
634 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 72 (2) 
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consent is permitted by the Court, however first it ought to go through a test which 
evaluates its relevance.635 
 
- Final remarks 
 
Simply put, the basis of element 2 is that, from both a logical and legal point of 
view, so that sexual acts are legal, both parties engaging in the sexual activity 
ought to be unforced and uncoerced.636  
 
Nevertheless, if the person was incapable of giving genuine consent (in other 
words, was affected by natural, induced or age-related incapacity), the 
employment of force and coercion does not play a role in the configuration of the 
crime, and the invasion of element 1 as a matter of course amounts to the crime 
of rape (subject to being present the context elements). 
 
4.3.1.(iii).(c). Further considerations 
 
The detailed definition of rape inserted in the Elements of Crime, which is centred 
on force and coercion, has been target of praise and criticism. The concept of 
rape of the Elements of Crimes is precise and clear, but gives rise to the 
discussion if, since they sought for accuracy, the delegates finally decided upon 
a rather narrow definition of the offence.637  
 
As stated above, this definition managed to be a little broader than the elected by 
the ICTY in the Furundžija case (and subsequently in the ICTY the Prosecutor v. 
Kunarac case): the penetration of the vagina or anus can also be carried out with 
fingers, hands and tongue (instead of exclusively with “the penis of the 
perpetrator or any other object”), and an orifice other than vaginal, anal or oral 
ones can be penetrated with the sexual organ. However, as also aforementioned, 
such approach to rape is more restrict than the model adopted in the Akayesu 
case: the latter comprises situations of sexual violence that do not include 
penetration with the penis (e.g., forced masturbation, forced nudity, or sexual 
mutilation). Consequently, albeit mechanical, the definition of the Elements of 
Crimes sets apart rape and inferior degrees of sexual violence.638  
 
Moreover, conversely to the Akayesu case judgment (which, for the configuration 
of rape, demands the physical invasion of a sexual nature committed against a 
person to be carried out “under circumstances which are coercive”, and, thus, 
requires the awareness of the perpetrator and  of  the victim  of  the purposely 
forcible environment), the sexual acts that, according to the of Elements of 
Crimes, amount to rape are objectified (as a result of the mechanical vein in the 
delimitation of the crime). Hence, the victim´s subjective perception and the 
 
635 Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 427 
636 Amnesty International (2011), p. 14 
637 Boon, K. (2001), pp. 625-775; de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 136; Eriksson, M. (2011), pp. 
391, 425, 429 
638 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 133; Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 425; ICTY. The Prosecutor v. 
Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T. Trial Chamber, Judgment, p. 73, para. 185 (10 
December 1998); ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T and 
IT-96-23/1-T. Trial Chamber, Judgment, para. 460 (22 February 2001) 
127 
 
perpetrator´s intentions in relation to the sexual acts do not play a role in the 
configuration of rape in the terms it is delineated in the Elements of Crimes.639   
 
It is relevant to stress that rape, as understood in the Rome Statute and the 
Elements of Crimes, has departed from the traditional conception of a crime 
which attempts against morality and honour. Undoubtedly, the Preparatory 
Commission aimed to reflect the objective of safeguarding sexual autonomy 
when drafting the concept of rape of the Elements of Crimes. The employment of 
force, or threat of force or coercion by the criminal renders it impossible for the 
victims to make use of their entitlement to physical and mental integrity, and, as 
an extension, of their sexual autonomy. This new format640 
 
“signals a new paradigm for the international criminalization of 
sexual crimes - one based on broader principles of human 
dignity, autonomy, and consent."641 
 
Finally, it is also important to highlight that the language used in the definition by 
the drafters is deliberately gender-blind, upholding that both men and women can 
suffer sexual violence. The employment of the words “person”, “victim” and 
“perpetrator” (and the lack of gender-specific pronouns such as “he” and “she”) 
goes to show the gender-neutrality spread throughout the definition of rape. In 
spite of the fact that women account for the largest part of the victims of sexual 
violence, the perpetration of sexual violence against men is more frequent than 
commonly thought. In fact, 3% of men worldwide have been raped in their lifetime 
in comparison with 13% of women. Sexual violence against men (including male 
to male rape and woman to male rape) has taken place in several conflicts and 
has been addressed in the “ad hoc" tribunals cases and the Special Court of 
Sierra Leone. For instance, sexual violence reached new levels during the civil 
war in the former Yugoslavia, so much so that the ICTY formed a Sexual Assault 
Investigation Team and, “inter alia”, assigned it with, the task of investigating the 
rape of men during the conflict. The Team reported that men were compelled to 
rape and sexually assault other men, were victims of sexual mutilations (such as 
castrations, circumcisions, among others), and were also obliged to perform oral 
sex and other sexual acts on both guards and one another.642 
 
4.3.1.(iii).(d). The crime against humanity of rape 
 
As explained above, the singularities of the definition of rape as a crime against 
humanity and of the concept of such crime as a war crime are found in the 
contextual elements set up by the Elements of Crimes. Such approach was also 
exploited by the drafters of the Elements of Crimes when defining the other sexual 
 
639 Ibidem; Ibidem 
640 Amnesty International (2011), p. 11; Eriksson, M. (2011), pp. 425, 429; United Nations, Entity 
for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, General Recommendations made by the Committee on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 19, 
para. 7 (g) (1992). 
641 Boon, K. (2001), p. 631 
642 Bassiouni, M. C., & McCormick, M. (1996), pp. 17-18; Carlson, E. S. (1997), p. 129; Eriksson, 
M. (2011), p. 424; Schabas, W. A. (2011), pp. 122-155; Sivakumaran, S. (2007), pp. 253-276; 
Spitzberg, B. H. (1999), pp.  241-260; Stemple, L. (2008), pp. 605-647; Taylor, L. (2003), p. 42   
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and gender-based crimes enlisted in the Rome Statute (specifically, sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and 
sexual violence).643   
 
When the subject matter at issue is the context, the Elements of Crimes 
reverberates Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute. 
 
Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute (drawing inspiration from the preamble of Article 
3 of the ICTR Statute) disposes that  
 
"[f]or the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means 
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack."644 
 
Accompanying this vein, the drafters of the Elements of Crimes established in 
Elements of Article 7 (1) (g)-1 Crime against humanity of rape, the following 
circumstantial elements: 
 
"3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
 
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended 
the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population."645 
 
Certainly, the Introduction (2) to Article 7 of the Elements to Crimes elucidates 
that “[t]he last two elements for each crime against humanity describe the context 
in which the conduct must take place.”646 
 
Therefore, pursuant the Elements of Crimes, for the configuration of rape as a 
crime against humanity, it is not enough that the perpetrator invaded the body of 
a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, and that such 
invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, or against a 
person incapable of giving genuine consent. It is imperative that the conduct was 
carried out “as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population” and that the perpetrator was conscious that his conduct647  
 
“was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread 





643 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 7, Introduction (2); Amnesty 
International (2011), p. 11; Manenti, M. R., (2013- 2014), p. 172 
644 Rome Statute, Art. 7 (1)  
645 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 7 (1) (g)-1 
646 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 7, Introduction (2) 
647 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Article 7 (1) (g)-1 (1) (2) (3) 
648 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Article 7 (1) (g)-1 (4) 
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4.3.1. (iii).(d)-1. Element 3 
 
"The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against a civilian population."649 
 
In short, the invasion resulting in penetration must integrate an attack which is 
either widespread or systematic and, in any case, directed against a civilian 





Article 7 (2) (a) of the Rome Statute disposes that for the ends of paragraph 1: 
 
“‘Attack directed against any civilian population’ means a course 
of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to 
in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such 
attack”.650  
 
As a result, pursuant to symmetry, Elements of Crimes states that, in these 
context elements, the term "attack directed against a civilian population” 
 
"is understood to mean a course of conduct involving the multiple 
commission of acts referred to in article 7, paragraph 1, of the 
Statute against any civilian population, pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such 
attack. The acts need not constitute a military attack. It is 
understood that “policy to commit such attack” requires that the 
State or organization actively promote or encourage such an 
attack against a civilian population."651 
 
Such provisions were inspired in the ICTR law cases. In fact, in the Akayesu case, 
the Trial Chamber of the ICTR stated that  
  
“[t]he concept of attack' maybe defined as a unlawful act of the 
kind enumerated in Article 3(a) to (I) of the Statute, like murder, 
extermination, enslavement etc. An attack may also be non 
violent in nature, like imposing a system of apartheid … or 




649 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 7 (1) (g)-1, Element 3 
650 Rome Statute, Art. 7 (2) (a) 
651 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 7, Introduction (3) 
652 ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4. Chamber I, Judgment, 
para. 581 (2 September 1998). 
130 
 
In this exert, the Trial Chamber is referring to Article 3 of Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, that enlists the crimes against 
humanity (among which is rape).653  
 
In the Kayishema and Ruzindana case, the same “ad hoc” tribunal affirmed that  
 
“[t]he attack is the event in which the enumerated crimes must 
form part. Indeed, within a single attack, there may exist a 
combination of the enumerated crimes, for example murder, rape 
and deportation.”654  
 
Besides, the Elements of Crimes establishes that the multiplicity of such unlawful 
acts does not have to be committed within a military context.  
 
2) Widespread or systematic 
 
Further, such course of conduct has to be perpetrated as an integrating  
 
“part of a wide spread or systematic attack and not just a random 
act of violence. The act can be part of a widespread or systematic 
attack and need not be a part of both.”655 
 
It is necessary to highlight that the conduct has to be widespread or, alternatively, 
systematic, the two terms being purposefully linked by the disjunctive ‘or’ (rather 
than by the conjunctive ‘and’). Surely, in consonance with Customary 
International Law as well as the practice of the International Law Commission 
and the ICTY, the attack has to be either widespread or systematic.656 
 
A widespread attack encompasses 
 
“massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively 
with considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity 
of victims.”657   
 
Therefore, two elements can inform the element widespread: the broad scale of 
action or the quantity of victims, ruling out isolated inhumane acts carried out as 
a private enterprise and also those directed against a unique victim.658 
 
653 United Nations, Security Council. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(1994), Art. 3 (g)  
654 ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T. 
Trial Chamber II, Judgment, para. 122 (21 May 1999); 
655 ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4. Chamber I, Judgment, 
para. 579 (2 September 1998). 
656 ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4. Chamber I, Judgment, 
para. 579, footnote 144 (2 September 1998); ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and 
Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T. Trial Chamber II, Judgment, para. 123, footnote 63 (21 
May 1999); Hwang, P. (1998), pp. 457-504.  
657 ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4. Chamber I, Judgment, 
para. 580 (2 September 1998). 
658 United Nations, International Law Commission. Report of the Work of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session (6 May to 26 July 1996), Art. 18, 




The concept of systematic, by its turn, can be regarded as 
 
“thoroughly organised and following a regular pattern on the 
basis of a common policy involving substantial public or private 
resources. There is no requirement that this policy must be 
adopted formally as the policy of a state. There must however be 
some kind of preconceived plan or policy.”659  
 
Consequently, to be rendered systematic, the attack ought to integrate a more 
ample strategy or policy.660  
 
In a nutshell, an attack is considered widespread when it can be regarded as 
massive or if it is aimed at multiplicity of victims, whereas a systematic attack is 
that committed in accordance with a premeditated state/ organizational policy or 
planning.661 
 
The requirement of a “widespread or systematic" attack poses a barrier for the 
trial as a crime against of a "random act", driven solely by private causes, which 
constitutes an ordinary criminal offence (and, as such, should be prosecuted in 
national jurisdiction). As a result, rest excluded those conducts “carried out for 
purely personal motives and those outside of a broader policy or plan”, allowing 
the International Criminal Court to focus on crimes of international concern.662 
 
Nevertheless, it is unnecessary to prove that the person charged has personally 
perpetrated multiple crimes since the accused can be rendered criminally liable 
for only one inhumane act (e.g., rape), provided that the crime was carried out as 
an integrating part of the larger attack. This understanding is congruent with 
Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute which disposes that a crime against 
humanity means "any of the following acts when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack.”663  
 
Indeed, since the context is an attack (that is “a course of conduct involving the 
multiple commission of acts” which were enlisted by the Rome Statute as criminal 
 
659 ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4. Chamber I, Judgment, 
para. 580 (2 September 1998); United Nations, International Law Commission. Report of the 
Work of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session (6 May to 26 
July 1996), Art. 18, commentary- para. 3 
660 The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T. Trial 
Chamber II, Judgment, para. 122 (21 May 1999) 
661 The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T. Trial 
Chamber II, Judgment, para. 123 (21 May 1999); ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 
Case No. ICTR-96-4. Chamber I, Judgment, para. 579 (2 September 1998); Hwang, P. (1998), 
pp. 457-504. 
662 The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T. Trial 
Chamber II, Judgment, paras. 122.123 (21 May 1999); United Nations, International Law 
Commission. Report of the Work of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty -
eighth session (6 May to 26 July 1996), Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security 
of Mankind, Art. 1; Hwang, P. (1998), pp. 457-504. 
663 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić a.k.a. “Dule”, Case No. IT-94-1. Trial Chamber, Opinion 




offences under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court), obligatorily the 
sexual offence will have taken place amidst a series of crimes.664   
 
Nevertheless, for the attack (multiple commission of acts of violence enumerated 
in Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute) to take place, it is not necessary the 
perpetrator to act repeatedly by him/herself. Certainly, the other crimes might be 
carried out by persons other than the perpetrator of the sexual crime, and do not 
have to present a sexual/gender-based character.665 
 
3) Directed against a civilian population 
 
After determining that in order to amount to a crime against humanity, an act 
ought to be directed against the civilian population, the Chamber I in the Akayesu 
case clarified that:666 
 
"[m]embers of the civilian population are people who are not 
taking any active part in the hostilities, including members of the 
armed forces who laid down their arms and those persons placed 
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other 
cause. Where there are certain individuals within the civilian 
population who do not come within the definition of civilians, this 
does not deprive the population of its civilian character."667 
 
It is relevant to highlight that the requisite that the attack has to be directed against 
a civilian population”, “per se” indicates that there is guidance, commandment 
regarding the specific target, circumstance that implicates in the attack taking 
place within a preconceived and structured planning.668 
 
In spite of that, the Rome Statute determines in Article 7 (2) (a) that the attack 
directed against any civilian population must be carried out “pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack”,669 
reiterating the idea that there must be some sort of “planning, pattern, coordinated 
activity, or scheme.”670  
 
Certainly, the categorical mention to “policy” was the catalyst which enabled the 
achievement of a compromise in the Rome Conference. Although some 
observers, afraid that such term could pose as an obstacle to prosecution, would 
have been more content if it was not expressly included in the Statue, the element 
“policy” has been backed by several authorities since the Nuremberg Charter and 
the Nuremberg Tribunal´s pronouncements.671  
 
 
664 Rome Statute, Art. 7 (2) (a) 
665 Werle, G., & Bung, J. (2010), p. 2  
666 ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4. Chamber I, Judgment, 
para. 582 (2 September 1998) 
667 Ibidem 
668 Robinson, D. (1999), pp. 43-57 
669 Rome Statute, Art. 2 (a) 
670 Hwang, P. (1998), pp. 457-504. 
671 Robinson, D. (1999), pp. 43-57 
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Likewise, the Elements of Crimes asserted that the “attack directed against a 
civilian population” must be carried out  
 
"pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy 
to commit such attack ... It is understood that “policy to commit 
such attack” requires that the State or organization actively 
promote or encourage such an attack against a civilian 
population."672 
 
Since the attack must be perpetrated in accordance with or in furtherance of a 
State or organizational policy/plan, it would seem that it will ever be systematic, 
being solely left open the question on whether or not the attack is widespread.  
 
Finally, it is noteworthy that in addition to state officials and representatives, 
organizations (including terrorist ones and those organizations of separatist and 
insurrectional movements) can also be behind the plan or policy that gives rise to 
the widespread or systematic attack.673 
 
The Elements of Crimes asserts that  
 
“[a] policy which has a civilian population as the object of the 
attack would be implemented by State or organizational 
action”674  
 
and adds that, in unusual circumstances, such a policy can be achieved by 
means of a purposeful inertia in face of the awareness that the lack of action will 
stimulate the attack. Therefore, the mere absence of governmental or 
organizational action is not enough to rule out the existence of such a policy.675 
 
From the explained above, "[t]he conduct was committed as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack directed against a civilian population", signifies, for the 
purpose of the definitions provided in the Elements of Crimes, that the unlawful 
act (enumerated in Article 7 (1) (a) to (k) of the Rome Statute) was perpetrated 
as part of a course of procedure encompassing the multiple commission of such 
acts. Additionally, aforementioned course of procedure must be either 
widespread (when it can be rendered substantial, of a vast scale or if it is aimed 
at a multiplicity of victims), or systematic (carried out pursuant to or in 
advancement of a State or organizational policy/plan) and anyhow directed 
against civilians (meaning people that are not taking any active role in the 
hostilities). 
   
Therefore, elements 1 and 2 of the definition of rape set up in the Elements of 
Crimes must have been perpetrated in this context so that the unlawful act can 
be regarded as a crime against humanity of rape, and be under the jurisdiction of 
the International Criminal Court.  
 
 
672 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 7, Introduction (3) 
673 Arsanjani, M. H. (1999), pp. 22-43 




4.3.1.(iii).(d)-2. Element 4 
 
"The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended 
the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population."676 
 
In paragraph 2 of the introduction to Article 7 of the Elements of the Crimes, after 
establishing that the last two elements for each crime against humanity actually 
describe the context in which the conduct must be perpetrated, the drafters 
clarified that  
 
“the requisite … knowledge of a widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population … should not be interpreted as 
requiring proof that the perpetrator had knowledge of all 
characteristics of the attack or the precise details of the plan or 
policy of the State or organization. In the case of an emerging 
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, the 
intent clause of the last element indicates that this mental 
element is satisfied if the perpetrator intended to further such an 
attack.”677 
 
Further, the Elements of the Crimes explains that the existence of the factors 
knowledge and intent can be drawn from important facts and circumstances.678 
 
4.3.1.(iii).(e). War crime of rape 
 
As explained above, regarding the demarcation of rape as a war crime and as a 
crime against humanity in the Elements of Crimes, the first two elements present 
literally the same wording, purely being different the last elements, which dispose 
about the context of the crime.679 
 
Moreover, since war crimes are actually bi-folded (they can take place in either 
an international armed conflict or an armed conflict not of an international 
character), the Preparatory Commission elaborated two sets of elements of 
crimes for the war crime of rape: one for rape related to an international armed 
conflict, (Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-1); and another for rape associated with an armed 
conflict not of an international character (Article 8 (2) (e) (vi)-1). Once more, the 
distinction lies on the contextual elements. 
 
 Certainly, Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-1 enlisted the following as context elements: 
 
“3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated 
with an international armed conflict.  
 
 
676 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 7 (1) (g)-1, Element 4 
677 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 7, Introduction (2) 
678 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, General Introduction (3) 
679 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, General Introduction, (7) (c), Arts. 7, 
Introduction (2), (1) (g)-1; 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-1, (e) (vi)-1; Amnesty International (2011), p.11 
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4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an armed conflict”,680 
 
whilst Article 8 (2) (e) (vi)-1 enumerated these elements: 
 
“3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated 
with an armed conflict not of an international character.  
 
4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an armed conflict.”681 
 
4.3.1.(iii).(e)-1. Element 3 
 
To amount to a war crime, the conduct has to be carried out within the context of 
and be connected with an armed conflict, which can present either an 
international or a municipal character.  
 
In the ICTY Tadić case, the Trial Chamber stated that “armed conflict” exists  
 
“whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or 
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities 
and organised armed groups or between such groups within a 
State.”682 
 
In a footnote inserted to element 4 of the war crime of willful killing, the drafters 
clarified that:683 
 
"[t]he term “international armed conflict” includes military 
occupation. This footnote also applies to the corresponding 
element in each crime under article 8 (2) (a).”684 
 
This is as far as the Element of Crimes went to set up the boundaries of an 
international armed conflict, so it is necessary to recourse to Common article 2 of 
the four Geneva Conventions which states:685 
 
“the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war 
or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or 
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is 
not recognized by one of them.”686 
 
The nexus that ought to exist between the conduct of the perpetrator and the 
armed conflict is relevant insofar as it sets up the distinction between war crimes 
and common criminal practice. Further, it clarifies that determined war crimes can 
 
680 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-1 (3), (4) 
681 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8 (2) (e) (vi)-1 (3), (4) 
682 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić a.k.a. “Dule”, Case No. IT-94-1. Trial Chamber, Opinion 
and Judgment, pp. 24, 25 (7 May 1997) 
683 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art.  8 (2) (a) (i) 
684 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8 (2) (a) (i)-4, footnote 34  
685 Dörmann, K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 300-322 
686 Geneva Conventions I, II, III, and IV, Art. 2  
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be carried out following the termination of the conflict (as for instance, a conduct 
that amounts to a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 is 
committed subsequently to a general halt of military activity).687  
 
The term “associated with” was intended to mirror the case law of the “ad hoc” 
International Criminal Tribunals which rendered necessary the establishment of 
a sufficient connection between the crimes and the armed conflict. Indeed, 
criminal acts which are not related to an armed conflict are not regarded war 
crimes.688 
 
In the Kunarac case, the Appeals chamber affirmed that  
 
“[w]hat ultimately distinguishes a war crime from a purely 
domestic offence is that a war crime is shaped by or dependent 
upon the environment – the armed conflict – in which it is 
committed.  It need not have been planned or supported by some 
form of policy.  The armed conflict need not have been causal to 
the commission of the crime, but the existence of an armed 
conflict must, at a minimum, have played a substantial part in the 
perpetrator’s ability to commit it, his decision to commit it, the 
manner in which it was committed or the purpose for which it was 
committed.  Hence, if it can be established … that the perpetrator 
acted in furtherance of or under the guise of the armed conflict, 
it would be sufficient to conclude that his acts were closely 
related to the armed conflict.”689  
 
4.3.1.(iii).(e)-2. Element 4  
 
The delegates in charge of defining the elements of crimes were not ready to 
accept an exclusively objective requirement, and thus included a mental 
requirement- “the awareness of the factual circumstances that established the 
existence of an armed conflict.”690  
 
Regarding such requirement, the own Elements of Crimes made it clear that the 
awareness “is implicit in the terms “took place in the context of and was 
associated with””.691 
 
In the introduction to Article 8 War crimes, the drafting States affirmed that 
 
 “[w]ith respect to the last two elements listed for each crime:  
 
 
687 Dörmann, K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 300-322 
688 Ibidem   
689 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al. The Appeals Chamber, Judgment, p. 17, 
para. 58 (12 June 2002) 
690 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-1, (e) (vi)-1; 
Dörmann, K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 300-322 
691 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8, Introduction (c) 
137 
 
(a) There is no requirement for a legal evaluation by the 
perpetrator as to the existence of an armed conflict or its 
character as international or noninternational;  
 
(b) In that context there is no requirement for awareness by the 
perpetrator of the facts that established the character of the 
conflict as international or noninternational;  
 
(c) There is only a requirement for the awareness of the factual 
circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict 
that is implicit in the terms “took place in the context of and was 
associated with”.”692 
 
Article 8, in its subparagraphs (a) and (b) states that the perpetrator is required 
neither to carry out a legal evaluation in relation to the existence of an armed 
conflict or its character (international or not) nor to be aware of the facts that 
defined the character of the conflict as international or municipal. In fact, legal 
evaluation and knowledge of the character assumed by the armed conflict are 
spared, not constituting requirements for the configuration of the crime.693 
 
However, some sort of knowledge is demanded (a threshold lower than the one 
inserted in Article 30 of the Rome Statute, which, addressing the mental element 
issue, demands the material elements to be carried out with intent and 
knowledge): the perpetrator has to be conscious of factual junctures that brought 
about the armed conflict.694  
 
Ostensibly, the perpetrator ought to be merely aware that his unlawful acts and 
an armed conflict are intertwined. Indeed, the criminal is only required to be 
conscious that the rape was connected with the armed conflict.695   
 
Such interpretation is coherent with Article 8 (1) of the Rome Statute which affirms 
that  
 
“[t]he Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in 
particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of 
a large-scale commission of such crimes.”696 
 
This provision means that the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over 
war crimes particularly when carried out in a systematic (as part of a plan or 
policy) or widespread (as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes). Thus, 
the perpetrator must realize that the rape is inset in the hostilities, being a “piece 
in the puzzle”.  
 
 
692 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8, Introduction (a) (b) (c) 
693 Ibidem 
694 Rome Statute, Art. 30 (1); Dörmann, K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 300-
322; Dörmann, K. (2000), pp. 771-796. 
695 Ibidem 
696 Rome Statute, Art. 8 (1) 
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All and all, so that rape can be tried before the International Criminal Court as a 
war crime, it must be perpetrated in the context of and be associated with an 
(international or domestic) armed conflict, and the perpetrator must be aware of 




In short, the crime of rape in the Rome Statute, means the following: 
 




“The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct 
resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of 
the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal 
or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part 




1-) Invasion resulting in penetration of the body of a person. 
 
2-) If the victim is suffering the invasion/penetration, there are 2 possibilities: 
 
a-) invasion of any part of the victim´s body with a sexual organ; or 
b-) invasion of the anal or genital opening of the victim with either an object or 
any other part of the body.  
 
3-) If the victim is compelled to carry out the invasion, the victim is forced to insert 




“The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or 
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, 
detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against 
such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a 
coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a 














4-) By taking advantage of a coercive environment;  
 





“The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or 




1-) The invasion was carried out as part of an attack; 
 
2-) The attack must be widespread or systematic; 
  
3-) The attack must be directed against a civilian population (independently if it is 
systematic or widespread). 
 
Element 4  
 
“The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended 
the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack 




1-) The perpetrator´s knowledge that the invasion was part of the attack described 
in element 3; or 
 
2-) The perpetrator´s aspiration that the invasion would constitute an integrating 
part of the attack. 
 
4.3.1. (iii).(f)-2. War crime of rape  
 
Elements 1 and 2  
 




“The conduct took place in the context of and was associated 





1-) The invasion was perpetrated in the context of an international armed conflict, 




2-) The invasion was associated with such armed conflict. 
 
Element 4  
 
“The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that 




1-) The perpetrator´s awareness of factual circumstances that gave cause to the 
existence of the armed conflict. 
 
4.3.1.(iii).(g). Subsequent evolution of the definition of 
the crime of rape 
 
The rape definition of the Elements of Crimes did not consist in the ultimate 
definition of such crime in the international law scenario since a posterior 
judgment of the ITCY in the Kunarac case came up with yet another definition of 
rape, grounded on the non-consent issue.697  
 
Indeed, in its judgment, the Appeal Chamber of the Kunarac case understood 
necessary, for the configuration of its mechanical definition of rape, that  
 
“such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim. 
Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a 
result of the victim’s free will, assessed in the context of the 
surrounding circumstances. The mens rea is the intention to 
effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs 
without the consent of the victim.”698  
 
The Appeal Chamber also explained that, when the Trial Chamber of the Kunarac 
case regarded the non-consent as the “conditio sine qua non” for the 
configuration of rape, it had intended to clarify the relation between force and 
consent, rather than contradict the findings of the Tribunal in the Furundžija Trial 
Judgment. The fact that Trial Chamber of the Furundžija case had considered the 
element force as the defining feature of rape actually meant that force (or its 
threat) implies one of two possibilities:699   
 
- the use of physical violence finishes nullifying the feasibility of a potential 
resistance, or  
 
- the circumstances are so coercive that renders consent impossible.700  
 
697 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 135 
698 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T. 
Trial Chamber, Judgment, para. 460 (22 February 2001) 
699 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T. 
Trial Chamber, Judgment, para. 458 (22 February 2001) 
700ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T. Trial 
Chamber, Judgment, para. 185 (22 February 2001); ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, 




As a consequence, force or threat of force clearly indicates the inexistence of 
consent. Nevertheless, force does not amount to an element “per se” of rape 
because there are “factors other than force which would render an act of sexual 
penetration non-consensual or non-voluntary on the part of the victim.”701  
 
The Appeal Chamber of such case further stated that there are such coercive 
circumstances which annihilate any chance of consent, causing it to be 
unattainable. Therefore, both force and coercive circumstances can make 
consent to sexual activity impossible, and the non-consent is the “registered 
mark” of rape in accordance with the findings of this Chamber in such case.702 
 
The Kunarac case had an important influence on the ulterior case law of the 
ICTR, the European Court of Human Rights, as well as of the own ICTY.703 
 
The different definitions of rape adopted in the case law of the International 
Criminal Tribunals have given raise to discussions among academics in relation 
to the benefits of the distinct models, based on the elements force (like the ICTY 
Furundžija case), coercion (as the ICTR Akayesu case) or non-consent (e.g. the 
ICTY Kunarac case).704 
 
Some authors judge that is not appropriate to give emphasis to the element force 
when defining the crime of rape for such approach does not pay proper regard to 
the person´s autonomy. Certainly, the Preparatory Commission´s model of rape 
inserted in the Elements of Crimes (grounded on force and coercion) can be 
considered as coming behind the ICTY´s approach in what concerns the 
extension of the protection dispensed towards sexual autonomy (for the latter 
clearly focused on the element non-consent in the Kunarac case).705  
 
Nevertheless, other authors consider that a concept of rape whose focus is on 
consent is not suitable in circumstances of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes, rendering the application of the “non-consent standard” 
unsatisfactory in the supranational criminal law scenario. Further, the not 
inclusion of “non-consent” among the cornerstone elements of rape can be 
considered beneficial for the victims: it avoids the degrading need of delving in 




701 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T. 
Trial Chamber, Judgment, para. 458 (22 February 2001); ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub 
Kunarac, et al. The Appeals Chamber, Judgment, para. 129 (12 June 2002) 
702 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al. The Appeals Chamber, Judgment, paras. 
132-133 (12 June 2002) 
703 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 136; Eriksson, M. (2011), pp. 390, 424 
704 Eriksson, M. (2011), pp. 391, 429 
705 Cryer, R., Friman, H., Robinson, D., & Wilmshurst, E. (2014), p. 210; Eriksson, M. (2011), pp. 
425, 429 
706 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), pp.120-123, 136; Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 391, 429; Halley, J. 
(2008), pp. 1-120; Kalosieh, A. (2003), pp. 121- 136; Schomburg, W., & Peterson, I. (2007); pp. 
121-140; United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on systematic rape, sexual slavery 
and slavery-like practices during armed conflict, para. 25 
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Undoubtedly, the adequacy of a concept of rape grounded on non-consent has 
been especially challenged. For instance, Gay McDougall, UN Special 
Rapporteur on Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices 
during Armed Conflict, understood that707  
 
“the manifestly coercive circumstances that exist in all armed 
conflict situations establish a presumption of non-consent and 
negates the need for the prosecution to establish a lack of 
consent as an element of the crime.”708   
 
de Brouwer (2005), has vehemently positioned against the introduction of “non-
consent standard”709 in the elements of crimes of rape sustaining that in the 
situation of genocide, crimes against humanity and armed conflict, every case of 
rape (if not all) will have been perpetrated under force, threat of force, coercion 
or coercive circumstances, and, thus, it is tautological to inquire if there was 
consent.710 She advocates that “removing consent as an element of the crime of 
rape or as a defence if coercive circumstances have been proved.”711  
 
In conclusion, there is room for more than one definition of rape in the 
supranational law panorama. The approach adopted in practice by International 
Criminal Court and the way it has been addressing such crime will be analised in 
the study of its preliminary investigations, situations and cases.712 
 




The crime of sexual slavery relates to enslavement through recurrent rape or 
sexual abuse to compel the victim to dispense sexual services. Its concept had 
not been included in treaties of international humanitarian law or distinct 
international conventions before the Rome Statute even though the crime of 
slavery “lato sensu” had been addressed in several international conventions. 
Surely, the crime of sexual slavery had no precedents in being expressly 
recognised as an independent crime in the international criminal law scenario, 
and was codified for the first time ever in the Statute.713  
 
The ICTR and the ICTY Statutes do not differentiate sexual slavery as an 
independent crime, exclusively enumerating the crime of enslavement. In the 
 
707 Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 391 
708 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on systematic rape, sexual slavery and 
slavery-like practices during armed conflict, para. 25 
709 Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 391 
710 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 120 
711 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 121 
712 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 135 
713 Bedont, B. (1999). In Lattanzi, F., & Schabas, W. A. (eds.), pp. 183-210; Cottier, M. (2008). In 
Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 431-454; de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 137; United 
Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like 
practices during armed conflict, para. 28 and Annex, para.12 (1998); United Nations, Economic 
and Social Council. Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and 
Slavery-Like Practices During Armed Conflict, Update to the final report submitted by Ms. Gay J. 
McDougall, Special Rapporteur, paras. 9, 51 (6 June 1998) 
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ICTY Kunarac case (the first in which the “ad hoc” tribunal had to deal with the 
crime of enslavement as a crime against humanity) two of the defendants were 
accused of committing "rape" and "enslavement" as crimes against humanity. 
In the indictment these accused were charged for enslaving women and young 
girls and subjecting them to reiterated rape and other forms of sexual violence 
(inclusive of sexual entertainment and forced nudity), during weeks or even 
months.714  
 
Regarding the crime of slavery, the Trial Chamber of this case established that   
 
“the actus reus of the violation is the exercise of any or all of 
the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person.  
The mens rea of the violation consists in the intentional 
exercise of such powers.”715 
 
In spite of the fact that the main objective of the perpetrators was to obtain 
sexual servitude from the victims (the women and girls being forced to perform 
domestic chores was rather collateral), in its findings the Trial Chamber did not 
always associate the crimes of sexual violence to the enslavement. Further, 
when the Chamber did relate them, it merely considers the sexual violence 
crimes as one of the determinants of enslavement:716  
 
“[u]nder this definition, indications of enslavement include 
elements of control and ownership; the restriction or control of 
an individual’s autonomy, freedom of choice or freedom of 
movement; and, often, the accruing of some gain to the 
perpetrator.  The consent or free will of the victim is absent.  It 
is often rendered impossible or irrelevant by, for example, the 
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion; the fear of 
violence, deception or false promises; the abuse of power; the 
victim’s position of vulnerability; detention or captivity, 
psychological oppression or socio-economic condition.”717 
 
Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights on Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-
like practices during armed conflict stated in her report that 
 
““slavery” should be understood to be the status or condition of a 
person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right 
 
714 Argibay, C. M. (2003), pp. 375-389; de Brouwer, A.-M. L.M. (2005), p. 89; United Nations, 
Security Council. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993), 
Art. 5 (c); United Nations, Security Council. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (1994), Art. 3 (c) 
715 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T. 
Trial Chamber, Judgment, para. 540 (22 February 2001) 
716 de Brouwer, A.-M. L.M. (2001), pp. 221-236; de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 92 
717 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, 
Trial Chamber, Judgment, para. 542 (22 February 2001) 
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of ownership are exercised, including sexual access through 
rape or other forms of sexual violence.”718 
 
and reinforced that “[i]n all respects and in all circumstances, sexual slavery is 
slavery and its prohibition is a jus cogens norm.”719  
 
Certainly, as in the ICTY Kunarac case, the focal point of such report is to 
acknowledge that the infraction of sexual freedom through rape or other types 
of sexual violence consists in a power attaching to the right of ownership of a 
person.720 
 
However, the Special Rapporteur also made clear that, for the ends of the 
report, the term “sexual” was used “as an adjective to describe a form of 
slavery, not to denote a separate crime.”721  
 
In spite of such approach, the report considered that the reach of sexual slavery 
was rather ample, as demonstrated by the following extracts: 
 
“practices such as the detention of women in "rape camps" or 
"comfort stations"; forced, temporary "marriages" to soldiers; and 
other practices involving the treatment of women as chattel, are 
both in fact and in law forms of slavery and, as such, violations 
of the peremptory norm prohibiting slavery”722 
and 
 
“[s]exual slavery also encompasses situations where women and 
girls are forced into "marriage", domestic servitude or other 
forced labour that ultimately involves forced sexual activity, 
including rape by their captors.”723 
 
As a consequence of how sexual slavery had been addressed in these previous 
instances, during the drafting of the Statute the question if sexual slavery should 
figurate as a crime independent of enslavement was rather controversial.724  
 
Ultimately, the drafters reached a few conclusions: that sexual slavery is a 
prevailing contemporary criminal offence that should be explicitly recognised; that 
forbiddance of sexual slavery was firmly entrenched in the then existing law; that 
the gender-sensitivity the Rome Statute would be boosted by the enlistment of 
 
718 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on systematic rape, sexual slavery and 
slavery-like practices during armed conflict, para. 27 (1998) 
719 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on systematic rape, sexual slavery and 
slavery-like practices during armed conflict, para. 30 (1998) 
720 Argibay, C. M. (2003), pp. 375-389 
721 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on systematic rape, sexual slavery and 
slavery-like practices during armed conflict, para. 30 (1998) 
722  United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on systematic rape, sexual slavery and 
slavery-like practices during armed conflict, para. 8 (1998) 
723 Ibidem 
724 Dörmann, K. (2001), p. 480; Oosterveld, V. (2004), pp. 605-651; Oosterveld, V. (2011). In 
Sadat, L. N. (ed.), pp. 78-101 
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such crime; and that sexual slavery presents a conceptual distinction from 
determined other kinds of enslavement or slavery-like practices.725  
 
As a result, the Rome Statute enumerated amidst its criminal offences not only 
enslavement but also sexual slavery, thus acknowledging the sexual character 
informing the latter. In fact, to include the crime of sexual slavery as a separate 
crime (rather than allowing it to be merely treated as a form of enslavement) 
shows the recognition of the criminal sexual nature intrinsic to the sexual 
slavery.726 
 
Additionally, it was disputed the issue of how differentiate sexual slavery from 
enforced prostitution. The criminalisation of sexual slavery in contrast to enforced 
prostitution was relevant for it flashes on the strong coercive aspect involving the 
situations in which a person is obliged to dispense sexual services. “Enforced 
prostitution” has been regarded as insinuating some degree of voluntariness that 
is inexistent when women are subjugated to conditions akin to slaves. It casts a 
shadow on the profuse violence, control and coercion that are typical to sexual 
slavery, as it will be further discussed below.727   
 
In face of that, Article 7 (1) (g), Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii), and Article 8 (2) (e) (vi) 
expressly included the crime of sexual slavery among the sexual and gender-
based crimes.    
 
In the Elements of Crimes, the Preparatory Commission reached an agreement 
on the elements of crimes of sexual slavery after protracted debates on the 
slavery question.728  
 
Hence, first it is necessary to proceed to an analysis the reach of the crime of 
slavery.  
 
4.3.2.(i).(a). Slavery and enslavement  
 
In accordance with the 1926 Slavery Convention, slavery is  
 
“the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the 
powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.”729 
 
Article 7(a) of the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, 
the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery states:   
 
 
725 Oosterveld, V. (2004), pp. 605-651; Oosterveld, V. (2011). In Sadat, L. N. (ed.), pp. 78-101 
726 Bedont, B. (1999). In Lattanzi, F., & Schabas, W. A. (eds.), pp. 183-210; de Brouwer, A.-M. L. 
M. (2005), p. 137 
727 Bedont, B. (1999). In Lattanzi, F., & Schabas, W. A. (eds.), pp. 183-210; Dörmann, K. (2001), 
p. 48; Oosterveld, V. (2004), pp. 605-651; Oosterveld, V. (2011). In Sadat, L. N. (ed.), pp. 78-101; 
Women´s Caucus for Gender Justice for an ICC. Recommendations and Commentary for 
December 1997 PrepCom on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, paras. WC5.6-
6 to WC5.6-11 (1997).  
728 Oosterveld, V. (2004), pp. 605-651; Oosterveld, V. (2011). In Sadat, L. N. (ed.), pp. 78-101 
729 League of Nations. Slavery Convention, Art. 1 (1) (1926).  
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“´Slavery´ means, as defined in the Slavery Convention of 
1926, the status or condition of a person over whom any or all 
of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised, 
and ´slave´ means a person in such condition or status.”730 
 
In the Kunarac case, the ICTY, leveraged by the 1926 Slavery Convention, 
established the following concept (also shared by the ICTR):731 
 
“enslavement as a crime against humanity in customary 
international law consisted of the exercise of any or all of the 
powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person.”732 
 
The Rome Statute, albeit inspired by these definitions, preferred to set up an 
amplified definition of enslavement:733  
 
“the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such 
power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular 
women and children.”734 
 
The first obvious difference between the two concepts of slavery and the 
definition of enslavement found in the Rome Statute is the absence of “the 
status or condition” in the latter. This topic will be developed below.  
  
Besides, the introduction of “trafficking in persons” was a novelty. “Trafficking 
in persons” was defined in the 2001 United Nations Palermo Protocol and the 
same concept was inserted in the 2005 Council of Europe Convention:735     
 
“‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by 
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, 
of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of 
a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of 
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having 
control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. 
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the 
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, 
forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, 
servitude or the removal of organs.”736 
 
730 United Nations. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, 
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Art. 7 (a) (1956).  
731 Bassiouni, M. C. (2011), p. 378  
732 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T.  
Trial Chamber, Judgment, para. 539 (22 February 2001) 
733 Bedont, B. (1999). In Lattanzi, F., & Schabas, W. A. (eds.), pp. 183-210 
734 Rome Statute, Art. 7 (2) (c) 
735 Allain, J. (2007), p. 17, para. 33; Bedont, B. (1999). In Lattanzi, F., & Schabas, W. A. (eds.), 
pp. 183-210 
736 Council of Europe. Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, Art. 4 (a) (2005); 




Therefore, the term “slavery” (one of the forms in which enslavement is 
manifested) is included in the definition of “trafficking in persons” . In spite of 
that, “slavery” should be prosecuted before the International Criminal Court 
under the head of the crime of enslavement.737   
   
Furthermore, it is significant the express remark “in particular women and 
children". In fact, women and girls are especially susceptible to trafficking for 
the ends of sexual exploitation, and for forced labour or services as well.738   
 
The common element in these exerts of the 1926 Slavery Convention, the 1956 
Supplementary Convention and the Rome Statute is “the powers attaching to 
the right of ownership”.739 
 
4.3.2.(i).(b). Ownership v. the powers attaching to the 
right of ownership 
 
The concept of ownership is socially constructed, being usually regarded as 
one´s “priorital right over something”. It could be said that ownership is a 
conjunct of rights, the legal ability to, for example, buy, sell, or possess a 
person and, upon challenge, to have such a right vindicated in a court of law.740  
 
In relation to slavery, ownership implies the right to possess and use a slave, 
to compel and obtain profit from the slave’s labour, as well as to buy, sell, or 
destroy a slave, although even under Roman Law it was criminal to kill slaves 
or to use them as gladiators without the magistrate´s permission.741 
 
However, ownership is not the fundamental element informing the crime of 
slavery in the international law scenario. Instead, the heart of such criminal 
offence lies on “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership.”742  
 
In fact, the concept of slavery is not centred on the legal right of ownership, but 
rather related to the powers attached to the right of ownership. To exercise the 
right of ownership over a person is essentially distinct to exercise the powers 
attached to the right of ownership. The distinction between these two elements 
sets apart slavery “de jure” and slavery “de facto”.743  
 
 
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, Art. 3 (a) (2000) 
737 Allain, J. (2007), p. 17, para. 33  
738 Argibay, C. M. (2003), pp. 375-389; Bedont, B. (1999). In Lattanzi, F., & Schabas, W. A. (eds.), 
pp. 183-210; United Nations, General Assembly. Trafficking in women and girls (19 December 
2006). 
739 Allain, J. (2007), p. 3, para. 3 
740 Allain, J. (2007), pp. 3, 10-11, paras. 3, 15 
741 Allain, J. (2007), p. 11, para. 16; Johnston, D. (1999), p. 42 
742 Allain, J. (2007), p. 3, para. 3; Attachment, Amicus Curiae on Observations Related to Sexual 
Slavery Submitted by Queen’s University Belfast Human Rights Centre, pp. 1-24 (2009). 
743 Allain, J. (2007), pp. 11, 21, paras. 17, 45 
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Both the 1926 Slavery Convention and the Article 7(a) of the 1956 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and 
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery refer to  
 
“the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the 
powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised”744  
 
when defining slavery. 
 
The expression “status or condition” separate slavery “de jure” and slavery “de 
facto”: slavery as “status” is a legal recognition of slavery, whilst slavery as 
“condition” consists in slavery in fact, based on social custom, not endorsed by 
law.745   
 
The drafters of the Rome Statute, when setting up the definition of enslavement, 
removed the phrase “status or condition”, abiding for “the exercise of any or all 
of the powers attaching to the right of ownership”.746 
 
This entails that one would hold the powers of ownership except for the fact 
that the right of ownership is not recognized in law. Surely, the “owner” 
exercises powers attached to the right of ownership over his/her illegal “chattel” 
(the slave “de facto”), albeit does not exercise any legal rights of ownership. 
He/she is not entitled to bring a claim before a court of law, but can exercise the 
powers attached to the right of ownership (as, for instance, possession): it is 
equivalent to a right of ownership aside from the fact that it is illegal to own an 
individual.747 
 
As a consequence, within the definition of slavery, the question is not if a person 
“owns” another from a legal perspective, but rather if a person can exercise a 
power of ownership, as, for example, being able to transfer an individual without 
his/her consent.748 
 
In a 1953 Report, the United Nations Secretary-General, after addressing the 
Roman Law nature of the concept of slavery inserted in the 1926 Slavery 
Convention, considered the which are the characteristics of the various powers 
attaching to the right of ownership:749 
 
“1. the individual of servile status may be made the object of a 
purchase;   
 
2. the master may use the individual of servile status, and in 
particular his capacity to work, in an absolute manner, without 
 
744 Slavery Convention, Art. 1; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the 
Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Art. 7 (a) 
745 Allain, J. (2007), p. 12, para. 21; Slavery Convention, Art. 1  
746 Allain, J. (2007), pp.12-13, para. 22; Rome Statute, Art. 7 (2) (c) 
747 Allain, J. (2007), pp. 12-13, 21, paras. 22,55 
748 Attachment, Amicus Curiae on Observations Related to Sexual Slavery Submitted by Queen’s 
University Belfast Human Rights Centre, pp. 1-24 (2009). 
749 Allain, J. (2007), p. 13, para. 24 
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any restriction other than that which might be expressly 
provided by law;   
 
3. the products of labour of the individual of servile status 
become the property of the master without any compensation 
commensurate to the value of the labour;   
 
4. the ownership of the individual of servile status can be 
transferred to another person;   
 
5. the servile status is permanent, that is to say, it cannot be 
terminated by the will of the individual subject to it;   
 
6. the servile status is transmitted ipso facto to descendants of 
the individual having such status.”750 
 
When these six characteristics of “the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership” are analysed under the prism of the global definition of slavery (“the 
status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to 
the right of ownership are exercised”) what stems are elements which, 
separately or conjunctly considered, amount to slavery in law.751 
 
Moreover, such characteristics of power attaching to the right of ownership 
established in the Memorandum of the United Nations Secretary-General 
provide authoritative consistence to the definition of enslavement found in the 
Rome Statute.752 
 
Therefore, the inclusion of “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to 
the right of ownership” (without mentioning status or condition) in the Rome 
Statute indicates that enslavement of a person does not imply possessing a 
legal right of ownership over such person, but rather the powers connected to 
such rights except for the fact that ownership is illegal. In consonance with 
contemporary law (that does not shelter the legal right of ownership over a 
person, thus, not foreseeing a remedy for a claim based on such grounds), the 
Statute attained to “the powers attached to the right of ownership”, which 
corresponds to slavery “de facto”, as opposed to “the legal right of ownership”, 
which amounts to slavery “de jure”.753  
 
So, the crime of sexual slavery, being a kind of slavery, would be inherently 






750 United Nations, Economic and Social Council. Slavery, the Slave Trade, and other forms of 
Servitude (Report of the Secretary-General), p. 28 (1953).  
751 Allain, J. (2007), p. 11, para. 17 
752 Attachment, Amicus Curiae on Observations Related to Sexual Slavery Submitted by Queen’s 
University Belfast Human Rights Centre, pp. 1-24 (2009). 
753 Allain, J. (2007), p. 11-13, paras. 17, 22 
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4.3.2.(ii). “Actus reus”  
 
4.3.2.(ii).(a). Introduction  
 
As explained above, the negotiations of the sexual and gender-based crimes as 
crimes against humanity and war crimes progressed together during the 
enactment of the Rome Statute. Following the parallelism of such discussions, 
the Preparatory Commission inserted identical “actus reus” (elements 1 and 2) in 
the elements of crimes of the sexual and gender-based crimes when defining 
them under the heads crimes against humanity and war crimes in the Elements 
of Crimes.  
  
The crime of sexual slavery is no exception to the approach applied by the 
Commission throughout the definitions of the cluster of criminal offences object 
of the present study, and, thus, elements 1 and 2 found in Article 7 (1) (g)-2 Crime 
against humanity of sexual slavery also appear in Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-2 War 
crime of sexual slavery and Article 8 (2) (e) (vi)-2 War crime of sexual slavery. 
 
4.3.2.(ii).(b). Element 1 
 
“The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to 
the right of ownership over one or more persons, such as by 
purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or 
persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of 
liberty.”754  
 
By inserting such wording in the first element, the Preparatory Commission 
clearly preferred to start focusing on the element slavery instead of the sexual 
aspect.755  
 
The Preparatory Commission came up with this element when defining the crime 
against humanity of sexual slavery in the Elements of Crimes. Certainly, when 
establishing the elements of crimes of such sexual offence, the delegates of 
the Commission resolved to insert the first part of the concept of enslavement 
provided by the Rome Statute “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching 
to the right of ownership over a person” for they acknowledged that sexual 
slavery is a form of slavery.756 
 
Subsequently, the exact terms of this element 1 were reproduced by the 
delegates of the Commission when setting up the elements of crimes of the 
crime against humanity of enslavement.757 
 
Element 1 expands on the definition of enslavement brought by the Rome 
Statute (“the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
 
754 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g)-2 (1); 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-2 
(1), (e) (vi)-2 (1) 
755 Attachment, Amicus Curiae on Observations Related to Sexual Slavery Submitted by Queen’s 
University Belfast Human Rights Centre, pp. 1-24 (2009). 
756 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 87; Rome Statute, Art. 7 (2) (c); 
757 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 87 
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ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course 
of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children”). In fact, some 
States considered the concept of enslavement in the Statute rather vague, so 
the United States proposed to provide examples of forms of exercising the 
powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person.758  
 
The expression “such as”, indicating flexibility, was included, being succeeded 
by examples of conducts that amount to “powers attaching to the right of 
ownership”: buying, selling, lending or bartering such person/ persons, or even 
inflicting on them a similar deprivation of freedom.759  
 
The insertion of the “purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person” 
corroborates the idea that “slavery”, as “enslavement” is to be regarded as being 
embodied in not only slavery “de jure” but also slavery “de facto”.  Therefore, in 
relation to enslavement, the Elements of the Crimes accompanied the evolution 
of the constitutive elements of slavery in international law, specifically exercising 
“any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership”.760 
 
Beyond supplying examples of “the powers attaching to the right of ownership”, 
element 1 adds the phrase “or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of 
liberty”. The conjunction “or” at the beginning of such phrase should be 
interpreted as a continuation of the examples “such as by purchasing, selling, 
lending or bartering such a person or persons”, forming part of the sequence of 
instances of “the powers attaching to the right of ownership”. Therefore, a “similar 
deprivation of liberty” is very much alike to the purchasing of an individual, the 
selling of an individual, or the lending or bartering of an individual. Since these 
are illustrations of “the powers attaching to the right of ownership”, “similar 
deprivation of liberty” does not present any meaning if separate from these 
powers (and indicates that the roster of powers is non-exhaustive).761 
 
However, there were a few concerns regarding the wording of element 1. Firstly, 
the substitution of the word “includes” in the definition of enslavement figuring in 
the Rome Statute by the term “such as” could give rise to doubts regarding an 
eventual attempt by the drafters of the Elements of Crimes to restrict the reach of 
the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over 
a person. In fact, “includes” could be regarded as covering a broad reach, while 
“such as” followed by concrete examples could be understood as a limit to the 
conducts that amount to enslavement, instead of a way of conferring 
extensibility to the definition. Moreover, the alternative “or by imposing on them 
a similar deprivation of liberty” was criticised for being rather narrow.762 
 
758 Allain, J. (2013), p. 275; de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 138; La Haye, E. (2001). In Lee, 
R. S. K. & Friman, H. (eds.), pp. 184-18; Rome Statute, Art. 7 (2) (c) 
759 Allain, J. (2013), p. 275 
760 Allain, J. (2007), p. 18, para. 35 
761 Ambos, K. (2014), p. 99; Attachment, Amicus Curiae on Observations Related to Sexual 
Slavery Submitted by Queen’s University Belfast Human Rights Centre, pp. 1-24 (2009); Special 
Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL). The Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, 
Santigie Borbor Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T. Trial Chamber II, Judgment, pp. 218-219, para. 
709 (20 June 2007) 





Also, many drafters were worried that “buying, selling, lending or bartering” 
appeared to be based on some sort of commercial advantage. This was rather 
troublesome since sexual slavery can be, and in most instances is, not connected 
to any commercial benefit (as was the case of the comfort women during Second 
World War).763 
 
In face of these issues, and in the interest of repelling the idea that the crime of 
sexual slavery required a commercial or pecuniary exchange, the concerned 
drafters insisted in inserting in the elements of crimes of sexual slavery a footnote 
originally conceived for the crime of enslavement, clarifying the boundaries of 
the expression “by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty”:764  
 
“It is understood that such deprivation of liberty may, in some 
circumstances, include exacting forced labour or otherwise 
reducing a person to servile status as defined in the 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the 
Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery 
of 1956. It is also understood that the conduct described in this 
element includes trafficking in persons, in particular women and 
children.”765 
 
In accordance with the 1930 Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory 
Labour, 
 
“forced or compulsory labour shall mean all work or service which 
is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and 
for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.”766  
 
The term “servile status”, pursuant the disposing of the aforementioned footnote, 
should be conceived as in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of 
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 
1956. Such convention establishes that "a person of servile status" means a 
person in the condition or status resulting from any of the following institutions or 
practices: debt bondage, serfdom, forced marriage and child exploitation.767 
 
 
763 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 87; Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, 
Arts. 7 (1) (c), Element 1, Footnote 11; 8 (2) (b) (xxii), Element 1, footnote 53, (e) (vi), Element 
1, footnote 66 
764 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 87; Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, 
Arts. 7 (1) (c), Element 1, Footnote 11; 8 (2) (b) (xxii), Element 1, Footnote 53, (e) (vi), Element 
1, Footnote 66; Hall, C. K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 237-255 
765 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (c), Element 1, Footnote 
11; 8 (2) (b) (xxii), Element 1, Footnote 53, (e) (vi), Element 1, Footnote 66  
766 International Labour Organisation. Forced Labour Convention, Convention concerning Forced or 
Compulsory Labour, Art. 2 (1) (28 June 1930) 
767 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (c), Element 1, Footnote 
11; 8 (2) (b) (xxii), Element 1, Footnote 53, (e) (vi), Element 1, footnote 66; Supplementary 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar 
to Slavery, Arts. 1 (a) (b) (c) (d), 7 (b) 
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As before mentioned, “trafficking in persons” was defined in Article 3(a) of the 
United Nations’ (2000) Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children. 
 
The goal of the drafters to provide such instances of “a similar deprivation of 
liberty” was to enable sexual violence offences to be tried as the crimes against 
humanity of enslavement or sexual slavery regardless of proof that the 
perpetrator obtained a pecuniary advantage. Certainly, various of the examples 
do not necessarily entail a commercial advantage (debt bondage, forced 
marriage, child exploitation), and the result is that the term “similar”, which 
appears in the expression “by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty”, 
rests detached from the concept of commercial benefit. Furthermore, debt 
bondage eliminates the need to demonstrate that the victims were confined in a 
determined place.768    
 
This approach of the drafters of the Elements of Crimes is in accordance with the 
Special Rapporteur understanding that  
 
“based on customary law interpretations of the crime of slavery, 
and thus sexual slavery, there are no requirements of any 
payment or exchange; of any physical restraint, detention or 
confinement for any set or particular length of time; nor is there a 
requirement of legal disenfranchisement. Nonetheless, these 
and other factors may be taken into account in determining 
whether a "status or condition" of slavery exists. While the most 
commonly recognized form of slavery involves the coerced 
performance of physical labour or service of some kind, again, 
this is merely a factor to be considered in determining whether a 
"status or condition" exists, which transforms an act, such as 
rape, into sexual slavery. It is the status or condition of being 
enslaved which differentiates sexual slavery from other crimes of 
sexual violence, such as rape.”769 
 
Additionally, the Kunarac case asserts: 
 
“indications of enslavement include elements of control and 
ownership; the restriction or control of an individual’s 
autonomy, freedom of choice or freedom of movement; and, 
often, the accruing of some gain to the perpetrator.  The 
consent or free will of the victim is absent.  It is often rendered 
impossible or irrelevant by, for example, the threat or use of 
force or other forms of coercion; the fear of violence, deception 
or false promises; the abuse of power; the victim’s position of 
 
768 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), pp. 89, 138; de Brouwer, A.-M. L.M. (2011). In Jones, J., 
Grear, A., Fenton, R. A., and Stevenson, K. (eds.), pp. 201-212; Elements of Crimes of the 
International Criminal Court, Art. 8 (2) (b) (xxii), Element 1, footnote 53, (e) (vi), Element 1, 
footnote 66 
769 United Nations, Economic and Social Council. Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Systematic 
Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices During Armed Conflict, Update to the final report 
submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur, para. 50 
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vulnerability; detention or captivity, psychological oppression or 
socio-economic conditions.  Further indications of enslavement 
include exploitation; the exaction of forced or compulsory 
labour or service, often without remuneration and often, though 
not necessarily, involving physical hardship; sex; prostitution; 
and human trafficking.”770 
 
Consequently, the Preparatory Commission intended the phrase “by imposing on 
them a similar deprivation of liberty” to have a broad interpretation, subsuming 
forced labour, servile status, and trafficking in persons, in particular women and 
children. In fact, the elements of crimes of the sexual slavery crime were 
purposefully constructed so as to prevent a rather narrow interpretation of such 
offence.771 
 
In conclusion, this element, based on the crime of enslavement, is focused on 
ownership (chattel slavery) and deprivation of liberty.772  
 
4.3.2.(ii).(c). Element 2  
 
“The perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in 
one or more acts of a sexual nature.”773  
 
Element 2 addresses the sexual aspect of the crime by stating that the perpetrator 
causes the victim(s) to engage in at least one act of a sexual nature. It 
differentiates sexual slavery from the enslavement as a crime against humanity, 
and openly condemns the sexual aspect of the crime of sexual slavery.774 
 
It is noteworthy that the perpetrator must only cause a determined person to 
perform one or more sexual acts, being dispensable proof that the victim was 
coerced by the perpetrator. Undoubtedly, it is not necessary to demonstrate the 
victim´s lack of resistance or consent, although it can be obliquely important in 
the establishment that the perpetrator exercised power attaching to the right of 
ownership.775     
 
Proceeding to an interpretation of element 1 (which regards the powers attaching 
to the right of ownership as forms of deprivation of liberty), it is possible to infer 
that when the perpetrator is causing the person/persons to engage in sexual 
act/acts, he is further depriving such person/persons of liberty.  
 
 
770 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T. 
Trial Chamber, Judgment, para. 542 (22 February 2001) 
771 Cottier, M. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 431-454; de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. 
(2005), p. 87; Henckaerts, J.-M., & Doswald-Beck, L. (2009), pp. 327-330. 
772 Cottier, M. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 431-454; Ambos, K. (2014), p.99 
773 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g)-2 (2); 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-2 
(2), (e) (vi)-2 (2) 
774 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 141 
775 Boot, M. revised by Hall, C. K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 206-216; Cottier, 
M. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 431-454 
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Control and deprivation of a person´s autonomy, as, for instance, to restrict the 
freedom of movement or command the sexual access, can be rendered as 
constitutive elements of slavery.776  
 
Certainly, the persons solely engage in acts of a sexual nature because the 
perpetrator, exercising powers attaching to the right of ownership over such 
persons, cause them to do so. The victims are stripped from their self-
determination with regards to sexual conducts, they lose control over their 
sexuality.  
 
When the Preparatory Commission referred to “at least one act of a sexual 
nature”, it established that the perpetrator can be tried under the head of “sexual 
slavery” even if he caused the victim(s) to engage in solely one punctual act of a 
sexual nature. Thus, the sexual conduct has to be neither reiterated nor 
protracted in time.777  
 
In this regard, the Kunarac case, addressing the crime of enslavement, 
preconises that albeit the duration of the suspected exercise of powers attaching 
to the right of ownership is an element that may be considered when establishing 
if a person was enslaved, the duration does not constitute an element of the 
crime.778 
 
It is important to stress that, in spite of the fact that coercion and long duration 
are not essential for the configuration of the crime of sexual slavery, sexual 
control normally implies some other token of enslavement, e.g. control over 
movement, repetition, duration or coercion.779   
 
Further, the choice of the expression “act of a sexual nature” denotes that the 
drafters envisaged the definition of “sexual slavery” to cover sexual acts “lato 
sensu”, thus, permitting an ample range of sexual acts to be subsumed and 
prosecuted, for the benefit of the victims. Certainly, the sexual acts do not 
compulsorily cover rape, but beyond any doubt worsen the aggression against 
the self-determination of the victim(s).780  
 
As a consequence, in the “actus reus” of the crime of sexual slavery, the 
Preparatory Commission tied together element 1 (“the perpetrator exercised any 
or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one or more persons, 
such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or persons, or 
by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty”) and the requirement that 
the perpetrator must prompt “such person or persons to engage in one or more 




777 Argibay, C. M. (2003), pp. 375-389 
778 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T., 
Trial Chamber, Judgment, para. 542 (22 February 2001); ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub 
Kunarac, et al. The Appeals Chamber, Judgment, p. 37, para.121 (12 June 2002) 
779 Argibay, C. M. (2003), pp. 375-389 
780 Lupig, D. (2009), pp. 433-491 
781 ICRC, Updated version of the Study on customary international humanitarian law, Rule 94 
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In sum, this crime entails restriction of the victim´s autonomy, freedom of 
mobility, and ability to decide questions regarding his/her sexual activity. The 
endurance of serial rapes allied to the impossibility of escaping (and, thus, no 
foreseeable halt of the violence) makes it tremendously barbaric.782  
 
Moreover, the own Elements of Crimes establishes in a footnote to the crime 
against humanity of sexual slavery that: 
 
“Given the complex nature of this crime, it is recognized that its 
commission could involve more than one perpetrator as a part of 
a common criminal purpose.”783 
 
Therefore, in view of the intricate facet of the crime of sexual slavery, its 
perpetration could draw in a bundle of individuals as a constituent of a criminal 
purpose held in common by them.784 
 




Following the same pattern of the crime of rape (and of the other sexual and 
gender-based crimes), the contextual elements incorporated in the crime against 
humanity of sexual slavery and those included in the war crime of sexual slavery 
embody the distinction between the two forms assumed by sexual slavery.785  
 
4.3.2.(iii).(b). Crime against humanity of sexual slavery 
 
4.3.2.(iii).(b)-1. Elements 3 and 4 
 
“3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
 
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended 
the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population.”786 
 
Here, the drafters simply repeated the context elements inserted in the crime 
against humanity of rape. Thus, the same observations inserted in 4.3.1. (iii).(e)-




782 Bassiouni, M. C. (1991), pp. 445-571; Boot, M. revised by Hall, C. K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., 
& Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 206-216; de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 140; Ray, A. E. (1997), pp. 
793-840  
783 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8(2)(b)(xxii), footnote 52, (e)(vi), 
footnote 65 
784 Ambos, K. (2014), p. 99; Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 7 (1) (g)-
2, footnote 17 
785 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g)-2, 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-2, (e) 
(vi)-2 
786 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, 7 (1) (g)-2 (3) (4) 
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Pursuant to the Elements of Crimes, the criminal offence of sexual slavery occurs 
when the perpetrator, exercising any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership over one or more persons, causes such person or persons to engage 
in one or more acts of a sexual nature. 
 
The exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership which ultimately leads 
to the victim(s) unwantedly engage in sexual act(s) amounts to a crime against 
humanity if: 
 
1) it constitutes part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a 
civilian population; and 
 
2) the perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct 
to be part of such attack.  
 
In short, the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership that causes 
the forcedly engagement of the victim(s) in sexual act(s) must integrate a 
widespread (with a large number of victims or covering a sweeping geographical 
area) or systematic (carried out following a plan/ policy) attack (commission of 
multiple acts enlisted in article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute) directed against 
civilians. Also, the perpetrator must be aware that his conduct was part of this 
attack, or at least intend his conduct to integrate the attack, in accordance with 
or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to perpetrate such attack.787 
   
4.3.2.(iii).(c). War crime of sexual slavery 
 
The contextual elements regarding armed conflicts of international character are: 
 
“3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated 
with an international armed conflict.  
 
4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an armed conflict.”788 
 
While the contextual elements related to a domestic armed conflict are: 
 
“3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated 
with an armed conflict not of an international character.  
 
4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an armed conflict.”789 
      
The exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership which culminate in the 
victim(s) unwillingly engaging in sexual act(s) constitutes a war crime if: 
 
- The conduct was carried out in the context of and had association with a 
national or international armed conflict;  
 
787 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 7, Introduction, (2) (3) 
788 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-2 (3) (4) 




- and the perpetrator was conscious of circumstances of fact which led to 
the establishment of the armed conflict.  
 
Therefore, the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership that brings 
about the involuntary engagement of the victim(s) in sexual act(s) must be related 
to a domestic or supranational armed conflict. In fact, there must be a satisfying 
link between the conduct of the criminal and the armed conflict. Moreover, the 
perpetrator must know about facts which culminated in the conflict.790  
 
Certainly, in accordance with the terms of the introduction to the war crimes 
inserted in the Elements of Crimes: 
 
“With respect to the last two elements listed for each crime:  
 
(a) There is no requirement for a legal evaluation by the 
perpetrator as to the existence of an armed conflict or its 
character as international or noninternational;  
 
(b) In that context there is no requirement for awareness by the 
perpetrator of the facts that established the character of the 
conflict as international or noninternational;  
 
(c) There is only a requirement for the awareness of the factual 
circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict 
that is implicit in the terms “took place in the context of and was 
associated with.”791 
 
  4.3.2.(iv). Final remarks 
 
In those cases, in which the control of one´s sexuality is an element of 
enslavement, the crime of sexual slavery should be separately charged. In fact, 
there should be charges for sexual slavery and enslavement since they 
encompass different elements and protect diverse interests. Sexual slavery 
acknowledges the particular nature of this type of enslavement and guarantees 
that it will receive a correspondent adequate handling.792 
 
Additionally, the protective measures and redress that are appropriate to the 
victims of sexual slavery may result distinct than those applicable to victims of 
other kinds of slavery.793 
 
In an updated report subsequent to the Elements of Crimes, the Special 
Rapporteur on Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices 
During Armed Conflict endorsed the following the definition of slavery: 
 
 
790 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-2, (e) (vi)-2 
791 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8, Introduction 




“the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the 
powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised, 
including sexual access through rape or other forms of sexual 
violence. Slavery, when combined with sexual violence, 
constitutes sexual slavery."794  
 
Later on, it will be analysed how the International Criminal Tribunal has dealt 
practically with the crime of sexual slavery and its close relation with 
enslavement. 
 
Finally, it is noteworthy that sexual slavery can englobe one or more conducts 
that configure rape or another sexual offence.795 
 
Undoubtedly, the UN Special Rapporteur stated in her final report on 
Contemporary forms of Slavery that “[s]exual slavery also encompasses most, 
if not all forms of forced prostitution”.796 
 




The stamp "prostitute" applies to individuals who sell sex, and to women that 
infringe social rules that oppose extra-marital sex or who otherwise 
contravenes what is considered an adequate female sexual behaviour. In fact, 
throughout history, the concept of “prostitute” has been linked to the female 
gender.797  
 
In several countries, the practice of prostitution (exchanging sex for money or 
another value) remains criminalised. Further, for centuries there has been 
account of prostitution (voluntary and forced) during war.798  
 
The term “enforced prostitution” had already been employed in international 
humanitarian law and conventions against slavery before being included amidst 
the sexual crimes of the Rome Statute.799 
 
As previously stated, the 1919 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors 
of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties inserted "rape" and "abduction of 
girls and women for the purpose of enforced prostitution" when enumerating war 
crimes that had been perpetrated by Germany and its allied countries during 
World War I. 
 
 
794 United Nations, Economic and Social Council. Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Systematic 
Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices During Armed Conflict, Update to the final report 
submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur, para. 47 
795 Cottier, M. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 431-454 
796 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on systematic rape, sexual slavery and 
slavery-like practices during armed conflict, para. 31 
797 Argibay, C. M. (2003), pp. 375-389 
798 Ibidem; Askin, K. D., (1997), p. 71 
799 Oosterveld, V. (2011). In Sadat, L. N. (ed.), pp. 78-101 
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However, the term "enforced prostitution" presented a problematic nature, as 
illustrated by the 1933 Trafficking Convention in which the term "immoral 
purposes" refers to not only voluntary prostitution but also coerced 
prostitution.800  
 
In the course of World War II, thousands of women were confined in brothels by 
the Japanese and Germans. Around 200.000 women, mostly Korean between 14 
and 18 years old, were captured by Japanese forces and used as “comfort 
women”, being compelled to serve around 60-70 men per day. The Japanese run 
a system of comfort women in organised and supervised brothels established for 
the soldiers. The comfort women stations were set up in China, the Philippines, 
Korea and the Dutch East Indies, countries where Japanese military bases were 
present, being regulated by the military. In fact, in accordance with official 
documents issued by Japanese authorities, the scope of such brothels or 
“comfort stations” was801  
 
“to prevent anti-Japanese sentiments from fermenting as a result 
of rapes and other unlawful acts by Japanese military personnel 
against local residents in the areas occupied by the then 
Japanese military, the need to prevent loss of troop strength by 
venereal and other diseases, and the need to prevent 
espionage.”802 
 
In spite of that, the crime of enforced prostitution was not brought before the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, solely appearing in a few judgments in domestic courts 
(none in Japan, Germany, or Italy).803  
 
The impunity experienced by the Japanese military in relation to sexual slavery 
during World War II is one of the several examples of the States´ failure to 
investigate and try perpetrators of crimes of sexual violence.804  
 
800 Argibay, C. M. (2003), pp. 375-389; League of Nations. International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age, Art. 1 (1933) 
801 Demleitner, N. V. (1994), pp. 163-197; Eriksson, M. (2011), p. 131; Goldstein, A. T. (1993), p. 
11; Meron, T. (1992), pp. 1-45; Meron, T. (1993), pp. 424-428; United Nations, Economic and 
Social Council, Commission on Human Rights. Note Verbale dated 26 March 1996 from the 
Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations Office at Geneva Addressed to the Centre for 
Human Rights, p. 14. (27 March 1996); United Nations, Economic and Social Council, 
Commission on Human Rights. Preliminary report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on 
violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, in 
accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1994/45, para. 288 (22 November 
1994); United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights. Addendum-  
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences, 
Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 
1994/45- Report on the Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of 
Korea and Japan on the Issue of Military Sexual Slavery in Wartime, pp. 6, 9 (4 January 1996); 
Wood, E. J. (2006), pp. 307-341 
802 Note Verbale dated 26 March 1996 from the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations 
Office at Geneva Addressed to the Centre for Human Rights, p. 14 
803 Demleitner, N. V. (1994), pp. 163-197; Goldstein, A. T. (1993), p. 11; Meron, T. (1992), pp. 1-
45; Meron, T. (1993), pp. 424-428 
804 Eriksson, M. (2011), pp. 130-131; United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission 
on Human Rights. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and 




As stated in Chapter 2 (2.2.12 Batavia Military Tribunal, 1948), a Netherlands 
court in Batavia (Indonesia) prosecuted 12 Japanese army officers for the 
abduction of 35 Dutch girls and women “for the purpose of enforced prostitution" 
(a war crime in municipal law and in the compilation of war crimes set up by the 
1919 Commission). The court found Washio Awochi (a hotel-keeper) guilty of the 
“war crime of enforced prostitution”, holding him directly liable for the women´s 
exploitation. Lupig highlighted the relevance of the Batavia Military Tribunal`s trial 
by asserting that it was “[t]he first known international criminal law prosecution for 
“forced prostitution””. Nevertheless, the judgment was focused on the women´s 
incarceration, ill-trieatment, and destitution of freedom instead of their abduction 
or deportation with the aim of forcing them to engage in prostitution.805  
 
Moreover, such prosecution was an exception to the general impunity. As a rule, 
the enforced prostitution of the comfort women was mainly ignored and remained 
unacknowledged until the establishment of the Women’s International War 
Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery, held in Tokyo, between 8 
and 12 December 2000.806 
 
Additionally, previously to the Rome Statute, most instruments that brought 
sexual violence crimes regarded them as attacks on honour, instead of criminal 
offences against the victims´ personal autonomy.807 
 
In fact, Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) affirmed that women 
should be guarded from "any attack on their honor, in particular, rape, enforced 
prostitution, or any form of sexual assault."808 
 
Such approach to sexual violence as consisting in an attack against the honour 
of a woman is founded on the stereotype that women are ashamed of being 
victims of crimes of sexual violence and deny the significant harm (physical and 
emotional) endured as a consequence of such offences.809  
 
The 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions persisted in the line of 
subsuming crimes of sexual violence under categories related to female honour 
and dignity. Indeed, Additional Protocol I affirmed that women should be “the 
object of special respect” and should be guarded “in particular against rape, 
forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault.”810  
 
 
Violence against women perpetrated and/or condoned by the State during times of armed conflict 
(1997-2000), p. 5. (23 January 2001) 
805 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 139; Demleitner, N. V. (1994), pp. 163-197; Lupig, D. (2009), 
pp. 433-491; Piccicallo, P. R. (1979), p. 180; United Nations, War Crimes Commission (1949). 
Case No. 76, Trial of Washio Awochi, pp. 122-124 
806 Eriksson, M. (2011), pp. 346-349; Tokyo Tribunal 2000 & Public Hearing on Crimes Against 
women; Women´s Caucus for Gender Justice (2001). RE: Judgment of the Women´s International 
War Crimes Tribunal 2000 for the Trial of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery, in the matter of the 
Prosecutors and the Peoples of the Asia-Pacific Region vs. Emperor Hirohito et al., & the 
Government of Japan  
807 Boot, M. revised by Hall, C. K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 206-216 
808 Geneva Convention IV, Art. 27 
809 Ibidem; Bedont, B., & Martinez, K. H. (1999), pp. 65-85  
810 Bedont, B., & Martinez, K. H. (1999), pp. 65-85; Protocol I, Art. 76 (1); Protocol II 
162 
 
Additional Protocol II compiles together "outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment” and “rape, enforced prostitution 
and any form of indecent assault”.811 
 
In 1983, Jean Fernand-Laurent, Special Rapporteur on the suppression of the 
traffic in persons and the exploitation of the prostitution of others, regarded "traffic 
in persons" as "the exploitation of the prostitution of women and children" and 
considered it as a violation of human rights. Such definition regarded the term 
"traffic" as being immaterial, while the expression "exploitation of prostitution" 
embodies the forced character of the practice. Even though the Special 
Rapporteur recommended the combat against procurement as the short-term 
objective, the main goal was to decrease prostitution.812 
 
The Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies elaborated at the 1985 International 
Women's Conference conceived forced prostitution as "a form of slavery 
imposed on women by procurers.” These strategies considered that forced 
prostitution arises from813 
 
“economic degradation that alienates women's labour through 
processes of rapid urbanization and migration resulting in 
underemployment and unemployment. It also stems from 
women's dependence on men. Social and political pressures 
produce refugees and missing persons. Often these include 
vulnerable groups of women who are victimized by procurers. 
Sex tourism, forced prostitution and pornography reduce 
women to mere sex objects and marketable commodities.”814  
 
Article 4 (e) of the ICTR Statute, when establishing the competence of the “ad 
hoc” Tribunal, enumerated “[o]utrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form 
of indecent assault” as Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.815   
 
In the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
the crimes “[r]ape, enforced prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse” were 
inserted in Article 18 (j), which compiled the crimes against humanity. It was 
the first instrument in which enforced prostitution and other forms of sexual 
 
811  Bedont, B., & Martinez, K. H. (1999), pp. 65-85; Protocol II, Art. 4 (2) (e) 
812 Demleitner, N. V. (1994), pp. 163-197; United Nations, Economic and Social Council. Activities 
for the Advancement of Women: Equality, Development and Peace, Report of Mr. Jean Fernand-
Laurent, Special Rapporteur on the suppression of the traffic in persons and the exploitation of 
the prostitution of others, p. 4, para. 8 (17 March 1983); United Nations, Department of 
International Economic and Social Affairs. Activities for the Advancement of Women: Equality, 
Development and Peace, pp. 5, 7, 17, 19 (1985) 
813 United Nations. Report of The World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements 
of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, p. 70, para. 290. 
(15 to 26 July 1985) 
814 Ibidem 
815 United Nations, Security Council. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(1994), Art. 4 (e)  
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abuse were unambiguously enlisted as a crime against humanity, along with 
rape.816  
 
During the negotiation of the Rome Statute, there were corridor discussions on 
whether the term “enforced prostitution” was actually outdated and should be 
substituted by “sexual slavery”.817 
 
As mentioned above, there was a problem with the term "enforced prostitution”, 
which has been described as embodying the male point of view (the perspective 
of the procurers, brothel owners and managers, and those who benefit from the 
system by the rape of women).818   
 
The expression “enforced prostitution” implied some degree of willingness, 
tarnishing the victims’ reputation, concealing the real cruelty of the crime. The 
survivors were regarded depraved, “used goods”.819  
 
Indeed, after the end of the war, the “comfort women” who had been confined to 
brothels by the Japanese were not welcomed back to their communities as 
individuals who had been subjected to an awful crime, but rather experienced 
ineffable shame and loneliness.820  
 
Many survivors of the comfort system instituted by the Japanese who testified 
before the Tokyo 2000 Tribunal (a people´s tribunal constituted by Asian 
women and organisations of human rights with moral authority and which 
issued a judgment on 4 December 2001 holding guilty all the ten defendants who 
had been indicted) affirmed that being “branded” as prostitutes evilly escalated 
their suffering.821   
 
The States decided to include both terms “enforced prostitution” and “sexual 
slavery” in the Rome Statute. Such decision was praised. The crime sexual 
slavery covers the sexual facet of the crime of slavery and also highlights the 
coercive element present when women are compelled to provide sexual services. 
At the same time, the crime of enforced prostitution was preserved and inserted 
in the Rome Statute so as to cover the cases short of slavery-like conditions, 
which are not subsumed in the concept of slavery.822 
 
It has been affirmed that the classification of sexual slavery as a crime under 
international law (by its insertion in the Rome Statute) consists in a belated 
 
816 Boot, M. revised by Hall, C. K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 206-216; United 
Nations, International Law Commission. Report of the Work of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session (6 May to 26 July 1996), Draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Art. 18 (j)  
817 Oosterveld, V. (2004), pp. 605-651; Oosterveld, V. (2011). In Sadat, L. N. (ed.), pp. 78-101 
818 Argibay, C. M. (2003), pp. 375-389 
819 Ibidem 
820 Ibidem 
821 Argibay, C. M. (2003), pp. 375-389; de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 139; Eriksson, M. 
(2011), pp. 346-349; Tokyo Tribunal 2000 & Public Hearing on Crimes Against women; Judgment 
of the Women´s International War Crimes Tribunal 2000 for the Trial of Japanese Military Sexual 
Slavery 
822 Bedont, B., & Martinez, K. H. (1999), pp. 65-85; Oosterveld, V. (2004), pp. 605-651; 
Oosterveld, V. (2011). In Sadat, L. N. (ed.), pp. 78-101 
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change of the name of the conduct formerly known as crime of forced prostitution. 
Classifying the crime endured by comfort women as “sexual slavery" diminished 
the prejudice against the survivors and eventual future victims of such sexual 
offence.823  
 
In reality, the inclusion of the crime of sexual slavery in the Statute corrected the 
underlying prejudice carried by the word prostitution. 
 
When outlining the elements of crimes of the crime of enforced prostitution, the 
Preparatory Commission had the opportunity to establish the difference between 
this crime and sexual slavery. The negotiations of the elements of crimes of 
enforced prostitution gave rise to the discussion of two intertwined points. The 
first was if a person who is not subject to enslavement may be compelled to 
perform sexual acts. The second issue at hand was if there was a requirement of 
an interchange of a benefit (monetary or of another type) for the sexual acts, what 
could amount to a benefit, and whom must take advantage of the benefit.824   
 
The understating of the majority of the drafters was that the idea underlying 
prostitution is that either the perpetrator or another person bears the expectative 
or obtains a monetary or another kind of benefit as a retribution for or in relation 
to the sexual acts.825   
 
Nevertheless, they also decided that “advantage” should be regarded in a rather 
intricate acceptation. It could enclose advantage of sexual access to either the 
perpetrator or a person somehow connected to the latter, material advantage (as, 
for instance, exchanging objects or services for sex) in benefit of the perpetrator 
or someone else, or psychological advantage obtained by the perpetrator or 
some other person over the victim or an individual connected to the victim. Some 
delegates asserted that the own victims could be the persons expecting the 
advantage for they could aspire to be spared of torture or murder in exchange for 
sex.826   
 
4.3.3.(ii). Elements of Crimes 
 
The Preparatory Commission applied here the same formula used in the other 
sexual and gender-based crimes: elements 1 and 2 (“actus reus”) are common 
to “enforced prostitution” as a crime against humanity and as a war crime, and 








823 Argibay, C. M. (2003), pp. 375-389 
824 Oosterveld, V. (2004), pp. 605-651; Oosterveld, V. (2011). In Sadat, L. N. (ed.), pp. 78-101 
825 La Haye, E. (2001). In Lee, R. S. K. & Friman, H. (eds.), pp. 184-189; Oosterveld, V. (2011). 
In Sadat, L. N. (ed.), pp. 78-101 
826 La Haye, E. (2001). In Lee, R. S. K. & Friman, H. (eds.), pp. 184-189; Oosterveld, V. (2004), 
pp. 605-651; Oosterveld, V. (2011). In Sadat, L. N. (ed.), pp. 78-101 
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4.3.3.(ii).(a). “Actus reus” 
 
4.3.3.(ii).(a)-1. Element 1 
 
“The perpetrator caused one or more persons to engage in one 
or more acts of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or 
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, 
detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against 
such person or persons or another person, or by taking 
advantage of a coercive environment or such person’s or 




“The perpetrator caused one or more persons to engage in one 
or more acts of a sexual nature” 
 
The first part of element 1 bears a very close resemblance to the wording of 
element 2 of the crime of sexual slavery- “[t]he perpetrator caused such person 
or persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature.”828  
 
Therefore, here as well the perpetrator must prompt the victim or victims to 
engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature. Like in the crime of sexual slavery, 
the interpretation of “acts of a sexual nature” should be broad as to include a large 




“by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused 
by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression 
or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another 
person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such 
person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent.” 
 
Still in element 2, the Preparatory Commission determined the manner in which 
the perpetrator must cause one or more persons to engage in one or more acts 
of a sexual nature. 
 
The extract above is mainly a replica of the provision found in element 2 of the 
crime of rape: 
 
“[t]he invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or 
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, 
detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against 
such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a 
 
827 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g), Element 3; 8 (2) (b) 
(xxii)-3, Element 1, (e) (vi)-3, Element 1 
828 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g)-2, Element 2; 8 (2) (b) 
(xxii)-2, Element 2, (e) (vi)-2 Element 2 
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coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a 
person incapable of giving genuine consent.”829 
 
Certainly, likewise in the definition of rape, there are four conditions that 
compromise the exercise of sexual autonomy:830 
 
1) Force or threat of force; 
 
2) Coercion;  
 
3) Taking advantage of a coercive environment; 
 
4) Taking advantage of such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine 
consent. 
 
Force, threat of force and coercion are exemplified by the same 5 elements used 
in the crime of rape, namely “fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological 
oppression or abuse of power”.  
 
Furthermore, also like in the crime of rape, when the perpetrator causes one or 
more persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature by making use of 
force, threat of force, or coercion, the damage or menace can be directed either 
against the own victim or a third person.   
 
Other forms in which the perpetrator can cause one or more persons to engage 
in one or more acts of a sexual nature is by taking advantage of a coercive 
environment, or taking advantage of such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give 
genuine consent. 
 
“Taking advantage of a coercive environment” means that the perpetrator can 
make use of a pre-existent situation marked by coerciveness (which arose 
independently of the perpetrator) to cause one or more persons to engage in one 
or more acts of a sexual nature. 
 
The wording of the crime of enforced prostitution “taking advantage of such 
person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent” slightly differs from the 
expression inserted in the crime of rape “the invasion was committed against a 
person incapable of giving genuine consent”.  
 
Despite this difference, the expression inserted in the crime of enforced 
prostitution should be interpreted in the light of the explanation provided by the 
own Elements of Crimes when addressing the crime of rape: 
 
“a person may be incapable of giving genuine consent if affected 
by natural, induced or age-related incapacity.”831  
 
 
829 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g)-1, Element 2; 8 (2) (b) 
(xxii)-1, Element 2 
830 Amnesty International (2011), p. 18 
831 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 7 (1) (g)-1, Element 1, footnote 16 
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Thus, for the configuration of the crime of enforced prostitution in the form of 
taking advantage of such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine 
consent, the person should be affected by natural incapacity (e.g. mental 
incapacity to comprehend the nature of the act), induced incapacity (e.g. reduced 
capacity resultant from the ingestion of drugs and/or alcohol; deception) or age-
related incapacity (e.g. children´s capability to give free and cognisant agreement 
to sexual conduct).832 
 
As a consequence, the comments made when the analysis of element 2 of the 
crime of rape (Chapter 4, 4.3.1. (iii).(b)-2. Element 2) apply here “mutatis 
mutandi”. 
 
4.3.3.(ii).(a)-2. Element 2 
 
“The perpetrator or another person obtained or expected to 
obtain pecuniary or other advantage in exchange for or in 
connection with the acts of a sexual nature” 
 
The crimes of enforced prostitution and sexual slavery have in common the fact 
that the perpetrator causes an individual or individuals to engage in one or more 
acts of a sexual nature. 
 
In element 2 of the crime of enforced prostitution is found the fundamental 
distinctive feature of the two crimes: while the crime of enforced prostitution 
comprehends the perpetrator or another person obtaining or hoping to attain 
advantage (pecuniary or of another type) in reciprocation for sexual acts, the 
crime of sexual slavery is not concerned with the matter of advantage. Instead, 
the gravitational point of the crime of sexual slavery consists in exercising the 
powers attaching to the right of ownership.833 
 
In view of that, the situation of the World War II “comfort women” was erroneously 
classified as “enforced prostitution”. Indeed, these women were subject to sexual 
slavery since their hole was to provide sex and perpetrators did not expect to 
reap benefits.834 
 
Even though enforced prostitution is generally centred in pecuniary advantage, 
the own text of the Elements of Crimes recognises that the advantage has a 
broad reach: the benefit expected/obtained goes beyond the monetary dimension 
and can possibly assume a different nature. As mentioned above, the advantage 





832 Amnesty International (2011), pp. 27-28, footnote 78 
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834 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 142 
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4.3.3.(ii).(b). “Mens rea” 
 
4.3.3.(ii).(b)-1. Crime against humanity of enforced 
prostitution836 
 
Element 3  
 
“The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against a civilian population”  
 
Therefore, the conduct of the perpetrator consistent in causing one or more 
persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature (by force, or by threat 
of force or coercion, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such 
person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent) so as to obtain 
pecuniary or other advantage in exchange for or in connection with the sexual 
acts must be committed as part of a widespread (of a large scale or with a high 
number of victims) or systematic (in accordance with a premeditated state/ 
organizational policy or planning) attack (course of conduct encompassing the 
multiple commission of acts enlisted in Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute) directed 
against a civilian population (specific targeting civilians). 
 
Element 4  
 
“The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended 
the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population” 
 
Furthermore, the perpetrator must know that he caused individual(s) to engage 
in sexual act(s), with views to obtaining pecuniary or other type of advantage, as 
part of (or at least intended it to be part) a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population.  
 
4.3.3.(ii).(b)-2. War crime of enforced prostitution837 
 
Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-3 War crime of enforced prostitution 
 
“3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated 
with an international armed conflict.  
 
4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an armed conflict.” 
 
Article 8 (2) (e) (vi)-3 War crime of enforced prostitution 
 
“3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated 
with an armed conflict not of an international character.  
 
 
836 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 7 (1) (g)-3 
837 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-3 
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4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an armed conflict.”  
 
The perpetrator´s inducement to the sexual activity aimed at harvesting benefits 
must be appropriately related to an (either international or national) armed 
conflict.  
 
Also, the perpetrator ought to be conscious of factual circumstances that brought 
into being the armed conflict. 
 
4.3.3.(iii). Final remarks 
 
In situations of genocide, crimes against humanity and armed conflicts, women 
are often captured with the plain goal of being forced to provide sex, and the 
captors do not envisage to attain (financial or otherwise) benefits.  
 
Therefore, most of the cases in which perpetrator causes an individual or 
individuals to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature would be prosecuted 
as sexual slavery before the International Criminal Court.838 
 
In spite of that, by preserving the crime of enforced prostitution in the Rome 
Statute, the drafters allowed that sexual violence not fitting into the requirements 
of the crime of sexual slavery can still be prosecuted under the head enforced 
prostitution by the International Criminal Court. Thus, their option of including both 
crimes in the Statute amplifies the protection of victims against sexual crimes 
during armed conflicts.839  
 
Indeed, the crime of enforced prostitution can be related to sexual slavery or 
another type of sexual abuse.840  
 




The Rome Statute was the first international treaty to specifically list the crime of 
forced pregnancy (although forced pregnancy had been acknowledged as a 
fundamental humanitarian and human rights violation in the Vienna Conference's 
Programme of Action, the Beijing Conference's Platform for Action, and also in 
numerous resolutions of UN Commission on Human Rights).841  
 
838 de Brouwer, A.-M. L.M. (2011). In Jones, J., Grear, A., Fenton, R. A., and Stevenson, K. (eds.), 
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United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights. The Elimination of 
Violence against Women (19 April 1996); United Nations, Economic and Social Council, 
Commission on Human Rights, The Elimination of Violence against Women (11 April 1997); 
United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights. Rights of the Child, 
para. 13 (a) (18 April 1997); United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on 




Furthermore, before the advent of the Statute, forced pregnancy (in the same 
manner as the other sexual-related crimes) was rendered as an infraction against 
honour. The Rome Statute constituted a turning point and established a new 
platform (whose pillars are the principles of human dignity, autonomy and 
consent) for the international criminalisation of sexual offences. Indeed, after its 
enactment, the sexual and gender-based crimes, among which is included forced 
pregnancy, started to be regarded from the perspective of the harm done to the 
bodily integrity of the victim.842 
 
However, as aforementioned, such achievements did not come easily: the 
inclusion of the sexual based-crimes in the Rome Statute was achieved by joint 
efforts of the civil society (particularly the Women´s Coalition for Gender Justice) 
to beat the resistance of determined delegations to agree to provisions 
safeguarding women´s rights.843   
 
During the Rome negotiations, the discussions concerning the crime of forced 
pregnancy were very tough. It also constituted one of the most emotional topics 
debated during the confection of the Statute. In fact,844 
 
“[w]hile some negotiation took place on the other gender crimes, 
such as enslavement and gender-based prosecution, none of 
them was the subject of such intense opposition as forced 
pregnancy.” 845   
 
Some delegates sustained that the inclusion of such criminal offence was 
dispensable for it would be covered by the crimes of rape and unlawful 
confinement. Contrarily, other delegates argued that such approach finished 
denying the criminal nature intrinsic to forced pregnancy, and, consequently, it 
should be regarded as a separate crime.846   
 
The crime of forced pregnancy infringes the fundamental human right to 
bodily integrity, and only can be inflicted against women, thus, being gender-
based. Certainly, this crime causes paramount physical harm on the victims by 
occupying a woman's body and compelling her to carry her rapist's baby. 
Moreover, there is an enormous psychological impact since the victim has to 
decide whether to keep the baby (whose father is her rapist, often from a distinct 
 
Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights. Rights of the Child, para. 
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ethnicity) or not (meaning to have an abortion or give up the baby for adoption 
after he/she is born).847  
 
In case she opts for keeping the baby, in several societies (particularly in 
patriarchal ones), the woman and the baby will not be accepted, what can cause 
her to reject the child as well. The Vatican and other delegations were worried 
about the second option in which the woman raped and made pregnant wants to 
have an abortion and the State where she resides (or has sought refuge) does 
not allow it.848      
 
In fact, the main issue at stake was that many delegations (inclusive of the 
Vatican and Ireland whose policies prohibit all abortions) were concerned that if 
crime of forced pregnancy was included in the Rome Statute, States would be 
required to permit the victims of such crime to have access to abortion. Apart 
from the Vatican and Ireland, other countries that made statements opposing or 
expressing concern in relation to the insertion of the crime of forced pregnancy 
were: Bahrain, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, 
Malta, Nicaragua, Oman, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
San Marino, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela.849 
 
The reasoning behind the apprehension was that if it was a crime to maintain a 
raped woman pregnant, States would have to provide these women with access 
to abortion, otherwise they would be contributing to maintain these women 
pregnant, thus, incurring in the crime. Therefore, the resistance to the inclusion 
of the crime of forced pregnancy (likewise the insertion of the term gender) 
reflected the persistent refusal of certain States to accept women's rights. 
Certainly, the hostile states sought to undermine the insertion of the crime of 
forced pregnancy because of misleading associations with the question of the 
legalisation of abortion.850 
 
In a proposal submitted by the Holy See during the last PrepCom meeting 
(March-April 1998), the Vatican suggested to substitute “enforced pregnancy” for 
“forcible impregnation”. However, in view of the then recent atrocities perpetrated 
in Bosnia (women were raped and kept confined to captivity up to the point in 
which they could no longer abort a child that the Serbian criminals considered to 
be of Serbian ethnicity, like the rapist), most of the delegations did not agree to 
use the expression “forcible impregnation” (that was seem as referring to make 
forcibly a woman pregnant) in detriment of “enforced pregnancy” (which was 
considered to embrace maintaining the woman pregnant).851 
 
Indeed, the scope of those who wanted to include the crime in the Statute was 
not to make a criminal offence to deny services of abortion (which is regarded an 
 
847 Bedont, B., & Martinez, K. H. (1999), pp. 65-85; de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 144; Jessie, 
S. S. E. (2006), pp. 311-337   
848 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 144 
849 Bedont, B., & Martinez, K. H. (1999), pp. 65-85; de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 144; 
Steains, C. (1999). In Lee, R. S. K. (ed.), pp. 357-390 
850 Ibidem; Ibidem; Ibidem 
851 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 144; Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, 16 March- 3 April 1998. Proposal Submitted by the Holy See. (1 April 
1998); Steains, C. (1999). In Lee, R. S. K. (ed.), pp. 357-390 
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omission under criminal law), but rather to criminalise the acts of making and 
maintaining a woman pregnant (that is a commission under criminal law).852  
 
In view of that, negotiations continued with the aim of elaborating a concept of 
forced pregnancy which would set up the boundaries of the crime.853   
 
So as to minimise the concerns of the Vatican and other States, the delegates 
arrived at a compromise and inserted it in the last sentence of the concept of 
forced pregnancy included in the Rome Statute:854  
 
“‘Forced pregnancy’ means the unlawful confinement of a woman 
forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic 
composition of any population or carrying out other grave 
violations of international law. This definition shall not in any way 
be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to 
pregnancy.”855 
 
It is noteworthy that the Holy See tried to limit the definition of forced pregnancy 
to acts perpetrated with the goal of promoting an ethnic cleansing. However, such 
proposal did not find support because it would implicate in the exclusion of 
several other facets of the crime (i.e., in World War II, Jewish women were forcibly 
made and kept pregnant for medical experiments purposes). Following protracted 
debates, the parties reached an agreement to include "carrying out other grave 
violations of international law" as an alternative goal for the perpetration of such 
crime.856  
 
4.3.4.(i).(a). The Rome Statute´s definition  
 
After enlisting the crime of forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity and a 
war crime, the Rome Statute defined forced pregnancy as857 
 
“the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, 
with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any 
population or carrying out other grave violations of international 
law. This definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting 
national laws relating to pregnancy.”858 
 







852 Bedont, B., & Martinez, K. H. (1999), pp. 65-85  
853 Ibidem 
854 Ibidem 
855 Rome Statute, Art. 7 (2) (f) 
856 Bedont, B., & Martinez, K. H. (1999), pp. 65-85  
857 Rome Statute, Arts. 7 (1) (g), 8 (2) (b) (xxii) 
858 Rome Statute, Art. 7 (2) (f) 
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4.3.4.(i).(a)-1. Unlawful confinement 
 
The expression “unlawful confinement” should be regarded as any form of seizure 
of an individual´s physical liberty which attempts against international law and 
standards.859   
 
Oppositely to the crime of imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical 
liberty, which demands the deprivation of liberty to be severe, in the crime under 
analysis there is no such requirement of severity in the deprivation of the victim´s 
liberty.860   
 
A conduct which constitutes forced pregnancy can also configure the crime of 
unlawful confinement.861 
 
4.3.4.(i).(a)-2. Forcibly made pregnant 
 
“Forcibly made pregnant” refers to a pregnancy which resulted from the use of 
force, or to a pregnancy in which the element force was otherwise involved and 
played a hole in the impregnation.862   
 
As already mentioned, the Elements of Crimes adopted a broad approach when 
delimiting “forcibly” and stated that this term is not constricted to physical force, 
but can cover threat of force or coercion, or by taking advantage of a coercive 
environment.863  
 
In the same manner as the crime of rape, the crime of forced pregnancy is 
informed by coercion “lato sensu”. The use of violence is not obligatory.864 
 
As aforementioned in the crime of rape, any type of force, threat of force, or 
coercion against the own victim or a third person forbids consent. Moreover, any 
type of physical detention wipes out consent.865 
 
For the configuration of the crime, it is not necessary that the woman was forcibly 
impregnated by the person responsible for holding her in captivity. The act of 
forcibly making the victim pregnant can also be comprised by the crimes of rape 
or “any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity”.866 
 
It is noteworthy that among the sexual and gender-based crimes, the crime of 
forced pregnancy is the only one which can be perpetrated exclusively against 
women. Surely, the other sexual offences were redacted by the drafters in a 
 
859 Boot, M. revised by Hall, C. K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 255-263 
860 Ibidem, Rome Statute, Art. 7 (1) (e)  
861 Rome Statute, Art.  8 (a) (vii)-2; 
Cottier, M. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 431-454 
862 Boot, M. revised by Hall, C. K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 255-263 
863 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 7 (1) (d) footnote 12 
864 Boot, M. revised by Hall, C. K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 255-263 
865 Ibidem; Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g)-1, Element 2; 8 
(2) (b) (xxii)-1, Element 2 
866 Boot, M. revised by Hall, C. K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 255-263; Rome 
Statute, Art. 7 (1) (g) 
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gender-neutral form, hence, both the perpetrators and the victims can be of 
whatever sex and gender.867 
 
4.3.4.(i).(a)-3. With the intent of affecting the ethnic 
composition of any population or carrying out other 
grave violations of international law 
 
For the occurrence the crime of forced pregnancy is not enough to carry out the 
unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant. It is indispensable that 
the perpetrator unlawfully confines such a woman with a specific objective: either 
to affect the ethnic composition of a determined population or to carry out other 
grave violations of international law.868  
 
As aforementioned, the intend of "carrying out other grave violations of 
international law" as an alternative goal for the perpetration of such crime was 
included to cover a broad spectrum of situations that do not fit into the aim of 
affecting the ethnic composition of a determined population. Undoubtedly, the 
second intend can be considered to cover the crime of genocide (forced 
pregnancy can cause “serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group”, 
and can be regarded as purposefully imposing “on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”), torture 
(listed as both a crime against humanity and war crime) and enforced 
disappearances (which is a war crime).869 
 
4.3.4.(i).(a)-4. This definition shall not in any way be 
interpreted as affecting national laws relating to 
pregnancy 
 
This sentence was inserted to guarantee that the concept of forced pregnancy 
included in the Rome Statute would not have any impact on the national laws 
concerning pregnancy.870  
 
The goal was to easy the States which were reticent in relation to the inclusion of 
the crime in the Statute and make it clear that such States would not be forced to 
permit abortion.     
 
In fact, the phrase clarified that national laws that forbid abortion do no constitute 
the crime of forced pregnancy of the Rome Statute, as long as they are not 
intended to affect the ethnic composition of any population or commit other grave 





867 Cottier, M. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 431-454 
868 Boot, M. revised by Hall, C. K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 255-263 
869 Ibidem, Bedont, B., & Martinez, K. H. (1999), pp. 65-85; Rome Statute, Arts. 6 (b) (c); 7 (1) (f) 
(i), (2) (e); 8 (2) (a) (ii), (c) (i); Salzman, T. A. (1998), pp. 348–378 






4.3.4.(ii).(a). Element 1  
 
“The perpetrator confined one or more women forcibly made 
pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of 
any population or carrying out other grave violations of 
international law” 
 
The “actus reus” of the crime of forced pregnancy is composed by solely one 
element, which is actually a restatement of the definition provided by the Rome 
Statute.873  
 
Hence, the requirements of the Statute and of the Elements of Crimes coincide:  
 
“the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, 
with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any 
population or carrying out other grave violations of international 
law.”874 
  
4.3.4.(iii). “Mens rea” 
 
4.3.4.(iii).(a). Crime against humanity of forced 
pregnancy 
 
In the crime against humanity of forced pregnancy the contextual elements (which 
are the same as the contextual elements of the other crimes against humanity) 
appear in elements 2 and 3: 
 
“2. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
 
3. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended 
the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population.”875 
 
Thus, in accordance with Art. 7 (1) (g)-4 of the Elements of Crimes, the conduct 
of unlawfully confining a woman who was forcibly made pregnant (with the aim of 
affecting a population´s ethnic composition or perpetrating distinct serious 
infringements of international law) must be carried out “as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.”876  
 
 
872 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g)-4, Element 1, 8 (2) (b) 
(xxii)-4, Element 1 
873 Boot, M. revised by Hall, C. K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 255-263; Rome 
Statute, Art. 7 (2) (f) 
874 Rome Statute, Art. 7 (2) (f) 




Surely, such confinement must be part of an operation or campaign, meaning the 
multiple commission of acts (referred to in paragraph 1 of article 7 of the Rome 
Statute) on a large scale or with a high quantity of victims (widespread), or in a 
thoroughly organised manner and consonant to a steady pattern (systematic), 
carried out in detriment of civilians, in accordance with or boosting a State or 
organizational plan or policy. Additionally, the perpetrator´s knowledge (regarding 
the direct linkage between the confinement and the attack) or intention is 
required.877 
 
4.3.4.(iii).(b). War crime of forced pregnancy 
 
4.3.4.(iii).(b)-1. Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-4 War crime of 
forced pregnancy 
 
“2. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated 
with an international armed conflict.  
 
3. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an armed conflict.”878 
 
4.3.4.(iii).(b)-2. Article 8 (2) (e) (vi)-4 War crime of 
forced pregnancy 
 
“2. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated 
with an armed conflict not of an international character.  
 
3. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an armed conflict.”879 
 
The act of confining one or more women forcibly made pregnant, with the scope 
of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or committing other grave 
violations of international law, ought to be interwoven to an armed conflict 
(international, Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-4, or local, Article 8 (2) (e) (vi)-4) and be 
related to the conflict.  
 
Consequently, the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership that 
brings about the involuntary engagement of the victim(s) in sexual act(s) must be 
related to a domestic or supranational armed conflict. In fact, there must be a 
satisfying link between the conduct of the criminal and the conflic. Moreover, the 







877 Boot, M. revised by Hall, C. K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 255-263; Dixon, 
R., revised by Hall, C. K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 168-183 
878 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-4 
879 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8 (2) (e) (vi)-4 
880 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-2, (e) (vi)-2 
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The criminal offence “enforced sterilization” was firstly codified by the Rome 
Statute. Posteriorly, it appeared enlisted as both a crime against humanity and 
war crime (along the crimes of rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence of 
comparable gravity) in Regulation no. 2000/15 of the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor.881 
 
The inclusion of the crime of enforced sterilization in the Rome Statute was 
prompted by cases of mass sterilization and medical experimentations conducted 
during World War II. The performance of sterilization and medical 
experimentations in concentration camps was related in the “Medical Case” 
(U.S.A. vs. Karl Brandt, et al.) of the Nuremberg Trials. Also contributed reports 
of acts of sexual violence conducted during conflicts and that gave cause to 
serious reproductive damage (inclusive of sterilization).882  
 
Indeed, enforced sterilization can result from sexual violence and, for this reason, 
figures among the crimes of sexual violence in the Rome Statute. For instance, 
sterilization can come about as a consequence of sexual mutilation or damage, 
as the employment of a weapon or another object to rape, trough violent and/or 
multiple rapes, or castration. Furthermore, sexually transmitted diseases and 
forced or botched abortions are among causes of sterilization. Several “comfort 
women” lost their ability of reproduce as a consequence of the sexual slavery 
they were submitted to during World War II.883  
 
Nevertheless, sterilization may stem from medical procedures which affect 
reproductive capacity which do not obligatorily involve sexual violence. In fact, in 
1993 Germany adopted a sterilization law that allowed forcible sterilization of any 
person who suffered from so-called “genetically determined” illnesses (which 
covered schizophrenia, manic-depressive insanity, feeblemindedness, deafness, 
genetic blindness, genetic epilepsy and “severe alcoholism”). In the following 
year, 181 Genetic Health Courts and Appellate Genetic Health Courts were set 
up, giving effectivity to such law. Together with the Nuremberg Laws and the 
euthanasia operation, the sterilization law constituted one the core programs of 
the Nazi regime policy of wiping out "inferior" populations (negative racial 
hygiene) and promoting positive racial hygiene.884 
 
 
881 Oosterveld, V. (2011). In Sadat, L. N. (ed.), pp. 78-101; United Nations, Transitional 
Administration in East Timor. Regulation No. 2000/15, On the Establishment of Panels with 
Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, Section 5.1 (g), Section 6.1 (b) (xxii), 
Section 6.1 (e) (vi) (6 June 2000). 
882 Nuremberg Military Tribunal. NMT 1 (U.S.A. v. Karl Brandt et al.), Rudolf Emil H. Brandt`s 
Affidavit concerning the sterilization experiments (19 April 1946); Oosterveld, V. (2011). In Sadat, 
L. N. (ed.), pp. 78-101 
883 Askin, K. D. (2005), pp. 146-147; Oosterveld, V. (2011). In Sadat, L. N. (ed.), pp. 78-101 
 884 Oosterveld, V. (2011). In Sadat, L. N. (ed.), pp. 78-101; Proctor, R. N. (1994), pp. 35-37.; 
Proctor, R. N. (1992), pp. 20-21 
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Furthermore, the Medical Case (U.S.A. vs. Karl Brandt, et al., “the Doctors' Trial”) 
reported that during World War II medical experiments involving x-rays, drugs 
and surgery were conducted on concentration camps prisoners so as to find out 
manners of obtaining expeditious, outreach sterilization. In fact, in this case, 23 
Nazi doctors and administrators were tried under the accusation of organising 
and participating in war crimes and crimes against humanity, specifically 
conducting medical experiments and medical procedures on both prisoners and 
civilians. Sterilization experiments were amidst the medical experiments and 
medical procedures charged.885 
 
Certainly, between March 1941 and January 1945 sterilization experiments were 
carried out in concentration camp inmates with a view of developing methods of 
fast and extensive sterilization (the typical tubal ligature was considered very slow 
and costly to be employed on a large scale). Sterilization experiments using drugs 
(such as caladium sequinum, or the injection of an irritating compound), x-rays, 
and surgery were prepared and/or performed at Auschwitz Ravensbrueck, and in 
other places. The physicians who performed such experiments sought to develop 
a new area of medical science which would provide the Nazi with scientific means 
to plan and carry out racial cleansing, and annihilate Jews, Russians, Poles, 
Gypsies, etc. A total of 8 defendants were charged for conducting sterilization 
experiments. The charges against 2 of them (Mrugowsky and Oberheuser) were 
withdrawn. Out of the 6 remaining defendants, 3 were acquitted (K. Brandt, 
Pokorny and Poppendick) and 3 (Brack, R. Brandt and Gebhardt) were found 
guilty of conducting sterilization experiments. Therefore, these experiments, 
aimed at enabling the Nazi to sterilize millions of people and ultimately destroy 
them, presented a eugenics character. They were not “sexual” in the common 
usage of the word.886  
 
In fact, some of the forms of causing enforced sterilization do not present a sexual 
vein (differently than the crimes of rape, enforced prostitution, sexual slavery and 
enforced pregnancy). For this reason, it has been argued that the crime of 
enforced sterilization should have not been listed with the other sexual criminal 
offences in the Rome Statute. Supporting this argument is the fact that even 
though sexual violence frequently damages the victim´s reproductive system, 
causing sterilization, it is difficult to prove that the perpetrator of the sexual 
violence conduct actually intended the victim to become sterile.887  
 
It is also important to highlight that enforced sterilization performed without 
consent can amount to genocide insofar it is carried out with a view to destroy a 
certain group in whole or in part. Surely, non-consensual sterilization can be a 
form of “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group”, 
subsuming to article 6 (e) of the Rome Statute.888   
 
 
885  Harvard Law School Library, Nuremberg Trials Project. Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Case 
1, U.S.A. v. Karl Brandt et al.: The Doctor´s Trial.  
886 Ibidem; Schabas, W. A. (2010), p. 174 
887 Oosterveld, V. (2011). In Sadat, L. N. (ed.), pp. 78-101; Schabas, W. A. (2010), p. 174 
888 Boot, M. (2002), p. 516; Mason, J. K. (1998), p. 68; Rome Statute, Art.  6 (e) 
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4.3.5.(ii). “Actus reus”889 
 
4.3.5.(ii).(a). Element 1  
 
“The perpetrator deprived one or more persons of biological 
reproductive capacity” 
 
This element surrounded by controversy and there was a delegation that wanted 
to remove mandatory measures destined to apply to all inhabitants.890 
 
The forbidden conduct is to deprive a human being of producing descendants.891  
 
According to Mason (1998), what is protected is the right to choose whether or 
not to procreate (a particular feature of the right of a person to control his/her own 
body), or, as an alternative, the right to withhold the ability to procreate.892   
 
The drafters of the Elements of Crimes added in a footnote to this element that 
the deprivation “is not intended to include birth-control measures which have a 
non-permanent effect in practice”. Therefore, in accordance with the wording of 
the Elements of Crimes, the crime of enforced sterilization demands the intention 
of stripping a person from his/her reproductive capacity for good.893  
 
Consequently, the induced inability of procreating any further should be 
everlasting, and “a priori” birth-control pills that once no longer ingested cease 
being effectively should not regarded as a method of enforced sterilization.894   
 
However, this is a thorny issue. It has been argued that it is questionable if such 
exception (birth-control measures with a non-permanent effect) is congruent with 
international law. In fact, the imposition of temporary birth-control measures 
directed to avoid births within a certain group (and the consequent decrease of 
birthday rate) can be deployed as a means of genocide.895      
 
4.3.5.(ii).(b). Element 2  
 
“The conduct was neither justified by the medical or hospital 
treatment of the person or persons concerned nor carried out 
with their genuine consent” 
 
 
889 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g)-5; 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-5, (e) 
(vi)-5 
890 Cottier, M. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 431-454 
891 Boot, M., revised by Hall, C. K. (2008). Article 7 Crimes Against Humanity, para. 1(g). In 
Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 206-216 
892 Mason, J. K. (1998), pp. 85, 87 
893 Cottier, M. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 431-454; Elements of Crimes of 
the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g)-5, Element 1, Footnote 19; 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-5, 
Element 1, Footnote 54; (e) (vi)-5, Element 1, Footnote 67 
894 Cottier, M. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 431-454 
895 Boot, M., revised by Hall, C. K. (2008). Article 7 Crimes Against Humanity, para. 1(g). In 
Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 206-216 
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Element 2 of the crime disposes that sterilization constitutes a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court if not legitimised by therapeutic 
reasons, or if carried out without the victim´s genuine consent.896  
 
“Genuine consent” is an essential element of the definition of the crime of 
enforced sterilization. Indeed, a therapeutic sterilization may still constitute 
enforced sterilization in case it is performed without the person´s genuine 
consent.897   
 
This consent-based approach is somewhat surprising, since the term “enforced” 
employed by the Rome Statute when enlisting this crime could be regarded to be 
implying that the sterilization ought to be forcible, as, for example, when it is 
carried out against the victim´s will.898 Indeed, it could be expected that the 
drafters would restate the formula applied in the crime of rape, whose conditions 
are mainly centred on coercion (“by force, or by threat of force or coercion … or 
by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or … against a person incapable 
of giving genuine consent”).899 
 
However, as aforesaid in the analysis of the crime of rape, so as to be in 
agreement with international human rights law, the term “genuine consent” 
should be interpreted as being free, unhindered of force, coercion, discrimination 
and violence.900  
 
Therefore, so as to legitimize the sterilization, the person´s consent must be 
voluntary, unconstrained.901  
 
Furthermore, a person can only give true consent if he/she forms an 
understanding based on veracious, accurate information. Consent given by a 
person who was not properly informed, is not valid. Lack of informed consent is 
sufficient to render the sterilization criminal. It is imperative that the person is 
adequately informed when consenting.902  
 
In this sense, in a footnote to element 2, the redactors of the Elements of Crimes 
explained that the expression “genuine consent” “does not include consent 
obtained through deception”. Thus, rest excluded, for example, cases of 
deception in relation to the durability of the sterilization or the possibility of 




896 Cottier, M. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 431-454 
897 Ibidem 
898 Ibidem 
899 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g)-1, Element 2; 8 (2) (b) 
(xxii)-1, Element 2  
900 Amnesty International (2011), p. 15 
901 Cottier, M. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 431-454 
902 Cottier, M. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 431-454; Leon Acevedo, J. P. P. 
(2015); Mason, J. K. (1998), p. 89 
903 Cottier, M. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 431-454; Elements of Crimes of 
the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g)-5, Element 2, footnote 20; Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-5, 
Element 2, footnote 55, (e) (vi)-5, Element 2, footnote 68 
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In the crime of rape, a footnote established that  
 
“[i]t is understood that a person may be incapable of giving 
genuine consent if affected by natural, induced or age related 
incapacity”904  
 
and that such provision applies also to the crimes of enforced prostitution, 
enforced sterilization, and sexual violence.905  
 
Consequently, if there is a case in which someone was sterilized purportedly 
agreeing to it, but such person is affected by natural, induced or age-related 
incapacity, then the International Criminal Court judges will have to analyse if the 
person´s condition prevented him/her of manifesting genuine consent.  
 
It is important to stress that a sterilization carried out for medical care reasons 
may still constitute enforced sterilization in case it is forcible (takes place against 
the person´s capable, voluntary, and knowledgeable will).906   
 
In sum, adult holds jurisdiction over his/her body as a result of individual´s 
autonomy, and, thus, can make a free, unrestrained, and rational choice to submit 
himself/herself to sterilization. If the sterilization carried out in dissonance with 
this premise (in other words, without the person´s genuine consent), it is 
enforced.907   
 
Finally, it is noteworthy that this concept of enforced sterilization is not limited to 
medical operations, but also includes a calculated use of chemical to achieve 
it.908 
 
4.3.5.(iii). “Mens rea” 
 
The “mens rea” of the crime of enforced sterilization obeys the same logic of the 
other sexual and gender-based crimes: the distinct contextual elements consist 
in the differentiation factor between enforced sterilization as a crime against 
humanity and as a war crime.     
 
4.3.5.(iii).(a). Crime against humanity of enforced 
sterilization909  
 
“3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
 
 
904 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g)-1, Element 2, footnoote 
16; 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-1, Element 2, footnoote 51; (e) (vi)-1, Element 2, footnoote 64 
905 Ibidem 
906 Cottier, M. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 431-454 
907 Mason, J. K. (1998), p. 87 
908 Cryer, R., Friman, H., Robinson, D., & Wilmshurst, E. (2014), pp. 258; La Haye, E. (2001). In 
Lee, R. S. K. & Friman, H. (eds.), pp. 184-189 
909 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 7 (1) (g)-5 
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4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended 
the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population.” 
 
Therefore, the perpetrator must know/ intend that he/she is depriving a person of 
his/her biological reproductive capacity (absent medical reasons and the 
person´s genuine consent) as part of a widespread (against a large number of 
victims or extended over an ample geographic area) or systematic (of an 
organized nature) attack directed against civilians. 
 
4.3.5.(iii).(b). War Crime of enforced sterilization910  
 
4.3.5.(iii).(b)-1. Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-5 War Crime of 
enforced sterilization 
 
“3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated 
with an international armed conflict.  
 
4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an armed conflict.”911 
 
4.3.5.(iii).(b)-2. Article 8 (2) (e) (vi)-5 War Crime of 
enforced sterilization 
 
“3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated 
with an armed conflict not of an international character.  
 
4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an armed conflict.”912 
 
In the war crime of enforced sterilization, the deprivation of a person´s biological 
reproductive capacity (not present medical reasons and the person´s genuine 
consent) must present a bond with an armed conflict. It is indifferent the character 
(international or not) of the armed conflict.  
 




Sexual violence is wider than rape, presenting a far-ranging concept. It includes 
any type of violence implemented by sexual means or which attempts against 
one´s sexuality.913 
 
To reflect this amplitude, in the Rome Statute the listing of sexual and gender-
based crimes finishes with a basket clause which condemns “any other form of 
 
910 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8 (1) (g)-5 
911 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-5 
912 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8 (2) (e) (vi)-5 
913 Boot, M., revised by Hall, C. K. (2008). Article 7 Crimes Against Humanity, para. 1(g). In 
Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 206-216 
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sexual violence”. However, the wording of this last part slightly differs in the “crime 
against humanity” and the “war crimes”.914 
 
Indeed, after enlisting the 5 initial sexual informed offences (rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization), the drafters of the 
Rome Statute adopted different wordings when redacting the last offence 
composing Article 7 (1) (g), Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii), and Article 8 (2) (e) (xxii), as it 
will be subsequently analysed. 
 
4.3.6.(i).(a). Crimes against Humanity 
 
The last crime enumerated in Article 7 (1) (g) is “or any other form of sexual 
violence of comparable gravity”.915 
 
It is a residual class which unequivocally emphasises the sexual violence 
element.916  
 
It was another relevant advancement introduced by the Rome Statute. Certainly, 
in the ICTY and ICTR statutes, apart from rape, the crimes of sexual violence 
were tried as “other humane acts”, defaulting any reference to the sexual 
aspect.917 
 
This criminal type captures other forms of sexual violence which, although not 
expressly itemised in the sexual and gender-based crimes group, also worry the 
international community (as, for example, forced nudity, forced undressing, 
sexual mutilation, forced abortion, forced marriage, forced impregnation not 
followed by forcible confinement, and forced sexual intercourse or distinct sexual 
acts with family members).918   
 
The insertion of the vestigial basket clause in the Rome Statute was somewhat 
agreeable. Nonetheless, the inclusion the term “comparable gravity” was not so 
pacific.919  
 
“Comparable gravity” was adopted so as to easy the concerns of delegates of the 
Rome Conference that if such expression was absent, the basket clause could 
be considered rather vague and, thus, come short of meeting the principle of 
legality.920   
 
 
914 Oosterveld, V. (2011). In Sadat, L. N. (ed.), pp. 78-101 
915 Rome Statute, Art. 7 (1) (g)  
916 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 147 
917 Ibidem; United Nations, Security Council. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (1993), Art. 5 (i); United Nations, Security Council. Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994), Article 3 (i) 
918 ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4. Chamber I, Judgment, 
para. 697 (2 September 1998); ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka, et al., Case No. IT-98-
30/1. Trial Chamber, Judgment, para. 180, footnote 343 (2 November 2001); Oosterveld, V. 
(2011). In Sadat, L. N. (ed.), pp. 78-101 




In spite of that, there were doubts in relation to this requisite, if it demanded 
penetration. Non-Governmental Organizations were uneasy with the possibility 
that the International Criminal Court could regard the phrasing “of comparable 
gravity” as signifying that sexual violence would have to resemble the crime of 
rape.921 
 
However, the expression “comparable gravity” should not be interpreted as ruling 
out acts which do not implicate penetration or physical contact.922   
 
Certainly, in the Akayesu case the ITCR found that 
 
“[s]exual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human 
body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or 
physical contact.”923 
 
This issue was resolved in the elaboration of the Elements of Crimes, as it will be 
seen further below. 
 
4.3.6.(i).(b). War crimes  
 
Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii) final criminal offence is “or any other form of sexual violence 
also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions”.924 
 
Grave breaches constitute notably grave infringements of international 
humanitarian law. Article 8 paragraph 2 (a) of the Rome Statute assimilated the 
list of grave breaches that appear in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions (Art. 50 
Geneva Convention I, Art. 51 Geneva Convention II, Art. 130 Geneva Convention 
III, and Art.  147 Geneva Convention IV). The drafters of the Statute decided to 
simply repeat the concept of grave breaches inserted in the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, namely:925 
 
“(i) Willful killing;  
 
(ii) Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological 
experiments;  
 
(iii) Willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or 
health;  
 
(iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not 





922 Boot, M., revised by Hall, C. K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 206-216 
923 ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4. Chamber I, Judgment, 
paras. 598, 688 (2 September 1998).  
924 Rome Statute, Art. 8 (2) (b) (xxii) 
925 Dörmann, K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 300-322 
925 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 7 (1) (g)-6 
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(v) Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to 
serve in the forces of a hostile Power;  
 
(vi) Willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person 
of the rights of fair and regular trial;  
 
(vii) Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement;  
 
(viii) Taking of hostages.”926  
 
“A priori” it would seem that the wording “or any other form of sexual violence 
also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions” would grant two 
interpretations. It could either purport that “any other form of sexual violence” is 
under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court exclusively if it qualifies 
as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions too, or convey that the specific 
“other form of sexual violence” must be considered as a grave breach “per se” by 
the relevant international law (conceivably covering those conducts not yet 
classified as grave breaches at the time that the Rome Statute was adopted).927 
 
Nonetheless, none of these lines was adopted by the Preparatory Commission 
when elaborating the Elements of Crimes, as it will be discussed later on.    
 
Article 8 (2) (e) addresses “other serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character” and closes its 
subparagraph (vi) with the phrasing  
 
“and any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious 
violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions.”928 
 
Article 3 Common to the four Geneva Conventions handles conflicts not of an 
international character and states in paragraph 1: 
 
“the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time 
and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
mentioned persons: 
 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
 
(b) taking of hostages; 
 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment; 
 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted 
 
926 Rome Statute, Art. 8 (2) (a) 
927 Cottier, M. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 431-454; Rome Statute, Article 8 
(2) (b) (xxii) 
928 Rome Statute, Art. 8 (2) (e) (vi) 
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court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized 
as indispensable by civilized peoples.”929  
 
The insertion of violations of article 3 Common to the four Geneva Conventions 
in the Rome Statute was challenged by a handful of States (China, India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey). This was unexpected bearing in mind that the 
International Court of Justice had stated that Common Article 3 serves as a 
minimum benchmark in cases of civil conflicts:930 
 
“Article 3 which is common to all four Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 defines certain rules to be applied in the armed 
conflicts of a non- international character. There is no doubt that, 
in the event of international armed conflicts, these rules also 
constitute a minimum yardstick, in addition to the more elaborate 
rules which are also to apply to international conflicts” 931 
 
Also, Article 4 of the ICTR Statute had explicitly criminalized serious violations of 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions:932 
 
“The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to 
prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed 
serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, 
and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977.”933  
 
Furthermore, previously to the Rome Conference, the Appeals Chamber of both 
the ICTY and the ICTR had expressly corroborated that, in accordance with 
current customary international law provisions, violations of Common Article 3, 
even in cases of internal armed conflicts, implicate in the individual responsibility 
of the person incurring in the infringements:934 
 
“customary international law imposes criminal liability for serious 
violations of common Article 3 … for breaching certain 
fundamental principles and rules regarding means and methods 
of combat in civil strife.”935 
 
“It is today clear that the norms of Common Article 3 have 
acquired the status of customary law in that most States, by their 
domestic penal codes, have criminalized acts which if committed 
during internal armed conflict, would constitute violations of 
Common Article 3. It was also held by the ICTY Trial Chamber in 
 
929 Geneva Conventions I, II, III, IV, Art. 3 
930 Zimmermann, A. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 475-502 
931 International Court of Justice. Nicaragua v. United States of America, Merits Judgment, p. 114, 
para. 219 (27 June 1986). 
932 Zimmermann, A. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 475-502 
933 United Nations, Security Council. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(1994), Art. 4  
934 Zimmermann, A. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 475-502 
935 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić a.k.a. “Dule”, Case No. IT-94-1. Trial Chamber, Opinion 
and Judgment, pp. 46-49 (7 May 1997) 
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the Tadic judgment 155 that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute 
(Customs of War), being the body of customary international 
humanitarian law not covered by Articles 2, 4, and 5 of the ICTY 
Statute, included the regime of protection established under 
Common Article 3 applicable to armed conflicts not of an 
international character. This was in line with the view of the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber stipulating that Common Article 3 beyond 
doubt formed part of customary international law, and further that 
there exists a corpus of general principles and norms on internal 
armed conflict embracing Common Article 3 but having a much 
greater scope.”936  
 
Theoretically, the wording of Article 8 (2) (e) (vi) “and any other form of sexual 
violence also constituting a serious violation of article 3 common to the four 
Geneva Conventions” could signify that “any other form of sexual violence” is 
under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court solely in case it 
constitutes as a serious violation of article 3 Common to the four Geneva 
Conventions too. Alternatively, it could mean that the determined “other form of 
sexual violence” must be regarded as a serious violation of article 3 Common to 
the four Geneva Conventions.937 
 
In spite of the different terminology employed in the last criminal figure inserted 
in Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii), Article 8 (2) (e) (vi) and Article 7 (1) (g), they stand on a 
common basis. Surely, the goal of the delegates of the Rome Conference was to 
include a far-reaching group of relevant sexual informed crimes so as to avoid 
that an eventual sexual crime could not be prosecuted for a deficiency in 
subsuming it into one of the sexual criminal offences brought by the Rome 
Statute. Indeed, the drafters of the Rome Statute, recognising the gravity of 
sexual crimes, aimed to demonstrate to the world that sexual violence is among 
the most serious offences of concern of the international community and, hence, 
ought not to continue without punishment.938   
 
Once again, the concept of sexual violence found in the ICTY and ICTR cases 
inspired the drafters of the Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court. 
In such case law, sexual violence can take place even in the absence of 
penetration or physical contact. In fact, both “ad hoc” tribunals have considered 
forced nudity to amount to sexual violence.939 
 
In the ICTY Furundžija case, the Trial Chamber stated that: 
 
“international criminal rules punish not only rape but also any 
serious sexual assault falling short of actual penetration.  It would 
seem that the prohibition embraces all serious abuses of a sexual 
 
936 ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4. Chamber I, Judgment, 
para. 608 (2 September 1998). 
937 Rome Statute, Art.  8 (2) (e) (vi); 
Cottier, M. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 431-454 
938 Cottier, M. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 431-454; de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. 
(2005), p. 147 
939 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 149 
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nature inflicted upon the physical and moral integrity of a person 
by means of coercion, threat of force or intimidation in a way that 
is degrading and humiliating for the victim’s dignity. As both these 
categories of acts are criminalised in international law, the 
distinction between them is one that is primarily material for the 
purposes of sentencing.”940 
 
The ICTR defined the crime of sexual violence in the Akayesu case: 
 
“The Tribunal considers sexual violence, which includes rape, as 
any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence is not limited 
to physical invasion of the human body and may include acts 
which do not involve penetration or physical contact.”941 
 
In the Kvocka case, the ICTY tribunal referred to and held up such concept: 
 
“[t]he Akayesu Trial Chamber defined sexual violence as “any act 
of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive.” Thus, sexual violence is 
broader than rape and includes such crimes as sexual slavery or 
molestation. Moreover, the Akayesu Trial Chamber emphasized 
that sexual violence need not necessarily involve physical 
contact and cited forced public nudity as an example.”942 
 
Therefore, sexual violence in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunals 
was considered a wide-ranged concept that covers all types of sexual violence, 
inclusive of rape.943 
 
The 1998 Slavery report also adopted such approach: 
 
“[r]ape falls within the broader category of "sexual violence", 
which this report defines as any violence, physical or 
psychological, carried out through sexual means or by targeting 
sexuality. Sexual violence covers both physical and 
psychological attacks directed at a person’s sexual 
characteristics, such as forcing a person to strip naked in public, 
mutilating a person’s genitals, or slicing off a woman’s 
breasts.”944 
 
In the Rome Statute and the supplementary Elements of Crimes, the crime of 
sexual violence retained this feature. Indeed, it was designed to offer a wide 
 
940 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T. Trial Chamber, Judgment, 
p. 73, para. 186 (10 December 1998) 
941 ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4. Chamber I, Judgment, 
paras. 598, 688 (2 September 1998).  
942 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka, et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1. Trial Chamber, 
Judgment, para. 180 (2 November 2001) 
943 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 150 
944 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on systematic rape, sexual slavery and 
slavery-like practices during armed conflict, PP. 7-8, para. 21 
189 
 
protection to victims against acts of sexual violence. It encompasses conducts 
such as forced nudity, mutilation of parts of the human body which present a 
sexual aspect (for instance, the breasts of a woman or a person´s genitals), 
sexual molestations, and forced abortion, which, failing to qualify as the specific 
sexual crimes aforementioned, find shelter in the broad scope of the sexual 
violence provision.945 
 
Conducts which theoretically could be qualified as amounting to the crime of 
sexual violence, but, concomitantly, constitute a specific criminal type inserted in 
the Rome Statute, should be tried with basis on the particular sexual crime.946   
 
Indeed, only types of sexual violence which cannot be subsumed under one of 
the 5 specialized sexual crimes should be prosecuted as the crime of sexual 
violence, for the latter is residual.947  
 
4.3.6.(ii). Elements of Crimes 
 
4.3.6.(ii).(a). Crime against humanity of sexual 
violence948 
 
4.3.6.(ii).(a)-1. “Actus reus” 
 
           Element 1  
 
“The perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one 
or more persons or caused such person or persons to engage in 
an act of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or 
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, 
detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against 
such person or persons or another person, or by taking 
advantage of a coercive environment or such person’s or 
persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent.” 
 
This inaugural element establishes that the crime of sexual violence can assume 
two forms. The first consists in committing an act of a sexual nature against one 
or more persons. The second involves causing such person or persons to engage 
in an act of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion.949 
 
The examples of coercion (fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological 
oppression or abuse of power, against such person or a third party, or by taking 
advantage of a coercive environment, or by taking advantage of such person’s 
incapacity to give genuine consent) laid down here are a restatement of those 
inserted in the crimes against humanity of rape and enforced prostitution.950  
 
 
945 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 150 
946 Ibidem 
947 Cottier, M. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 431-454 
948 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 7 (1) (g)-6 
949 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 148 
950 Ibidem; Oosterveld, V. (2011). In Sadat, L. N. (ed.), pp. 78-101 
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In fact, the ample concept of coercion inserted in the crime of rape was reapplied 
here. As a result, non-consent does not amount to a constitutive element of 
sexual violence.951  
 
Moreover, from the expression “psychological oppression” rests explicit that 
sexual violence encloses not only physical but also psychological attempts 




“Such conduct was of a gravity comparable to the other offences 
in article 7, paragraph 1 (g), of the Statute”  
 
As already stressed out, in the making of the Rome Statute were raised concerns 
with regards to the phrasing “comparable gravity”, if it required penetration as the 
crime of rape.953  
 
The negotiations on the elements of crimes made it explicit that the conduct must 
be “of a gravity comparable to the other offences in article 7, paragraph 1 (g), of 
the Statute”, and not only rape, in consonance with the findings of the “ad hoc” 
tribunals that sexual violence covers a large variety of conducts, ranging from the 
invasion of sexual organs to humiliating acts that dispense physical contact.954 
 
Undoubtedly, element 2 demands seriousness of the conduct (either carry out an 
act of a sexual nature against a person or cause somebody to participate of an 
act of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion) to be equivalent 
to the crimes of rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or 
enforced prostitution.955  
 
As a result, the expression “comparable gravity” should not be taken as ruling out 
conducts which do not imply penetration or physical contact.956 
 
Element 3  
 
“The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that 
established the gravity of the conduct”  
 
 
951 Boot, M., revised by Hall, C. K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 206-216; de 
Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 148 
952 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on systematic rape, sexual slavery and 
slavery-like practices during armed conflict, para. 21; 
Boot, M., revised by Hall, C. K. (2008). Article 7 Crimes Against Humanity, para. 1(g). In Triffterer, 
O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 206-216 
953  de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 148; Rome Statute, Art. 7 (1) (g) 
954 Oosterveld, V. (2011). In Sadat, L. N. (ed.), pp. 78-101 
955 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 148 
956 Boot, M., revised by Hall, C. K. (2008). Article 7 Crimes Against Humanity, para. 1(g). In 
Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 206-216 
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The third element does not demand the perpetrator to proceed to a legal analysis 
of the seriousness of the act. Certainly, the perpetrator must only be conscious 
of the facts that informed the gravity of his act.957 
 
4.3.6.(ii).(a)-2. “Mens Rea” 
 
Element 4  
 
“The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against a civilian population.”  
 
Once more, the conduct (to perpetrate an act of a sexual nature against a person 
or cause somebody to participate of an act of a sexual nature by force, or by 
threat of force or coercion) must be part of course of action targeting civilians. 
Such course of action must produce several victims, be carried out within a wide 
geographic region (widespread), or be conducted in accordance with a 
policy/strategy (systematic). 
 
Element 5  
 
“The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended 
the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population.” 
 
The perpetrator ought to know that his act was part (or at least intended it to be 
part) of the attack described in element 4.  
 
4.3.6.(ii).(b). War crime of sexual violence 
 




Element 1  
 
“The perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one 
or more persons or caused such person or persons to engage in 
an act of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or 
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, 
detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against 
such person or persons or another person, or by taking 
advantage of a coercive environment or such person’s or 
persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent.” 
 
Element 1 is a reproduction of element 1 of the crime against humanity of sexual 
violence, and, hence, brings the same two modes of incurring in the crime of 
sexual violence: committing an act of a sexual nature against one or more person, 
or causing such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature. 
 
957 Ibidem, p. 215, para. 53 




Further, so as to be qualified as sexual violence within the provisions of the Rome 
Statute (oppositely to a simple sexual act), the conduct must be informed by 




“The conduct was of a gravity comparable to that of a grave 
breach of the Geneva Conventions” 
 
This element is the interpretation provided by the International Criminal Court 
Preparatory Commission of the phrasing of Article 8 paragraph 2 (b) (xxii) of the 
Rome Statute “also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions”.960  
 
The term “also constituting” generated an intense discussion due to its lack of 
precision. The International Criminal Court Preparatory Commission, influenced 
by the Women´s Caucus´ lobby, decided to regard the statement “also 
constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions” of the Rome Statute as 
meaning “of a gravity comparable to that of a grave breach of the Geneva 
Conventions”.961 
 
Nevertheless, such understating is not in consonance with the wording of the 
concept inserted in the Rome Statute and, thus, is not binding on the International 
Criminal Court judges, in the terms of Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Rome 
Statute.962  
 
Having said that, it is noteworthy that the interpretation given to the phrasing of 
Article 8 paragraph 2 (b) (xxii) agrees with the main goal behind it, specifically, 
the willingness to establish a threshold and ban “less relevant” types of sexual 
violence (those not be important enough to be among the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community), whose prosecution before the 
International Criminal Court would be misplaced.963    
 
All and all, in the terms of the Element 2, so that it can be subsumed in the terms 
of the Rome Statute, “any other form of sexual violence” must reach the required 
minimum limit of gravity comparable to a grave breach of the Geneva 
Conventions, as, for example, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological 
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health, 
or, tenably, one of the 5 particular types of sexual crimes enumerated in Article 8 
paragraph 2 (b) (xxii), since the latter are considered “per se” grave breaches. In 
fact, nowadays it is largely acknowledged that rape and other types of sexual 












Element 3  
 
“The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that 
established the gravity of the conduct” 
 
The perpetrator has to be conscious of the factual (but not legal) circumstances 






“The conduct took place in the context of and was associated 
with an international armed conflict” 
 
There must be established a sufficient nexus between the act of sexual violence 
and the international armed conflict.965 
 
Element 5  
 
“The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an armed conflict” 
 
Also, it is demanded form the perpetrator some type of knowledge about the 
factual circumstances that gave rise to the international armed conflict.966 
 





Element 1  
 
“The perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one 
or more persons or caused such person or persons to engage in 
an act of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or 
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, 
detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against 
such person or persons or another person, or by taking 
advantage of a coercive environment or such person’s or 
persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent” 
 
The terms of element 1 of the war crime of sexual violence in armed conflict not 
of an international character (Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-6) are precisely the same as 
those inserted in element 1 of the war crime of sexual violence in armed conflict 
of an international character (Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-6). Therefore, the observations 
made there apply here.967  
 
965 Dörmann, K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 300-322 
966 Ibidem 






“The conduct was of a gravity comparable to that of a serious 
violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions” 
 
Article 8 (2) (e) (vi) of the Rome Statute stated, in relation to armed conflicts not 
of an international character, that  
 
“any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious 
violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions”968 
 
is subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.  
 
It means that sexual acts beyond rape, forced pregnancy, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution and enforced sterilization perpetrated in internal armed 
conflict solely could be prosecuted before the ICC in case they also amount to a 
serious violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions. This 
interpretation is availed by the employment of the word “also” and by the fact that 
a comma separates the first 5 criminal figure and “any other form of sexual 
violence”, entailing that “also constituting a serious violation of article 3 common 
to the four Geneva Conventions” is to be regarded as a threshold that must be 
met.969 
 
Moreover, the term “also” corroborates the widely accepted understanding that 
the crimes of rape, forced pregnancy, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution and 
enforced sterilization consist in serious violations of common Article 3 “per se”.970 
 
Notwithstanding that, when determining the constitutive elements of this crime, 
the Preparatory Commission resolved to follow the same path it headed to set up 
the boundaries of Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii) of the Rome Statute. Indeed, The 
Preparatory Commission, interpreting “also constituting a serious violation of 
article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions”, adopted the wording  
 
“of a gravity comparable to that of a serious violation of article 3 
common to the four Geneva Conventions.”971  
 
As a consequence, symmetrically to the situation found in the war crime of sexual 
violence in armed conflict of an international character, here the wording of 
element 2 does not coincide with the definition inserted in Article 8 (2) (e) (vi) of 
the Rome Statute and, hence, is not binding on the judges of the International 
Criminal Court (Article 9, paragraph 3, Rome Statute).972 It will be possible to see 
eventual effects of this issue in the study of the practice of the International 
Criminal Court.  
 
968 Rome Statute, Art. 8 (2) (e) (vi) 
969 Zimmermann, A. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 475-502 
970 Ibidem 
971 Rome Statute, Art. 8 (2) (e) (vi); Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8 
(2) (b) (xxii)-6, Element 2, (e) (vi)-6, Element 2 






“The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that 
established the gravity of the conduct” 
 
This element coincides with element 3 of Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-6, Elements of 
Crimes. The perpetrator is required to be conscious of factual circumstances that 
arouse the gravity of his conduct. Awareness of legal circumstances is not 
demanded. 
 




“The conduct took place in the context of and was associated 




“The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an armed conflict” 
 
Except for the requirement that the armed conflict must be not of an international 
character, Elements 4 and 5 of the war crime of sexual violence in armed conflict 
not of an international character are an identical to Elements 4 and 5 of the war 
crime of sexual violence in armed conflict of an international character (Article 8 
(2) (b) (xxii)-6).973  
 
Therefore, the act of sexual violence must be wedded to the armed conflict not of 
an international character.974 
 
Moreover, it is demanded form the perpetrator some kind of knowledge about the 
factual circumstances which triggered the establishment of the armed conflict not 




The establishment of the International Criminal Court coronated the evolving 
process of the internationally criminalizing sexual and gender-based crimes. The 
drafters of the Rome Statute attached great importance to the relevance of 
gender in the commission of criminal offences under the Statute.975  
 
 
973 Zimmermann, A. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 475-502 
974 Dörmann, K. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 300-322 
975 ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4. Chamber I, Judgment, 
para. 598 (2 September 1998). 
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As a result, the Rome Statute was the inaugural instrument in international law to 
present a broad roster of sexual and gender-based crimes and regard them as 
war crimes (in both international and non-international armed conflicts).976    
 
Moreover, the Rome Statute, apart from including the crime of rape among which 
constitute crimes against humanity (as the two “ad hoc” International Criminal 
Tribunals), extended the list of sexual and gender-based crimes that constitute 
crimes against humanity. In fact, it established that the following crimes are to be 
prosecuted under the head crimes against humanity: sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual 
violence of comparable gravity, and persecution on the grounds of gender.977   
 
Also, the commission of sexual and gender-based crimes with intent to destroy, 
either in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group can amount 
to genocidal acts.978 
  
From a broad point of view, the Rome Statute considerably expanded the range 
of situations in which one can be regarded responsible for committing sexual and 



























976 International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes, pp. 9-11 (9 June 2014). 
977 International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes, pp. 5, 9 (9 June 2014); Rome Statute, Art. 5 (g) (h) 
978 International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes, pp. 5, 9 (9 June 2014); Rome Statute, Art. 6 
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In spite of the increase of legal instruments protecting human rights and the 
startling number of persons victimised in the subsequent 50 years to the World 
War II (there were roughly 70-170 million mortal victims- a number twice as high 
as the number of casualties during the two World Wars- caused by around 250 
international and non-international conflicts), the first International Criminal 
Tribunals, instead of opting for a victim-oriented approach, decided to follow the 
usual neglect to which war victims traditionally have been submitted, and, in 
general, did not pay much regard to victims.979     
 
At the Nuremberg Trials, the procedure was based on written sources, and, solely 
sporadically, victims figured as witnesses.980 
 
Indeed, the role played by victims and survivors of the Nazi regime and their rights 
were understated during the Nuremberg Trials proceedings. This can be 
somehow surprising bearing in mind that one of the central goals of the 
Nuremberg Trials was to promote justice and vindicate millions of victims of the 
Nazism. The American and British prosecutors did not call any survivors to 
provide evidence. Even though French and Russian prosecutors called survivors 
to testify, the role of the evidence provided by the latter was incidental. Certainly, 
the trials were predominantly directed by the Americans, thus, following their 
prosecution case and method.981   
 
Furthermore, apart from the fact that the American and British prosecutors 
mistakenly did not call any survivor to testify, another factor contributed for the 
exclusion of the victims and survivors from the trial: the 1945 Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal, which established the Nuremberg Military 
International Tribunal, did not include the words “victims” and “survivors”. This 
entails that, in the constitution of the Tribunal, it was not foreseen that survivors 
would give testimony or that they would play a part in the proceedings, and, 
logically, it was not envisaged that survivors would have right to be protected and 
supported before, during and after testifying. Moreover, before and during the 
trials there was no discussion about the possibility of giving or awarding some 
type of reparation to victims and survivors.982   
    
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda made more use of witness testimony, 
and were attuned to the concept that victims should, at least, not be subject to 
further victimisation by the system of international criminal justice.983 
 
The 1993 ICTY Statute included innovative and forward-looking measures to help 
and guard victims, which constituted a significant advancement for the rights and 
 
979 Bassiouni, M. C. (2006), pp. 203-279; Mégret, F. (2012); pp. 23-27 
980 Mégret, F. (2012), pp. 23-27  
981 Garkawe, S. (2006), p. 86 
982 Ibidem 
983 Mégret, F. (2012), pp. 23-27 
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interests of the victims in the international scenario. The ICTY was invested with 
competence to create specific procedural rules or measures to protect victims 
and witnesses. A Victims and Witnesses Section was constituted to provide 
support to victims and help them when dealing with the Tribunal.984   
 
Indeed, Rule 34 (A) determined that  
 
“[t]here shall be set up under the authority of the Registrar a 
Victims and Witnesses Section consisting of qualified staff to:  
 
(i) recommend protective measures for victims and witnesses in 
accordance with Article 22 of the Statute; and  
 
(ii) provide counselling and support for them, in particular in 
cases of rape and sexual assault.”985 
 
Subparagraph (ii) demonstrates that victims regarded “vulnerable”, in particular 
women and children, were object of distinguished consideration in the rules of the 
ICTY.986  
 
Another example of the special treatment dispensed towards women and children 
is Rule 96 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. This Rule, disposing about evidence in cases 
of sexual assault, provides that “no corroboration of the victim's testimony” is 
demanded. It also establishes that987  
 
“consent shall not be allowed as a defence if the victim  
  
(a) has been subjected to or threatened with or has had reason 
to fear violence, duress, detention or psychological oppression, 
or  
(b) reasonably believed that if the victim did not submit, another 
might be so subjected, threatened or put in fear;” 988 
 
and that “prior sexual conduct of the victim shall not be admitted in evidence.”989 
 
 
984 Garkawe, S. (2006), pp. 86-87; ICTY. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Rule 34, (A) (i) (ii) (11 February 1994); 
United Nations, Security Council. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (1993), Arts. 15, 20 (1), 22;  
985 ICTY. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, Rule 34, (A) (i) (ii) 
986 Garkawe, S. (2006), pp. 86-87; International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia´s 
Statute, Art. 22; ICTY. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia, Rules 69, 74, 75, 90 (B), 96, 98 (B), 105, 106 
987 ICTY. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, Rule 96 (i) 
988 ICTY. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, Rule 96 (ii) (a) (b) 
989 ICTY. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, Rule 96 (iv) 
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The main feature of the ICTY in relation to victims was that for the first time in 
history an international criminal court made an effort towards facilitating the 
reparation or compensation of victims. However, there were few provisions on 
reparation. Moreover, the existent ones were insufficient and only went so far as 
to provide that victims could appear before national courts with an international 
condemnatory judgment holding guilty the person(s) who incurred in criminal 
offence(s) against them, but this seldom happened. Another downside was that 
victims were not considered as parties to the ICTY proceedings. The 1994 Statute 
of the ICTR and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence contained similar measures 
to those inserted in the ICTY Statute.990  
 
All and all, even though the “ad hoc” International Criminal Tribunals´ provisions 
which related to victims contained measures of protection and reparation (the 
latter circumscribed to restitution and compensation), they failed to outline 
victims´ participation in proceedings (the role of the victims was seen as a mere 
instrument to make progress the cases) and a well-grounded possibility of 
claiming reparations.991 
 
As a result, the “ad hoc” International Criminal Tribunals came short of granting 
more significant and palpable justice.992  
 
The victims’ dissatisfaction with these Tribunals was one of the catalyst elements 
for including further victim-oriented provisions in the constitution of the 
International Criminal Court.993 
 
Certainly, fostered by the unsatisfactory answers of the “ad hoc” International 
Criminal Tribunals to the victims´ needs, the movement to establish the 
International Criminal Court almost from its origin adopted a different perspective 
of the victims´ role and status.994 
 
In the first place, the International Criminal Court was not to be constituted by the 
Security Council and pursued other sources of legitimacy.995  
 
The States Parties to the Rome Statute established the International Criminal 
Court “as an independent permanent institution in relationship with the United 
Nations system.” A relationship agreement between the ICC and the United 
 
990 Garkawe, S. (2006), pp. 86-87; ICTR. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules 34 (A) (i) (ii), 39 (ii), 40 (iii), 65 (B), 69, 75 (13 May 1995); 
Mégret, F. (2012), pp. 23-27; United Nations, Security Council. Statute of the International l 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Arts. 14, 19 (1), 21 
991 Donat-Cattin, D. (1999). In Lattanzi, F., & Schabas, W. A. (eds.), pp. 251-277; Moffett, L. (2014 
a), p.1; Nitti, G., & Bourguiba, L. (2012). Victim´s access to the International Criminal Court: Much 
remains to be done. In Michelon, C., Clunie, G., McCorkindale, C., & Psaras, H.  (eds.), pp. 287-
302 
992 Moffett, L. (2014 a), p.1 
993 Ibidem 
994 Nitti, G., & Bourguiba, L. (2012). In Michelon, C., Clunie, G., McCorkindale, C., & Psaras, H.  




Nations was approved by the Assembly of States Parties and concluded by the 
President of the Court in 2004.996 
 
Moreover, civil society groups (in particular Redress and Human Rights Watch) 
had an important role in the setting up of the International Criminal Court. These 
groups were more prone to consider international criminal justice as a way of 
providing justice to victims instead of only, for instance, a channel to achieve both 
international peace and security.997  
 
Further, associations of victims were frustrated and disappointed with the 
international criminal tribunals that had been created until then and by several 
legal developments related to the human right to reparation, fact that impacted 
the debates in the 1990s. The pressure exerted by these agents and 
circumstances rebounded in the Rome Conference.998 
 
Indeed, the insertion of the victim-oriented norms in the Rome Statute resulted 
from arduous work from such groups and associations.  
 
The 1994 Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court of the International Law 
Commission had merely 3 articles destined to the safeguard of victims:999  
 
Article 26 (2) (a) disposed that, in the investigation of alleged crimes, the 
Prosecutor could request the presence of and question suspects, victims and 
witnesses.1000 
 
Article 38 stated that it is among the functions of the Trial Chamber to 
 
“ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted in 
accordance with this Statute and the Rules, with full respect for 
the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of 
victims and witnesses.”1001 
 
Article 43, on protection of the accused, victims and witnesses stated that the 
Court was responsible for taking the necessary measures so as to protect the 
accused, victims and witnesses, and, to achieve such goal, could conduct closed 




996 Rome Statute, Arts. 1-2, United Nations, General Assembly. Negotiated Relationship 
Agreement between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, Preamble 
997 Mégret, F. (2012), pp. 23-27 
998 Ibidem 
999 Vázquez Pedreño, J. (2014), pp. 248-249 
1000 United Nations, International Law Commission.  Report of the International Law Commission 
on the work of its forty-sixth session, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court with 
commentaries 1994, Art. 26 (2) (a) 
1001 United Nations, International Law Commission.  Report of the International Law Commission 
on the work of its forty-sixth session, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court with 
commentaries 1994, Art. 38 (2) 
1002 United Nations, International Law Commission.  Report of the International Law Commission 
on the work of its forty-sixth session, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court with 
commentaries 1994, Art. 43 
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It was rather an incipient start. However, the movement pro-victims was 
empowered by two factors. First, the negotiations of the contents of the Rome 
Statute coincided with an advance in the conception of the relevance of victims 
in both international human rights law and international humanitarian law. 
Second, at the same time, there was a strengthening of the restorative justice in 
criminal justice.1003 
 
Stimulated by these circumstances, the movement pro-victims gained strength 
and influenced the debates. Fiona McKay, representing REDRESS, in behalf of 
the Victims´ Rights Working Group at the Rome Conference of the International 
Criminal Court, affirmed in a 1998 statement that: 
 
“It is this theme of how the ICC can do justice in the eyes of 
victims that I wish to take up.  
 
The establishment of an international criminal court, able to bring 
to justice those responsible for the most heinous crimes, is itself 
an important symbol for survivors of those crimes.  
 
But punishing criminals is not enough. There will be no justice 
without justice for victims. And in order to do justice for victims, 
the ICC must be empowered to address their rights and needs. 
There is increasing recognition at both international and national 
levels of the need to ensure that criminal justice does take 
account of victims’ rights:  
 
• At the international level, the UN Declaration of Basic Principles 
of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power calls for a 
greater responsiveness of judicial processes to the needs of 
victims, and for victims to be treated with compassion and 
respect for their dignity. 
… 
Victims have a wide range of needs which must be met if the 
process of healing and reconciliation is to take place. They need 
to have the opportunity to speak the truth about what happened 
to them, however painful that might be. They also need to hear 
the truth: to receive answers, and official acknowledgement 
concerning the violations. They need to be protected from further 
harm. They need to be involved in the judicial process. And they 
need compensation, restitution and rehabilitation. All these 
needs, now largely recognized in international law, have been 
translated into rights.  
 
It should be recognized that victimisation affects not only the 
individual victim but families, communities and whole 
societies.”1004  
 
1003 Schabas, W. A. (2011), p. 172 
1004 Victims Rights Working Group, advocating for the rights of victims at the International Criminal 
Court. Rome Conference for the establishment of an International Criminal Court, Speech by 




In the same statement, McKay also focused on how the International Criminal 
Court could adequately and effectively attend to the needs and rights of victims:  
 
“[f]irst, it is essential that the Court be able to guarantee 
protection for victims and other witnesses in the proceedings. 
This means a strong and effective victims and witnesses unit with 
adequate powers and resources.  
 
Second, women - who are a majority of victims and are often 
victims of sexual or gender violence - must have appropriate 
structures and personnel with gender expertise to ensure proper 
respect and treatment. Recognition of crimes against women is 
itself a crucial aspect of justice and the healing process.  
 
Third, child victims will also require specialised treatment and 
mechanisms.  
 
Fourth, it is important that victims are involved in the judicial 
process as more than mere bystanders. Adequate provision must 
be made for their effective participation in the proceedings.  
 
Fifth, the Court must be able to ensure the right of victims and 
their families to reparation. Reparation is defined in the draft UN 
Principles and Guidelines on the right to reparation for violations 
of human rights and humanitarian law. It includes not only 
compensation but also restitution, rehabilitation, satisfaction and 
guarantees of non-repetition.  
 
Finally, if the Court proves able to effectively bring to justice those 
responsible for the crimes within its jurisdiction, that will do most 
of all to make victims feel that justice has been done.”1005 
 
Therefore, the engagement of non-governmental organizations was crucial for 
the insertion of measures containing victims´ rights.1006   
 
As a result of their lobby, an unparalleled role was conceded to the victims in the 
creation of the International Criminal Court through the enactment of the Rome 
Statute.1007 
 
Regarding the special treatment dispensed towards victims of sexual or gender 
violence and the insertion of specific measures to protect and support them in the 
Rome Statute, it is necessary to bear in mind that there were other elements 
which contributed to them being leveraged to a group entitled to receive extra 
protection and assistance from the Court.  
 
1005 Ibidem 
1006 Nitti, G., & Bourguiba, L. (2012). In Michelon, C., Clunie, G., McCorkindale, C., & Psaras, H.  
(eds.), pp. 287-302 




Indeed, the feminist movement, especially after World War II, emphasised that 
criminal law not only does not protect victims but also re-victimises them (re-
victimisation or secondary victimisation refers to the victimisation that takes place 
not as a direct consequence of the crime but by how institutions and individuals 
respond to the victim, in this case, by the International Criminal Court), being 
gender violence the most remarkable example. Furthermore, it highlighted that 
the first victimologists were prone to blame the women victims of violent crimes, 
especially in cases of crimes of a sexual nature.1008 
 
Although it is not possible to affirm that there is a proper feminist victimology, 
under this concept three principles have been established: rejection of gender-
centrism; patriarchy as an element explaining the criminalisation and victimisation 
of women; and it was reached the conclusion that usually women victims form a 
minority without power, in qualitative terms, and they suffer effective 
discrimination by control agents.1009 
 
Therefore, there was a tendency in Criminology to pay attention to the implication 
of the gender category in the commission of crimes, and the unfairness with which 
women were treated in particular in crimes of violence of a sexual character.1010  
 
In this framework, the international community adopted numerous substantial 
steps so as to respond to the increasing demand to acknowledge sexual and 
gender-based crimes as grave crimes nationally and internationally.1011 
 
A great attainment in this process was the enlistment of sexual (rape, sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and 
sexual violence, which encompass physical and non-physical acts with a sexual 
factor) and gender-based crimes (those perpetrated against persons, either male 
or female, in view of their sex and/or socially fabricated gender roles, which can 
cover non-sexual attacks on male and female due to their gender) in the Rome 
Statute, and the particular protection and support dispensed to victims of  sexual 
and gender-based violence (within the groundbreaking protection and assistance 
to victims in general).1012      
 
Certainly, cognisant of the vulnerability and specific needs of the victims of sexual 
and gender-based crimes, the Rome Statute and subsequent related legal 
instruments have further established an even more attentive system of protection 
and assistance to this category of victims, as it will be seen below.  




1008 Varona Martínez, G. (2012), pp. 8, 19, 25; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (1999), 
p. 9; Wolfgang, M. E., & Singer, S. I. (1978), pp. 379-394 
1009 Varona Martínez, G. (2012), pp. 7-8 
1010 Ibidem 
1011 International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes, pp. 5, 9 (9 June 2014).  
1012 Rome Statute, Arts. 7 (1) (g), 8 (2) (b) (xxii), (e) (vi); International Criminal Court, the Office of 
the Prosecutor. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, p. 3 (9 June 2014). 
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5.2. Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court: innovations 




The Rome Statute adopted a solid victim constituent.1013  
 
Undoubtedly, during the negotiations of the Statute, it was a priority to ensure the 
observance of the fundamental values of the International Criminal Court, 
namely, the promotion of greater peace and security by means of liability for 
crimes, and the respect for victims’ rights and dignity. This was a central and 
decisive issue for it entailed the acknowledgement of the States involved in the 
elaboration of the Statute that the International Criminal Court besides its 
retributive role, had also a restorative one.1014  
 
Although the traditional conceptions associated with due process and criminal 
justice were not abandoned, the drafters of the Statute decided to deploy a 
victimological approach, elevating victims’ accounts to an eminent position in the 
international criminal justice process.1015 
 
As a consequence, the Rome Statute is permeated by a victim-oriented spirit, 
bringing several provisions on the protection and support of the victims, and has 
been regarded as turning point in Victimology.1016 
 
Surely, the Statue was pioneer in the history of international criminal justice, and, 
for the first time ever, conceded to victims the chance to bring their views and 
considerations to the Court. Thus, the victim-based provisions inserted in the 
Statute grant victims with the possibility to have a say in the proceedings of the 
International Criminal Court.1017 
 
In the preamble it is disposed that the States Parties to the Statute were 
 
“[m]indful that during this century millions of children, women and 
men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply 
shock the conscience of humanity.”1018 
 
The reference to the suffering experienced by millions of innocent human beings 
is an attempt to guarantee that the alarming number of victims and their suffering 
persists on the focus of the collective human conscience. In fact, the idea of 
 
1013 Moffett, L. (2014), p. 86 
1014 International Criminal Court, Office of Public Counsel for Victims. Representing Victims 
before the International Criminal Court, A Manual for legal representatives appearing before the 
Court, p. 26  
1015 Benhassine, S. (2015), pp. 11-12; Groenhuijsen, M. S., & Pemberton, A. (2011). In Letschert, 
R., Havemen, R., de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M., & Pemberton, A. (eds.), pp. 9-34 
1016 Groenhuijsen, M. S. (2005). In Snyman, R., & Davis, L. (eds.), pp. 333-351 
1017 International Criminal Court, The Office of Public Counsel for Victims. Helping victims make 
their voice heard, pp. 3, 11; International Criminal Court. Victims Participation and Reparations 
Section´s booklet, Victims before the International Criminal Court, A guide for the participation of 
victims in the proceedings of the Court, p. 12; International Criminal Court website, Victims 
1018 Rome Statute, Preamble 
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justice was reviewed so that, beyond referring to individuals or categories of 
victims, it would be delivered in behalf of humankind.1019  
 
The preamble is followed by an array of rights conceded to victims along the 
Rome Statute, which constituted one of its great novelties.1020  
 
Comparing with the procedural rules of the two “ad hoc” International Criminal 
Tribunals, the main improvements of the Rome Statute are the enlargement of 
the protection conferred to victims, the extension of the victims´ participation in 
the proceedings, and the ameliorated provisions regarding reparation.1021 
 
Certainly, the Rome Statute confers a more ample procedural role to victims by 
means of acknowledgment, participation, safeguarding, and aid measures, 
opposed to prior International Criminal Tribunals.1022 
 
5.2.2. The definition of victim for the International Criminal Court 
 
The Rome Statute did not elaborate a concept of victim. Such task was 
undertaken by the drafters of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Rome 
Statute.  Inspired by the definition of victims of the 1985 UN Declaration on 
Justice for Victims, the Preparatory Commission established in Rule 85 the 
following definition:1023 
 
“For the purposes of the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence: 
 
(a) “Victims” means natural persons who have suffered harm as 
a result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court;  
 
(b) Victims may include organizations or institutions that have 
sustained direct harm to any of their property which is dedicated 
to religion, education, art or science or charitable purposes, and 
to their historic monuments, hospitals and other places and 
objects for humanitarian purposes.”1024 
 
Therefore, in accordance with Rule 85, not only natural people can be regarded 
as victims but also organisations or institutions. In fact, Rule 85 (b) wording 
“[v]ictims may include organizations or institutions” implies that organisations and 
 
1019 Triffterer, O.  (2008), preamble. In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), p. 7 
1020 International Criminal Court. Victims Participation and Reparations Section´s booklet, p. 12 
1021 Garkawe, S. (2003), pp. 345-367 
1022 Moffett, L. (2014), p. 86 
1023 de la Cuesta Arzamendi, J. L. (2018), pp. 229-248; de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 25, 
footnote 96; Fernandez de Gurmendi, S. A. (2001). In Lee, R. S. K. & Friman, H. (eds.), pp. 427-
433; International Criminal Court. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, No. ICC-
01/04. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of 
VPRS1, VPRS2, VPRS3, VPRS4, VPRS5 and VPRS6, para. 66 (17 January 2006); United 
Nations, General Assembly. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power (29 November 1985) 
1024 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 85 
206 
 
institutions maybe be rendered victims, and it is a task of the International 
Criminal Court, in view of the peculiarities of the case, to determine if certain 
organizations and institutions should be considered victims.1025 
 
It is important to stress that a victim can be a person that endures harm as a 
consequence of a criminal offence directed at someone else as, for instance, a 
relative of a person who has been murdered. Indeed, upon recognising that the 
notion of “family” can have numerous cultural variations, the Court understood 
that it is necessary1026 
 
“to have regard to the applicable social and familial structures. In 
this context, the Court should take into account the widely 
accepted presumption that an individual is succeeded by his or 
her spouse and children.”1027 
 
The notion of “harm” was not defined by the Rome Statute or the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. In spite of that, the Court has understood that it relates 
to “hurt, injury and damage”. The harm does not have to be direct, but it is 
necessary that it is personal to the victim. Harm can be material, physical, and 
psychological.1028 
 
The causal relation between the criminal offence and the harm for the ends of 
reparations is to be established by the Court in face of the particularities of the 
case.1029 
 
Still with regard to the concept of victim employed by the International Criminal 
Court, in a decision on Victims’ Participation in the Prosecutor v. Lubanga case, 
the Trial Chamber I, applying what the Rome Statute disposes in its Article 21 (3) 
(“The application and interpretation of law … must be consistent with 
internationally recognized human rights”), and taking into account the decision of 
the Appeals Chamber that1030   
 
"makes the interpretation as well as the application of the law 
applicable under the Statute subject to internationally recognised 
human rights",1031  
 
 
1025de la Cuesta Arzamendi, J. L. (2018), pp. 229-248; de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), p. 25; 
Fernandez de Gurmendi, S. A. (2001). In Lee, R. S. K. & Friman, H. (eds.), pp. 427-433 
1026 International Criminal Court. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06. The Appeals Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 2, para. 7 (3 March 2015); 
International Criminal Court. Victims Participation and Reparations Section´s booklet, p. 9  
1027 International Criminal Court. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06. The Appeals Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 2, para. 7 (3 March 2015) 
1028 International Criminal Court. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06. The Appeals Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 3, para. 10 (3 March 2015) 
1029 International Criminal Court. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06. The Appeals Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 3, para. 11 (3 March 2015) 
1030 Rome Statute, Art. 21 (3) 
1031 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the 
Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 
3 October 2006, p. 18, para. 36 (14 December 2006). 
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provided a definition of victims with basis on principles 8 and 9 of the Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims 
of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law.1032  
 
In consonance with these principles: 
 
“victims are persons who individually or collectively suffered 
harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, 
economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental 
rights, through acts or omissions that constitute gross violations 
of international human rights law, or serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. Where appropriate, and in 
accordance with domestic law, the term "victim" also includes the 
immediate family or dependants of the direct victim and persons 
who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress 
or to prevent victimization. 
 
9. A person shall be considered a victim regardless of whether 
the perpetrator of the violation is identified, apprehended, 
prosecuted, or convicted and regardless of the familial 
relationship between the perpetrator and the victim.”1033 
 
It is noteworthy that the definition of victim contained in the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence of the Rome Statute is broader than the adopted by the ICTR and 
ICTY- “[a] person against whom a crime over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction 
has allegedly been committed.”1034 
 
Indeed, the ICTR and ICTY´s concept is limited, whereas the International 
Criminal Court´s definition determines that all those that have been harmed by 
the perpetration of any crime under the jurisdiction of the Court may qualify as 
victims, hence encompassing immediate family members or dependants of the 
person who suffered direct harm from the criminal offence.1035  
 
Further, the International Criminal Court´s definition regards a person as a victim 
since the moment that he/she reports the crime, while in accordance with the 
wording of the ICTR and ICTY´s concept someone only becomes a victim after 




1032 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on Victims' Participation, para. 35 (18 January 2008). 
1033 Ibidem; United Nations, General Assembly. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, Principles 8 and 9 (16 December 2005). 
1034 ICTR. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
Rule 2 (A); ICTY. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, Rule 2 (A) 




5.3. Protection and support to victims and witnesses in the 
proceedings 
 
In the International Criminal Court system, the prominence of the protection and 
support of victims and witnesses stands out. Undoubtedly, having in mind the 
vulnerability of victims and witnesses, the Rome Statute, its Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, the Regulations of the Court, Regulations of the Office of the 
Prosecutor and the Regulations of the Registry brought norms designed to 
safeguard and assist them.1037   
 
The goal of the Court is to protect and support victims and witnesses, shielding 
them from the risks they are susceptible to. Certainly, the evidence of witnesses 
exposes the offenders, helping to hold the latter accountable for the suffering 
caused to victims. Therefore, the silence of victims and witnesses and even their 
disappearance would be of assistance to criminals and their coadjutors.1038 
 
Together with the objective of preserving the victims and witnesses` safety and 
guarding them from retaliation and intimidation, the International Criminal Court 
aims to minimise other inconveniences to victims.1039   
 
In fact, the establishment of measures of protection is also intended to prevent 
intrusion in the privacy and dignity of victims and witnesses and to decrease 
trauma connected with the process of giving testimony, issues that would most 
certainly arise in cases of sexual and gender-based violence.1040    
 
The last rationale behind the safeguard measures is that without victims and 
witnesses, in general, the trial would not even take place. Therefore, victims are 
needed so as to determine the truth. In fact, the various Chambers of the 
International Criminal Court have remarkably recognised that the participation of 
victims helps them to undercover the truth.1041  
 
In view of the essentiality of the victims and witnesses, on the one hand, and their 
exposure to potential dangers, on the other hand, the International Criminal Court 
system (in addition to establishing practical measures to support and guard them 
in the course of the Court´s proceedings) assigned bodies to specifically deal with 
and care for victims and witnesses, namely the Victims and Witnesses Unit 
(VWU), the Victims Participation and Reparations Section (VPRS), 




1037 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Registry, Regulations 95-96; Pikis, G. M. 
(2010), p. 277 
1038 Ibidem; Ibidem 
1039  Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers. Recommendation No. R (85) 11 of the Committee 
of Ministers to Member States on the Position of the Victim in the Framework of Criminal Law and 
Procedure (28 June 1985); de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), pp. 231-232; United Nations, General 
Assembly. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, 
Annex, Art. 6 (d) 
1040 Ibidem; Ibidem; Ibidem 
1041 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), pp. 231-232; International Criminal Court website, Victims 
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The Victims and Witnesses Unit and the Victims Participation and Reparations 
Section were set up within the Registry, whereas the Office of Public Counsel for 
victims was created as an independent body.1042  
 
The Trust Fund for Victims was established by decision of the Assembly of States 
Parties for the benefit of victims and their families. The role of the Trust Fund will 
be addressed in the analysis of reparations to victims.1043  
 
The Victims and Witnesses Unit was set up by the Registrar in accordance with 
Article 43 (6) of the Statute. Its objective is  
 
“to provide, in consultation with the Office of the Prosecutor, 
protective measures and security arrangements, counselling and 
other appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims who appear 
before the Court, and others who are at risk on account of 
testimony given by such witnesses.”1044  
 
Thus, the VWU`s function is bi-folded: it is in charge of providing both protection 
measures and services of assistance.1045 
 
The Unit is responsible for providing victims, witnesses, and others who are in 
danger due to the witnesses´ testimony (as, for example, family members) with 
pertinent protective and security measures (for instance, witness anonymity). The 
protection envisaged is rather wide and the Unit is bound to formulate long-term 
and short-term plans for protecting them.1046 
 
Also, Article 68 (4) determines that the Victims and Witness Unit of the Registry 
has to 
 
“advise the Prosecutor and the Court on appropriate protective 
measures, security arrangements, counselling and assistance as 
referred to in article 43, paragraph 6.”1047 
 
When victims testify as witnesses, the VWU offers administrative and logistical 
support so as to expedite their appearance before the International Criminal 
Court.1048    
 
Further, it must take gender-sensitive measures in order to facilitate the testimony 
of victims of sexual violence crimes at all stages of the proceeding.1049 
 
1042 Rome Statute, Art. 43 (6); International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Court, Regulation 
81 (1) 
1043 Rome Statute, Art. 79 (1) 
1044 Rome Statute, Art. 43 (6) 
1045 Tolbert, D. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 981-991 
1046 Rome Statute, Art. 68 (4); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal 
Court, Rule 17 (2) (a) (i) 
1047 Rome Statute, Art. 68 (4)  
1048 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 17 (1), (2) (b) (i) 
(ii); International Criminal Court. Victims Participation and Reparations Section´s booklet, pp. 10-
11 




The Unit includes staff with expertise in trauma, inclusive of trauma connected to 
crimes of sexual violence. Certainly, its staff must be trained in relation to victims’ 
and witnesses’ security, integrity and dignity, inclusive of matters concerning 
gender and cultural sensitivity. The Unit has to make available to the Court and 
the parties training in questions of trauma, sexual violence, security and 
confidentiality.1050  
 
It is also the Unit´s duty to help victims, witnesses, and other persons at risk to 
obtain medical, psychological and other adequate assistance.1051   
 
The Victims Participation and Reparations Section (VPRS) was created in 
accordance with the established in Regulation 86 (9) of the Regulations of the 
Court, being set up within the Registry in order to help victims and groups of 
victims, and make streamlined their access to the Court. It serves as point of entry 
for victims` applications to participate in the Court´s proceedings and is in charge 
of processing these applications.1052 
 
The VPRS informs victims of their rights connected with participation and 
reparations in the International Criminal Court, permitting them to submit 
applications to the Court in case they want to do it. The Section also helps victims 
in obtaining legal advice and organising their legal representations.1053  
 
The Office of Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV) was established in consonance 
with Regulation 81 of the Regulations of the Court. It was an important advance 
in reinforcing the victims` legal representation in proceedings before the 
Court.1054 
 
The OPCV functions in its substantive work as a totally independent office, only 
falling within the remit of the Registry for purposes of administration. Counsel and 
assistants within the Office act with independence. Its central aim is to provide 
general support and assistance to the victims and their legal representative.1055 
 
In fact, the functions of the OPCV consist in providing general support and 
assistance to the victims and their legal representative, inclusive of legal research 
and advice, and, upon the instruction or with the permission of the Chamber, 
advising on and helping with the particularised factual circumstances of the case. 
Hence, it enhances the competency of external legal representatives by providing 
 
1050 Rome Statute, Art. 43 (6); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal 
Court, Rules 17 (2) (a) (vi); 18 (d)  
1051 Rome Statute, Art.  68 (4); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal 
Court, Rule 17, (2) (a) (iii) 
1052 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Court, Regulation 86 (9); McKay, F. (2008), 
pp. 2-5 
1053 International Criminal Court. Victims Participation and Reparations Section´s booklet, p. 10 
1054 de Brouwer, A.-M., & Heikkilä, M. (2013). In Sluiter, G., Friman, H., Linton, S., Zappala, S., & 
Vasiliev, S. (eds.), pp. 1299-1374, footnote 79; International Criminal Court. Regulations of the 
Court, Regulation 81; International Criminal Court, The Office of Public Counsel for Victims. 
Helping victims make their voice heard, p. 3 
1055 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Court, Regulation 81 (1) (2) (4) 
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legal research and advice, thus, strengthening the capacity of the victims` legal 
representation.1056 
 
Further, the Office can represent a victim or victims in the proceedings, upon the 
instruction of the Chamber or with its leave, in those cases in which it is in the 
interests of justice.1057 
 
When appointed as legal representative, the OPCV´s mandate is not different 
from that of external legal representatives. Consequently, in fulfilling their duties, 
members of the Office have the same rights and prerogatives of external legal 
representatives of victims. They are also bound by the same obligations, inclusive 
of those inserted in the Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel before the 
International Criminal Court.1058 
 
It is necessary to highlight that the OPCV´s members do not receive directions 
from anyone related to the handling of the representation of victims. Such 
independence is indispensable to perform its role of aiding the victims´ legal 
representatives and/ or helping and representing the victims. In fact, the 
independence enables the Office to carry out its work without being subordinate 
to any type of pressure and protects the privileged relation existent between 
victims and their legal representatives.1059 
 
The Victims and Witnesses Unit (VWU), the Victims Participation and 
Reparations Section, and the Office of Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV) form 
part of the structure within the International Criminal Court designed to assist and 
support victims. Their work of is parallel. Certainly, these three bodies co-operate 
to guarantee that they support each other in an effective manner. The VWU, 
VPRS and OPCV´s functions are coordinated and directed at helping victims to 
have their rights wholly recognised, specifically, to be adequately represented, 
well-advised, and updated of the status of the proceedings.1060  
 
The net of protection to victims and witnesses includes as well provisions 
establishing measures intended to protect and support them. Undoubtedly, 
beyond setting up the aforementioned bodies, the Rome Statute and related legal 
instruments contain further norms to assist and safeguard victims and witnesses. 
 
Article 68 paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute is the mainstay of the protection of 
the victims and witnesses and establishes that:  
 
“The Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, 
physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of 
victims and witnesses. In so doing, the Court shall have regard 
 
1056 Ibidem, Regulation 81 (4) (a); International Criminal Court, The Office of Public Counsel for 
Victims. Helping victims make their voice heard, p. 3 
1057 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Court, Regulations 80 (1), 81 (4) (b) (e) 
1058 International Criminal Court. Code of Professional Conduct for counsel (2 December 2005); 
International Criminal Court, The Office of Public Counsel for Victims. Helping victims make their 
voice heard, pp. 3-4 
1059 International Criminal Court. Victims Participation and Reparations Section´s booklet, p. 18 
1060 International Criminal Court, The Office of Public Counsel for Victims. Helping victims make 
their voice heard, p. 4 
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to all relevant factors, including age, gender as defined in article 
7, paragraph 3, and health, and the nature of the crime, in 
particular, but not limited to, where the crime involves sexual or 
gender violence or violence against children. The Prosecutor 
shall take such measures particularly during the investigation and 
prosecution of such crimes. These measures shall not be 
prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a 
fair and impartial trial.”1061 
 
Rule 86 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Rome Statute, by its turn, 
contains a general principle relative to victims: 
 
“[a] Chamber in making any direction or order, and other organs 
of the Court in performing their functions under the Statute or the 
Rules, shall take into account the needs of all victims and 
witnesses in accordance with article 68, in particular, children, 
elderly persons, persons with disabilities and victims of sexual or 
gender violence.”1062 
 
In accordance with these norms, the International Criminal Court is bound to 
adopt the necessary measures to shield the safety, physical and psychological 
well-being, honour and privateness of all victims, and, specifically, of victims of 
sexual and gender-based crimes, children, elderly persons, and persons with 
disabilities.   
 
The safety, physical and psychological well-being, privacy and, particularly, 
dignity of the victim or witness encompasses the whole amplitude of the 
inalienable human rights established in international and national legal 
instruments.1063  
 
By establishing this high threshold so as to safeguard victims and witnesses, the 
Rome Statute gave rise to a paradigm for the continuous development of law not 
only in international criminal justice but actually in all operating criminal justice 
systems.1064 
 
The second part of Article 68 (1) and the last part of Rule 86 require the Court to 
pay regard to determined groups of victims and witnesses that are in 
circumstances of serious danger due to the nature of the crimes (specially, albeit 
not exclusively, in the cases in which the crime involves sexual or gender violence 
or violence against children), and/or their status, which covers their gender, age, 
and health condition, “inter alia”. 1065     
 
The final part of the Article 68 (1) is related to pre-trial proceedings, phase in 
which it is essential the adoption of all available protection measures so as to 
 
 1061 Rome Statute, Art. 68 (1) 
1062 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 86 
1063 Donat-Cattin, D. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 1275-1300; Rome Statute, 
Art.  68 (1) 
1064 Ibidem; Ibidem 
1065 Ibidem; Ibidem 
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guarantee the observance to the supra-mentioned prerogatives to which victims 
and witnesses are entitled to. In fact, at this stage of the proceedings the 
Prosecutor has to be able to impart to the victims and witnesses the extension of 
their rights and the important actions that the Court will take.1066     
 
Along the same lines, Article 54 of the Statute affirmed that 
 
“[t]he Prosecutor shall:  
… 
(b) Take appropriate measures to ensure the effective 
investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court, and in doing so, respect the interests and personal 
circumstances of victims and witnesses, including age, gender 
as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, and health, and take into 
account the nature of the crime, in particular where it involves 
sexual violence, gender violence or violence against 
children;”1067 
 
Consequently, the Prosecutor should take into consideration these practical 
questions so as to conduct an adequate and effective investigation and 
prosecution. In fact, in the consecution of his/her objective of holding guilty the 
perpetrators of the most heinous crimes, the Prosecutor has to be attentive to the 
victims and witnesses` needs, thus, avoiding to further traumatising them.1068   
 
In this sense, when selecting persons to be questioned in relation to an 
investigation, the Office, apart from assessing the reliability of the person, and 
has to consider his/her safety and well-being, paying regard to all elements 
important to the risks of re-traumatisation.1069 
 
Also, the Office has to gather all information possible on the degree of risk which 
a questioning can pose for that person and for others (including those persons 
that intermediated the contact between the Office and the person who will be 
questioned). Grounded on the establishment of the level of risk, the Office can 
consider options to questioning and the prospect of additional security measures, 
in examination with the Victims and Witnesses Unit, as adequate.1070 
 
These dispositions reaffirm the protection to victims and witnesses and extend it 
to other persons (usually their relatives) who have their security endangered.   
 
Article 68 (5) of the Statute establishes that  
 
“[w]here the disclosure of evidence or information pursuant to this 
Statute may lead to the grave endangerment of the security of a 
 
1066 Ibidem; Ibidem 
1067 Rome Statute, Art. 54 (b) 
1068 Rome Statute, Art. 54 (1) (c) 
1068 Rome Statute, Art. 54 (3) (f); Bergsmo, M., & Kruger, P. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. 
(eds.), pp. 1077-1087 
1069 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, Regulation 36 (1) 
1070 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, Regulation 36 (2)  
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witness or his or her family, the Prosecutor may, for the purposes 
of any proceedings conducted prior to the commencement of the 
trial, withhold such evidence or information and instead submit a 
summary thereof. Such measures shall be exercised in a manner 
which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the 
accused and a fair and impartial trial.”1071 
 
During the pre-trial phase, the Prosecutor can present summaries of the 
evidence, keeping the disclosure of the evidence for the trial phase. This 
contributes to protect the physical and psychological well-being of witnesses, who 
are remarkably vulnerable when they are also victims, particularly if they have 
suffered sexual violence crimes.1072  
 
Undoubtedly, the Prosecutor is required to fully observe the rights established by 
the Rome Statute so as to protect persons. He/she is bound to take adequate 
measures “to ensure the confidentiality of information, the protection of any 
person or the preservation of evidence.”1073  
 
Therefore, the Prosecutor should be careful in the investigations so as not to 
infringe the prerogatives of any person, victims and witnesses included.1074 
 
The Rome Statute in its Article 57 (3) (c) determines that the Pre-Trial Chamber 
can “[w]here necessary, provide for the protection and privacy of victims and 
witnesses”, while Regulation 48 (2) of the Regulations of the Court determines 
that1075 
 
“[t]he Pre-Trial Chamber shall take such measures as are 
necessary… under article 68, paragraph 5, to protect the safety 
of witnesses and victims and members of their families.”1076 
 
In the same direction, Rule 107 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence affirms 
that the Pre-Trial Chamber may request a review of the Prosecutor´s decision of 
not investigating or prosecuting and/or request the Prosecutor to transmit the 
information or documents in his/her possession, or summaries, “to protect the 
safety of witnesses and victims and members of their families.”1077 
 
The Trial Chamber is responsible as well for guaranteeing the protection of the 
witnesses and victims. Surely, the Trial Chamber must ensure that1078 
 
 
1071 Rome Statute, Art. 68 (5) 
1072 Donat-Cattin, D. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 1275-1300 
1073 Rome Statute, Art. 54 (1) (c) (3) (f) 
1074 Rome Statute, Art. 54 (1) (c); Bergsmo, M., & Kruger, P. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. 
(eds.), pp. 1077-1087 
1075 Rome Statute, Art. 57 (3) (c) 
1076 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Court, Regulation 48 (2) 
1077 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 107 (1) (2) (3) 
1078 Rome Statute, Art. 64 (6) (e)  
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“a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted with full respect 
for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of 
victims and witnesses.”1079 
 
Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the Statute,  
 
“[as] an exception to the principle of public hearings provided for 
in article 67, the Chambers of the Court may, to protect victims 
and witnesses or an accused, conduct any part of the 
proceedings in camera or allow the presentation of evidence by 
electronic or other special means. In particular, such measures 
shall be implemented in the case of a victim of sexual violence or 
a child who is a victim or a witness, unless otherwise ordered by 
the Court, having regard to all the circumstances, particularly the 
views of the victim or witness.”1080 
 
On the same subject, Rule 88 (1) establishes that  
 
“a Chamber may, taking into account the views of the victim or 
witness, order special measures such as, but not limited to, 
measures to facilitate the testimony of a traumatized victim or 
witness, a child, an elderly person or a victim of sexual violence, 
pursuant to article 68, paragraphs 1 and 2”1081 
 
and in its paragraph 2 asserts that  
 
“a Chamber may hold a hearing on a motion or a request under 
sub-rule 1, if necessary in camera or ex parte, to determine 
whether to order any such special measure, including but not 
limited to an order that a counsel, a legal representative, a 
psychologist or a family member be permitted to attend during 
the testimony of the victim or the witness.”1082  
 
Still in this regard, Rule 87 (1) asserts that  
 
“a Chamber may order measures to protect a victim, a witness or 
another person at risk on account of testimony given by a witness 
pursuant to article 68, paragraphs 1 and 2.”1083 
 
However, whenever possible, before ordering the protective measures disposed 
in Rule 87 (1) and Rule 88 (1), the Chamber should seek to obtain the agreement 
of the person who is the addressee of the protective measure.1084 
 
1079 Rome Statute, Art. 64 (2); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal 
Court, Rules 101 (1), 132 (2) 
1080 Rome Statute, Art. 64 (2) 
1081 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 88 (1) 
1082 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 88 (2) 
1083 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 87 (1), the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence  





Furthermore, taking into account that infringements of the privacy of a witness or 
victim can give rise to the endangerment of his/her safety, a Chamber has to be 
vigilant in controlling the form of questioning a witness or victim in order to prevent 
any intimidation or harassment, being especially attentive to avoid attacks against 
victims of sexual violence crimes.1085 
 
It stems from these norms that the sexual/gender-based character of crimes 
exerts a further weight on the level of protection and support dispensed by the 
Court towards the victims. In fact, when providing for special measures of 
protection and assistance to victims, the Rome Statute and related legal texts 
paid specific attention to the most vulnerable groups of victims, among which the 
victims of gender-based and sexual crimes are enlisted. The topic of the specific 
protection and aid to victims of sexual and gender-based crimes will be expanded 
below.1086 
 
Also, Regulation 21 (8) determines that 
 
“[a]t the request of a participant or the Registry, or proprio motu, 
…, the Chamber may, in the interests of justice, order that any 
information likely to present a risk to the security or safety of 
victims, witnesses or other persons, or likely to be prejudicial to 
national security interests, shall not be published in any 
broadcast, audio- or video-recording or transcript of a public 
hearing.”1087 
 
Regulation 100 of the Regulations of the Registry disposes as well about the 
protection and security of the victims, determining that   
 
“[w]here the Registry is in direct communication with victims, it 
shall ensure that it does not endanger their safety, physical and 
psychological well-being, dignity and privacy. … 
 
2.  Where a victim who communicates with the Court fears that 
his or her application is putting him or her or a third person at risk, 
or where the assessment undertaken under regulation 99, 
subregulations 1 and 2, concludes that such a risk might exist, 
the Registry may take measures under regulations 92 to 96 
and/or advise the relevant Chamber on appropriate protective 
measures and/or security arrangements in order to protect the 
safety and the physical and psychological well-being of the victim 





1085 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 88 (5) 
1086 International Criminal Court, Office of Public Counsel for Victims. Representing Victims before 
the International Criminal Court 
1087 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Court, Regulation 21 (8) 
1088 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Registry, Regulation 100 
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Regulation 43 (3) of the Regulations of the Registry establishes that 
 
“[a] request for non-publication of information may be made more 
than 30 minutes after the information is mentioned during the 
hearing if it presents a risk to the security or safety of victims, 
witnesses or other persons at risk, or is prejudicial to national 
security interests.”1089 
 
Regulation 42 of the Regulations of the Court tackles the question of application 
and variation of protective measures, establishing that 
 
“[p]rotective measures once ordered in any proceedings in 
respect of a victim or witness shall continue to have full force and 
effect in relation to any other proceedings before the Court and 
shall continue after proceedings have been concluded, subject to 
revision by a Chamber.”1090 
 
Regulation 41 permits the Victims and Witnesses Unit to  
 
“draw any matter to the attention of a Chamber where protective 
measures under rule 87 or special measures under rule 88 
require its consideration.”1091 
 
On the subject of the Court´s requests to States Parties for cooperation, Article 
87 (4) of the Rome Statute establishes that  
 
“the Court may take such measures, including measures related 
to the protection of information, as may be necessary to ensure 
the safety or physical or psychological well-being of any victims, 
potential witnesses and their families. The Court may request 
that any information that is made available under this Part shall 
be provided and handled in a manner that protects the safety and 
physical or psychological well-being of any victims, potential 
witnesses and their families.”1092 
 
Also, in the terms of the Statute`s Article 93 (1) (j), the States Parties have to 
comply with requests by the Court to provide protection to victims and witnesses 
when assisting the Court with investigations or prosecutions.1093 
 
Moreover, the Registrar on behalf of the Court can negotiate with the States 
(confidential) agreements on relocation and provision of assistance services on 
the territory of a State where are located traumatized or threatened victims, 
witnesses and others who are in peril in view of the testimony of witnesses. 1094 
 
 
1089 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Registry, Regulation 43 (3) 
1090 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Court, Regulation 42 (1) 
1091 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Court, Regulation 41 
1092 Rome Statute, Art.  87 (4) 
1093 Rome Statute, Art.  93 (1) (j)  
1094 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 16 (5) 
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Further, Article 57 (3) (e) disposes that  
 
“[w]here a warrant of arrest or a summons has been issued under 
article 58, and having due regard to the strength of the evidence 
and the rights of the parties concerned”1095 
 
the Pre-Trial Chamber  
 
“can seek the cooperation of States pursuant to article 93, 
paragraph 1 (k), to take protective measures for the purpose of 
forfeiture, in particular for the ultimate benefit of victims.”1096 
 
These numerous provisions go to show that the protection to the security of 
victims and witnesses, as well as to their privacy and integrity, is of paramount 
relevance to the International Criminal Court. Certainly, the system of the Court 
innovated the approach of international criminal tribunals towards victims and 
witnesses by adopting several measures in order to guarantee the safety, 
physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims, witnesses 
and their families. 
 
5.3.1. Specific provisions directed at protecting victims of 
sexual and gender-based crimes  
 
The victims of sexual or gender violence (natural persons who have suffered 
harm as a consequence of the perpetration of sexual or gender-based be crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court, namely, rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual 
violence of similar seriousness) are regarded vulnerable persons (those persons 
at a higher risk of psychological harm due to the process of appearing before the 
Court and/or who suffer psychosocial or physical difficulties that alter their 
capacity to so appear), thus, requiring particular safeguard in the Court`s 
proceedings.1097 
 
As a result, the International Criminal Court scheme brings specific provisions 
aimed at safeguarding the rights and interests of victims and witnesses of such 
crimes and at guaranteeing the effectiveness of the investigation and prosecution 
of sexual and gender-based crimes.1098   
 
Article 68 (1) of the Statute bounds the Court to adopt adequate measures to 
protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of 
victims and witnesses, paying regard to all relevant elements, including age, 
gender (meaning both sexes, males and females, within the context of society), 
and health, and the character of the crime, in special, albeit not limited to, in the 
case of crimes encompassing sexual or gender violence or violence against 
 
1095 Rome Statute, Art.  57 (3) (e)  
1096 Ibidem 
1097 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Registry, Regulation 94 bis (2) (b), Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 85 (a) 
1098 International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes, p. 9 (9 June 2014). 
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children. Still pursuant Article 68 (1), as well as Article 54 (1) (b), the Prosecutor 
has to take the same measures, especially when investigating and prosecuting 
crimes that involve sexual or gender violence or violence against children.1099  
 
The general principle inserted in Rule 86 determines that the Chambers (when 
making a direction or order) and other organs of the Court (in the performance of 
their duties) have to take into consideration the needs of all victims and witnesses 
pursuant to Article 68, particularly of victims of sexual or gender violence, 
children, elderly, and persons with disabilities.1100  
 
Paragraph 2 of Article 68 establishes in its initial part that 
 
“[a]s an exception to the principle of public hearings provided for 
in article 67, the Chambers of the Court may, to protect victims 
and witnesses or an accused, conduct any part of the 
proceedings in camera or allow the presentation of evidence by 
electronic or other special means.”1101 
 
Here the Chambers have discretion to conduct any part of the proceedings in 
camera, or permit the presentation of evidence by electronic or diverse special 
means. 
 
In the final part of the paragraph, it is stated that: 
 
“In particular, such measures shall be implemented in the case 
of a victim of sexual violence or a child who is a victim or a 
witness, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, having regard to 
all the circumstances, particularly the views of the victim or 
witness.” 1102 
 
The expression “such measures shall be implemented” (in contrast to “the Court 
may, to protect victims and witnesses or an accused, conduct” of the first part of 
the paragraph) means that when these measures (in camera hearings and other 
exceptions to the principle of public hearings) are requested by a victim of sexual 
violence or minors, the Court is obliged to accede to them.1103  
 
Rule 88 (1), complementing the disposed in Article 68, paragraphs 1 and 2, 
provides that upon the motion of the Prosecutor or the defence, or upon the 
request of a witness or a victim or his or her legal representative, if any, or on its 
own motion, and after having consulted with the Victims and Witnesses Unit, as 
adequate, a Chamber can, taking into consideration the victim or witness` views, 
order special measures as, for example, measures to facilitate the testimony of a 
traumatised victim or witness, a child, an elderly person or a victim of sexual 
violence. Whenever possible, before ordering the measure, the Chamber should 
 
1099 Rome Statute, Arts. 54 (1) (b), 68 (1) 
1100 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 86 
1101 Rome Statute, Art.  68 (2) 
1102 Rome Statute, Art.  68 (2) 
1103 Rome Statute, Art. s 67 (1), 68 (2); Donat-Cattin, D. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. 
(eds.), pp. 1275-1300 
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endeavor to get the consent of the person who will be benefited by the special 
measure.1104  
 
The wording of Rule 88 (1) is pretty similar to that of Rule 87 (1). However,  the 
latter determines “lato sensu”, that a Chamber can order measures to protect a 
victim, a witness or another person at risk on account of testimony given by a 
witness pursuant to article 68, paragraphs 1 and 2, while  the former establishes 
“stricto sensu” that a Chamber can order special measures as, for instance, 
measures to facilitate the testimony of a traumatised victim or witness, a child, an 
elderly person or a victim of sexual violence, pursuant to Article 68, paragraphs 
1 and 2.1105 
 
The inclusion of the specific norm (Rule 88 (1)) subsequently the general one 
(Rule 87 (1)) clearly demonstrates that the International Criminal Court is obliged 
to be extremely attentive to the protection and participation of victims of sexual 
and gender-based violence, children, disabled and elderly persons in the 
proceedings.  
 
Rule 88 (2) determines that a Chamber can hold a hearing on a motion or a 
request in the terms of under sub-rule 1, if necessary “in camera” or “ex parte”, 
to establish whether to order any such special measure, including (albeit not 
limited to) an order that a counsel, a legal representative, a psychologist or a 
family member be allowed to attend in the testimony of the victim or the 
witness.1106   
 
Certainly, the fact that the person is a victim of sexual or gender violence is one 
of the criteria taken into consideration by the International Criminal Court when 
determining whether a witness, a victim that appears before the Court, or a 
person at risk is eligible to bring an accompanying support person with him/her 
to the Court.1107 
 
Also, pursuant Rule 88 (5), taking into account that violations of the privacy of a 
witness or victim can give rise to a risk to his/her security, a Chamber should be 
cautious in directing the way of questioning a witness or victim in order to avoid 
any demoralisation or harassment, paying particular regard to attacks directed 
against victims of crimes of sexual violence.1108  
 
In fact, the judges should exercise a strict control of narrative testimony and of 
forbearance of aggressive examination of victims-witnesses since it is a relevant 
procedural mechanism to reduce the danger of re-traumatisation, to which the 
victims of sexual and gender-based violence are so susceptible to.1109 
 
Rule 16 enlists the responsibilities of the Registrar relating to victims and 
witnesses and establishes that the Registrar is bound to adopt gender-sensitive 
 
1104 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 88 (1) 
1105 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court; Rules 87 (1), 88 (1) 
1106 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 88 (2) 
1107 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Registry, Regulation 91 (2) (g) 
1108 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 88 (5) 
1109 Donat-Cattin, D. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 1275-1300 
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measures to expedite the participation of victims of sexual violence at all the 
stages of the proceedings.1110  
 
In conformity with Regulation 89 (b) of the Regulations of the Registry, the 
Registry is bound to assist witnesses and victims that appear before the Court 
(and, where adequate, the dependants of these persons as well as 
accompanying support persons) by providing psychological assistance, as 
adequate, especially for victims of sexual violence, children, the disabled, and 
elderly persons.1111  
 
The Rules of Evidence and Procedure built on Article 69 (4) of the Statute and 
introduced provisions concerning the questions of corroboration, consent and 
past behaviour.1112  
 
Rule 63 (4) establishes that corroboration is not required so as to prove any crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court, especially, crimes of sexual violence.1113 
 
Rule 70 sets up the principles of evidence in cases of sexual violence. Consent 
cannot be inferred on account of any words or conduct of a victim where force, 
threat of force or coercion, or taking advantage of a coercive environment, 
impaired the victim’s capability of giving voluntary and genuine consent.1114 
 
Likewise, consent cannot be inferred on account of any words or conduct of a 
victim where the victim is unable to give genuine consent, or by virtue of the 
silence of, or lack of resistance by, the victim. This includes, for instance, the 
situations in which the victim engages in an act of a sexual nature because of 
fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of 
power.1115 
 
Moreover, credibility, character or predisposition to sexual availability of a victim 
or witness cannot be inferred by virtue of the sexual nature of the former or 
subsequent conduct of a victim or witness.1116 
 
Also, Rule 71 establishes that, in view of the definition and character of the crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court, and subject to article 69, paragraph 4, a 
Chamber cannot admit evidence of the anterior or subsequent sexual conduct of 
a victim or witness.1117 
 
 
1110 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 16 (1) (d) 
1111 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Registry, Regulation 89 (b) 
1112 International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes, p. 36 (9 June 2014). 
1113 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 63 (4) 
1114 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 70 (a) 
1115 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g)-1 and (g)-6; 8 (2) (b) 
(xxii)-1 and (xxii)-6, 8 (2) (e) (vi)-1 and (e) (vi)-6, Element 2; International Criminal Court, the Office 
of the Prosecutor. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, p. 36 (9 June 2014); Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 70 (b) (c) 
1116 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 70 (d) 
1117 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 71 
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These provisions constitute a relevant exclusion of any effort to undermine or 
discredit victims or witnesses of sexual violence with basis on their prior or current 
sexual conduct.1118 
 
Rule 72 demands notification to the Court in case the Defense intends to present 
evidence of the victim´s consent, inclusive by means of the questioning of a victim 
or witness, or evidence of the victim or witness` words, conduct, silence or lack 
of resistance.1119  
 
The drafters of the Rome Statute, aware that the evidence and/or testimony in 
cases of sexual and gender-based crimes not rarely finish being punctured by 
pre-conceptions and patriarchal/ chauvinistic notions, established in Article 69 (4) 
that1120   
“[t]he Court may rule on the relevance or admissibility of any 
evidence, taking into account, inter alia, the probative value of 
the evidence and any prejudice that such evidence may cause to 
a fair trial or to a fair evaluation of the testimony of a witness.” 1121   
 
The well-being (both physical and psychological) of individuals who are 
questioned by the Office of the Prosecutor and are regarded vulnerable 
(especially victims of gender and sexual crimes, children, and persons with 
disabilities) should be analysed by a psychology, psycho-social or another expert 
in an in-person interview before the questioning takes place. This assessment 
should establish if the person’s condition at that determined moment permits 
him/her to be questioned without risk of experiencing re-traumatisation.1122     
 
The Office should consult with experts, and, where adequate, propose their 
testimony on different issues, as, for example, the socio-political, psychological 
and medical elements of sexual and gender-based crimes. These experts can 
also assist in the identification of patterns of sexual and gender-based crimes, 
the nature of injuries and their congruency with victim testimony, as well as the 
personal and social sequelae of such crimes.1123 
 
The Office of the Prosecutor maintains contact with witnesses post-testimony so 
as to keep them informed of developments in the case, inclusive of sentence, and 
any appeal. It also pays attention to questions related to the victims` safety and 
physical and psychological well-being in their interaction with the Office.1124 
 
 
1118 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rules 70 (d), 71; 
International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes, p. 36 (9 June 2014). 
1119 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 71; International 
Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, 
p. 36 (9 June 2014). 
1120 International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes, p. 36 (9 June 2014). 
1121 Rome Statute, Art. 69 (4) 
1122 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, Regulation 34 (1) (2) 
1123 International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes, pp. 36-37 (9 June 2014). 
1124 Ibidem; Rome Statute, Arts.  43 (6), 68 (1) (4); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
International Criminal Court, Rule 50 (1) 
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These provisions on special measures aimed at protecting victims of sexual and 
gender-based violence are complemented by rules related to the structure of the 
Organs of the Court, and by the availability of pertinent expertise.1125  
 
In fact, a relevant achievement of the Women's Caucus during the negotiations 
of the Rome Statute was to guarantee that women would integrate the staff of all 
organs of the Court, as well as to ensure that women and men with particular 
expertise in sexual and gender violence would be part of the staff of the Court at 
all levels. As a result of their lobbying, the Statute was the first to explicitly adopt 
principles of female representation and gender expertise.1126 
 
Indeed, in its function, the International Criminal Court has to employ a gender 
perspective that demands a comprehension of the variation in power, needs, 
roles and status between men and women, and the effect of gender on people’s 
opportunities and relations.1127  
 
Also, the Court has to proceed to a “gender analysis” which attempts to the 
 
“underlying differences and inequalities between women and 
men, and girls and boys, and the power relationships and other 
dynamics which determine and shape gender roles in a society, 
and give rise to assumptions and stereotypes. In the context of 
the work of the Office, this involves a consideration of whether, 
and in what ways, crimes, including sexual and gender-based 
crimes, are related to gender norms and inequalities.”1128 
 
The inclusion of women in the staff of the Court was essential not only because 
of the recognition of the gender equity as an objective “per se” but also because 
women are usually more motivated than men to guarantee the effectiveness of 
the investigation and punishment of sexual and gender-based crimes. Besides, 
unlike men, women tend to have a conciliatory moral reasoning, which is more 
aligned with the restorative justice pursued by the International Criminal Court. In 
fact, the female relational line of thinking is linked to the ideas of justice, 
responsibility and maintainment of relations, opposite to a criminal law system 
traditionally dominated by the male perspective.1129 
 
The Rome Statute demands the States Parties to take into account, when 
selecting judges, the requirement for an equitable representation of female and 
male judges, as well as the necessity of incorporating judges with legal expertise 
 
1125 International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes, p. 9 (9 June 2014). 
1126 Bedont, B., & Martinez, K. H. (1999), pp. 65-85  
1127 International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes, p. 3 (9 June 2014). 
1128 International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes, p. 4 (9 June 2014). 
1129 Bedont, B., & Martinez, K. H. (1999), pp. 65-85; 
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women´s Development, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press cited in Varona Martínez, G. (2012), p.7   
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on determined issues, including (albeit not limited to) violence against women or 
children.1130   
 
Similarly, pursuant Article 44 (2) of the Statute, it must be paid due regard to just 
representation of female and male staff members in the other organs of the 
Court.1131 
 
The Staff Regulations of the International Criminal Court established that  
 
“[a]ll vacancies to be filled, and requirements to be met by 
candidates to such vacancies, shall be notified to all States 
Parties.”1132   
 
and, where adequate, so as to attain a better parity in gender or geographical 
representation, these notifications can include favored consideration of 
candidates of determined nationalities or gender.1133   
 
Moreover, in the appointment, transfer or promotion of the staff it should be taken 
into consideration the necessity of fair representation of female and male staff 
members, “inter alia” requirements.1134 
 
Therefore, there must be a balanced, fair representation of men and women in 
the staff of International Criminal Court.1135 
 
Further, in accordance with Article 42 (9) of the Statute preconises that the 
Prosecutor ought to appoint advisers who have legal expertise on particular 
issues, including, although not restricted to, sexual and gender violence and 
violence against children.1136   
 
Also in this regard, Regulation 6 of Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor 
addresses expert advice on sexual and gender violence, violence against 
children and other issues and establishes that 
 
“[i]n accordance with article 42, paragraph 9:   
 
(a) expertise related to sexual and gender violence and violence 
against children shall be provided by the Gender and Children 
Unit of the Office; and   
 
(b) a Special Gender Advisor and advisors on other matters shall 
provide additional expertise to the Prosecutor and ExCom.”1137 
 
 
1130 Rome Statute, Art.  36 (8) (a) (iii), (b) 
1131 Rome Statute, Art.  44 (2) 




1135 Wen-qi, Z., & Chana, S. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 941-948 
1136 Rome Statute, Art.  42 (9) 
1137 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, Regulation 6 (a) (b) 
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The Gender and Children Unit is composed by staff with legal and other expertise 
on sexual and gender violence and violence against children. The Unit is in 
charge of providing advice to the Prosecutor, the Executive Committee 
(constituted by the Prosecutor and the Heads of the three Divisions of the 
Office)1138 and the Divisions (the Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation 
Division, the Investigation Division, the Prosecution Division) in all issues 
regarding sexual and gender violence and violence against children, and is 
required to provide assistance in preliminary examinations and evaluations, 
investigations and prosecutions which involve these types of violence.1139   
 
Also, when planning investigative activities, the joint team (that is constituted 
following a decision to proceed with an investigation in a situation so as to 
conduct the investigation) has to attempt, particularly by consulting with the 
Gender and Children Unit, to guarantee the well-being of victims and witnesses 
and to prevent that they suffer re-traumatisation.1140   
 
Moreover, the joint team, after identifying a provisional case hypothesis, should 
select incidents that reflect the gravest crimes and the principal kinds of 
victimisation, including sexual and gender-based violence and violence against 
children, and which are the most delineative of the dimension and effects of the 
crimes.1141     
 
The staff of the Victims and Witnesses Unit is also required to have expertise in 
trauma, including trauma connected with crimes of sexual violence.1142 
 
These are crucial steps forward and play an important role in decreasing the 
perils of re-victimisation, which is inherent to the criminal law proceedings.1143 
 
In fact, these measures are in consonance with the objective inserted in the Rome 
Statute of avoiding that the victims` interaction with the Court could give rise to 
secondary victimisation (it occurs, for example, when the relevant court is 
oblivious to the victims` necessities or negates their victimisation).1144  
 
5.3.1.(i). Final Remarks 
 
By instituting specific norms aimed at protecting and supporting victims of sexual 
and gender-based crimes, the International Criminal Court scheme is pursuing to 
promote procedural justice to these vulnerable victims (which includes to make 
sure that victims receive a fair, respectful, and dignified treatment during the 
proceedings and have access to reparations).1145  
 
 
1138 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, Regulation 12 
1139 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, Regulations 4, 5 
1140 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, Regulations 32 (1), 
35 (3) 
1141 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, Regulation 34 (1) (2) 
1142 Rome Statute, Art.  43 (6) 
1143 Varona Martínez, G. (2012), pp. 19, 25; Wolfgang, M. E., & Singer, S. I. (1978), pp. 379-394 
1144 Moffett, L. (2014 a), p. 3; United Nations. Handbook on Justice for Victims, pp. 9-10 
1145 Wemmers, J.-A. M. (1996), pp. 101-102; Moffett, L. (2014 a), p. 3 
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Certainly, the Rome Statute innovated by codifying a mandate for the 
International Criminal Court to make use of particular investigative, procedural, 
and evidentiary measures which are fundamental to guarantee gender justice.1146 
 
Such innovation is extremely important because, as highlighted by de la Cuesta, 
vulnerable victims sholud be individually evaluated and receive adequate 
protection, since the acknowledgment of the condition of vunerable victim entails 
particular obligations to the public institutions.1147 
 
If the International Criminal Court is performing its mandate in accordance with 
these parameters will be seen in the analysis of the Court´s practice.  
 
5.4. Protection of the rights of the victims and witnesses, protection 
of rights of the accused and promotion of an impartial and just trial?   
 
Notwithstanding the large protection and assistance conferred to the victims and 
witnesses, it must not be forgotten that the Rome Statute provides protection for 
the accused person too.  
 
Indeed, Article 66 (1) of the Rome Statute adopted the general principle of 
criminal law of presumption of innocence disposing that: 
 
“Everyone shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty before 
the Court in accordance with the applicable law.”1148 
 
In consonance with this approach, in its Article 67, the Statute established the 
accused person´s rights, which must be utterly observed by the Court. Amidst 
other guarantees, the accused is entitled to a public hearing, which must be fair 
and conducted with impartiality.1149 
 
Certainly, the Court must respect the rights of the accused so as to reach 
international legitimacy:1150 
 
“it is precisely at those times when moral outrage is at its highest 
that the burden on adjudicating bodies is heaviest both to satisfy 
society’s collective need for condemnation and punishment of 
war criminals and simultaneously to assiduously protect the 
rights of those accused of war crimes.  In order for a war crimes 
tribunal to possess legitimacy, it must ensure that rights of the 




1146 Bedont, B., & Martinez, K. H. (1999), pp. 65-85  
1147 de la Cuesta Arzamendi, J. L. (2018), pp. 229-248 
1148 Rome Statute, Art.  66 (1) 
1149 Rome Statute, Art.  67 (1) (c)  
1150 Corrie, K. (2007), pp. 1-2 
1151 Baum, L. M. (2001), pp.197-230 
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Hence, the International Criminal Court, on the one hand, protects, supports and 
grants rights to the victims and witnesses, and, on the other hand, guarantees 
rights to the accused.1152   
 
The Rome Statute aims to observe the legitimate prerogative of victims’ without 
compromising a fair trial for the accused. Surely, the Court has to ensure that the 
victims and witnesses` rights are not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the 
accused´s rights.1153 
 
Article 64 (2) of the Statute demonstrates it by affirming that  
 
“[t]he Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and 
expeditious and is conducted with full respect for the rights of the 
accused and due regard for the protection of victims and 
witnesses.”1154 
 
Also, Article 68 of the Rome Statute, which, as seen, is one of the cornerstones 
on protection of the victims and witnesses, establishes in the first part of 
paragraph 1 that the Court and the Prosecutor are bound to adopt the necessary 
measures  
 
“to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, 
dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses. In so doing, the 
Court shall have regard to all relevant factors, including ... gender 
…, and the nature of the crime, in particular, … where the crime 
involves sexual or gender violence …”1155 
 
and finishes the paragraph affirming that  
 
“[t]hese measures shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights 
of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.”1156 
 
The same article, in para. 3, puts forward the participation of victims in the 
proceedings upon approval of the Court. This participation must occur  
 
“in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the 
rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.”1157 
 
The Court must attain an equilibrium of the rights at stake for the purpose of 
conducting a just and unbiased trial. In fact, the maintenance of the balance 
between the victims and witnesses` entitlements and the accused´s prerogatives 
is of vital importance since it allows the International Criminal Court to conduct a 
fair and impartial trial and, ultimately, achieve justice. 
 
 
1152 Schabas, W. A. (2010), p. 823       
1153 Ibidem       
1154 Rome Statute, Art.  64 (2) 
1155 Rome Statute, Art. 68 (1) 
1156 Ibidem 
1157 Rome Statute, Art. 68 (3) 
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Thus, the Court pursues to equilibrate the accused´s rights and the efficiency of 
the proceedings with significant participation of the victims.1158 
 
In its practice, the Court must analyse the concrete circumstances and 
counterweight the interests at stake when the rights of the accused and the rights 
of the victims and witnesses seem to be at odds. 
 
Article 67 (1) (e) stipulates that the accused has the right to examine, or have 
examined 
 
“the witnesses against him or her and to obtain the attendance 
and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the 
same conditions as witnesses against him or her.”1159 
 
In spite of that, in the terms of Article 68 (2) of the Statute, so as to protect victims 
and witnesses, it can be made an exception to the principle of public hearings 
(inserted in Article 67),  
 
“and the Chambers of the Court may … conduct any part of the 
proceedings in camera or allow the presentation of evidence by 
electronic or other special means. In particular, such measures 
shall be implemented in the case of a victim of sexual violence or 
a child who is a victim or a witness, unless otherwise ordered by 
the Court, having regard to all the circumstances, particularly the 
views of the victim or witness.”1160 
 
In the same direction, Rule 112 allows the Prosecutor to audio- or video-record 
the questioning of witnesses  
 
“in particular where the use of such procedures could assist in 
reducing any subsequent traumatization of a victim of sexual or 
gender violence, a child or a person with disabilities in providing 
their evidence.”1161 
 
Therefore, in certain circumstances (namely, so as to avoid traumatisation of a 
victim of sexual or gender violence, a child or a person with disabilities in 
providing their evidence), it can made an exception to the principle of public 
hearings and a part of the proceedings can be conducted in camera or evidence 
can be provided by electronic or other special means. In these circumstances, 
the examination of witnesses on behalf of the accused might differ of the 
conditions of examination of witnesses against him/her.  
 
 
1158 Corrie, K. (2007), pp. 1-2 
1159 Rome Statute, Art.  67 (1) (e) 
1160 Rome Statute, Art.  68 (2) 
1161 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 112 (4) 
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As already explained, this exception is part of the framework conceived by the 
Statute to provide a higher level of protection to victims and witnesses of crime 
involving sexual or gender violence.1162  
 
5.5. Participation of victims and witnesses in the proceedings 
 
In the international criminal justice system, the International Criminal Court was 
pioneer in permitting victims to participate in the proceedings.1163  
 
As anteriorly explained, the failure of the ICTR and the ICTY in getting closer to 
the communities which were most harmed by the perpetration of the crimes in 
addition to a wide movement in favour of the implementation of restorative justice 
(in opposition to a rigid retributive justice) contributed for the drafters of the Rome 
Statute to include provisions on the victims` participation in the proceedings.1164  
 
Whilst the ICTR and the ICTY did not provide for any type of victims´ participation 
in the proceedings beyond serving as witnesses to be called to testify before the 
Court, the International Criminal Court established a rather wide scheme allowing 
victims to voluntarily participate of the proceedings. 1165  
 
Indeed, the International Criminal Court, being framed by victim-centred 
instruments that empowered victims by providing them with the possibility of 
having a say in the proceedings, has assumed a role of real leadership in the 
victims´ rights area.1166   
 
The Rome Statute in its Article 68 (3) asserted that 
 
“[w]here the personal interests of the victims are affected, the 
Court shall permit their views and concerns to be presented and 
considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be 
appropriate by the Court and in a manner which is not prejudicial 
to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and 
impartial trial.”1167 
 
This provision does not convey that victims may start proceedings (they do not 
acquire the status or condition of a party to the proceedings before the 
International Criminal Court), but it does constitute a significant advance for now 
 
1162 Rome Statute, Arts.  43 (6), 68 (1) (2); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International 
Criminal Court, Rules 16 (1) (d), 17 (2) (a) (iv), (b) (iii), 63 (4), 70, 71, 72 (1), 86, 88 (1) (5), 112 
(4) 
1163 International Criminal Court, The Office of Public Counsel for Victims. Helping victims make 
their voice heard, p. 3 
1164 Donat-Cattin, D. (2008). In Triffterer, O., & Ambos, K. (eds.), pp. 1275-1300; Haslam, E. 
(2004). In McGoldrick, D., Rowe, P., & Donnelly, E. (eds.), pp. 315-336 
1165 Baumgartner, E. (2008), pp. 409-440; Corrie, K. (2007), pp. 1-2; Donat-Cattin, D. (1999). In 
Lattanzi, F., & Schabas, W. A. (eds.), pp. 251-277; International Criminal Court. Victims 
Participation and Reparations Section´s booklet, p. 10 
1166 Funk, T. M. (2010), p.  225 
1167 Rome Statute, Art.  68 (3) 
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they are entitled to participate in criminal proceedings by presenting their views 
and concerns severally from the Prosecution and the Defence.1168 
 
It is important to highlight that, at the same time that the Rome Statute created a 
place for victims to participate, it established limitations. Certainly, even though 
victims can take part in the proceedings, their involvement is not thorough and 
unlimited.1169  
 
As seen, Article 68 (3) establishes that victims whose “personal interests” are 
affected can submit “their views and concerns” to be considered by the Court at 
proceedings stages deemed appropriate by the latter.  
 
The first thing that stands out in such provision is the fact that the victims` 
participation can take place when their personal interests are affected.  
 
In the Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
I issued a “Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings” on 
17 January 2006, in which it affirmed that 
 
“the “personal interests” criterion expressly set out in article 68 
(3) constitutes an additional criterion to be met by victims, over 
and above the victim status accorded to them.”1170    
 
Personal interests are those that individuate the person of the victim when 
compared to anybody else. The interests involved must be different from those 
of the other victims or of the public in general (the latter has a permanent interest 
that individuals who perpetrated crimes under the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court should be tried before it, regardless of who they are, or the position 
they occupy).1171 
 
Surely, when the victims participate of the proceedings, it is in pursuance of their 
own interests and concerns, autonomous from the parties.1172   
 
In the mentioned decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber I also affirmed that “the Statute 
grants victims an independent voice and role in proceedings before the Court”1173 
and asserted that victims are not to be regarded as inevitably being the ally of the 
prosecution for their roles and goals are markedly distinct.1174 
 
 
1168 International Criminal Court, Office of Public Counsel for Victims. Representing Victims before 
the International Criminal Court, p. 27; International Criminal Court`s Trust Fund for Victims` 
website; McKay, F. (2008), pp. 2-5; Vázquez Pedreño, J. (2014), pp. 262, 278-280 
1169 Schabas, W. A. (2011), pp. 342-368 
1170 ICC. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the 
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS2, VPRS3, VPRS4, VPRS5 and 
VPRS6, para. 62 
1171 Pikis, G. M. (2010), p. 291 
1172 International Criminal Court. Victims Participation and Reparations Section´s booklet, p. 10; 
McKay, F. (2008), pp. 2-5 
1173 ICC. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the 
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS2, VPRS3, VPRS4, VPRS5 and 




Also, the Court has affirmed that  
 
“[t]he principal criterion for victim participation is that the personal 
interests of the applicant must have been affected. This 
requirement is met whenever a victim applies for a participation 
following the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The personal 
interests of a victim are affected in respect of proceedings 
relating to the very crime in which that victim was allegedly 
involved.”1175 
 
Hence, in accordance with the understanding of the International Criminal Court, 
so that victims can participate, their interests must be affected by the 
proceedings.1176  
 
In the same direction, in the Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo case, a Decision of the 
Appeals Chamber related to Victims´ Participation Application expressed that: 
  
“pursuant to article 68 (3) of the Statute, victims will first have to 
demonstrate that their personal interests are affected by the trial 
in order to be permitted to present their views and concerns at 
stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the 
Court and in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent 
with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.”1177 
 
It is of note that, even though in the supra decision the Appeals Chamber 
expressed that the victims have to show that their personal interests are impacted 
by the trial, in the terms of Article 68 (3) of the Statute, victims can participate “at 
stages of the proceedings”, which should be interpreted as encompassing the 
pre-trial phase. This issue will be further addressed in the “forms of participation” 
below.1178   
   
Therefore, the first boundary is that the victims´ personal interests must be 
impacted by the proceedings. 
 
The second boundary consists in the conditioning of the victims´ participation to 
the Court´s approval. In fact, victims can have a voice in the proceedings only if 
the Court considers convenient their participation at a determined stage.1179 
 
Exceptionally, the rule that the participation of the victims is subject the Court´s 
authorisation does not apply to restitution. In the terms of Article 75 (1) of the 
Statute, when a person is condemned by the International Criminal Court, victims 
of the crimes perpetrated by him/her can request the Court to award restitution 
 
1175 ICC. Situation in Uganda, Pre-Trial Chamber II (Single Judge), Decision on victims' 
applications for participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and 
a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, pp. 8-9, paras. 9-10 (10 August 2007) 
1176 Pikis, G. M. (2010), p.291 
1177 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber. Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial Chamber 
I's Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008, p. 21, para. 61 (11 July 2008). 




(without excluding the possibility of the Court awarding restitution “proprio 
motu”).1180 
 
The third boundary found in Article 68 (3) is that victims who are allowed by the 
Court to present views and observations at a determined stage of the 
proceedings must do it “in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with 
the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial”.1181  
 
The importance of finding a mid-term between the rights of the victims, on one 
side, and the rights of the accused, on the other, so as to conduct a just and 
unprejudiced trial was addressed above when dealing with the protection of the 
victims. In short, the Court can permit victims to take part of the proceeding, but 
their participation should interfere neither with the accused´s prerogatives nor 
with the fairness and neutrality of the trial.   
 
Shortly, the participation of the victims in the proceedings is built upon the 
following requisites: 
 
- The victims` personal interests must be affected by the proceedings; 
- As a rule, the participation of the victims in the proceedings depends on 
the Court´s previous approval: 
- The Court has to ensure that the involvement of the victims in the 
proceedings occurs in a way which is not detrimental to or incompatible 
with the rights of the accused and a fair and unbiased trial. 
 
Therefore, so that a victim can participate at a certain phase of the proceedings, 
the Chamber will establish if the applicant victim’s interests are in particular 
affected by these proceedings and if participation in the manner requested is 
adequate and compatible with the defence´s rights to a fair and expeditious 
trial.1182 
 
5.5.1. Application process 
 
In the Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
I issued a Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings on 10 
January 2006, in which it asserted that 
 
“the status of victim will be accorded to applicants who seem to 
meet the definition of victims set out in rule 85 of the Rules of 





1180 Rome Statute, Art. 75 (1) 
1181 Rome Statute, Art. 68 (3) 
1182 Redress Trust (2012), p. 41  
1183 ICC. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the 




Furthermore, it has been established by the Appeals Chamber in its judgment of 
11 July 2008 in the Lubanga Dyilo case that: 
 
“whilst the ordinary meaning of rule 85 does not per se, limit the 
notion of victims to the victims of the crimes charged, the effect 
of article 68 (3) of the Statute is that the participation of victims in 
the trial proceedings, pursuant to the procedure set out in rule 89 
(1) of the Rules, is limited to those victims who are linked to the 
charges.”1184 
 
As a result, so that victims can apply for participation in the proceedings of the 
Court, apart from subsuming to the concept inserted in Rule 85, they must be 
connected to the charges in the terms of Rule 89 (1).  The latter establishes that 
 
“[i]n order to present their views and concerns, victims shall make 
written application to the Registrar, who shall transmit the 
application to the relevant Chamber. Subject to the provisions of 
the Statute, in particular article 68, paragraph 1, the Registrar 
shall provide a copy of the application to the Prosecutor and the 
defence, who shall be entitled to reply within a time limit to be set 
by the Chamber. Subject to the provisions of sub-rule 2, the 
Chamber shall then specify the proceedings and manner in which 
participation is considered appropriate, which may include 
making opening and closing statements.”1185  
 
Accordingly, the victims that want to participate of the proceedings have to file a 
written application (there is an application form for individuals and an application 
form for organisations on the website of the ICC) to the Registrar.1186 
 
In the case of individual victims, the application can be made by someone acting 
with the consent of the victim. Also, when the victim is a child or in if the victim 
presents an incapacitating disability, the application can be filed by a person 
acting on behalf of the victim.1187  
 
If the victims are organisations or institutions, solely rightfully authorised 




1184 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Appeals 
Chamber´s Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial Chamber 
I's Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008, p. 21, para. 58 
1185 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 89 (1) 
1186 Ibidem; International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Court, Regulation 86; International 
Criminal Court. Application Form for Individuals, Request for Participation in Proceedings and 
Reparations at the ICC For Individual Victims; International Criminal Court. Application Form for 
Organisations, Request for Participation in Proceedings and Reparations at the ICC For Victims 
that are Organisations or Institutions 
1187 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 89 (3) 
1188 International Criminal Court (2010). Booklet, Victims before the International Criminal Court, 
A Guide for the Participation of Victims in the Proceedings of the Court, p.9 
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In any case, the filing of the application to participate of the proceedings is 
gratuitous.1189   
 
Regarding the timing of the application, Regulation 86 (3) determines that   
 
“[v]ictims applying for participation in the trial and/or appeal 
proceedings shall, to the extent possible, make their application 
to the Registrar before the start of the stage of the proceedings 
in which they want to participate.”1190 
 
Thus, victims should apply for participation in the trial and/or appeal proceedings 
prior to the commencement of the stage of the proceedings in which they want to 
engage in. 
 
The Victims Participation and Reparations Section, which is the part within the 
Registrar responsible for processing the application, remits the application to the 
pertinent Chamber.1191  
 
In the sequence, the VPRS  
 
“shall review the application and assess whether the disclosure 
to the Prosecutor, the defence and/or other participants of any 
information contained in such application, may jeopardise the 
safety and security of the victim concerned or any third person. 
 
2. Such review shall take into account the factors set out in article 
68, paragraph 1, any request for non-disclosure made by the 
victim, consultations held with the legal representative(s) of the 
victim, where appropriate, and inter alia, the level of security in 
the area where the victim lives and the feasibility of implementing 
local measures for their protection and security and/or protective 
measures where necessary.  
 
3.  The Registry shall inform the Chamber of the results of the 
assessment and may make recommendations regarding the 
disclosure of all or part of the information provided by the victim.  
 
4.  If a victim requests that all or part of the information he or she 
has provided to the Registry not to be disclosed to the 
Prosecutor, the defence, or other participants, the Registry shall 
inform the victim that such requests may be granted or rejected 
by the Chamber. The Registry shall communicate the victim's 
request, together with the result of the assessment made 
 
1189 International Criminal Court (2010). Booklet, Victims before the International Criminal Court, 
A Guide for the Participation of Victims in the Proceedings of the Court, p. 20 
1190 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Court, Regulation 86 (3) 
1191 Rome Statute, Art.  68 (1); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal 
Court, Rule 89 (1); Vázquez Pedreño, J. (2014), p. 259 
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pursuant to sub-regulations 1 and 2, to the Chamber and to the 
legal representative of the victim.”1192  
 
In fact, the VPRS must review the application and verify if the disclosure of the 
application´s information harbours any potential harm to the safety, physical and 
psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of the victims and other 
participants.1193 
 
Other factors that weigh on the VPRS assessment are any request for non-
disclosure made by the victim (such request may be granted or rejected by the 
relevant Chamber), eventual consultations held with the legal representative(s) 
of the victim, and “inter alia”, the level of security in the place in which the victim 
lives and the possibility of putting into effect local measures for their protection 
and security and/or protective measures should the need arise.1194 
 
The VPRS informs the Chamber of the results of the assessment and can make 
recommendations on the partial or whole disclosure of the information provided 
by the victim.1195  
 
In case it is established that the disclosure of the information contained in the 
application does not endanger victims or any third person, the VPRS will forward 
a copy of the application to the Prosecutor and the defence so that they have the 
opportunity to reply within a time period determined by the Chamber.1196 
 
The Chamber is responsible for ruling whether or not the application is going to 
be accepted. Indeed, Rule 89 (2) establishes that                               
    
“[t]he Chamber, on its own initiative or on the application of the 
Prosecutor or the defence, may reject the application if it 
considers that the person is not a victim or that the criteria set 
forth in article 68, paragraph 3, are not otherwise fulfilled. A victim 
whose application has been rejected may file a new application 
later in the proceedings.”1197  
 
Therefore, the Chamber, “proprio motu” or prompted by the Prosecutor or the 
defence, can reject the victim´s application in case it understands that the person 




1192 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Registry, Regulation 99 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1193 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Registry, Regulation 99 (1); Rome Statute, 
Art.  68 (1) 
1194 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Registry, Regulation 99 (2) (4) 
1195 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Registry, Regulation 99 (3) 
1196International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Registry, Regulation 99 (1); 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 89 (1) 
1197 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 89 (1) 
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Apart from verifying if the applicant subsumes to the concept of victim established 
in Rule 85, the Chamber has also to ensure that applicant is actually connected 
with the charges.1198 
 
Indeed, in accordance with the Pre-Trial Chamber I´s Decision on the 
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of 17 January 2006 in the 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, before taking a decision, the 
Chamber should conduct  
 
“a general assessment, pertaining to the scope of the application 
filed with the Court which relates to the whole of the proceedings 
before it.”1199 
 
It is important to highlight that this general assessment  
 
“does not rule out the possibility of a more specific assessment 
of victims’ personal interests based on the applications filed by 
victims in accordance with the modalities of the participation of 
victims in the proceedings.” 1200 
 
It is of note that 
 
“the analysis of whether victims’ personal interests are affected 
under article 68(3) of the Statute is to be conducted in relation to 
stages of the proceedings, and not in relation to each specific 
procedural activity or piece of evidence dealt with at a given 
stage of the proceedings."1201 
 
Consequently, the applicants must be victims in the terms of Rule 85 and be 
linked with the charges, thus, having their personal interests impacted by the 
proceedings “lato sensu”. Furthermore, the Chamber should also evaluate the 
pertinence of applicants´ participation in the specific stage of the proceedings 
they are willing to take part in. In fact, so that the application is accepted and 
participation granted, the personal interests of the victims must be 
straightforwardly influenced by that determined stage of the proceedings.  
 
 
1198 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Appeals 
Chamber´s Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial Chamber 
I's Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008, p. 21, para. 58 
1199 ICC. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the 
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS2, VPRS3, VPRS4, VPRS5 and 
VPRS6, para. 64; International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Registry, Regulation 109 (1) 
1200 ICC. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the 
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS2, VPRS3, VPRS4, VPRS5 and 
VPRS6, para. 64 
1201 ICC. Situation in Darfur, Sudan, No. ICC-02/05. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the 
Requests for Leave to Appeal the Decision on the Application for Participation of Victims in the 
Proceedings in the Situation, p. 6 (7 February 2008). 
237 
 
There have been cases in which over 2000 applications of participation have 
been submitted to the Court.1202 The processing of this high volume of 
applications has faced capacity restraints. Also, there have been critics regarding 
provision of the victims` participation in the proceedings based on the argument 
that it constitutes a burden on the Court and can potentially causes delays to the 
proceedings.1203  
 
Moreover, it is relevant to stress that, in general, the identity of the victims will not 




“victims have to fill-in a written application which will be 
considered by the Court. From this very moment, the identities of 
victims are protected in the proceedings by a pseudonym 
attributed to them by the Court (for example: a/0001/18) and their 
names consequently do not appear in the public domain.”1205 
 
Finally, the rejection of the application does not prevent the victim of making a 
new one subsequently in the proceedings. 
 
Where there is acceptance of the application, the Chamber has to particularise 
the proceedings and point out the form in which participation is regarded 
appropriate, which can encompass making opening and closing statements, 
submitting observations, and making representations to the Court.1206 
  
When approving an application, the Chamber has to determine the adequate 
manner for the participation to take place, always ensuring that it  
 
“is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused 
and a fair and impartial trial.”1207 
 
Regarding the participation victims of sexual violence, Rule 16 establishes that 
the Registrar is bound to adopt gender-sensitive measures to expedite the 
participation of these victims at all the stages of the proceedings.1208  
 
5.5.2. Timing of victims` participation 
 
The International Criminal Court´s system has neither precisely established a 
moment from which victims could request the Court to participate of the 
 
1202 ICC. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joseph 
Arap Sang. Trial Chamber V, Application by Kituo Cha Sheria for Leave to Submit Observations 
pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, p. 6, para. 12 (30 October 2012). 
1203 Stahn, C. (2012), pp. 251-282. 
1204 International Criminal Court. Victims Participation and Reparations Section´s booklet, p. 17 
1205 International Criminal Court website, Victims 
1206 Rome Statute, Arts.  15 (3), 19 (3); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International 
Criminal Court, Rule 89 (1) 
1207 Rome Statute, Art.  68 (3) 
1208 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 16 (1 (d) 
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proceedings nor systematically defined the manners of victims’ participation in 
the proceedings.1209   
 
In fact, Article 68 (3) of the Rome Statute did not circumscribe the participation of 
victims to any determined stage of proceedings when it asserted that the Court 
shall permit the views and concerns of victims (whose personal interests are 
affected)  
 
“to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings 
determined to be appropriate by the Court” and in a manner 
which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the 
accused and a fair and impartial trial.”1210 
 
The convenience of the timing of the victims` participation has been established 
by the Judges on a case by case basis, paying regard to the accused`s rights, 
the need to guarantee the effectiveness and expeditiousness of the proceedings, 
and the victims` interests.1211  
 
There was controversy about the victims´ participation in the investigation and 
pre-trial stage. 
 
However, from a systematic analysis of the Rome Statute and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, it is coherent to interpret the term "proceedings" 
appearing in Article 68 (3) of the Rome Statute as encompassing the investigation 
stage.1212  
 
For example, Article 15 (3) of the Rome Statute and Rule 50 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence dispose that victims can make representations to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber when the Prosecutor requests the latter authorization to 
proceed with an investigation. In such circumstances, it is likely that victims will 
be on favor of the Prosecutor´s request.1213 
 
Also, after “taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of 
victims”, if the Prosecutor understands that an investigation or prosecution “would 
not serve the interests of justice”, the Court has to notify victims in relation to the 
Prosecutor`s decision so that they can apply for participation in the 
proceedings.1214 
 
In these circumstances, victims probably will be against the Prosecutor´s 
decision. The presence of victims before the Pre-Trial Chamber should serve the 
purpose of guaranteeing that the Prosecutor genuinely takes into consideration 
 
1209 International Criminal Court, Office of Public Counsel for Victims. Representing Victims before 
the International Criminal Court, pp. 29, 84; Redress Trust (2012); Schabas, W. A. (2010), pp. 
827- 830; Vázquez Pedreño, J. (2014), p. 258     
1210 Rome Statute, Art.  68 (3) 
1211 Redress Trust (2012), p. 41  
1212 International Criminal Court, Office of Public Counsel for Victims. Representing Victims before 
the International Criminal Court, pp. 27-28 
1213 Rome Statute, Art. 15 (3); Schabas, W. A. (2011) p. 330 
1214 Rome Statute, Art. 53 (1) (c), (2) (c); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International 
Criminal Court, Rule 92 (2) 
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all the circumstances, including the seriousness of the crime, the victims` 
interests, and the age or infirmity of the purportedly perpetrator.1215 
 
Similarly, when issues of admissibility of a case or jurisdiction of the Court arise, 
victims are entitled to be informed of the questions and challenges at stake and 
may submit observations in this regard, even in those cases which have started 
following the reference of a situation to the Prosecutor by the States parties or 
the Security Council.1216 
 
These and other provisionsdemonstrate that the drafters of the Rome Statute 
envisaged the participation of victims in the proceedings since the investigation 
stage, subject to the Court´s permission.1217 
 
Additionally, the International Criminal Court understood that the “stage of 
proceedings” of Article 68 (3) includes the investigation phase.  
 
In its Decision on Applications for Participation in the Proceedings the situation in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pre-Trial Chamber I considered that 
 
“the personal interests of victims are affected in general at the 
investigation stage, since the participation of victims at this stage 
can serve to clarify the facts, to punish the perpetrators of crimes 
and to request reparations for the harm suffered.”1218   
 
Still in the referred situation, the same Chamber considered that 
 
“pursuant to article 68 (3) of the Statute, … victims may present 
their views and concerns at the investigation stage of the 
situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo once the 
Chamber grants them victim status;”1219 
 
Also, in the Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of the 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, the Single Judge 
(Pre-Trial Chamber I) emphasised that the Chamber had repeatedly stated that:  
 
“(ii) the pre-trial stage of a case is a stage of the proceedings in 
relation to which the analysis of whether victims’ personal 
interests are affected under article 68(3) of the Statute is to be 
conducted; 
 
1215 Rome Statute, Art. 53 (1) (c), (2) (c); Schabas, W. A. (2011), pp. 342-368 
1216 Rome Statute, Arts. 13 (a) (b),15 (3),19 (3); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
International Criminal Court, Rule 59 (1) (b); Schabas, W. A. (2011), pp. pp. 342-368 
1217 Rome Statute, Arts. 15 (3);19 (3); 53 (1) (c), (2) (c); 56 (1) (a) (b), (3) (a); 57 (3) (c); Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rules 59 (1) (b); 87, 88, 92 (2); 93, 
119 (3) 
1218 ICC. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the 
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS2, VPRS3, VPRS4, VPRS5 and 
VPRS6, para. 63 
1219 ICC. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, No. ICC-01/04. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on the Application by Applicants a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 for Leave to Respond to the 




(iii) the interests of victims are affected at this stage of the 
proceedings since this is an essential stage of the proceedings 
which aims to determine whether there is sufficient evidence 
providing substantial grounds to believe that the suspects are 
responsible for the crimes included in the Prosecution Charging 
Document, and consequently: 
 
1. this is an appropriate stage of the proceedings for victim 
participation in all cases before the Court; 
…  and 
 
3. a procedural status of victim exists at the pre-trial stage of any 
case before the Court;”1220 
 
Therefore, from the procedure outlook, victims can take part in the proceedings 
of the International Criminal Court throughout the investigation, pre-trial, trial and 
appeals stages.1221 
 
Moreover, pursuant to Regulation 86 (3) determines that the victims that wish to 
participate of the trial and/or appeal proceedings should apply for participation 
before the beginning of such stages of the proceedings, to the extent possible.1222 
 
5.5.3. Modalities of victims` participation 
 
The Rome Statute did not provide a hampered script in relation to the form of the 
victims` participation.1223  
 
Instead, Article 68 (3) determines that it is also down to the Court to ensure that 
the participation of victims occurs  
 
“in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the 
rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.”1224 
 
Therefore, the drafters of the Statute opted for conferring to the Chambers the 
role of managing the participation of the victims in accordance with the 
specificities of stage of the proceedings.1225   
 
Following this path, Rule 89 (1) determined that “[t]he Chamber shall […] specify 
the proceedings and manner in which participation is considered appropriate.” A 
 
1220  ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Single Judge (Pre-Trial Chamber I), Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights Attached to 
Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, pp. 20-21, para. 45 (13 May 2008).                      
1221 Donat-Cattin, D. (1999). In Lattanzi, F., & Schabas, W. A. (eds.), pp. 251-277; Schabas, W. 
A. (2011) pp. 329-330 
1222 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Court, Regulation 86 (3) 
1223 Baumgartner, E. (2008), pp. 409-440 
1224 Rome Statute, Art.  68 (3) 
1225 Baumgartner, E. (2008), pp. 409-440; Donat-Cattin, D. (1999). In Lattanzi, F., & Schabas, W. 
A. (eds.), pp. 251-277; Stahn, C., Olásolo, H., & Gibson, K. (2006), pp. 219-238; 
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more detained analysis of the Rome Statute and of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence permits to delineate the parameters of the victims` participation.1226    
In accordance with the general scheme set up by Article 68 (3), the Court shall 
permit the victims´ views and concerns to be presented and considered in the 
course of the proceedings.1227  
 
Moreover, subject to the International Criminal Court`s permission, victims are 
allowed to make representations and submit observations.1228 
 
It is necessary to highlight that voluntariness is the core difference between the 
groundbreaking victims´ participation envisaged by the International Criminal 
Court system and simply being called to testify as a witnesses by the Prosecution 
or the Defense to provide evidence regarding the culpability or not of the accused 
person.1229 
 
Surely, the participation of the victims is voluntary, being up to them to decide 
which observations, views and concerns they want to communicate to the 
Court.1230 
 
In the terms of Rule 91(2), 
 
“[a] legal representative of a victim shall be entitled to attend and 
participate in the proceedings … This shall include participation 
in hearings unless, in the circumstances of the case, the 
Chamber concerned is of the view that the representative’s 
intervention should be confined to written observations or 
submissions.”1231 
 
At the Pre-trial stage of its first cases, the International Criminal Court allowed 
victims to attend hearings, make opening and closing remarks and other oral 
submissions in the confirmation of charges hearing, question witnesses at the 
confirmation hearing, have access to filings and distinct documents, as well as 
make written submissions on questions of law and fact.1232 
 
1226 Rome Statute, Art. s 15(3), 19(3), 68(1) and (2), 68(3), 75(3), 87(4), 93(1)(j) of the Rome 
Statute; Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rules 16, 69, 70-
73, 87, 88, 89 (1), 90, 91, 94, 95, 97-99, 101, 132 (2), 136, 139, 143, 144 (1) (2), 145, 191, 217, 
221; International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Court, Regulations 21 (8), 24 (2), 28 (1) (2), 
31 (1) (2), 54, 79 (2) (3), 86 (1) (2), 86, 88, 117(c); International Criminal Court. Regulations of 
the Registry, Regulations 64 (4), 66 (4), 99 (2) (4); 109(3); International Criminal Court, Office of 
Public Counsel for Victims. Representing Victims before the International Criminal Court, p. 29 
1227 Rome Statute, Art.  68 (3); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal 
Court, Rule 89 (1) 
1228 Rome Statute, Art. s 15 (3), 19 (3) 
1229 International Criminal Court. Victims Participation and Reparations Section´s booklet, p. 10; 
McKay, F. (2008), pp. 2-5 
1230 International Criminal Court. Victims Participation and Reparations Section´s booklet, p. 10 
1231 Rule 91(2), Rules of Procedure 
1232 Corrie, K. (2013), pp. 1-9; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Single Judge (Pre-Trial Chamber I), Decision on the Set of 
Procedural Rights Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case; 
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. 




At trial stage, the victims are entitled to attend and participate in hearings, 
present written observations or submissions, question a witness, an expert or the 
defendant, make opening and closing statements, file a response to any 
document, have access to evidence and filings, make comments regarding the 
evidence put forward by the defence and the Prosecution, present evidence 
related to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, testify (both on their own motion 
and as witnesses for one of the parties), make not under oath statements, and 
suggest to the Chamber other witnesses who could be called to testify.1233  
 
Furthermore, in the terms of Rule 87 (1), 
 
“[u]pon the motion of the Prosecutor or the defence or upon the 
request of a witness or a victim or his or her legal representative, 
if any, …, a Chamber may order measures to protect a victim, a 
witness or another person at risk on account of testimony given 
by a witness pursuant to article 68, paragraphs 1 and 2. The 
Chamber shall seek to obtain, whenever possible, the consent of 
the person in respect of whom the protective measure is sought 
prior to ordering the protective measure”.1234 
 
Therefore, the victims have the prerogative to request the relevant Chamber to 
adopt protective measures to safeguard himself/herself, a witness or another 
person at risk on account of testimony given by a witness.  
 
Moreover, pursuant to Rule 88 (1)  
 
“upon the request of a witness or a victim or his or her legal 
representative, if any, … a Chamber may, taking into account the 
views of the victim or witness, order special measures such as, 
but not limited to, measures to facilitate the testimony of a 
traumatized victim or witness, a child, an elderly person or a 
victim of sexual violence, pursuant to article 68, paragraphs 1 
and 2.”1235 
  
As a consequence, the victims have the right to request a Chamber to order 
special measures, as, for example, measures to facilitate the testimony of a victim 
of sexual violence.  
 
 
Anonymous Victims (30 May 2008); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International 
Criminal Court, Rules 91 (2); 92 (3) (4) (5) (a)                                                                             
1233 Corrie, K. (2013), pp. 1-9; International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Court, Regulation 
24 (2); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Trial Chamber 
I, Decision on Victims' Participation, paras. 108, 111; International Criminal Court. Victims 
Participation and Reparations Section´s booklet, p. 13; Rome Statute, Art.  68 (3); Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 89 (1), 91-93; 
1234 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 87 (1)  
1235 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 88 (1)  
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Once a defendant is found guilty, the Chamber can, upon request or “proprio 
motu” in exceptional situations, establish the scope and proportions of any 
damage, loss and injury to, or apropos of, victims.1236 
 
Surely, victims can request reparation for the harm they have endured, 
independently of the Court´s approval.1237  
 
The competent Chamber is empowered to 
 
“make an order directly against a convicted person specifying 
appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including 
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.”1238  
 
Where adequate, the Chamber can order the award for reparations to be made 
by means of the Trust Fund.1239 
 
The topic of reparation will be further addressed below.  
 
If the Judges on their own motion grant reparation to the victims, the latter can 
appeal their order of reparations. Apart from this decision, victims are not entitled 
to appeal. Notwithstanding that, when the Prosecution or the defence appeals a 
decision of the Chamber, victims can be allowed to present their views and 
concerns regarding it.1240 
 
So as to enable the victims` participation in the proceedings, Rule 92 establishes 
a wide scheme of notification to the victims and their legal representatives.  
 
Certainly, the Court is bound to notify the victims of the course of proceedings, 
important decisions (such as the Court´s decision to hold a confirmation hearing), 
materials, etc. This obligation imposed on the Court (more specifically, the 
Registrar and the Prosecutor) is reiterated in the framework of particular rights 
conferred to victims in the proceedings of the International Criminal Court.1241 
 
5.5.4. Final remarks 
 
This extensive participation of victims in the proceedings before the International 
Criminal Court, in addition to be a novelty, is extremely relevant.   
 
Undoubtedly, apart from helping the International Criminal Court to unveil the 
truth and to hold accountable the perpetrators of the crimes (retributive justice), 
 
1236 Rome Statute, Art.  75 (3) 
1237 Ibidem; Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rules 94 (1), 
95 2 (a) (b); International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Court, Regulation 88 
1238 Rome Statute, Art.  75 (2) 
1239 Ibidem 
1240 Corrie, K. (2013), pp. 1-9 
1241 Rome Statute, Arts.  15 (3), 19 (3) Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International 
Criminal Court, Rule s 16 (1) (a) (b), (2)(b); 49 (1) (2); 50 (1) (3) (4) (5) (6); 92; 95 (1); 142 (1); 
144 (1) (2); 217; 221 (1); International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Court, Regulations 31(1) 
(2), 87 (1) (2); International Criminal Court, Office of Public Counsel for Victims. Representing 
Victims before the International Criminal Court, p. 29 
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the victims´ participation is an essential element of the restorative justice. 
Certainly, it permits victims (who are the persons most impacted by the crimes at 
stake) to express what has occurred to them, their families, and their 
communities. The participation of victims is also a form of acknowledging the 
suffering they have gone through. Also, by participating of the Court´s 
proceedings, the victims are experiencing justice. Further, their taking part in the 
proceedings can promote heal and rehabilitation and constitutes the basis for the 




“[v]ictims’ participation empowers them, recognises their 
suffering and enables them to contribute to the establishment of 
the historical record, the truth as it were of what occurred. Victims 
play an important role as active participants in the quest for 
justice and should be valued in that way by the justice process. 
Moreover their participation in the justice process contributes to 
closing the impunity gap and is one step in the process of healing 
for individuals and societies.”1243 
 
In the same direction, 
 
“[p]articipation is significant not only to protecting the rights of the 
victim at various stages of the proceeding, but also to advancing 
the process of healing from trauma and degradation. The active 
involvement, enhanced respect and protection afforded by 
participation and representation is particularly significant for 
victims of sexual and gender violence whose perceptions and 
needs are – in all cultures of the world – frequently ignored, 
presumed, or misunderstood.”1244 
 
In spite of the general praise of the Rome Statute for its provisions on the 
participation of victims in the Court`s proceedings, critics have also been made 
on this regard.  
 
It has been sustained that strengthening the role of the victims in criminal 
proceedings is actually harmful to the defence´s rights.  Further, it has been 
pointed that the scheme of victims` involvement is elaborated and costly, entailing 




1242 Corrie, K. (2013), pp. 1-9; McKay, F. (1999), p. 15; Pena, M. (2010), pp. 498-516; 
War Crimes Research Office. Victim Participation Before the International Criminal Court, p. 9. 
(November 2007); Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice (1997). Recommendations and 
Commentary for August 1997 PrepCom on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
p. 33 
1243 International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties. Revised Strategy in Relation to 
Victims. ICC-ASP/11/38 (5 November 2012). 
1244 Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, Recommendations and Commentary for August 1997 
PrepCom on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
1245 Schabas, W. A. (2011 a) pp. 493–509; Redress Trust (2012), p. 41 
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The reality of the participation of victims of sexual and gender-based violence in 
the investigations, situations and cases before the International Criminal Court 
will be analysed in the next chapter.  
 
5.6. Legal representatives of the victims  
 
The last part of Article 68 (3) determines that the victims´ 
 
“views and concerns may be presented by the legal 
representatives of the victims where the Court considers it 
appropriate, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.”1246 
 
By its turn, Rule 90 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence on legal 
representatives of victims provides that  
 
“1. A victim shall be free to choose a legal representative. 
 
2. Where there are a number of victims, the Chamber may, for 
the purposes of ensuring the effectiveness of the proceedings, 
request the victims or particular groups of victims, if necessary 
with the assistance of the Registry, to choose a common legal 
representative or representatives.  
… 
 
3. If the victims are unable to choose a common legal 
representative or representatives within a time limit that the 
Chamber may decide, the Chamber may request the Registrar to 
choose one or more common legal representatives.  
 
4. The Chamber and the Registry shall take all reasonable steps 
to ensure that in the selection of common legal representatives, 
the distinct interests of the victims, particularly as provided in 
article 68, paragraph 1, are represented and that any conflict of 
interest is avoided. 
 
5. A victim or group of victims who lack the necessary means to 
pay for a common legal representative chosen by the Court may 
receive assistance from the Registry, including, as appropriate, 
financial assistance.”1247 
 
Taking into consideration the intricacy of the International Criminal Court`s 
proceedings, victims have the prerogative to choose a legal representative so as 
to enable their efficient participation.1248   
 
 
1246 Rome Statute, Art.  68 (3) 
1247 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 90 (1) 
1248 International Criminal Court, Office of Public Counsel for Victims. Representing Victims before 
the International Criminal Court, p. 27 
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Surely, victims do not to have to appear personally before the Court so as to 
participate of stages of the proceedings. In the majority of cases, the presentation 
of the victims´ views and concerns on issues that affect their personal interests 
occurs through their legal representatives.1249  
 
However, given the potentially high number of victims who might wish to 
participate in the proceedings before the Court, and, so as to ensure the 
effectiveness of the proceedings, the Chamber may request the victims or 
specific groups of victims to elect a common legal representative or 
representatives.1250 
 
If the victims are not able to agree on a common legal representative or 
representatives within a determined period of time, the Chamber can request 
Registrar to select one or more common legal representatives.1251  
 
Certainly, in accordance with Regulation 80 (1) (2) and 81 (3), in those cases in 
which the interests of justice so demand, subsequently to consultation with the 
Registrar, a Chamber can appoint a legal representative of victims, that can be 
from the Office of Public Counsel for victims and should meet the same criteria 
required from the legal representatives of victims.1252 
 
In the selection of common legal representatives, it must be ensured by the 
Chamber and the Registry that the different interests of the victims (such as age, 
gender, health, and the nature of the crime, particularly where the crime involves 
sexual or gender violence or violence against children) are represented and that 
potential conflicts of interest are prevented.1253 
 
Also, if a victim or a group of victims cannot afford to pay for a common legal 
representative selected by the International Criminal Court, he/she/they can 
receive assistance from the Registry, including, as adequate, financial aid.1254  
 
It is required from the victims` legal representative 
 
“established competence in international or criminal law and 
procedure, as well as the necessary relevant experience, 
whether as judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other similar 
capacity, in criminal proceedings. A counsel for the defence shall 
have an excellent knowledge of and be fluent in at least one of 
the working languages of the Court.”1255 
 
 
1249 International Criminal Court website, Victims; International Criminal Court`s Trust Fund for 
Victims´ website,  
1250 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 90 (1) (2); 
International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Court, Regulations 79, 80 (1) (2), 81 (3); 
International Criminal Court, The Office of Public Counsel for Victims. Helping victims make their 
voice heard, p. 3 
1251 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 90 (3) 
1252 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Court, Regulations 80 (1) (2), 81 (3) 
1253 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 90 (4) 
1254Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 90 (5) 
1255 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 22 (1) 
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To subsume to the “necessary relevant experience whether as judge, prosecutor, 
advocate or in other similar capacity, in criminal proceedings”, the legal 
representative must have been acting in this capacity for a minimum period of 10 
years, in the terms of Regulation 67 (1).1256  
 
Also, he/she should not have been found guilty of a grave criminal or disciplinary 
offence which conflicts with the nature of the office of counsel before the 
International Criminal Court.1257 
 
The victims` legal representative is required to be fluent in English or French, 
which are the working languages of the International Criminal Court, in 
accordance with Article 50 (2) of the Rome Statute.1258  
 
Rule 91 disposes about the participation of legal representatives in the Court 
proceedings. In its Sub-rule 2 it establishes that  
 
“[a] legal representative of a victim shall be entitled to attend and 
participate in the proceedings … [t]his shall include participation 
in hearings unless, in the circumstances of the case, the 
Chamber concerned is of the view that the representative’s 
intervention should be confined to written observations or 
submissions. The Prosecutor and the defence shall be allowed 
to reply to any oral or written observation by the legal 
representative for victims.”1259 
 
Therefore, the victims´ counsel can take part in the proceedings, file submissions 
and attend the hearings on behalf of the victims. Also, in the terms set up in sub-






Several global and regional human rights treaties and distinct instruments attest 
that the right to a remedy pertains to international law.1261  
 
1256 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Court, Regulation 67 (1) 
1256 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 90 (3) 
1257 International Criminal Court. Regulations of the Court, Regulation 67 (2) 
1258 Rome Statute, Art.  50 (2); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal 
Court, Rule 22 (1) 
1259 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 91 (2) 
1260 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 91 (2) (3) (4) 
1261 United Nations, General Assembly. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Arts. 
2 (3), 9 (5), 14 (6), 17 (16 December 1966); United Nations, General Assembly. Convention on 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Art. 6. (21 December 1965); United Nations, General 
Assembly. Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, Art. 2 (c). 
(18 December 1979); United Nations, General Assembly. Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Art. 14 (10 December 1984); United 
Nations, General Assembly. Convention on the Rights of Child, Art. 16; American Convention on 
Human Rights, Arts. 1(1), 8, 10, 11 (3), 25 (22 November 1969); European Convention on Human 
Rights, Art. 8 (4 November 1950); African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples` Rights, Arts. 




The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in its Article 8 affirms that 
 
“[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent 
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights 
granted him by the constitution or by law.”1262 
 
Nevertheless, customarily, the harm endured by victims during an armed conflict 
was not considered as entitling them to some form of reparation. In the best 
scenario, their suffering was taken into consideration when war indemnities were 
paid to the Government of their country of origin, situation in which the State 
would be purportedly acting on behalf of its citizens.1263  
 
It was not only until 1991, after the end of the Golf War, that it was set up a 
compensation scheme for victims of a war by the faulty State.1264  
 
In fact, subsequently to the Golf War, the United Nations Security Council 
determined in its Resolution 687 that Iraq was liable under international law for 
any direct loss, damage, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and 
corporations as a result of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait, and 
decided to create a fund to pay compensation to claims arising from such 
determination and to establish a commission to administer the fund.1265  
 
In its Resolution 692, the Security Council, implementing its decision of 
Resolution 687, set up the Fund and the United Nations Compensation 
Commission to handle the requests for compensation made by foreign 
Governments, nationals and corporations in view of the direct loss, damage or 
injury they suffered as a consequence of Iraq´s unlawful invasion and occupation 
of Kuwait.1266 
 
On the reparations issue, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda had a quite limited 
margin, only being able to order property and proceeds seized by means of 
 
Rights, Arts. 8, 12 (10 December 1948); American Declaration of Rights and Duties of the Man, 
Arts. VV, XVII (2 May 1948); International Labour Organisation. Convention n. 169 Concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, Arts. 15 (2), 16 (4), 16 (5) (27 Jun 1989); 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 13 
(20 March 1952); European Union. Council Framework Decision of 15 March 2001 on the 
standing victims in criminal proceedings, 2001/220/JHA, Official Journal of the European 
Communities. L 82/1 (22 March 2001); European Union. Council Directive 2004/80/EC of 29 April 
2004 relating to compensation to crime victims, Official Journal of the European Communities. L 
261/15 (6 August 2004); Shelton, D. (2005). In De Feyter, K., Parmentier, S., Bossuyt, M., & 
Lemmens, P. (eds.), pp. 11-34.  
1262 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 8 
1263 International Criminal Court, Office of Public Counsel for Victims. Representing Victims before 
the International Criminal Court, p. 30 
1264 Ibidem 
1265 United Nations, Security Council. Resolution 687, paras. 16, 18. S/RES/687(1991) (3 April 
1991) 
1266 United Nations, Security Council. Resolution 692, para. 3. (20 May 1991); International 
Criminal Court, Office of Public Counsel for Victims. Representing Victims before the International 
Criminal Court, p. 30 
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criminal conduct (including through duress) to be returned to their rightful 
owners.1267 
 
Surely, in the terms of Article 24(3) of the ICTY Statute and Article 23(3) of the 
ICTR Statute 
 
“[i]n addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chambers may order the 
return of any property and proceeds acquired by criminal 
conduct, including by means of duress, to their rightful 
owners.”1268 
 
The Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence introduced a system 
of reparations which mirrors a growing acknowledgment in the international 
criminal law field that it is necessary to go beyond the concept of punitive justice 
towards a more inclusive solution, which stimulates participation and recognises 
the importance of providing victims with effective remedies.1269  
 
As a result, the International Criminal Court is not solely worried about trying and 
punishing those who incur in the international crimes enlisted in the Rome 
Statute, but also aims to provide justice to victims of such crimes.1270  
 
In fact, the Court seeks to balance retributive justice (put criminals on trial and 
render them accountable for the crimes they have incurred into) and restorative 
justice (assist the victims in patching and rebuilding their lives).1271 
 
This is a key advancement bearing in mind that the Criminology and Victimology 
have recurrently exposed, from the perspective of the necessary reparation and 
asistence to the victims, the insufficiencies of the tradicional systems of civil 
responsibility. On the one hand, because such systems demand the 
unappealable sentence, and, on the other hand, in the frequent cases of 
indigence of the convicted person, in spite of a favourable outcome, the victim 
experiences a complete insatisfaction.1272   
 
So as to promote restorative justice, the Rome Statute and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence provided for reparations, which fulfil two central goals 
of the Rome Statute: they oblige the convicted persons to repair the harm which 
their crimes gave rise to the victims, and they allow the Court to guarantee that 
the perpetrators respond for their acts.1273   
 
1267 United Nations, Security Council. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (1993), Art. 24 (3); United Nations, Security Council. Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994), Art. 23 (3); International Criminal Court, Office of Public 
Counsel for Victims. Representing Victims before the International Criminal Court, p. 27 
1268 United Nations, Security Council. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (1993), Art. 24 (3); United Nations, Security Council. Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994), Art. 23 (3). 
1269 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 1, para. 1 
1270 Moffett, L., (2014), p. 86 
1271 International Criminal Court website, Victims 
1272 de la Cuesta Arzamendi, J. L. (2018), pp. 229-248 
1273 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 




The Rome Statute´s system of reparations is a key characteristic. Indeed, to a 
certain degree, the Court´s success is dependent on the success of its reparation 
scheme. The trials will only be significant to the communities in case there is 
outreach which is proactive, attentive to the cultural context, and mindful of 
peoples’ thoughts on the Court and its trials.1274 
 
It is interesting that, in spite of the Rome Statute´s advance, the Special Tribunal 
for East-Timor and the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone are not empowered to 
issue reparations awards, even though their statutes were considerably 
influenced by the Rome Statute .1275 
 
5.7.2. The International Criminal Court reparations scheme  
 
The drafters of the Rome Statute innovated and stated in Article 75 that:   
 
“1. The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, 
or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation. On this basis, in its decision the Court may, either 
upon request or on its own motion in exceptional circumstances, 
determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury 
to, or in respect of, victims and will state the principles on which 
it is acting.  
 
2. The Court may make an order directly against a convicted 
person specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, 
victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.  
 
Where appropriate, the Court may order that the award for 
reparations be made through the Trust Fund provided for in 
article 79. 
 
3. Before making an order under this article, the Court may invite 
and shall take account of representations from or on behalf of the 
convicted person, victims, other interested persons or interested 
States.”1276 
 
Therefore, in its Article 75, the Statute foresaw the possibility of awarding 
reparations to victims of the international crimes so as to compensate/ alleviate 
their suffering. Undoubtedly, in those cases in which an accused is found guilty, 
the Court can issue an order of reparations either upon the victims` request or on 
its own motion in extraordinary circumstances.  
 
 
1274 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 1, para. 3; International Criminal Court, Assembly 
of States Parties. Report of the Bureau on the impact of the Rome Statute system on victims and 
affected communities, p. 10, para. 27 (22 November 2010). 
1275 International Criminal Court, Office of Public Counsel for Victims. Representing Victims before 
the International Criminal Court, p. 27 
1276 Rome Statute, Art.  75 (1) (2) (3) 
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This article clearly permits victims´ participation at the reparation phase, thus, 
placing them in the middle of the proceedings.1277 
 
It is important to clarify that there were more ambitious proposals for victims` 
compensation, but they were ruled out during the negotiations. The idea of 
international compensation is appealing, but there are several practical 
difficulties. Generally, defendants are successful in claiming indigence and finish 
being represented by tribunal-funded counsel even though they are widely 
believed to have proceeded to the looting of the countries they used to rule.1278  
 
In the International Criminal Court system, victims are entitled to apply for 
reparations even if they did not apply for participation at the Pre-trial or Trial 
stages of the proceedings or were not admitted.1279  
 
Undoubtedly, all victims should be treated justly and equally in relation to 
reparations, regardless of whether or not they participated in the trial proceedings 
which led to the conviction sentence.1280 
 
Also, the Court can act on its own initiative when the victims do not make a 
specific request for reparations. This concept that the International Criminal Court 
could on its own motion award reparations to victims was a thorny issue. The 
argument of the delegations favouring this idea was that victims in 
underdeveloped countries were hardly in a position to exercise this prerogative 
by themselves.1281  
 
When the Court awards reparations on its own initiative, it should inform the 
defendant and the victims as extensively as possible. The Court ought to give 
publicity, as broadly as possible, to the reparation proceedings, and, when 
necessary, seek the cooperation of States Parties so that the maximum number 
of victims can make their request.1282 
 
Pursuant to Rule 97, 
 
“[t]aking into account the scope and extent of any damage, loss 
or injury, the Court may award reparations on an individualized 
basis or, where it deems it appropriate, on a collective basis or 
both.”1283 
 
Thus, reparation is to be awarded with basis on the harm endured as a 
consequence of the perpetration of the crimes under the Court´s jurisdiction. 
 
1277 Funk, T. M. (2010), p.  225 
1278 Schabas, W. A. (2011), pp. 342-368 
1279 Corrie, K. (2013), pp. 1-9 
1280 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 1, para. 3 
1281 Schabas, W. A. (2011), pp. 342-368 
1282 Rome Statute, Arts.  75 (3) (4), 86, 87 (1), 88, 93 (1) (I); International Criminal Court, Office 
of Public Counsel for Victims. Representing Victims before the International Criminal Court, p. 30 
1283 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 97 (1) 
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 




Further, as established in Article 75, paragraph 2 of the Rome Statute, the Court 
can direct the convicted person to make adequate reparations to, or in relation 
to, victims. Where pertinent, the ICC can determine “the award for reparations to 
be made through the Trust Fund”.1284  
 
It is relevant to stress that when the Court grants individual awards for 
reparations, the latter should be “made directly against a convicted person.”1285  
 
“The Court may order that an award for reparations against a 
convicted person be deposited with the Trust Fund where at the 
time of making the order it is impossible or impracticable to make 
individual awards directly to each victim.” 1286 
 
In this situation,  
 
“[t]he award for reparations thus deposited in the Trust Fund shall 
be separated from other resources of the Trust Fund and shall 
be forwarded to each victim as soon as possible.” 1287 
 
Also, “where the number of the victims and the scope, forms and modalities of 
reparations makes a collective award more appropriate”, the ICC can determine 
that the award for reparations is to “be made through the Trust Fund”.1288 
 
In all cases, the Court is bound to observe the rights of the victims and of the 
convicted person.1289   
 
At the request of victims or their legal representatives, or at the request of the 
person who was found guilty, or on the Court´s “propro motu” initiative, the latter 
 
“may appoint appropriate experts to assist it in determining the 
scope, extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of 
victims and to suggest various options concerning the 
appropriate types and modalities of reparations.”1290   
 
In addition, the Court can invite, as adequate, victims or their legal 
representatives, the person who was convicted as well as interested persons and 
interested States to make observations regarding the experts` reports.1291   
 
As determined in Article 68 of the Statute and in the general principle of Rule 86 
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in all issues concerning reparations the 
Court should pay regard to the needs of all the victims (particularly, children, 
 
1284 Rome Statute, Art.  75 (2) 
1285 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 98 (1) 
1286 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 98 (2) 
1287 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 98 (2) 
1288 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 98 (3)  
1289 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 97 (3) 




elderly persons, persons with disabilities, and victims of sexual or gender 
violence).1292 
 
In the reparation proceedings, the applicant should sufficiently prove the causal 
nexus between the criminal offence and the harm endured, in accordance with 
the specific circumstances of the case. Due to the essentially distinct nature of 
reparations proceedings, the required standard of proof is not as high as that for 
trial (in the latter the prosecution, so as to secure a conviction, must proof the 
relevant facts “beyond a reasonable doubt”, in the terms of Article 66 (3)). In 
establishing the adequate standard of proof in reparation proceedings, several 
factors particular to the case should be taken into account, inclusive of the 
difficulty victims can have in gathering evidence to support their claim in view of 
either the destruction or unavailability of evidence.1293  
 
The victims of the crimes, along with their family members and communities that 
are also entitled to reparations, have the prerogative to participate during the 
reparations process.1294 
 
Surely, reparations are completely voluntary and the recipient must provide an 
informed consent before any award of reparations. The Court should consult with 
victims on questions regarding the beneficiaries´ identity and their priorities.1295 
 
The victims should get appropriate support so as to make their participation in 
reparations valuable and effective.1296 
 
It is noteworthy that the order for reparations do not affect the victims´ rights to 
reparations in other cases, brought before the Court or before regional, national, 
or other international bodies. Similarly, decisions by other national or international 
bodies do not impact the victims` rights to receive reparations in accordance with 
Article 75 of the Rome Statute. Nevertheless, despite those broad propositions, 
the Court can take into consideration any awards or benefits established pro the 
victims from other bodies so as to ensure that reparations are not applied unjustly 







1292 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 3, para. 14 
1293 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 5, para 22; Rome Statute, Art.  66 (3) 
1294 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 7, paras. 29, 31 
1295 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 7, paras. 30-32; UNICEF. The Paris Principles, 
Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, Principle 
3.8 (February 2007)   
1296 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 7, para.29, 31 
1297 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), pp. 1-3, paras. 4, 9; Rome Statute, Art.  75 (6) 
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5.7.3. Types of reparations  
 
As already stated, individual and collective reparations are not incompatible and 
can be awarded concomitantly.1298 
 
Also, individual reparations should be awarded in a manner so as to avoid 
generating tensions and discrepancies within the correspondent communities. 
Collective reparations should respond to the harm that the victims endured 
individually and collectively.1299   
 
In accordance with Article 75 of the Rome Statute, reparation comprises 
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. These institutes were addressed by 
the 2005 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law. Certainly, upon recalling 
articles 68 and 75 of the Rome Statute, this document asserted that: 
 
“19. Restitution should, whenever possible, restore the victim to 
the original situation before the gross violations of international 
human rights law or serious violations of international 
humanitarian law occurred. Restitution includes, as appropriate: 
restoration of liberty, enjoyment of human rights, identity, family 
life and citizenship, return to one’s place of residence, restoration 
of employment and return of property. 
 
20. Compensation should be provided for any economically 
assessable damage, as appropriate and proportional to the 
gravity of the violation and the circumstances of each case, 
resulting from gross violations of international human rights law 
and serious violations of international humanitarian law, such as:  
 
(a) Physical or mental harm;  
 
(b) Lost opportunities, including employment, education and 
social benefits;  
 
(c) Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of 
earning potential;  
 
(d) Moral damage;  
 
(e) Costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicine and 
medical services, and psychological and social services.  
 
 
1298 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 7, para. 33 
1299 Ibidem   
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21. Rehabilitation should include medical and psychological care 
as well as legal and social services.”1300 
 
Therefore, in the pursuance of restitution, the International Criminal Court should 
seek to restore the victim to the original situation before the perpetration of the 
crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court, whenever possible.  
 
Restitution is aimed at restoring the life of an individual. It encompasses return to 
the person´s family, home and prior employment, provide education on a 
continuous basis, and the return of either lost or stolen property.1301 
 
Restitution can be suitable as well for legal institutions, as, for instance, schools 
or other bodies.1302  
 
A few elements should concur for the award of compensation. Firstly, the 
economic harm should be sufficiently quantifiable. Secondly, this kind of award 
has to be adequate and proportionate in face of the seriousness of the crime and 
the circumstances surrounding the case. Thirdly, funds must be available, hence, 
making the award of compensation feasible.1303 
 
The award of compensation must be grounded on a gender-inclusive approach 
and must refrain from replicating former structural disparities and discriminatory 
measures.1304  
 
Compensation demands a wide application, to cover all sorts of injury, damage, 
and loss. Indeed, compensation applies to material damages as well as to other 
suffering and harms of a psychological and physical character. It encompasses 
alterations to the victims` projects of life and social interactions, and modifications 
in the idiosyncrasy of their families and communities.1305 
 
1300 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, paras. 19-21 
1301 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, para. 19; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNICEF. Guidelines on 
Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime, Model Law and Related 
Commentary, para. 37; United Nations, Economic and Social Council. Guidelines on Justice in 
Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime, para. 37 (22 July 2005); ICC. The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Appeals Chamber, Order for 
Reparations (amended), p. 8, para. 35 
1302 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 8, para. 36 
1303 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, para. 20; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/06. The Appeals Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 8, para. 37 
1304 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 8, para. 38 
1305 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 8, para. 39; Basic Principles and Guidelines on 
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human 
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, para. 20; Extraordinary 




Even though it is not viable to quantify some types of damage in monetary terms, 
compensation is a kind of financial relief directed at responding, in a proportionate 
and adequate way, to the harm that has been caused to the victims.1306 
 
Examples of harm endured by victims:  
 
- Physical harm, inclusive of causing a person to lose the ability to 
reproduce;1307 
 
- Moral and non-material harm causing physical, mental and emotional 
hardship;1308 
 
- Material damage, covering the income lost; the loss of chance to work; 
loss of, or harm to, possessions; not paid wages or salaries; other ways of 
inhibiting a person’s ability to work; and reduction of savings;1309 
 
- Loss of opportunities (covering those concerning education, employment, 
and social benefits); status lost; and the hampering of the legal rights of a 
person (even though the Court must not maintain customary or existing 
prejudice practices, for example on the grounds of gender, in trying to 
address to respond to these questions);1310 
 
Human Rights. Case “Las Dos Erres” Massacre v. Guatemala. Judgment, (Preliminary Objection, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs) para. 226 (24 November 2009) 
1306 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, para. 20; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/06. The Appeals Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 8, para. 40 
1307 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Case Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Judgment 
(Merits), paras. 156, 175, 187 (29 July 2998); European Court of Human Rights. Case X and Y v. 
the Netherlands (Application n. 8978/80). Judgment, para. 22 (26 March 1985); ICC. The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals Chamber, Order 
for Reparations (amended), p. 8, para. 40 (3) 
1308 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Case Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina. Judgment 
(Reparations and Costs), para. 49 (27 August 1998); Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
Case plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala. Judgment (Merits), paras. 80-89, 117 (29 April 
2004); Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Case the “Juvenile Reeducation Institute” v. 
Paraguay. Judgment (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), para. 295 (2 
September 2004); European Court of Human Rights. Case Selmouni v. France Application 
(Application n. 25803/94). Judgment, paras. 92, 98, 105 (28 July 1999); European Court of 
Human Rights. Case Aksoy v. Turkey (Application no. 21987/93). Judgment, para. 113 (18 
December 1996); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. 
Pre-Trial I, Decision on Applications for Participation in proceedings a/0004/06 to a/0009/06, 
a/0016/06, a/0063/06, a/0071/06 to a/0080/06 and a/0105/06 in the case of The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, para. 11 (21 October 2006); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, Fourth Decision on Victims' Participation, 
paras. 51 (21 January 2008); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/06.  Appeals Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 9, para. 40 (b) 
1309  Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Case El Amparo v. Venezuela. Judgment, paras. 28-
30 (14 September 1996);  
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Appeals Chamber, 
Order for Reparations (amended), p. 9, para. 40 (c) 
1310 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 9, para. 40 (d); European Court of Human Rights. 




- Costs of legal or other pertinent experts, and expenses associate with 
medical services, as well as social and psychological assistance.1311 
 
The victim` rights to rehabilitation should be implemented by the Court on the 
grounds of the principles concerning non-discrimination, and it should 
encompass a gender-inclusive approach covering men and women of all 
ages.1312 
 
Rehabilitation should encompass medical services and healthcare, psychiatric, 
psychological, and social assistance to help victims who suffer from grief and 
trauma; as well as any pertinent social and legal services.1313 
 
Victims are entitled to receive appropriate, adequate and expeditious 
reparations.1314 
 
The awards have to be proportionate to the damage, harm, injury, loss caused to 
the victims, as determined by the Court.1315    
 
Reparations should intend reconcile the victims with their families and the 
impacted communities.1316  
 
Always that possible, reparations should mirror local culture and conventional 
practices except if such practices are inequitable, exclusive or prevent victims of 
having igualitarian access to their rights.1317   
 
 
1992); European Court of Human Rights. Case T.P., & K.M. v. the United Kingdom (Application 
no. 28945/95). Judgment, para. 115 (10 May 2001); European Court of Human Rights. Case 
Thlimmenos v. Greece (Application no. 34369/97). Judgment, para. 70 (6 April 2000); Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. Case Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment, paras. 147-148 (17 
September 1997); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  
Appeals Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 9, para. 40 (d) 
1311  Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Case Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment, paras. 129 
(d) (17 September 1997); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06.  Appeals Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 9, para. 40 (e); Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights. Case Barrios Altos v. Peru. Judgment, para. 42 (14 March 2001). 
1312  Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, para. 25; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/06.  Appeals Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 9, para. 41 
1313 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 9, para. 42; Basic Principles and Guidelines on 
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human 
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, para. 21; 
1314 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 10, para. 44; Basic Principles and Guidelines on 
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human 
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, para.15; 
1315 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 10, para. 45 
1316 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 10, para. 46   
1317 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 10, para. 47 
258 
 
Reparations need to support self-sufficing programmes so as to permit victims, 
their families and communities to obtain advantages from these measures during 
a long period of time. If victims are entitled to pensions or other kinds of economic 
benefits, whenever possible, they should be paid by periodical instalments 
instead of by means of a lump payment.1318   
 
Also, the UN General Assembly, recognising that victims have right to benefit 
from remedies and reparation, adopted the 2005 Basic Principles and Guidelines 
on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law. The latter established that, pursuant to domestic law and 
international law, and paying regard to individual circumstances, victims of gross 
violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law should, as adequate and proportional to the seriousness of the 
violation and the particularities of each case, be provided with integral and 
efficient reparation, which, in addition to restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, 
includes also satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.1319   
 
In the terms of paragraph 22 of the Basic Principles and Guidelines, satisfaction 
should include, where adequate:   
 
“(a) Effective measures aimed at the cessation of continuing 
violations;   
 
(b) Verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the 
truth to the extent that such disclosure does not cause further 
harm or threaten the safety and interests of the victim, the 
victim’s relatives, witnesses, or persons who have intervened to 
assist the victim or prevent the occurrence of further violations;  
 
 (c) The search for the whereabouts of the disappeared, for the 
identities of the children abducted, and for the bodies of those 
killed, and assistance in the recovery, identification and reburial 
of the bodies in accordance with the expressed or presumed wish 
of the victims, or the cultural practices of the families and 
communities;   
 
(d) An official declaration or a judicial decision restoring the 
dignity, the reputation and the rights of the victim and of persons 
closely connected with the victim;  
 
(e) Public apology, including acknowledgement of the facts and 
acceptance of responsibility;  
 
 
1318 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 10, para. 48 
1319 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, para.18  
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(f) Judicial and administrative sanctions against persons liable for 
the violations;   
 
(g) Commemorations and tributes to the victims;   
 
(h) Inclusion of an accurate account of the violations that 
occurred in international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law training and in educational material at all 
levels.” 1320  
 
Guarantees of non-repetition, by its turn, should cover, where adequate, any or 
all of the subsequent measures, which will also lead to prevention:   
 
“(a) Ensuring effective civilian control of military and security 
forces;   
 
(b) Ensuring that all civilian and military proceedings abide by 
international standards of due process, fairness and impartiality;   
 
(c) Strengthening the independence of the judiciary;   
 
(d) Protecting persons in the legal, medical and health-care 
professions, the media and other related professions, and human 
rights defenders;   
 
(e) Providing, on a priority and continued basis, human rights and 
international humanitarian law education to all sectors of society 
and training for law enforcement officials as well as military and 
security forces;   
 
(f) Promoting the observance of codes of conduct and ethical 
norms, in particular international standards, by public servants, 
including law enforcement, correctional, media, medical, 
psychological, social service and military personnel, as well as 
by economic enterprises;   
 
(g) Promoting mechanisms for preventing and monitoring social 
conflicts and their resolution; 
 
(h) Reviewing and reforming laws contributing to or allowing 
gross violations of international human rights law and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law.”1321 
 
 
1320 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, para. 22 
1321 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, para. 23 
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In tune with the concept of satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition 
introduced by the 2005 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy 
and Reparation for Victims, the International Criminal Court has stated that 
reparations are not circumscribed to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. 
Certainly, the Court has affirmed that other kinds of reparations with a 
preventative or transformative value, as well as symbolic measures (like, for 
example, memorials or apologies), can also be adequate.1322   
 
Finally, the Court should actively engage the victims and their communities in the 
outreach activities, which encompass, primarily, programmes targeting 
vulnerable groups such as women and ethnic minorities, and, in second place, 
communication between the International Criminal Court and the impacted 
persons and their communities. The outreach activities are primordial to 
guarantee that reparations have ample and real meaning.1323   
 
As it will be discussed above, in the cases the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, the ICC, after finding the accused 
guilty and issuing the respective sentences, ordered reparations which have been 
implemented.1324 
 
5.8. The Trust Fund for Victims 
 
Pursuant to Article 79 of the Statute, the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) was created 
in 2004 by decision of the Assembly of States Parties1325  
 
“for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, and of the families of such victims.”1326 
 
The Trust Fund is separate from the Court, being managed by Board of Directors 




1322 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 10, para. 48; International Criminal Court website, 
Reparation/Compensation stage 
1323 International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties. Report of the Bureau on the impact 
of the Rome Statute system on victims and affected communities, p. 10, paras. 26-32 
1324 Rome Statute, Art.  75 (3); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal 
Court, Rule 103; The Prosecutor v. Lubanga case, Appeals Chamber, Order for reparations 
(amended), (3 March 2015); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06. Trial Chamber II, Redaction of Filing on Reparations and Draft Implementation Plan (3 
November 2005); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. 
Trial Chamber II, Order instructing the Trust Fund for Victims to supplement the draft 
implementation plan (9 February 2016); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, Order granting leave to file representations pursuant to article 75(3) 
of the Statute (1 April 2015). 
1325 International Criminal Court. Establishment of a Fund for the Benefit of Victims of Crimes 
Within the Jurisdiction of the Court, and of the Families of Such Victims (9 September 2002); 
International Criminal Court website, Trust Fund for Victims; Rome Statute, Art.  79 (1) 
1326 Rome Statute, Art.  79 (3) 
1327 Ibidem; International Criminal Court. Procedure for the nomination and election of members 
of the Board of Directors of the Trust Fund for the benefit of victims (9 September 2002); 
International Criminal Court website, Trust Fund for Victims 
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The Trust Fund´s goal is 
 
“to support and implement programmes that address harms 
resulting from genocide, crimes of humanity and war crimes. To 
achieve this mission, the TFV has a two-fold mandate: (i) to 
implement Court-Ordered reparations and (ii) to provide physical, 
psychological, and material support to victims and their 
families.”1328  
 
Indeed, independently from reparations (which can solely be granted after the 
conviction of a defendant), the Trust Fund was assigned with the task of using1329 
 
“[o]ther resources of the Trust Fund ... to benefit victims of crimes 
as defined in rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
and, where natural persons are concerned, their families, who 
have suffered physical, psychological and/or material harm as a 
result of these crimes.”1330 
 
The term “other resources” means resources different than those obtained by 
means of fines, forfeitures and awards for reparations (namely, voluntary 
contributions and resources that the Assembly of States Parties allocates to the 
Trust Fund).1331  
 
The Trust Fund´s assistance mandate is essential for repairing the harm endured 
by victims. Its assistance (physical assistance, psychological assistance and 
material support) is provided1332 
 
“1) in a timelier manner than the judicial process may allowed, 
and 2) to a more extensive range of victims who are affected by 
the broader situations before the Court, regardless of whether 
the harm they suffered stems from particular crimes charged in a 
specific case. In particular, earmarked funding constitutes an 
important component of the TFV’s resources under the 
assistance mandate, especially for supporting victims of sexual 
and gender-based violence”.1333 
 
The expedite character of the assistance mandate of the TVF is of paramount 
importance to victims of sexual and gender violence since the latter are often in 
a remarkably vulnerable situation and urgently require psycho-social support and 
medical care, thus, demanding a high-priority and fast answer.1334  
 
1328 International Criminal Court. How the Court works; International Criminal Court website, Trust 
Fund for Victims  
1329 Rome Statute, Art.  75 (2); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal 
Court, Rule 98; The Trust Fund for Victims website 
1330 Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims, Regulation 48 
1331 Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims, Regulations 21 (a) (d), 47; Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 98 (5) 
1332 The Trust Fund for Victims website, Assistance Mandate 
1333 Ibidem 
1334 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Appeals 




In fact, if these victims` needs are not quickly satisfied (which would be the case 
if victims were only aided and supported after the condemnation of a defendant 
by the Court), their health conditions would deteriorate and some of them would 
not even be able to survive, as, for instance, those victims infected by the 
HIV/AIDS as a consequence of the perpetration of sexual and gender-based 
crimes.1335  
 
In the Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo situations, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber permitted the Trust Fund to provide the most vulnerable and 
marginalised victims (who are within the victim concept inserted in Rule 85) with 
interim relief since the investigation stage, by means of provision of rehabilitation 
(both physical and psychological) and material assistance.1336 
 
In these situations, the victims of sexual and gender-based violence have 
benefitted of physical rehabilitation (care and rehabilitation of victims that have 
endured physical injury, as for example,  the provision of fistula repair, HIV tests 
and treatment, post-exposure-prophylaxis, as well as reproductive health 
services and other specialised medical care), psychological rehabilitation 
(provision of cost-effective psychological, social and other health benefits as a 
form of help in the recovery of victims, and educate local populations about the 
victims` needs, reducing the stigmatisation of victims) and material support  
(enhancement of the victims` economic status as a way to aid in their 
recovery).1337  
 
By answering to harm, the Trust Fund for Victims assists victims to reobtain 
dignity and hope and rebuild their lives.1338 
 
Ultimately, by helping victims  
 
“to return to a dignified and contributory life within their 
communities, the TFV contributes to realizing sustainable and 





The enactment of the Rome Statute brought groundbreaking protection and 
assistance to victims in general. Also, observed certain conditions, victims were 
 
1335 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), pp. 418-424; Novak, A. (2015), p. 98 
1336 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), pp. 418-425; Novak, A. (2015), p. 98; Regulations of the Trust 
Fund for Victims, Regulation 50 (a) (i) (ii) (iii); International Criminal Court website, Victims; The 
Trust Fund for Victims website, Programmes; The Trust Fund for Victims website, Assistance 
Mandate; The Trust Fund for Victims, Programme Progress Report November 2009 
1337 de Brouwer, A.-M. L. M. (2005), pp. 418- 424; International Criminal Court website, Victims; 
The Trust Fund for Victims website, Assistance Mandate; Novak, A. (2015), p. 98  
1338 The Trust Fund for Victims website, Press Release, New TFV Board of Directors: Prioritizing 
Victim Survivors in International Justice (26 April 2016). 
1339 International Criminal Court. How the Court works; International Criminal Court website, Trust 




allowed to participate at all stages of the proceedings. Further, the drafters of the 
Rome Statute envisaged that the Court would offer a complementary restorative 
answer to victims in the International Criminal Law scenario, in which, 
traditionally, victims have had a secondary role.1340  
 
It is remarkable that specific norms (particular investigative, procedural, and 
evidentiary measures) were inserted in the Statute and its related legal 
instruments with a view to specifically protect and support victims of sexual and 
gender-based crime. The International Criminal Court scheme sought to promote 
procedural justice to these especially vulnerable victims (which includes to make 
sure that victims receive a fair, respectful, and dignified treatment during the 
proceedings and have access to reparations) and provide them with a meaningful 
role in the International Criminal Justice process.1341  
 
In view of these key advancements introduced by the Rome Statute, it could be 
theoretically suggested that international criminal justice is at last in a position to 
permit all victims, particularly victims of sexual and gender-based violence, to 
have access to retributive, restorative, practical and procedural aspects of 
justice.1342    
 
In the following chapter, when analysing the practice of the International Criminal 
Court in its first three cases involving sexual and gender-based crimes in which 
final judgments have been rendered, it will be possible to verify whether the 
Court`s handling of such crimes and the level of protection and support conferred 
to the victims stand to the high safeguard and assistance levels envisaged by its 
founding and sustaining legal instruments.  
 
Also, by scrutinising how the ICC has been developing the victims` participation 
regime, in particular in relation to victims of sexual and gender-based crimes, it 
will be possible to see if the Court has been taking in consideration the victims’ 
interests.1343  
 
Indeed, it will be possible to verify if the International Criminal Court is being able 
to, along with the traditional punitive answer to crimes, appropriately and 
effectively implement a restorative response focused on the victims rather than 
in the convicted person, and, thus, if the victims of sexual and gender-based 
crimes are being able to effectively access justice.1344 
 






1340 Ibidem; Varona Martínez, G. (2012 a), pp. 201-245 
1341 Bedont, B., & Martinez, K. H. (1999), pp. 65-85; Benhassine, S. (2015), p. 47; Moffett, L. 
(2014 a), p. 3; Wemmers, J.-A. M. (1996), pp. 101-102 
1342 Bedont, B., & Martinez, K. H. (1999), pp. 65-85; Benhassine, S. (2015), pp. 11-12, 47-48; 
Garbett, C. (2017), pp. 198-220 
1343 Moffett, L. (2015), pp. 255-289 
1344 Benhassine, S. (2015), pp. 47-48; Garbett, C. (2017), pp. 198-220 
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6. Case the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
 
6.1. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 
In April 2002, the Democratic Republic of the Congo ratified the Rome 
Statute.1345     
 
In July 2003, the Office of the Prosecutor started analysing the situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (initially focusing on crimes perpetrated in the 
Ituri region). Two months later, the Prosecutor informed the States Parties that 
he was willing to request the Pre-Trial Chamber an authorisation to use his 
powers laid down in Article 15 paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute and establish a 
formal investigation, but added that a referral from the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo in the terms of Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute would help 
his work.1346 
 
Subsequently, in November 2003, the Government of the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo sent a letter welcoming the involvement of the International Criminal 
Court and, on 3 March 2004, sent a referral letter of the situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (ICC-01/04) to the Court. The later was 
received by the Prosecutor in April and, as a result, investigations were initiated 
by the ICC on 21 June 2004.1347   
 
On 5 July 2004, the Presidency of the International Criminal Court issued a 
decision assigning the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo to Pre-Trial 
Chamber I.1348  
 
The core of the situation consists in the alleged perpetration of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity within the circumstances of armed conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (with a regional focus on Eastern part of the 
country, in the Ituri region as well as the North and South Kivu Provinces).  In 
fact, the Second Congo War took place in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
between1998-2003 and during this period the Hema, Lendu, Ngiti and Bira 
ethnicities disputed the control of gold mines. However, the investigation was on 
the events that happened from 1 July 2002 onwards (the date of entrance into 
force of the Rome Statute and, thus, from which the ICC has jurisdiction over war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and aggression).1349      
 
1345 International Criminal Court website, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04 
1346 Rome Statute, Art. 14 (1), 15 (1); ICC website, Press Release, The Office of the Prosecutor 
of the International Criminal Court opens its first investigation (23 June 2004). 
1347 International Criminal Court website, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04; International Criminal Court website, Case 
Information Sheet, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo; International Criminal Court website, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lubanga 
case, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06; ICC website, Press Release, 
23 June 2004 
1348 International Criminal Court, Presidency. Decision assigning the situation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo to Pre-Trial Chamber I (5 July 2004).  
1349 International Criminal Court website, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04; Galain Palermo, P. (2014). In Ambos, K., Malarino, 




This was the inaugural investigation of the Office of the Prosecutor and triggered 
the instatement of 6 cases (namely, the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
the Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, the 
Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, the Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Mudacumura, 
and the Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudojolo Chui) involving charges of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity that encompassed crimes of rape and sexual 
slavery, among other crimes.1350   
 
The cases the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga and the Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda will be subsequently analysed 
since they offer a portrait the evolution of the International criminal Court in 
regarding to the handling of sexual and gender-based crimes.  
 
6.2. Background and overview of the case 
 
The Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Case No.: ICC-01/04-01/06) was the 
first case of the International Criminal Court.1351   
 
The background of the case is the following: the Union des Patriotes Congolais 
(UPC) was formed on 15 September 2000. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a founding 
member of the UPC, was its President since the beginning. The UPC goal was 
to establish Hema dominance and control in Ituri through the use of military 
means and violence. In September 2002, Lubanga founded the Force Patriotique 
pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC) to be a military wing of the UPC. So as to 
achieve the objectives of the UPC, Lubanga (together with other UPC leaders 
and FPLC Commanders) outlined a strategy to attack the non-Hema militias, 
mainly the Lendu militia that ulteriorly appeared as the Lendu-controlled Front 
Nationaliste Integrationniste (FNI), and to make use of violence against Lendu 
civilians as well a civilian members of other ethnic groups connected with the 
Lendu in Ituri. Also, in September 2002, the UPC/ FPLC took power in Ituri and 
started large-scale military operations in Ituri, chiefly against the Lendu militia 
forces, Lendu civilians, and, following its creation in December 2002, against the 
FNI. As a consequence, an armed conflict of a non-international character took 
place in the Ituri region from September 2002 to 13 August 2003. In the course 
of the conflict, the UPC/FPLC allegedly carried out several of the crimes that were 




1350 International Criminal Court website, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04,  
1351 International Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor. Report on the activities performed 
during the first three years (June 2003 – June 2006), p. 2 (12 September 2006); International 
Criminal Court website, Case Information Sheet, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
1352 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Document Containing the Charges, Article 61(3) (a), pp. 3-7, paras. 4-5, 12-14, 19 
(28 August 2006); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. 
Trial Chamber I, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, pp. 24, 591, paras. 25, 27, 1359 
(14 March 2012). 
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In fact, in the establishment of the investigation of the Situation of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, the OTP affirmed that   
 
“States, international organizations and non-governmental 
organizations have reported thousands of deaths by mass 
murder and summary execution in the DRC since 2002. The 
reports allege a pattern of rape, torture, forced displacement and 
the illegal use of child soldiers.”1353 
 
Bearing in mind that the Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was the 
International Criminal Court´s first case/trial/verdict, there was a lot of expectation 
in relation to how the Court would conduct the case.1354    
 
Particularly, in view of the relevance given by the Rome Statute and subsequent 
documents regarding sexual and gender-based crimes, there was expectancy 
that the International Criminal Court would investigate these crimes and that they 
could be included among the charges made against Lubanga. Indeed, the Rome 
Statute furnished the International Criminal Court with the most progressive 
structure in history of sexual/ gender-based violence in international criminal law, 
and, thus, the Court has both the mandate and chance to prosecute sexual and 
gender-based crimes in those cases in which there is evidence these crimes have 
been perpetrated.1355  
 
Likewise at the outset of the investigation, in several posterior occasions the 
Prosecutor and the OTP reaffirmed that the Situation in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo comprised allegations of a multiplicity of large-scale crimes under 
the Rome Statute, inclusive of rape and other crimes of sexual violence, torture, 
conscription and use of child soldiers, forced displacement, deaths by mass 
murder and summary execution.1356 
 
It was well reported that during the operations of the UPC militia group, the 
perpetration of the crime of rape and other types of sexual-oriented crimes was 
widespread. Various sources (as, for instance, a letter from the Secretary-
General of the United Nations to the President of the Security Council dated 16 
July 2004, United States Department of State country reports for the DRC for the 
years 2003 and 2004, and reports by Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, as well as the Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice) publicly exposed 
the occurrence of these crimes. The OTP was aware of the availability of plenty 
of information, witnesses and documentation connected with sexual and gender-
 
1353 ICC website, Press Release, 23 June 2004 
1354 ICC website, Case Information Sheet, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (15 December 2017) 
1355 Inder, B. (2008), p. 3 
1356 ICC (2004). Address by Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo, Third Session of the Assembly of 
States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; United Nations, General 
Assembly. Report of the International Criminal Court, p. 10, para. 37 (1 August 2005); 
International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties. Fourth session, 28 November to 3 
December 2005, Report on the activities of the Court, p. 9, para. 53. ICC-ASP/4/16 (16 September 
2005); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Request for leave to participate as amicus curiae in the Article 61 Confirmation of 
Charges proceedings, p. 9, para. 11 (7 September 2006).                                                                                 
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based crimes carried out by the UPC/ FPLC during the 2002/ 2003 armed conflict 
in Ituri.1357 
 
However, on 12 January 2006, the Office of the Prosecutor submitted a sealed 
application for an arrest warrant against Lubanga and charged him uniquely with 
the crimes of conscripting, enlisting, and using children under fifteen years old to 
participate actively in hostilities.1358    
 
Accordingly, when the Pre-Trial Chamber I issued a Warrant of Arrest for Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo on 10 February 2006, it was solely stated that there were  
 
“reasonable grounds to believe that Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is 
criminally responsible under article 25 (3) (a) of the Statute for:  
 
(i) the war crime of enlisting children under the age of fifteen 
punishable under article 8 (2) (b) (xxvi) or article 8 (2) (e) (vii) of 
the Statute;  
 
(ii) the war crime of conscription of children under the age of 
fifteen punishable under article 8 (2) (b) (xxvi) or article 8 (2) (e) 
(vii) of the Statute; and  
 
(iii) the war crime of using children under the age of fifteen to 
participate actively in hostilities punishable under article 8 (2) (b) 
(xxvi) or article 8 (2) (e) (vii) of the Statute”.1359 
 
Certainly, no other crimes were included in the basis for the issuance of the 
Warrant of Arrest.   
 
It is noteworthy that before the issuance of the Warrant of Arrest, the Prosecution 
had informed the Pre-Trial Chamber that it was investigating further allegations 
of crimes and that it would be in a position to make its final determination in 
relation to a possible amendment of the charges by the end of the first semester 
of 2006. Certainly, the Prosecution explained that it was carrying out 
investigations in the case connected with allegations of intentional direction of 
 
1357 United Nations, Security Council. Letter dated 16 July 2004 from the Secretary-General 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, covering a "Special report on the events in 
Ituri, January 2002-December 2003" (16 July 2004); United States of America, Department of 
State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2003 (25 February 2004); United States of America, 
Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2004 (28 February 2005). Amnesty 
International (2003), pp- 3-4; Amnesty International (2004 a); Human Rights Watch (2005); Letter 
from Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice to the Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo (15 August 
2006); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Request for leave to participate as amicus curiae in the Article 61 Confirmation of 
Charges proceedings, pp. 12, 16, paras. 20 (4), 27; Letter from Women’s Initiatives for Gender 
Justice to the Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo (15 August 2006); Inder, B. (2008), pp. 15, 22                                                                                
1358 International Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor. Report on the activities performed 
during the first three years, p.12 
1359 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Warrant of Arrest, p. 4 (10 February 2006)  
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attacks against the civilian population, murders perpetrated during and after 
these attacks, the pillaging of towns and places, and ordering the displacement 
of the civilian population “inter alia” (no explicit reference was made in relation to 
an investigation into sexual and gender-based crimes in the case), and that, 
within a few months, it would determine if the evidence and information on other 
crimes constituted a basis steady enough and could justify to consider Lubanga 
criminally responsible for their commission.1360 
 
On 28 June 2006, the Prosecutor filed a document containing information on 
further investigation and stated that investigations that were being undertaken in 
relation to possible additional charges had been suspended, and that the charges 
against Lubanga would not be amended in the course of the proceedings. The 
Prosecutor explained that1361  
 
“it can reasonably be anticipated that the current limited 
possibilities to further investigate into crimes allegedly committed 
by Thomas LUBANGA DYILO will make it impossible to 
complement the collection of evidence to the extent necessary to 
amend the charges within the time frames as legally determined 
by Articles 61(4) and 61(9) of the Statute.  
 
9. In addition, the pace of the present proceedings, based on the 
current charges against Thomas LUBANGA DYILO has been 
heavily affected by the ongoing efforts of the Court to provide for 
adequate protection of victims and witnesses. In the Prosecutor's 
view, amending the charges would unavoidably add to these 
difficulties, likely to result in further significant delays that conflict 
with Thomas LUBANGA DYILO's right to be tried without undue 
delay.”1362 
 
Therefore, in spite of its knowledge of the occurrence of further crimes (including 
sexual and gender-based crimes), the OTP made limited charges in the Lubanga 
case arguing that:  
 
1-) due to then limited possibilities to investigate more into crimes which were 
allegedly perpetrated by Lubanga, it was not possible to complement the 
gathering of evidence to the extent required to amend the charges respecting the 
time frames established in Articles 61(4) and 61(9) of the Rome Statute; 
 
 
1360 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Request for leave to participate as amicus curiae in the Article 61 Confirmation of 
Charges proceedings, p. 11, para. 19; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor's Information on Further Investigation, pp. 2-
3, paras. 2-3 (28 June 2006); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecution's Submission of Further Information and Materials, 
paras. 8-15 (25 January 2006), cited in The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Prosecutor's Information on Further Investigation, p. 1 (28 June 2006) 
1361 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Prosecutor’s Information on Further Investigation, p. 4, para. 7 
1362 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Prosecutor’s Information on Further Investigation, p. 5, paras. 8-9  
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2-) the amendment of the charges would contribute to further delay the pace of 
the proceedings (which had already been heavily affected by the ICC´s  efforts to 
provide for proper protection of victims and witnesses), fact that would cause 
more relevant delays and that would be in conflict with the defendant´s rights to 
be tried without undue delay.1363 
 
In face of the Prosecutor´s decision to temporarily halt the investigation 
connected to other potential charges against Lubanga and to refrain from 
amending the charges up to the close of the pre-confirmation proceedings 
(without discarding an amendment at a posterior stage, though), the legal 
representative of 6 victims who had been granted participation in the proceedings 
(VPRS 1 to 6) tried to convince the Pre-Trial Chamber I to make use of its 
prerogatives of “propio motu” reviewing such a decision, in the terms of Article 53 
(3) (b) of the Statute.1364   
 
Such request of the victims´ legal representative came as an unfolding of the 
victims´ prerogative to participate in the proceedings, as established in Article 68 
(3) of the Statute and Rule 92 (2). These provisions conferred participatory rights 
to victims at this procedural stage so as to guarantee that the situation 
proceedings are not discharged improperly and without the victims´ concerns to 
have been taken into account.1365   
 
The legal representative of the victims argued that the Prosecutor´s resolution 
should be regarded as an unstated decision of not to prosecute based on Article 
53 (2) (c) of the Rome Statute (specifically, that the Prosecutor´s decision of not 
prosecuting the crimes that were under further investigation was based on his 
understanding that it would not be “in the interests of justice, taking into account 
all the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims 
and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged 
crime”), circumstance that would allow its revision by the Pre Trial Chamber in 
the terms of Article 53 (3) (b). Nevertheless, the Pre-trial Chamber I found that 
the Prosecutor´s decision of suspending the investigation did not subsume in the 
decision of not investigating or prosecuting in the terms laid in Article 53 (1) (c) 
and (2) (c) and, thus, dismissed the request alleging that it had no legal basis and 
was not appropriate.1366  
 
As a result, in the Document Containing the Charges of 28 August 2006, it was 
stated that Lubanga had committed:  
 
1363 Ibidem 
1364 Rome Statute, Arts. 53 (1) (c), (2) (c), (3) (b); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor’s Information on Further 
Investigation, pp. 4-5, paras. 7,10; Vasiliev, S. (2009). In Stahn, C., & Sluiter, G. (eds.), pp. 635-
690 
1365 ICC. Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecution’s Reply 
on the Applications for Participation 01/041/dp to 01/04-6/dp, pp. 4-8, paras. 14-17, 21. ICC-
01/04-84-Conf (15 August 2005); Vasiliev, S. (2009). In Stahn, C., & Sluiter, G. (eds.), pp. 635-
690 
1366 Rome Statute, Art.  53 (1) (c), (2) (c), (3) (b); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor’s Information on Further 





“Count 1: CONSCRIPTING CHILDREN INTO ARMED 
GROUPS, a WAR CRIME, punishable under Articles 8(2)(e)(vii) 
and 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute. 
 
Count 2: ENLISTING CHILDREN INTO ARMED GROUPS, a 
WAR CRIME, punishable under Articles 8(2)(e)(vii) and 25(3)(a) 
of the Rome Statute. 
 
Count 3: USING CHILDREN TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN 
HOSTILITIES, a WAR CRIME, punishable under Articles 
8(2)(e)(vii) and 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute.”1367 
 
The Confirmation Hearing took place from 9 to 28 November 2006. In accordance 
with the Rome Statute, the OTP is bound to centre its efforts on the most 
concerning crimes and the persons who bear the greatest responsibility. Several 
people in the Democratic Republic of Congo considered it unsettling the 
circumstance that the only crimes that the OTP appointed as being amidst the 
most serious perpetrated in the Ituri province were the supra mentioned ones. In 
fact, in accordance with assessments conducted in Ituri by the International 
Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), there was a degree of frustration amidst 
the Lendu community in view of the fact that Lubanga was not charged with what 
population members considered as being the relevant crimes carried out by the 
UPC (rape, torture, murder, looting and destruction of property). Surely, soon the 
media and human rights organizations expressed their indignation. It was 
expected that the OTP would include in the charges the whole (or, at least, a 
larger) range of the criminality perpetrated by the UPC/FPLC during the armed 
conflict so as to demand accountability for the most serious incidents and the 
principal forms of victimisation.1368   
 
On 29 January 2007, the Pre-Trial Chamber I in the Decision on the confirmation 
of charges, upheld that there was “sufficient evidence to establish substantial 
grounds to believe that Thomas Lubanga Dyilo” was responsible, in the condition 
of a co-perpetrator,1369 
 
“for the charges of enlisting and conscripting children under the 
age of fifteen years into the FPLC and using them to participate 
actively in hostilities within the meaning of articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) 
 
1367 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Document Containing the Charges, Article 61(3) (a), p. 24 
1368 Rome Statute, Preamble and Arts. 1, 5; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be 
applied to reparations, p.34, para. 84 (7 August 2012); International Criminal Court, The Office of 
the Prosecutor. Report on the activities performed during the first three years, pp.7-8; International 
Criminal Court website, Case Information Sheet, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo; Kambale, P. K. (2015). In De Vos, C., Kendall, 
S., & Stahn, C., (eds.), pp. 171-197 
1369 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, p. 156 (29 January 2007).  
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“for the charges of enlisting and conscripting children under the 
age of fifteen years into the FPLC and using them to participate 
actively in hostilities within the meaning of articles 8(2)(e)(vii) and 
25(3)(a) of the Statute from 2 June 2003 to 13 August 2003.” 1371 
 
Since the Prosecution´s original Document containing the charges did not reflect 
the charges that were confirmed against Lubanga by the Pre-Trial Chamber, on 
9 December 2008, the Trial Chamber I ordered the Prosecution to file an 
amended document containing the charges in the way that they had been 
confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber I. In view of that, on 23 December 2008, the 
Prosecution submitted the Amended Document Containing the Charges, Article 
61(3)(a).1372  
 
On 22 May 2009, a joint application was filed by the legal representatives of the 
victims for the implementation of the procedure under regulation 55 of the 
regulations of the Court. In the application, they requested the Trial Chamber I to 
trigger the procedure for legal re-characterisation of the facts as sexual slavery 
(Articles 7(l)(g) or 8(2)(b)(xxii) or 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute) and inhuman 
and/or cruel treatment (Articles 8(2)(a)(ii) or 8(2)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute).1373 
 
The victims` legal representatives argued that  
 
“the personal interests of the victims they represent are affected
by the application of the said regulation. Indeed, almost all of 
those victims are former child soldiers who were forcibly recruited 
into the UPC/FPLC when they were under the age of 15 years 
and were subsequently sent to training camps where they 
underwent military training. 
 
During that training, all of those victims suffered inhuman and/or 
cruel treatment.  Furthermore, the young girls were subjected to 
 
1370 Ibidem 
1371 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, p. 157 (29 January 2007).  
1372 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Order for the prosecution to file an amended document containing the charges, p. 8, para. 14 (9 
December 2008); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. 
Trial Chamber I, Amended Document Containing the Charges, Article 61(3)(a) (23 December 
2008); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the Decision 
of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009 entitled "Decision giving notice to the parties and participants 
that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 
55(2) of the Regulations of the Court, p. 4, para. 3. (8 December 2009). 
1373 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Joint Application of the Legal Representatives of the Victims for the Implementation of the 




various acts of sexual violence and were sexually enslaved. It 
follows that all of those victims have a direct and personal interest 
in seeing that the acts of sexual violence and inhuman and cruel 
treatment suffered by the UPC/FPLC recruits following their 
recruitment receive an appropriate legal characterisation under 
regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court.”1374 
 
In view of this request, on 14 July 2009, the Chamber issued a Decision giving 
notice to the parties and participants that it appeared to the majority of the 
Chamber that the legal characterisation of facts might be subject to change 
(Judge Adrian Fulford dissented).1375 
 
Indeed, Regulation 55 (on the Authority of the Chamber to modify the legal 
characterisation of facts) of the Regulations of the ICC establishes that 
 
“1. In its decision under article 74, the Chamber may change the 
legal characterisation of facts to accord with the crimes under 
articles 6, 7 or 8, or to accord with the form of participation of the 
accused under articles 25 and 28, without exceeding the facts 
and circumstances described in the charges and any 
amendments to the charges.  
 
2. If, at any time during the trial, it appears to the Chamber that 
the legal characterisation of facts may be subject to change, the 
Chamber shall give notice to the participants of such a possibility 
and having heard the evidence, shall, at an appropriate stage of 
the proceedings, give the participants the opportunity to make 
oral or written submissions. The Chamber may suspend the 
hearing to ensure that the participants have adequate time and 
facilities for effective preparation or, if necessary, it may order a 
hearing to consider all matters relevant to the proposed change. 
 
3.  For the purposes of sub-regulation 2, the Chamber shall, in 
particular, ensure that the accused shall:  
 
(a)  Have adequate time and facilities for the effective preparation 
of his or her defence in accordance with article 67, paragraph 1 
(b); and  
 
(b)  If necessary, be given the opportunity to examine again, or 
have examined again, a previous witness, to call a new witness 
or to present other evidence admissible under the Statute in 
accordance with article 67, paragraph 1 (e).”1376 
 
1374 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Joint Application of the Legal Representatives of the Victims for the Implementation of the 
Procedure under Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court, p. 5, para. 11 (22 May 2009). 
1375 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision giving notice to the parties and participants that the legal characterisation of the facts 
may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court, p. 
16, para. 35 (14 July 2009) 




The majority of the Trial Chamber I understood that 
 
“Regulation 55 sets out the powers of the Chamber in relation to 
two distinct stages. One stage is defined in Regulation 55(1) by 
referring expressly to Article 74 of the Statute which sets out the 
"Requirements for the decision", that is, the requirements for the 
Trial Chamber's final judgment. Pursuant to Article 74(2) of the 
Statute, that decision shall not exceed the facts and 
circumstances described in the charges and any amendments to 
the charges. In harmony with Article 74, Regulation 55(1) confers 
on the Chamber, in that final stage, the power to change the legal 
characterisation of facts with one express limitation: "without 
exceeding the facts and circumstances described in the charges 
and any amendments to the charges".  
 
28. On the other hand. Regulation 55(2) defines a distinct stage 
in which this subregulation operates. In contrast to Regulation 
55(1), the former applies "at any time during the trial". The power 
to change the legal characterisation of facts at this stage also has 
limitations, namely those specified in Regulation 55(2) and (3). 
However, the latter sub-regulations do not require that the 
modification is done "without exceeding the facts and 
circumstances described in the charges and any amendments to 
the charges."1377 
 
Therefore, the majority of the Trial Chamber I was of the view that the limitations 
set up in Regulation 55(1) (specifically, "without exceeding the facts and 
circumstances described in the charges and any amendments to the charges”) 
applied only to the Chamber´s final judgment, and not to the procedural moment 
at stake. Certainly, the Chamber stated that  
 
“the limitations provided in Regulation 55(1) to the "the facts and 
circumstances described in the charges" are not applicable to the 
present procedural situation, which is governed by Regulation 
55(2) and (3).”1378 
 
The Trial Chamber I was convinced by the victims´ legal representatives´ 
submissions and by the evidence heard during the trial that a change of the legal 
characterisation of facts was possible and, in accordance, issued the Decision 
giving notice to the parties and participants.1379  
 
1377 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision giving notice to the parties and participants that the legal characterisation of the facts 
may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court, p. 
14, paras. 27-28 
1378 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision giving notice to the parties and participants that the legal characterisation of the facts 
may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court, p. 
16, para. 32 
1379 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 




The fact that the Chamber understood that it would be possible to re-characterise 
the facts and circumstances described in the charges and amendments at that 
stage of the procedure meant, in practice, a chance of including of charges of 
sexual-slavery, and inhuman and/or cruel treatment in the case. 1380  
 
However, on 11 and 12 August 2009, respectively, the Defence and the 
Prosecution filed Applications for Leave to Appeal of the Decision giving notice 
to the parties and participants that it appeared to the majority of the Chamber that 
the legal characterisation of facts might be subject to change.1381  
 
On 27 August 2009, it was issued by Trial Chamber I the Clarification and further 
guidance to parties and participants in relation to the "Decision giving notice to 
the parties and participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be 
subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the 
Court".1382  
 
On 3 September 2009, the Trial Chamber I granted leave to appeal in relation to 
two questions: 
 
“Question 1  
 
Whether the Majority erred in their interpretation of Regulation 
55, namely that it contains two distinct procedures for changing 
the legal characterisation of the facts, applicable at different 
stages of the trial (with each respectively subject to separate 
conditions), and whether under Regulation 55(2) and (3) a Trial 
Chamber may change the legal characterisation of the charges 
based on facts and circumstances that, although not contained 
in the charges and any amendments thereto, build a procedural 





may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court, p. 
16, paras. 33-35 
1380 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision giving notice to the parties and participants that the legal characterisation of the facts 
may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court, p. 
16, para. 32 
1381 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber   
I, Defence Application for Leave to Appeal the Decision giving notice to the parties and 
participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in accordance 
with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court rendered on 14 July 2009 (11 August 2009); 
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the “Decision giving notice to the parties and 
participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in accordance 
with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court" (12 August 2009) 
1382 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Clarification and further guidance to parties and participants in relation to the "Decision giving 
notice to the parties and participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to 
change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court”. (27 August 2009).  
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Question 2  
 
Whether the Majority of the Chamber erred in determining that 
the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change, 
viz. to include crimes under Articles 7(l)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxvi) [sic\, 
8(2)(e)(vi), 8(2)(a)(ii) and 8(2)(c)(i) of the Statute.”1383 
 
The Defence and the Prosecution filed their documents in support of the appeal, 
on 10 and 14 September 2009, respectively.1384  
 
On 14 September 2009, victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06, a/0003/06, a/0049/06, 
a/0007/08, a/0149/08, a/0155/07, a/0156/07, a/0404/08, a/0405/08, a/0406/08, 
a/0407/08, a/0409/08, a/0149/07, a/0162/07, a/0610/08, a/0611/08 and 
a/0249/09 filed an application for participation in relation to the appeals of the 
Defence and the Prosecution. In the following day, victims a/0047/06, a/0048/06, 
a/0050/06 and a/0052/06 filed a similar application, and, on 18 September 2009, 
victims a/0051/06, a/0078/06, a/0232/06, a/0233/06 and a/0246/06 also filed an 
application with views to take part in the appeals.1385  
 
On 20 October 2009, the Appeals Chamber decided to grant these 27 victims  
 
“the right to participate in the present appeals for the purpose of 
presenting their views and concerns respecting their personal 
interests in the issues raised on appeal.”1386 
 
1383 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on the prosecution and the defence applications for leave to appeal the "Decision giving 
notice to the parties and participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to 
change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court", p. 22, para. 41 (3 
September 2009). 
1384  ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber 
I, Defence Appeal against the Decision of 14 July 2009 entitled Decision giving notice to the 
parties and participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in 
accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court (10 September 2009); 
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Prosecution's Document in Support of Appeal against the 'Decision giving notice to the 
parties and participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in 
accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court' and urgent request for 
suspensive effect (14 September 2009). 
1385 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  The Appeals 
Chamber, Application for Participation by the Legal Representatives in the Appeals Proceedings 
relating to the Decision giving notice to the parties and participants that the legal characterisation 
of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of 
the Court (14 September 2009); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/06. The Appeals Chamber, Application by the OPCV as the Legal Representative of 
Victims a/0047/06, a/0048/06, a/0050/06 and a/0052/06 to participate in the Interlocutory Appeals 
Lodged by the Prosecution and the Defence Against the Decision of 14 July 2009 (15 September 
2009); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Application for Participation from the Legal Representative of Victims a/0051/06, 
a/0078/06, a/0232/06 et a/0246/08 in the Defence and Prosecution Appeals against the Decision 
giving notice to the parties and participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be 
subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court rendered 
on 14 July 2009 (18 September 2009).  
1386 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  The Appeals 
Chamber, Decision on the participation of victims in the appeals, pp. 3-4 (21 October 2009). 
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Finally, on 8 December 2009, the Appeals Chamber understood that   
 
“Regulation 55 (2) and (3) of the Regulations of the Court may 
not be used to exceed the facts and circumstances described in 
the charges or any amendment thereto.”1387 
 
Regarding Question 1, the Appeals Chamber stated that it appeared to be a bi-
folded question, specifically, if Regulation 55 encompasses two different 
procedures, and if Regulation 55 (2) and (3) allows the1388  
 
"change of the legal characterisation of the charges based on 
facts and circumstances that, although not contained in the 
charges and any amendments thereto, build a procedural unity 
with the latter and are established by the evidence at trial.”1389 
 
However, the Appeals Chamber considered that the first question was elemental 
part of the second question and, thus, analysed both together.1390 
 
Regarding this issue, the Appeals Chamber recalled that the Trial Chamber, 
grounded on its understanding that Regulation 55 encompasses two different 
procedures which are applicable at distinct stages of the procedure, found that1391  
 
“the provision would allow it to change the legal characterisation 
"based on facts and circumstances that, although not contained 
in the charges and any amendments thereto, build a procedural 
unity with the latter and are established by the evidence at 
trial.”"1392 
 
The Appeals Chamber decided that the Trial Chamber I´s interpretation of the 
provision was incorrect since  
 
“Regulation 55 (2) and (3) may not be used to exceed the facts 




1387  ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the Decision 
of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009, p. 3, para. 1 
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the Decision 
of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009, p. 15, para. 38 
1389 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the Decision 
of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009, p. 22, para. 41 
1390 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the Decision 
of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009, p. 15, para. 38 
1391 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the Decision 





In relation to Question 2, the Appeals Chamber´s main argument was that the 
Trial Chamber I had grounded its finding that the legal characterisation of the 
facts might be subject to modification on an erroneous interpretation of 
Regulation 55. Additionally, the Appeals Chamber noted that the Trial Chamber 
I had not taken into consideration the questions that would derive from the second 
issue. The explanations of the Trial Chamber's concerning the facts and 
circumstances that it would consider for the legal re-characterisation were very 
incipient.1394 
 
As a consequence, the efforts of the Trial Chamber I to enlarge the rather narrow 
charges and include charges of sexual slavery and inhuman treatment and/or 
cruel treatment were to no avail.    
 
6.3. Lack of charges of sexual and gender-based crimes against 
Lubanga 
 
It could be argued that the Prosecutor failed to set out important charges before 
the Confirmation Hearing and before the beginning of the trial, in the terms of 
Article 61 paragraphs 4 and 9 of the Statute.1395  
 
In fact, it has been sustained that the Prosecution opted for a narrow approach 
when it charged Lubanga uniquely with the crimes of enlisting and conscripting 
children under the age of fifteen and using them to participate actively in 
hostilities.1396 
 
The restrict indictment issued by the Prosecutor against Lubanga was very 
limiting for various victims who endured the larger repercussions of the crimes of 
conscripting, enlisting and using child soldiers, as, for example, women that were 
raped by these child soldiers as well as villagers mutilated by them.1397   
 
Several human rights organisations affirmed in a joint letter sent to the Prosecutor 
on 31 July 2006 that “the failure to include additional charges in the case against 
Mr. Lubanga could undercut the credibility of the ICC in the DRC.”1398 
 
Specifically, when dealing with sexual and gender-based crimes, the OTP could 
have used two approaches: 
 
 
1394 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the Decision 
of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009, p. 39, 40, para. 109 
1395 Rome Statute, Art. 61 (4) (9); O’Connell, S. (2010), pp. 69-80  
1396 Ferstman, C. (2011). In Schabas, W. A., & Bernaz, N. (eds.), pp. 407-419; ICC. The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Request 
for leave to participate as amicus curiae in the Article 61 Confirmation of Charges proceedings, 
p.11, para. 18; Letter from Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice to the Prosecutor Luis Moreno 
Ocampo (15 August 2006); Joint Letter from Avocats Sans Frontières et al. to Chief Prosecutor 
of the International Criminal Court (31 July 2006)  
1397 Ferstman, C. (2011). In Schabas, W. A., & Bernaz, N. (eds.), pp. 407-419  
1398 Joint Letter from Avocats Sans Frontières et al. to the Chief Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court (31 July 2006) 
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1-) the fact that members of UPC/ FPLC- including the conscripted and enlisted 
child soldiers who were being used to participate actively in the hostilities- 
committed rape as a form of propagating violence during the armed conflict; 
 
2-) the circumstance that girls soldiers were victims of sexual violence, being 
subject to rape and sexual slavery by the UPC/ FPLC.  
 
Certainly, it seems that there was “substantial and available evidence” of the 
widespread practice of sexual and gender-based crimes in the Lubanga case.1399 
 
Regarding the use of rape as a weapon of war by the UPC/ FPLC, the Document 
Containing the Charges clearly stated that the child recruits had been permission 
by a commander to rape the Lendu women.  
 
Certainly, when describing individual cases (specifically, “Using REDACTED and 
other children under the age of fifteen years to actively participate in the FPLC 
attack on Lipri in February and March 2003”), the OTP affirmed that 
 
“[i]n February 2003, FPLC commander PITCHEN ordered 
REDACTED to accompany him to fight in Lipri, REDACTED. In 
compliance with the order, REDACTED followed commander 
PITCHEN and fought with him in Lipri. Prior to leaving for Lipri, 
PITCHEN told REDACTED to kill the Lendu fighters, and to 
plunder their houses. PITCHEN also told the recruits that they 
were allowed to rape the Lendu women.”1400 
 
The Prosecution relied on this information in the Document Containing the 
Charges, and, therefore, was fully aware that child soldiers who were being used 
to participate actively in hostilities by the FPLC had been given permission to 
commit the crime of rape against Lendu women.  
 
Thus, the OTP had a strong indication that members of the FPLC inclusive of 
child soldiers perpetrated rape against Lendu women during the attack on Lipri. 
It surfaces that the own child victims could have shed a light (and furnished the 
OTP with evidence during the investigation stage) on the question so as to 
establish if rapes were in fact carried out by the UPC/FPLC during the armed 
conflict. 
 
Moreover, apart from “readily-available public material documenting crimes of 
sexual violence that were committed specifically by the UPC/FPLC,” it seems it 
would have not been too burdensome for the OTP to gather specific evidence 
which is demanded at trial.1401 
 
1399 Letter from Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice to the Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo 
(15 August 2006)  
1400 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Document Containing the Charges, Article 61(3) (a), p. 17, para. 55 
1401 Letter from Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice to the Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo, 
p. 3 (15 August 2006); United Nations, Security Council; Letter dated 16 July 2004 from the 
Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council; United States of America, 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2003, Democratic Republic of the Congo, dated 25 




On 15 August 2006, the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice (a women's 
human rights organization which advocates for gender justice through the 
International Criminal Court and is committed to ensure that violence of a sexual 
character and gender-based crimes are a priority in the ICC´s investigations and 
prosecutions) sent a letter to the Prosecutor and “submitted a report to the 
Prosecutor detailing gender-based crimes committed in eastern DRC”, which 
included1402 
 
“over fifty-five (55) individual interviews with women 
victims/survivors of rape and other forms of sexualized violence 
since 1 July 2002. Of these, thirty-one (31) interviewees are 
victims/survivors specifically of acts of rape and sexual slavery 
committed by the UPC. This report is the result of two field 
missions conducted in May and July 2006 by the Women's 
Initiatives in collaboration with local activists in eastern DRC.” 1403 
 
In mentioned letter, the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice stressed that the 
perpetration of sexual and gender-based crimes had been widespread and that 
victims/survivors and witnesses of such crimes were disposed to come 
forward.1404 
  
It seems logical that if the victims/survivors of rape and sexual slavery had 
already come forward, they would have been willing to provide the OTP with 
information on the sexual crimes they suffered so as to base charges of such 
crimes against Lubanga and testify before the International Criminal Court. In 
fact, the Court had more means to protect and assist them than the Women’s 
Initiatives for Gender Justice and local activists in eastern DRC had when 
preparing their report. 
 
Therefore, the OTP could possibly have obtained evidence from those 31 
victims/survivors of acts of rape and sexual slavery carried out by the UPC, 
whose policies and practices were under the authority and ultimate control of its 
President, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.1405 
 
 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, dated 28 February 2005; Amnesty International (2003), pp. 
3-4; Amnesty International (2004 a); Human Rights Watch (2005); ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Request for leave to 
participate as amicus curiae in the Article 61 Confirmation of Charges proceedings, p. 12, para. 
20 (4)                                                                                
1402 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Request for leave to participate as amicus curiae in the Article 61 Confirmation of 
Charges proceedings, p. 15, paras. 26, 27; Letter from Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice to 
the Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo (15 August 2006)  
1403 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Request for leave to participate as amicus curiae in the Article 61 Confirmation of 
Charges proceedings, p.16, para. 2  
1404 Letter from Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice to the Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo, 
p. 4 (15 August 2006); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Warrant of Arrest, p. 4 
1405 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Warrant of Arrest, p. 4 (10 February 2006) 
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As a result, the OTP could have ascertained with both the presumed perpetrators 
of rapes (children who were victims of enlistment, conscription, and use by the 
UPC/FPLC militia) and with alleged victims (women interviewed in the Women’s 
Initiatives for Gender Justice`s report) whether rapes were committed by the 
UPC/FPLC the course of the attacks in the Ituri region.  
 
Certainly, despite the Prosecution´s allegations that it was not possible to 
complement the gathering of evidence to the level demanded to amend the 
charges within the time frames established in Articles 61(4) and 61(9) of Statute, 
apparently the obtainment of the necessary evidence on the perpetration of rape 
by the UPC/FPLC so as to charge Lubanga with sexual crimes would be neither 
very cumbersome nor too time consuming.  
 
On what concerns the sexual abuse of girls soldiers, it is well known that the 
crimes of enlisting and conscripting children into armed forces is entwined with 
the crimes of sexual slavery.1406    
 
Indeed, sexual slavery is one of the major consequences of the forced 
recruitment of girls into armed forces, or even its main objective, as several 
witnesses testified before the Court. Such concept is also defended by several 
international texts and by international organizations, inclusive of the United 
Nations and the African Union.1407  
 
Girls who are recruited into armed militias perform various roles in these groups, 
as, for instance, combatant, sexual slave, domestic help, cook, porter, body 
guard. The diversity of roles is recognised by numerous international 
documents.1408   
 
For example, the 1997 Cape Town Principles defines “child soldier” as 
 
“any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of 
regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, 
including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and 
anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. 
The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for 
 
1406 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Observations from the Legal Representatives of the Victims in response to the 
documents filed by the Prosecution and the Defence in support of their appeals against the 
Decision of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009, p. 11-12, para. 30 (23 October 2009); ICC. The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals Chamber, 
Judgment on the appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the Decision of Trial 
Chamber I of 14 July 2009, p. 23, para. 59 
1407Ibidem; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The 
Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the 
Decision of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009, p. 23, paras. 59-60 
1408 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Joint Application of the Legal Representatives of the Victims for the Implementation of the 
Procedure under Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court, p. 12, paragraph 26; UNICEF. 
Cape Town Principles and Best Practices on the Recruitment of Children into the Armed Forces 
and on Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa (30 April 1997); 
UNICEF. The Paris Principles, Principle 2.1 
281 
 
forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who 
is carrying or has carried arms.”1409  
 
Along the same lines, the 2007 Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children 
Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups establishes that “a child 
associated with an armed force or armed group” refers to 
 
“any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been 
recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any 
capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used 
as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual 
purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has 
taken a direct part in hostilities.”1410 
 
Moreover, the United Nations provided in its Operational Guide to the Integrated 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards that  
 
“[n]o distinction should be made between combatants and 
noncombatants when eligibility criteria are determined, as these 
roles are blurred in armed forces and groups, where children, and 
girls in particular, perform numerous combat support and 
non-combat roles that are essential to the functioning of the 
armed force or group.”1411 
 
In addition, in her Written Submissions regarding the application of Rule 103 of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the United Nations Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict (Radhika 
Coomaraswamy) asserted that  
 
“[t]he Court should deliberately include any sexual acts 
perpetrated, in particular against girls, within its understanding of 
the "using" crime. […] during war, the use of girl children in 
particular includes sexual violence”1412 
 
and, after quoting the 2004 African Union's Solemn Declaration on Gender 
Equality (where it had been agreed to “[l]aunch, within the next one year, a 
campaign for systematic prohibition of the recruitment of child soldiers and abuse 
of girl children as wives and sex slaves"), she stated that this Declaration 
“reiterated its disdain of the illicit sexual abuse conduct inflicted upon girl children 
when they are child soldiers.”1413  
 
1409 UNICEF. Cape Town Principles and Best Practices on the Recruitment of Children into the 
Armed Forces and on Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa 
1410 UNICEF. The Paris Principles, Principle 2.1 
1411United Nations. Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration Standards, p. 230 (2014).  
1412 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Written Submissions of the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 
Children and Armed Conflict Submitted in application of Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, para. 23. ICC-01/04-01/06-1229-AnxA (17 March 2008). 
1413 African Union's Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality (6-8 July 2004); The Prosecutor v. 




Further, the United Nations expressly recognised that the recruitment of girls 
into armed groups is mainly motivated by sexual purposes by stating:1414 
 
“[r]ecruitment often takes different forms for boys and girls: boys 
are used in combat and other military activities, whereas girls are 
more frequently used for sexual slavery and forced labour.”1415 
 
The Secretary‐General on Children and Armed Conflict affirmed in a 2000 
Report that  
 
“[t]here is still little awareness of the extreme suffering that armed 
conflict inflicts on girls or the many roles girls are often forced to 
play during conflict and long after. Girls are often abducted for 
sexual and other purposes by armed groups and forces. They 
face a variety of threats, including rape and forced prostitution. 
The work of the Special Rapporteur on systematic rape, sexual 
slavery and slavery like practices during armed conflict and that 
of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women have 
drawn attention to the human rights violations, including sexual 
slavery, which are perpetrated against women and girls in times 
of armed conflict.”1416  
 
It was also observed that the practice of exploiting girls as sexual slaves or 
"wives" is similar to the practice of serfdom, which is forbidden by Article 1 (b) of 
the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, 
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery.1417 
 
Consequently, by the time of the investigation of facts connected with the 
Lubanga case by the OTP, there were plenty of international instruments 
defending the idea that the recruitment or use of girls by an armed force is 
motivated by, and implicates the sexual abuse of these girls.1418 
 
United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict 
Conflict Submitted in application of Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, para. 23 
1414 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Joint Application of the Legal Representatives of the Victims for the Implementation of the 
Procedure under Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court, p.15, para. 31 
1415 United Nations, High Commissioner for Refugees. Sexual and Gender‐Based Violence 
against Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons. Guidelines for Prevention and 
Response, p. 73 (May 2003) 
1416 United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council. Children and armed conflict, 
Report of the Secretary-General, p. 13, para. 34 (19 July 2000). 
1417 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Observations from the Legal Representatives of the Victims in response to the 
documents filed by the Prosecution and the Defence in support of their appeals against the 
Decision of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009, pp. 11-12, para. 30; Supplementary Convention on 
the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery , Art. 
1 (b). 
1418 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Observations from the Legal Representatives of the Victims in response to the 
documents filed by the Prosecution and the Defence in support of their appeals against the 




The Trial Chamber clarified in the Judgment pursuant Article 74 of the Statute 
dated 14 March 2012 that a total of 129 individual victims (34 female and 95 male) 
were authorised by the ICC to participate in the proceedings.1419 
 
Whilst all the victims asserted that they had suffered harm as a consequence of 
the enlistment or conscription of children under the age of 15, or of being used to 
participate actively in the hostilities, many also affirmed they had suffered harm 
as a consequence of other crimes, as, for example, torture or other forms of ill 
treatment and sexual violence, which were not the included in the charges against 
Lubanga.1420         
 
Precisely, out of the 129 victims, “30 victims (18 female and 12 male) referred to 
acts of sexual violence which they either suffered or witnessed.” 1421 
 
Therefore, there were 30 victims who were granted participation in the 
proceedings either suffered or witnessed of sexual violence. The personal 
interests of these victims had already been affected by the proceedings and, 
accordingly, they had no reason to refuse to cooperate with the OTP to gather 
evidence to charge Lubanga with sexual and gender-related crimes, quite the 
opposite.1422 
 
For instance, child victim a/0050/06, who was granted participation in the 
proceedings and was enlisted as a witness for the Prosecution, affirmed that had 
suffered several acts of sexual violence by the UPC. This child victim (that was 
trusted by the Prosecution to the point of enlisting him/her as its witness) most 
certainly would have provided the Prosecution with evidence on acts of sexual 
violence he/she endured as a UPC/FPLC recruit and contributed to enable the 
charging of Lubanga with sexual/ gender crimes.1423    
 
 
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the Decision 
of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009, p. 23, para. 60 
1419 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Trial Chamber 
I, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, pp.19-20, paras. 15-16 
1420 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Trial Chamber 
I, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, pp. 19-20, paragraph 16 
1421 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Trial Chamber 
I, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 20, footnote 54 
1422 Rome Statute, Art. 68 (3) 
1423 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on the supplementary information relevant to the applications of 21 victims. ICC-01/04-
01/06-2063 (21 July 2009); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06. Trial Chamber I, Joint Application of the Legal Representatives of the Victims for the 
Implementation of the Procedure under Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court; ICC. The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals Chamber, 
Application by the OPCV as the Legal Representative of Victims a/0047/06, a/0048/06, a/0050/06 
and a/0052/06 to participate in the Interlocutory Appeals Lodged by the Prosecution and the 
Defence Against the Decision of 14 July 2009, p. 9, paras. 25-26; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of 
Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the Decision of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009, 
pp. 12-13, para. 30. 
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Further, the supposition that victims participating in the proceedings could have 
furnished the Prosecution with such evidence is supported by the fact that, in face 
of the absence of charges of sexual and gender-based crimes against Lubanga, 
the representatives of the victims (channelling the latter´s insatisfaction with the 
limited charges and willingness to see Lubanga held accountable for sexual 
criminal offences) applied for the legal re-characterisation of the facts as sexual 
slavery and inhuman and/or cruel treatment.1424 
 
As laid in Article 61 (9) of the Rome Statute, even after the confirmation of the 
charges, but still in the Pre-trial stage, the Prosecutor could have amended the 
charges. He could have explored the fact that the impact of the crimes of 
enlistment, conscription and use of child soldiers can be even more cruel on girls 
since in these circumstances they usually also finish being oppressed by sexual 
and gender-based crimes, and, accordingly, charged Lubanga with these 
crimes.1425  
 
However, the Prosecution did not include  
 
“the use of girl soldiers as sexual slaves together with the 
resulting unwanted pregnancies … in the facts and 
circumstances described in the charges as confirmed in the 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges”1426  
 
and the Trial Chamber I ensured that its Judgment did not exceed the facts and 
circumstances described in the charges.1427  
 
Certainly, Trial Chamber I affirmed in its 14 March 2012 verdict that 
 
“[i]t is to be noted that although the prosecution referred to sexual 
violence in its opening and closing submissions, it has not 
requested any relevant amendment to the charges. During the 
trial the legal representatives of victims requested the Chamber 
to include this conduct in its consideration of the charges, and 
their joint request led to Decisions on the issue by the Trial 
Chamber and the Appeals Chamber (viz. whether it was 
permissible the change the legal characterisation of the facts to 
include crimes associated with sexual violence). Not only did the 
prosecution fail to apply to include rape and sexual enslavement 
at the relevant procedural stages, in essence it opposed this 
step. It submitted that it would cause unfairness to the accused 
if he was tried and convicted on this basis.  
 
 
1424 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Joint Application of the Legal Representatives of the Victims for the Implementation of the 
Procedure under Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court 
1425 Charlesworth, H. (1999), pp. 385-394; Askin, K. D. (2003), pp. 288-349; Cahn, N. R. (2004), 
pp. 1-66 
1426 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Trial Chamber 




630. In accordance with the jurisprudence of the Appeals 
Chamber, the Trial Chamber’s Article 74 Decision shall not 
exceed the facts and circumstances (i.e. the factual allegations) 
described in the charges and any amendments to them. The Trial 
Chamber has earlier pointed out that “[f]actual allegations 
potentially supporting sexual slavery are simply not referred to at 
any stage in the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges”. 
Regardless of whether sexual violence may properly be included 
within the scope of “using [children under the age of 15] to 
participate actively in hostilities” as a matter of law, because facts 
relating to sexual violence were not included in the Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges, it would be impermissible for the 
Chamber to base its Decision pursuant to Article 74(2) on the 
evidence introduced during the trial that is relevant to this 
issue.”1428   
 
Undoubtedly,  in its Application for Leave to Appeal the “Decision giving notice to 
the parties and participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be 
subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the 
Court”, the  Prosecution sustained that the understanding of the majority of Trial 
Chamber I that it was authorised by Regulation 55(2) and (3) to add or change 
charges that go beyond the facts and circumstances described in the Document 
Containing the Charges had adverse consequences: 
 
“[t]his issue significantly affects the fairness of the proceeding.  It 
determines that the Accused may be tried and convicted on 
criminal charges based on facts that were not presented in the 
charging document or considered by the Pre-Trial Chamber at 
the confirmation hearing.  The principle that a judgment may not 
extend beyond the factual parameters of the charges is a 
fundamental aspect of the fairness of the legal process. The 
Statute reflects this, with Article 74(2) clearly stating that “[t]he 
Trial Chamber’s decision [….] shall not exceed the facts and 
circumstances described in the charges and any amendments to 
the charges” – a provision which has been described as 
“important, though perfectly classic”. Regardless of whether the 
Majority decision is ultimately judged to be correct or incorrect, 
the issue affects the rights and obligations of the Prosecution, the 
Defence, the victims, and the witnesses alike.    
 
23. The parties and all other participants have been preparing for 
trial, and the trial is half-way completed, based on the facts set 
out in the charges the Prosecution filed three years ago and the 
Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed. But with the Majority’s Decision, 
the parties and participants may not yet know the factual 
 
1428 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, pp. 286-288, paras. 629-631, and footnote 58 
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parameters of the case. Such uncertainty impacts on their ability 
to effectively prepare for the rest of the trial.”1429 
 
In spite of that, later in proceedings, the Prosecution sustained that the 
UPC/FPCL both sexually abused of girls soldiers and instigated child soldiers to 
commit rape during the hostilities, under the penalty of severe punishment.  
Certainly, the Prosecution included the sexual violence issue in both its opening 
and closing submissions.1430   
 
In its Closing Brief, the Prosecution, when addressing the use of girl child soldiers 
in the UPC/FPLC, stated that 10 witnesses had affirmed that girls soldiers had 
several distinct tasks, such as serving as bodyguards, doing household chores, 
keeping the commanders´ property while they went into war, carrying their bags, 
and participating of combat. Six of these witnesses specifically testified that the 
girls soldiers were also used to provide sexual services to UPC/FPLC 
commanders, raped, abused and taken by the commanders as “wives”. One 
witness had served as bodyguard to a determined commander and confirmed 
that she had been taken as one of his wives.1431 
 
Therefore, during the trial proceedings, the Prosecution recognised that there 
was extensive evidence demonstrating that girls soldiers were sexually abused.   
 
Along the same lines, the Prosecution affirmed that  
 
“[i]t was at these camps that the children first experienced the full 
reality and harshness of military life. They were ill fed, beaten, 
whipped, imprisoned, and young girls were raped. They were 
encouraged to drink alcohol and take drugs, and were regularly 
intoxicated.”1432 
 
Still in the same document the Prosecution acknowledged that the child soldiers 
were commanded to commit rape when participating of combats by saying that:  
 
“[d]uring battles, they were incited to pillage and to steal money 
from the population and sometimes to rape. If they refused, they 
were killed or beaten.”1433 
 
 
1429 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the “Decision giving notice to the parties and 
participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in accordance 
with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court", pp. 8-9, paras. 22-23 
1430 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Trial Chamber 
I, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, pp. 286-288, paras. 629-631, and footnote 58 
1431 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Prosecution’s Closing Brief, pp. 95-97, paras. 227-234. (1 June 2011); ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, Witness DRC-OPT-
WWWW-0008, pp. 20-22, 78-79 (27 February 2009)                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
1432 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Prosecution’s Closing Brief, p. 11, para. 18 
1433 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Prosecution’s Closing Brief, p. 87, para. 211 
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Moreover, in its closing statement, the Prosecution in an attempt to draw the 
dimensions of the cruelty exerted by the UPC/FPLC said that 
 
“[t]hose children were trained in about 20 camps around Ituri, a 
territory bigger than the Netherlands. They were used to fight in 
conflicts. They were used to kill, rape, and pillage throughout the 
12‐month period of these charges.”1434 
 
Therefore, the Prosecution unquestionably recognised that the UPC/FPLC 
members perpetrated sexual crimes against girls soldiers and ordered child 
soldiers to carry our rapes when participating of the armed conflicts.  
 
In view of the amount of evidence on sexual and gender violence which was 
produced during the trial, it is hard to conceive that if the Prosecution had strived, 
it would not have been able to collect enough information up to the beginning of 
the trial so as to amend the charges and prosecute Lubanga for sexual and 
gender-based crimes.  
 
All and all, it seems hardly justifiable that the Prosecutor did not charge Lubanga 
with sexual and gender-based crimes. This lack of charges could be regarded as 
a failure. 
 
Certainly, victims, several ONG and institutions on favour of women´s rights were 
disappointed with the lack of charges and impossibility of rendering Lubanga 
responsible for the sexual crimes perpetrated during the armed conflict in Ituri 
province.1435 
 
Such was the level of dissatisfaction that, in the Launch of the Gender Report 
Card on the International Criminal Court 2011, the Prosecutor (after affirming that, 
in the course of the trial of the Lubanga case, the OTP had “explained the gender 
dimension of the crime of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 15 
years”) asserted that  
 
“[t]he office took note of the reactions of civil society and their 
preference for these aspects to be explicitly charged.”1436 
 
It was expected that the practice of the ICC would give priority to sexual and 
gender-based crimes, in view of new parameters established by Rome Statute in 
relation to these criminal offences. The feeling was that the International Criminal 
Court had not honoured the Rome Statute and its provisions on gender and 
sexual-natured crimes.1437  
 
1434 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Office of the Prosecutors Closing Statements (Open Session), p. 4 (25 August 2011)  
1435 Statement by the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice on the Arrest of Germain Katanga; 
Pia-Comella, J. (2013). Talking points for panel presentation, Prosecuting gender-based crimes 
before the ICC, p.3.  
1436 ICC, the Office of the Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda. Launch of the Gender Report Card on the 
International Criminal Court 2011, p.3. (13 December 2011) 




Being the ICC´s inaugural case, the efficiency of the Court was under scrutiny 
and its credibility was tarnished to some extent. Undoubtedly, it was deemed that 
there was a gap between the International Criminal Court´s aspirations and its 
actual accomplishments, circumstance that was detrimental to its legitimacy.1438 
 
6.4. The factors that drew the OTP to solely charge Lubanga with 
the crimes of enlistment, conscription and use of child soldiers 
 
As supra mentioned, in the Prosecutor's Information on Further Investigation 
dated 28 June 2006, it was stated that it was not possible to complement the 
gathering of evidence to the extent required to amend the charges respecting the 
time frames established in Articles 61(4) and 61(9) of the Rome Statute in face 
of limited possibilities to investigate more into crimes which were allegedly 
perpetrated by Lubanga. The Prosecutor argued as well that the amendment of 
the charges would contribute to further delay the pace of the proceedings, 
circumstance that would cause more relevant delays and be in conflict with the 
accused´s rights to be tried without undue delay.1439 
 
When the Prosecutor put forward these arguments to justify the fact that the 
Prosecution would not be making more charges against Lubanga, he seemed to 
admit that the decision to try Lubanga on the charges of “conscripting or enlisting 
children under the age of fifteen years” into the FPLC and using them to 
“participate actively in hostilities” was not specially grounded on the seriousness 
of such crimes but instead on which crimes the investigators were able to rapidly 
collect evidence so as to guarantee a warrant arrest against the accused.1440  
 
Also, the OTP asserted that one of the challenges it faced was how to carry out 
investigations into situations of continuous violence  
 
“where even travelling to the areas in question may be 
impossible, or where the territory suffers from a collapse of 
functioning institutions,”1441  
 
thus, entailing remarkable logistical difficulties. In order to address such 
challenge, the Office adopted two critical measures- to decrease the length and 
the amplitude of the investigation, and, accordingly, requested a warrant arrest 
against Lubanga after 18 months of investigations.1442  
 
Green, L. (2011). First-Class Crimes, Second-Class Justice: Cumulative Charges for Gender-
Based Crimes at the International Criminal Court. International Criminal Law Review, 11 (3), pp. 
529-541; O’Connell, S. (2010), pp. 69-80 
1438 Kambale, P. K. (2015). In De Vos, C., Kendall, S., & Stahn, C., (eds.), pp. 171-197; Damaska, 
M. R. (2009), pp. 19-35. 
1439 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Prosecutor’s Information on Further Investigation, p.5, paras. 8-9  
1440 Kambale, P. K. (2015). In De Vos, C., Kendall, S., & Stahn, C., (eds.), pp. 171-197; ICC. The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Prosecutor’s Information on Further Investigation, p. 4, para. 7 
1441 International Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor. Report on the activities performed 
during the first three years, p. 7 
1442 International Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor. Report on the activities performed 




In this regard, it is necessary to highlight that the impending release of Lubanga 
(who had been under arrest in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since March 
2005) weighed on the Prosecutor´s decision to concentrate on the crimes of 
conscripting, enlisting, and using children under fifteen years old to actively 
participate in hostilities.1443  
 
The OTP explained that 
 
“[i]n the situation in the DRC, the Office initially investigated a 
wide range of crimes allegedly committed, seeking to represent 
the broad range of criminality. The Office subsequently decided 
in its first case to focus on the crime of enlisting and conscripting 
children under the age of 15 and using them to participate 
actively in hostilities. The decision to focus on this crime was 
triggered by the possible imminent release of Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, who had been under arrest in the DRC for approximately 
one year before he was transferred to the Court.  Therefore, after 
careful consideration of the evidence gathered, including linkage 
of the accused to the crime and in accordance with the 
requirement to prove charges beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
Office decided to limit the charges to those mentioned above.”1444 
 
Certainly, the possible imminent release of Lubanga acted as a catalyst element 
in the decision regarding the timing and the scope of charges. Since March 2005, 
Lubanga and leaders of other militias had been under arrest in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo in answer to the murder of UN peacekeepers on 25 
February 2005. The Human Rights Watch criticised the military proceedings of 
the DRC mainly because there were no charges against them. Lubanga´s 
detention was renewed every month by the military prosecutor. In accordance 
with DRC law, following 12 successive months of detention (specifically, on 19 
March 2006, in Lubanga´s case), a military judge must confirm the detention. 
Even though there was no information regarding the intentions of the competent 
military judge, it was plausible that Lubanga could be released on 19 March 2006 
for there was no information linking the latter with the attack against the UN 
peacekeepers. Consequently,1445   
 
“after careful consideration of the evidence gathered, including 
linkage of the accused to the crime and in accordance with the 
requirement to prove charges beyond a reasonable doubt,” 1446   
 
 
1443 International Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor. Report on the activities performed 
during the first three years, pp.2-3 
1444 International Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor. Report on the activities performed 
during the first three years, p. 8 
1445 International Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor. Report on the activities performed 
during the first three years, pp. 12-13 
1446 International Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor. Report on the activities performed 
during the first three years, p. 8 
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the OTP resolved to request for an arrest warrant against Lubanga with basis on 
the crimes of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen years 
and using them to participate actively in hostilities.1447   
 
It does not rest clear, though, if the OTP´s renounce to the persecution of further 
crimes that were under investigation was down to the fact that such crimes did 
not reach the material threshold to be prosecuted or if it was merely a decision of 
criminal politics in view of the circumstance that these crimes did not meet the 
interest of justice threshold.1448   
 
Based on the Prosecutor's Information on Further Investigation dated 28 June 
2006, it could be said that both factors played an important role in the decision.  
 
Thus, it could be sustained that the Prosecution´s renounce was to some extent 
incongruent with the then prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo´s assertion:1449  
 
“As the Prosecutor of the ICC, I was given a clear judicial 
mandate. My duty is to apply the law without political 
considerations.”1450 
 
So that the renounce could be based on Article 17 of the Rome Statute, 
mentioned crimes should have been tried by the Democratic Republic of Congo´s 
justice.1451 
 
Another issue was that the OTP´s independent investigations were regarded as 
secondary part in the gathering of evidence. On the one hand, it is a further 
evidence that the OTP employed a1452 
 
“prosecutorial strategy that prioritised political expedience over 
thorough investigation … frustrating a fuller accounting of the full 
scope of the DRC conflict.”1453  
 
On the other hand, it indicates the hardships of working in situations of conflict 






1447 International Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor. Report on the activities performed 
during the first three years, pp. 8, 12-13 
1448 Galain Palermo, P. (2014). In Ambos, K., Malarino, E., & Steiner, C. (eds.), pp. 389-430 
1449 Ibidem 
1450 Moreno‐Ocampo, L. M. (2009). Building a Future on Peace and Justice: The International 
Criminal Court. In Ambos, K., Large, J., & Wierda, M. (eds.). Building a Future on Peace and 
Justice: Studies on Transitional Justice, Peace and Development- The Nuremberg Declaration 
on Peace and Justice, pp. 9-13. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. 
1451 Rome Statute, Art.17; Galain Palermo, P. (2014). In Ambos, K., Malarino, E., & Steiner, C. 
(eds.), pp. 389-430, footnote 4 
1452 Stuart, H. V. (2008), pp. 409-417; O’Connell, S. (2010), pp. 69-80 
1453 Kambale, P. K. (2015). In De Vos, C., Kendall, S., & Stahn, C., (eds.), pp. 171-197 
1454 International Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor. Report on the activities performed 
during the first three years, p.7; O’Connell, S. (2010), pp. 69-80 
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Surely, being Lubanga the first case of the ICC, the OTP   
 
“had to learn how to: approach the possible witnesses without 
exposing them; identify safe sites for interviews; secure discreet 
transportation for investigators and witnesses; provide for the 
contingency of moving witnesses to safe locations without 
attracting attention; and even check the relationships of drivers 
and hotel owners with the suspects. In addition, the Office had to 
communicate effectively with witnesses in different languages, 
some of which have no corresponding words for the legal 
terminology required for the interview.  In Northern Uganda there 
are four local languages, … in Ituri district of the DRC there are 
three … Because there are few qualified professional translators, 
finding persons with the appropriate skills and background 
required exceptional efforts. Conditions on the ground for 
investigators are usually quite difficult, with poor facilities; in 
some cases 90% of the Officeʹs investigators returned from their 
missions with illnesses.”1455   
 
Additionally, the OTP failed to set up contacts and bring about closeness with 
women and other local groups in order to permit the follow up of evidence. The 
establishment of networks is of primordial relevance for the OTP. Surely, when 
compared to a domestic prosecuting authority, the investigative process of the 
OTP is more arduous since the latter does not dispose of unburdened access to 
witnesses and evidence and depends on the co-operation of States.1456  
 
In what concerns sexual and gender-based crimes, it must be born in mind that 
the specificities and particularities of this type of crimes constitute a disadvantage 
for their inclusion in the charges.1457 
 
In this sense, Askin affirmed that 
 
“[s]ex crimes are undoubtedly some of the most difficult to 
investigate and prosecute. Because there is reluctance from all 
sides, the tendency to ignore sex- and gender-based crimes. The 
crimes are intensely personal, the injuries often less visible, and 
the details provoke discomfort and aversion. But the alternative 
is silence, impunity and grave injustice.”1458 
 
The drafters of the Rome Statute, aware that the investigation and prosecution of 
sexual violence and gender violence crimes is burdened by the very nature of 
these crimes, established in Article 54 (1) (b) that the Prosecutor should take that 
 
1455 International Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor. Report on the activities performed 
during the first three years, p. 7 
1456 International Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor. Report on the activities performed 
during the first three years, p. 5; O’Connell, S. (2010), pp. 69-80; ICC, OTP, Fatou Bensouda, 
Launch of the Gender Report Card on the International Criminal Court 2011, p.4 
1457  Instituto de Estudios sobre Conflictos y Acción Humanitária (2012). Fatou Bensouda y su 
visión de los crímenes de violencia sexual. 
1458 Askin, K. D., (2003) 
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into account and adopt pertinent measures to guarantee the effective 
investigation and prosecution of such crimes.1459   
 
Also, so as to avoid that the demand of a more specific approach and in depth 
knowledge could constitute a barrier for the investigation and prosecution of 
sexual and gender-based crimes, the Rome Statute equipped the International 
Criminal Court and the OPT with the necessary human and procedural tools to 
be able to investigate and prosecute sexual and gender-based crimes.1460   
 
In the terms of Article 42 (9) of the Statute, the Prosecutor is bound to appoint 
advisers with legal expertise on sexual and gender violence. However, at the time 
of the investigation of the Lubanga case, the Prosecutor had not appointed a 
Gender Legal Adviser yet. Undoubtedly, only on 26 November 2008 Professor 
Catharine MacKinnon was appointed as Special Adviser on Gender Issues to the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. The deficiency of gender expertise 
in handling the investigations into gender-based crimes was an element that 
hampered the charging to sexual and gender-based crimes in the Lubanga 
case.1461 
 
The elements exposed above had a deterrent effect in the inclusion of further 
charges against Lubanga “lato sensu” and prevented the incorporation of sexual 
and gender-based crimes among the charges “stricto sensu”. 
 
As previously stressed, the Prosecution´s unilateral decision of not pursuing to 
charge Lubanga with sexual and gender-based crimes caused the repudiation of 
the victims and of large part of the international community involved in gender 
issues.1462 
 
6.5. The approach of the Trial Chamber I and the Appeals Chamber 
in relation to sexual and gender-based crimes in the Lubanga Case  
 
As previously indicated, the former Prosecutor failed to include sexual violence 
or sexual slavery in the original charges and did not request their inclusion at 
posterior stages of the proceedings either. Additionally, he forcibly objected the 
inclusion of charges of rape and sexual slavery during the trial by submitting that 
it would be unfair to the defendant if he was convicted on such grounds.1463 
 
Notwithstanding that, Luis Moreno Ocampo 
 
“advanced extensive submissions as regards sexual violence in 
his opening and closing submissions at trial, and in his 
 
1459 Rome Statute, Art. 54 (1) (b) 
1460 Rome Statute, Art. 42 (9), 54 (1) (b), 68 (1) (2) 
1461 Rome Statute, Art.42 (9); ICC, OTP, Fatou Bensouda, Launch of the Gender Report Card on 
the International Criminal Court 2011, pp. 2-3; O’Connell, S. (2010), pp. 69-80 
1462 Galain Palermo, P. (2014). In Ambos, K., Malarino, E., & Steiner, C. (eds.), pp. 389-430, 
footnote 4 
1463 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, p. 24, para .60 (10 July 2012) 
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arguments on sentence he contended that sexual violence is an 
aggravating factor that should be reflected by the Chamber.”1464  
 
Therefore, despite his previous posture towards the sexual violence issue 
throughout the proceedings, he submitted that sexual violence ought to be taken 
into account for the purposes of sentencing. Such attitude was strongly 
deprecated by the Trial Chamber I.1465 
 
In this sense, the Prosecution submitted that 
 
“although the Chamber did not base its Article 74(2) decision on 
evidence relating to sexual violence and rape, the evidence of 
the witnesses on this issue was credible and reliable and it may 
"assist as regards sentence". 
 
On this basis, the prosecution submits that the sexual violence 
and rape to which some girl soldiers were subjected 
demonstrates that the crimes of conscription, enlistment and use 
of children were committed with marked cruelty, and they were 
directed at victims who were particularly defenceless, within the 
meaning of Rule 145(2)(b)(iii) of the Rules. 
 
62. The prosecution argues that the evidence supports the 
conclusion that sexual violence was routinely inflicted upon 
female child soldiers by the UPC/FPLC trainers and 
commanders, and that the evidence of sexual violence and rape 
should be treated as an aggravating factor for the purposes of 
sentencing. It is submitted that this would not be prejudicial to the 
convicted person as the defence was on notice of this evidence 
and the accused cross-examined witnesses on this material 
during the trial.”1466 
 
The Trial Chamber I found itself in a thorny situation in face of the abundant 
evidence that rape and sexual enslavement had been perpetrated.  
 
As already stated, the Chamber could not judge Lubanga for these crimes in its 
verdict of 14 March 2012. Indeed, the boundaries of the judgment were 
circumscribed to the facts and circumstances outlined in the charges, and sexual 
and gender-based crimes were not incorporated therein.1467    
 
As a response to the sexual violence issue, Trial Chamber I affirmed that in due 
course it would “consider whether these matters ought to be taken into account 




1466 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, pp. 24-25, paras. 61-62 (10 July 2012) 
1467 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Trial Chamber 
I, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 27, para. 26  
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Subsequently, in its sentence issued on 10 July 2012, the Trial Chamber I 
affirmed that 
 
“[t]he prosecution's failure to charge Mr Lubanga with rape and 
other forms of sexual violence as separate crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court is not determinative of the question of 
whether that activity is a relevant factor in the determination of 
the sentence. The Chamber is entitled to consider sexual 
violence under Rule 145(l)(c) of the Rules as part of: (i) the harm 
suffered by the victims; (ii) the nature of the unlawful behaviour; 
and (iii) the circumstances of manner in which the crime was 
committed; additionally, this can be considered under Rule 
145(2)(b)(iv) as showing the crime was committed with particular 
cruelty.  
 
68. For the reasons set out above in the section establishing the 
procedure to be adopted at this stage, the Chamber is entitled to 
consider sexual violence in determining the sentence that is to 
be passed, notwithstanding the fact that it did not form part of the 
Confirmation Decision. Given the procedural safeguards, there 
will be no consequential unfairness if the Chamber decides that 
sexual violence is a relevant factor.  
 
69. However, that said, it remains necessary for the Chamber to 
be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that: (i) child soldiers under 
15 were subjected to sexual violence; and (ii) this can be 
attributed to Mr Lubanga in a manner that reflects his culpability, 
pursuant to Rule 145(1 )(a) of the Rules.” 1469 
 
Consequently, so that the sexual and gender-based crimes could be included as 
an aggravating factor and, hence, be taken into account for the purposes of 
sentencing, the Prosecution had to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. Such 
requirement is down to the circumstance that aggravating factors entail an 
increase in the defendant´s penalty.1470 
 
It is important to mention that in a Dissenting Opinion issued by judge Anita 
Ušacka in the Appeal of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his conviction, she 
affirmed that 
 
“Article 66 (3) of the Statute provides that “[…] to convict the 
accused, the Court must be convinced of the guilt of the accused 
beyond reasonable doubt” (emphasis added). This evidentiary 
standard is the highest one within the Court’s legal framework, 
and I understand it to mean that “conviction should not occur 
unless all reasonable hypotheses based on the evidence 
presented indicate guilt”. This standard applies not only to the 
 
1469 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, pp. 26-27, paras. 67-69 
1470 Dondé Matute, J. (2014). In Ambos, K., Malarino, E., & Steiner, C. (eds.), pp. 305-327  
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ultimate question of guilt, but also to the fact-finding stage, 
specifically to the facts necessary to establish the elements of 
the crimes charged.”1471  
 
And continued saying 
 
“as expressly stated in article 66 (2) of the Statute, this means 
that it is for the Prosecutor to prove before the Court that the 
accused is guilty to the standard of beyond reasonable doubt. A 
logical consequence of this onus is that it is for the Prosecutor to 
adduce sufficient evidence underpinning her case that she is 
convinced will have a chance of successfully proving the guilt of 
the accused.”1472 
 
Likewise, in the Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo case, the Trial Chamber II 
clarified that  
 
“the fact that an allegation is not, in its view, proven beyond 
reasonable doubt does not necessarily mean that the Chamber 
questions the very existence of the alleged fact. It simply means 
that it considers that there is insufficient reliable evidence to 
make a finding on the veracity of the alleged fact in light of the 
standard of proof. Accordingly, finding an accused person not 
guilty does not necessarily mean that the Chamber considers him 
or her to be innocent. Such a finding merely demonstrates that 
the evidence presented in support of the accused’s guilt has not 
satisfied the Chamber “beyond reasonable doubt”.”1473 
 
Thus, the requirement “beyond reasonable doubt” is straight related to the 
evidence presented and if it allows to make a finding on the verity of an alleged 
fact in view of the standard of proof. 
 
After mentioning the testimonies of 4 witnesses, the Trial Chamber I affirmed that 
 
“[o]n the basis of the totality of the evidence introduced during 
the trial on this issue, the Majority is unable to conclude that 
sexual violence against the children who were recruited was 
sufficiently widespread that it could be characterised as occurring 
in the ordinary course of the implementation of the common plan 
for which Mr Lubanga is responsible. Moreover, nothing suggests 
that Mr Lubanga ordered or encouraged sexual violence, that he 
was aware of it or that it could otherwise be attributed to him in a 
way that reflects his culpability.”1474   
 
1471 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka, p.13, para. 27 (1 December 2014) 
1472 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka, p. 14, para. 27 (1 December 2014) 
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Regarding the contextual criteria “the ordinary course of the crime”, the Majority 
of the Chamber´s view in the verdict was that 
 
“the “awareness that a consequence will occur in the ordinary 
course of events” means that the participants anticipate, based 
on their knowledge of how events ordinarily develop, that the 
consequence will occur in the future.”1475 
 
Therefore, it demands that during the planning of the crime or its execution, it was 
predictable the commitment of the aggravating factor from a “ex ante” 
perspective- in accordance with the perspective of an ordinary person in the 
position of author- independently if the concrete subject took it or not into account. 
As a consequence, the sexual violence would be communicable when its 
occurrence was expected, attending to the facts.1476   
 
The Majority of the Chamber was not convinced that sexual violence carried out 
against the child recruits was enough widespread to such an extent that would 
permit to characterise it as taking place in the ordinary course of the operation of 
the common plan for which Lubanga was held responsible.1477   
 
Further, the Majority of the Chamber understood that there was no element 
suggesting that the defendant had ordered or boosted sexual violence, that he 
was conscious of it, or that it could in any other way be attributed to him in a 
manner that emulates his culpability.1478  
 
Consequently, in the view of the Majority, it was not established beyond 
reasonable doubt the connection between Lubanga and sexual violence in the 
context of the charges. 
 
Once more, such outcome arose as consequence of the Prosecutor´s 
recklessness in relation to sexual violence in the Lubanga case. 
 
In fact, in the sentence, the Chamber affirmed that 
 
“[a]lthough the former Prosecutor was entitled to introduce 
evidence on this issue during the sentencing hearing, he failed to 
take this step or to refer to any relevant evidence that had been 
given during the trial. As a result, in the view of the Majority, the 
link between Mr Lubanga and sexual violence, in the context of 
the charges, has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. 
Therefore, this factor cannot properly form part of the 
assessment of his culpability for the purposes of sentence.  
 
1475 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Trial Chamber 
I, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 436, para. 1012 
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Circunstancias Agravantes y Atenuantes, Concurso y Cálculo de Pena. Ambos, K., Malarino, E., 
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76. In a separate Decision, the Chamber will assess whether this 
factor is relevant to the issue of reparations.”1479 
 
As a result, even though sexual violence took place in the context of the crimes 
of which Lubanga was convicted, there was not an adequate ground to hold him 
responsible for it, and, thus, sexual violence could not be rendered as an 
aggravating circumstance for the purposes of sentencing.1480  
 
In the Lubanga Sentencing Judgment on Appeals of 1 December 2014, the 
Appeals Chamber affirmed that this TCI understanding actually encompassed “a 
broad range of possibilities from objective foreseeability to intent”.1481 
 
In addition to sexual violence, the Prosecution argued that the factors 
“Commission of the Crime when the Victims are Particularly Defenceless” and 
“Discriminatory motive” should also be considered as aggravating circumstances 
by the Trial Chamber I.  
 
Regarding the Commission of the Crime when the Victims are Particularly 
Defenceless, the Trial Chamber I stated that  
 
“[t]he VOl group of victims suggests that in joining with others to 
form a rebel army that included children under the age of 15, Mr 
Lubanga knew the crime involved individuals who were 
particularly vulnerable; whose education would be interrupted; 
who might be injured or killed during fighting; and who were at 
risk of abuse, including sexual abuse. The victims submit that 
these factors should be taken into account as an aggravating 
circumstance by the Court. 
 
78. As already indicated, the factors that are relevant for 
determining the gravity of the crime cannot additionally be taken 
into account as aggravating circumstances. Therefore, the age 
of the children does not both define the gravity of the crime and 
act as an aggravating factor. Accordingly, the age of the children 
does not constitute an aggravating factor as regard these 
offences.”1482 
 
As the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia recalled in its Judgment on Sentencing Appeal (8 March 2006) in the 
 
1479 Ibidem 
1480 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, pp. 26-28, paras. 66, 74-75  
1481 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of the Prosecutor and Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the 
“Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute”, p. 38, para. 90 (1 December 2014) 
1482 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, p. 29, paras. 77-78 
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Prosecutor v. Nikolic case and the Trial Chamber I reaffirmed in its Decision 
Sentence of 10 July 2012,1483 
 
“any factors that are to be taken into account when assessing the 
gravity of the crime will not additionally be taken into account as 
aggravating circumstances, and vice versa.”1484 
 
Since the Trial Chamber I found that the age of the children defines the gravity of 
the crime, it could not constitute an aggravating factor. If it was treated as an 
aggravating circumstance, it would violate the “ne bis in ídem” material (double 
counting) principle. Certainly, the children´s age should not be "double-counted" 
for the ends of the sentence.1485 
 
In what concerns gender as a Discriminatory motive, the Chamber affirmed: 
  
“[t]he prosecution contends that the evidence demonstrates that 
the female recruits were subjected to sexual violence, rape and 
"conjugal subservience" on the basis of their gender. It is 
suggested this constitutes gender-based harm within the 
meaning of Rule 145(2)(b)(v) and, as a result, it is an aggravating 
factor. V02 group of victims submits that the crimes for which Mr 
Lubanga was convicted were committed in a deliberately 
discriminatory manner, given the commanders sexually abused 
female soldiers. 
… 
81. In the judgment of the Majority, the Court has not been 
provided with any evidence that Mr Lubanga deliberately 
discriminated against women in committing these offences, in the 
sense suggested by the prosecution or the victims. In any event, 
"motive involving discrimination" pursuant to Rule 145(2)(b)(v) 
has not been treated as an aggravating factor.”1486 
 
As a result, the Trial Chamber I did not find that Lubanga deliberately 
discriminated against women, and, in consonance, did not accept that gender as 
a discriminatory motive should be treated as an aggravating circumstance. 
 
 
1483 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolic, Case No. IT-02-60/1-A. The Appeals Chamber, 
Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, p., 22, para. 58 (8 March 2006) 
1484ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, p.14, para. 35 
1485 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolic. The Appeals Chamber, Judgment on Sentencing 
Appeal, p. 22, para. 58; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06. Trial Chamber I, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, p. 51, para. 
23; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, p. 51, para. 23; Dondé Matute, J. 
(2014). In Ambos, K., Malarino, E., & Steiner, C. (eds.), pp. 305-327 
1486 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, pp. 29-30, paras. 79, 81 
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In relation to the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Odio Benito, it is necessary to 
highlight that she did agree with the Majority of the Chamber that no aggravating 
circumstances should be considered.1487 
 
Nonetheless, she understood that, in accordance with Rule 145(l)(c) of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence, the harm caused to the victims and their families, 
especially as a consequence of the harsh punishments and sexual violence 
endured by the victims of such crimes, should be taken into account in the 
determination of the sentence against Lubanga since it relates to the seriousness 
of the crimes of enlistment, conscription and use of children under the age of 15 
to participate actively in the hostilities, and specifically the damage inflicted on 
child victims and their families as a consequence of such crimes.1488 
 
In fact, Judge Odio Benito strongly disagreed  
 
“with the Majority of the Chamber that disregards the damage 
caused to the victims and their families, particularly as a result of 
the harsh punishments and sexual violence suffered by the 
victims of these crimes pursuant to Rule 145(l)(c) of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence ("Rules").”1489 
 
She sustained her viewpoint explicating that 
 
“the Chamber received ample evidence during the trial related to 
the conditions in which boys and girls were recruited and the 
harms they suffered as a result of their involvement with the UPC. 
The evidence received as regards the punishments and harsh 
conditions of children in the recruitment camps and the sexual 
violence they suffered (mainly but not exclusively the girls) at 
their young age should be taken into consideration when 
determining the sentence against the convicted person as it 
touches upon the gravity of the crimes of enlistment, conscription 
and use of children under the age of 15 to participate actively in 
the hostilities, and particularly the damage caused to the child 
victims and their families as a result of these crimes. 
 
7. The evidence presented during the trial demonstrates beyond 
reasonable doubt that children "were subject to a range of 
punishments during the training with the UPC/FPLC, particularly 
given there is no evidence to suggest they were excluded from 
this treatment". As regards sexual violence, although the 
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Chamber concluded that it would not make findings of fact on 
whether the responsibility is to be attributed to Mr Lubanga, it 
concluded that it would hear submissions as to whether the issue 
could assist as regards sentence and reparations. 
 
8. Pursuant to Rule 145(l)(c) of the Rules, the Chamber has the 
authority and the obligation to consider the damaging effects that 
the recruitment, particularly the harsh treatment and sexual 
violence had upon very young children, as an exacerbating factor 
in the determination of the sentence. Although cruel treatment 
and sexual violence are not included in the facts and 
circumstances of the charges described in the Confirmation of 
Charges decision, as set out in the Majority Decision, given the 
procedural safeguards implemented by the Chamber, the 
convicted person has had adequate notice, time and facilities for 
the preparation of his defence during the sentence hearing. 
There is thus no unfairness towards the defence should the 
Chamber consider the issue in the determination of the sentence. 
 
C. The expert witnesses´ evidence on the harm caused to victims 
and their families  
 
9. The evidence that the Chamber heard from expert witness 
Elisabeth Schauer, who testified on post-traumatic stress 
disorder and other harmful effects that child recruitment has on 
its victims is fundamental to determine the damage that the 
crimes for which Mr Lubanga has been convicted cause on the 
lives of the young victims and their families. Although, as noted 
by the Majority Decision, the crimes subject matter of this case 
occurred during a rather limited time period, the effects of the 
crimes on the victims and their families are long-lasting, 
sometimes for a lifetime and often will pass from one generation 
to another. As noted by the expert witness Ms Schauer, the post-
traumatic stress disorder may affect victims for their entire lives, 
following their exposure to traumatic events (including having 
experienced or witnessed killing or mutilation, severe physical or 
sexual assault, sexual abuse and rape) whilst serving as child 
soldiers. 
… 
13. Whilst considering the gravity of the crimes of enlistment, 
conscription and use of children under the age of 15 to participate 
actively in the hostilities, it is essential to keep in mind the 
differential gender effects and damages that these crimes have 
upon their victims, depending on whether they are boys or girls. 
Along these lines, Ms Schauer stated that sexual violence, 
including torture, rape, mass rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced sterilization, forced termination of 
pregnancies, giving birth without assistance and being mutilated 
are some of the key gender-based experiences of both women 
and girls during armed conflicts. She also stated that in some 
301 
 
armed conflicts, abducted girls where almost universally raped. 
Similarly, Ms Coomaraswamy stated that rape happens to girls 
on a regular basis and they also suffer from forced marriage and 
other forms of sexual violence, including force nudity and sexual 
harassment. She stated that for girls, recruitment is a "particularly 
horrendous experience". 
… 
E. The harm caused to victims and their families has been proven 
beyond reasonable doubt as a factor pursuant to Rule 145(l)(c) 
of the Rules  
 
19. In light of the abundant evidence rehearsed above, it is my 
opinion that the damage caused to these children is a factor that 
shall be considered by the Chamber in the determination of the 
sentence against Mr Lubanga Dyilo, pursuant to Rule 145(1 )(c) 
of the Rules. The children who were victims of the crimes for 
which Mr Lubanga has been convicted were subjected to acts of 
extreme violence, including harsh punishments and sexual 
violence, all of which caused serious damage which may 
continue to date and may extend into the future, even affecting 
future generations. Given the nature of these crimes, the harm 
caused extends to the victims’ family, including the parents who 
lost their children or lost any possibility to have a relationship with 
their children in the future. Children born as a result of the sexual 
violence suffered by girls who were recruited are also deeply 
affected by these crimes and this is what was defined by expert 
Ms Schauer as the "transgenerational effects", which in her 
words "cripple individuals and families even into next 
generations".  
 
20. The fact that the victims were all of a young age (under the 
age of 15) must also be considered by the Chamber. Moreover, 
because of their age, many of the victims may never be able to 
be fully repaired for the harm they suffered and still continue to 
suffer. Their childhood was deeply affected by these crimes that 
have scarred their lives and those of their families forever. 
Consequently, I deem that these are exacerbating factors 
pursuant to Rule 145(l)(c) of the Rules, all of which may be 
attributed to Mr Lubanga since he was found guilty beyond 
reasonable doubt of the crimes that caused such harms to the 
child victims and their families.  
 
21. Although, as noted by the Majority of the Chamber, Mr 
Lubanga may not have "deliberately discriminated against 
women in committing these offences", the crimes for which he 
was convicted resulted in the discrimination of women, 
particularly girls under the age of 15 who were subject to sexual 
violence (and consequently to unwanted pregnancies, abortions, 
HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases) as a result of their 
recruitment within the UPC. Although this may not have been the 
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deliberate intention of the convicted person, the sexual violence 
suffered by children under the age of 15 as a result of the crimes 
for which he was found to be a co-perpetrator, impaired and most 
likely nullified, perhaps for the rest of their lives, the enjoyment of 
other human rights and fundamental freedoms of its victims 
(including inter alia, their right to education, their right to health, 
including sexual and reproductive health, and their right to a 
family life).  
 
22. Consequently, I dissent with the Majority of the Chamber that 
disregarded factors such as "punishment" and "sexual violence" 
in the determination of the sentence against Mr Lubanga Dyilo, 
as these acts resulted in serious and often irreparable harm to 
the victims and their families.”1490 
 
Therefore, in her dissenting opinion, Judge Odio Benito (contrarily to the majority 
of the Chamber) defended that both sexual violence and punishment should be 
considered in the elaboration of the sentence against Lubanga because these 





The reparations proceedings began on 7 August 2012 when the Trial Chamber I 
issued the Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to 
reparations.1491  
 
In this decision, the Trial Chamber affirmed that, in the terms of Article 21(l)(a) of 
the Rome Statute, when deciding on reparations the Court is bound to apply the 
Statute, the Elements of Crimes and the Rules. It added that the Court would 
consider as well the Regulations of the Court, the Regulations of the Registry and 
the Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims.1492 
 
The Chamber recalled the provisions inserted in these instruments connected 
with reparations and which provide guidelines as to how they should be 
established.1493   
 
Certainly, the Chamber affirmed that when implementing the reparations, the 
Court must attain to the preconised in Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute, 
 
1490 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
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specifically that reparations are to be granted to victims without detrimental 
differentiation on the basis of gender, age, race, colour, language, religion or 
belief, political or other opinion, sexual orientation, national, ethnic or social origin, 
wealth, birth or other status.1494 
 
The Trial Chamber I stated that, when establishing the guiding principles to apply 
to the reparations of the Lubanga case, it used as sources of inspiration 
international instruments, determined relevant human rights reports, the 
jurisprudence of the regional human rights courts and the national as well as 
international mechanisms and practices which have been developed in this 
area.1495  
 
The Chamber reaffirmed the disposition of Article 68 of the Rome Statute and 
Rule 86 of the Rules, and asserted that in all issues concerning reparations, it 
would take in consideration the needs of all the victims, and, in particular, 
children, the elderly, persons with disabilities and the victims of sexual or gender 
violence.1496   
 
The Trial Chamber I also sustained that  
 
“[r]eparations need to address any underlying injustices and in 
their implementation the Court should avoid replicating 
discriminatory practices or structures that predated the 
commission of the crimes. Equally, the Court should avoid further 
stigmatisation of the victims and discrimination by their families 
and communities.  
 
193. Reparations should secure, whenever possible, 
reconciliation between the convicted person, the victims of the 
crimes and the affected communities.”1497 
 
When addressing the beneficiaries of reparations, the Chamber recognised that 
 
“priority may need to be given to certain victims who are in a 
particularly vulnerable situation or who require urgent assistance. 
These may include, inter alia, the victims of sexual or gender-
based violence, individuals who require immediate medical care 
(especially when plastic surgery or treatment for HIV is 
necessary), as well as severely traumatized children, for instance 
following the loss of family members. The Court may adopt, 
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therefore, measures that constitute affirmative action in order to 
guarantee equal, effective and safe access to reparations for 
particularly vulnerable victims.”1498 
 
The Trial Chamber I also asserted that  
 
“[a] gender-inclusive approach should guide the design of the 
principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, ensuring 
that they are accessible to all victims in their implementation. 
Accordingly, gender parity in all aspects of reparations is an 
important goal of the Court.”1499 
 
The Trial Chamber I clarified that, if reparations are to have ample and real 
significance, it is essential to guarantee the implementation of outreach activities 
which encompass, first off gender-inclusive and ethnic-inclusive programmes, 
and also communication between the International Criminal Court and the 
affected persons and their communities.1500 
 
When addressing the victims of sexual violence, the Trial Chamber stated that 
the Court should devise and implement reparations awards which are adequate 
for the victims of sexual and gender-based violence. The Court must reflect the 
circumstance that the results of such crimes are convoluted and their unfolding 
reaches distinct levels. Their impact can live on a protracted long period of time, 
they affect women and girls, men and boys, jointly with their families and 
communities. To tackle the harms resulting from sexual and gender violence, it 
is necessary to deploy a specialist, unified and multidisciplinary approach.1501  
 
The Trial Chamber established that the Court shall implement gender-sensitive 
measures in order to surpass the difficulties endured by women and girls when 
they seek to access justice in such context. In accordance, the Court is bound to 
take measures to guarantee that women and girls can participate integrally in the 
reparation programmes.1502   
 
Consequently, the approach adopted by the Court should permit women and girls 
in the affected communities to participate in parity and meaningfully in the outline 
and implementation of the reparation orders.1503   
 
 
1498 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, p. 70, para. 200 
1499 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, p. 71, para. 202 
1500 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, p. 72, para. 205 
1501 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, p. 72, para. 207 
1502 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, p. 72, para. 208 
1503 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, p. 73, para. 209 
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Further, the reparations decisions regarding children should characterised by a 
gender-inclusive attitude.1504    
 
Likewise, a gender-inclusive approach must be deployed by the Court when 
rehabilitating former child soldiers and re-establishing them into society.1505    
 
Additionally, the International Criminal Court has to ensure that the award of 
reparations is made on non-discriminatory and gender-inclusive grounds.1506     
 
Even though Article 75 of the Statute enumerates restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation as types of reparations, such list is not closed. Other kinds of 
reparations, as, for example, those that present a symbolic, preventative or 
transformative value, can also be adequate. A gender-sensitive approach should 
be employed when establishing the form of applying reparations.1507   
 
Furthermore, awards should not replicate former structural inequalities or 
reinforce discriminatory practices, including disparities based on gender.1508   
 
Compensation (a type of economic relief directed at addressing, in a 
proportionate and adequate manner, the harm that has been caused, as for 
example, physical harm of causing a person to be unable to bear children, and  
medical services, psychological and social assistance for boys and girls with HIV 
and Aids) is to be approached on a gender-inclusive basis. Certainly, the 
measures put in place for awarding compensation should take into consideration 
the gender and age-specific effect that the criminal offences of enlisting and 
conscripting children under the age of 15 and using them to participate actively 
in the hostilities may have on victims, their families, and communities.1509     
 
The right of victims to rehabilitation should be implemented by the International 
Criminal Court on the grounds of the principles related to non-discrimination, 
including a gender-inclusive method that covers males and females of all 
ages.1510 
 
Reparations can encompass measures to tackle the shame felt by some ex child 
soldiers, and to avoid any future victimisation, especially in the cases in that they 
 
1504 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, p. 73, para.211 
1505 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, p. 74, para.216 
1506 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, p. 75, para. 218 
1507 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, pp. 75-76, para. 
222 
1508 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, p. 76, para. 227 
1509 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, p. 76-78, paras. 
227, 230, 231 
1510 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, p. 79, para. 232 
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endured sexual violence, torture and inhumane and degrading treatment 
subsequently to their recruitment.1511  
 
In all circumstances, the reparations should be awarded on a non-discriminatory 
grounds, and they have to be established and applied following a gender-
inclusive approach.1512   
 
The Trial Chamber I stated that reparations should be directed at reconciling the 
victims of the crimes with their families and all the communities impacted by the 
crimes. The Chamber, clarified that in cases of sexual violence, reconciliation 
with the perpetrator can be an inadequate measure as data indicates that 
numerous survivors of sexual violence want neither a direct apology from the 
perpetrator nor any contact with him/her.1513   
 
The Chamber endorsed the proposal of the Registry that there should be a 
multidisciplinary team of experts in order to provide assistance to the Court in the 
elaboration and implementation of a reparations plan. The team ought to 
encompass Democratic Republic of the Congo representatives, international 
representatives, as well as specialists in child and gender issues.1514    
 
The Trial Chamber I, in accordance with Rule 97(2) of the Rules, delegated to 
the TFV the function of choosing and appointing adequate multidisciplinary 
experts, including experts in the areas of child soldiers, gender issues and 
violence against girls and boys.1515 
 
However, 3 appeals were filed against the Trial Chamber I´s Decision 
establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations of 7 
August 2012. Certainly, on 24 August 2012, an appeal was filed jointly by the 
Legal Representatives of Victims V02 and the Office of Public Counsel for victims 
on behalf of the victims they represent; on 3 September 2012, an appeal was 
filed by the Legal Representatives of Victims V01 on behalf of the victims they 
represent; and on 6 September 2012, an appeal was filed by Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo.1516     
 
1511 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, p. 81, para. 240 
1512ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, p. 81, para. 243 
1513 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, p. 81, para. 244 
and footnote 431 
1514 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, pp. 86-87, paras. 
263, 264 
1515 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, p. 87, para. 265 
1516 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Appeal against Trial Chamber I’s Decision establishing the principles and procedures 
to be applied to reparations of 7 August 2012 (24 August 2012); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals Chamber, Appeal against Trial Chamber 
I’s Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparation of 7 August 
2012 (3 September 2012); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06. The Appeals Chamber, Appeal of the Defence for Mr Thomas Lubanga against Trial 
Chamber I’s Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparation 
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As a consequence, the Appeals Chamber amended referred Decision by 
majority.1517    
 
The Trial Chamber I had stipulated that  
 
“[t]he Court should formulate and implement reparations awards 
that are appropriate for the victims of sexual and gender-based 
violence.”1518 
 
The Defence disputed this finding of the Trial Chamber I. It sustained that the 
Prosecutor restricted the reach of the case to enlistment, conscription and use of 
child soldiers under the age of 15 years to participate actively in hostilities, and 
that the Trial Chamber rejected the Prosecutor´s argument that the perpetration 
of such crimes would mandatorily lead to the perpetration of sexual violence. 
Moreover, the Defence contended that Articles 8 (2) (e) (vi) and (vii) of the Rome 
Statute and the Elements of Crimes do not associate the perpetration of sexual 
violence to the condition of child soldiers.1519 
 
The Legal Representatives of Victims V01 argued that the TCI´s stipulation meant 
that persons that suffered gender-based violence can be considered victims in 
the reparations proceedings, but not that all of them can benefit from reparations. 
These victims are entitled to receive reparations solely if it is established a causal 
link between the harm they endured and the criminal offences for which Lubanga 
was condemned.1520   
 
The OPCV and the Legal Representatives of Victims V02 submitted that gender-
based crimes and inhumane treatment are intrinsic elements of the crimes of 
enlistment, recruitment and use of children in hostilities. As a result, applicants 
solely had to demonstrate that their harm derived from the crimes for which 
Lubanga was condemned so as to be awarded reparations.1521 
 
The Trust Fund assured that since the damage coming from sexual violence is 
innately related to the fundamental facts of the charges, the criteria of rule 85 of 
 
rendered on 7 August 2012 (6 September 2012); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeals against the 
“Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations” of 7 August 
2012 with AMENDED order for reparations (Annex A) and public annexes 1 and 2, pp. 6,10-11, 
paras. 18-20 (3 March 2015)  
1517 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals against the “Decision establishing the principles and 
procedures to be applied to reparations” of 7 August 2012 with AMENDED order for reparations 
(Annex A) and public annexes 1 and 2, p. 6, para. 1 
1518 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, p. 72, para. 207 
1519 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals against the “Decision establishing the principles and 
procedures to be applied to reparations” of 7 August 2012 with AMENDED order for reparations 
(Annex A) and public annexes 1 and 2, pp. 75-76, para. 193. 
1520 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals against the “Decision establishing the principles and 
procedures to be applied to reparations” of 7 August 2012 with AMENDED order for reparations 




the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are fulfilled independently of the issue of 
sexualised violence being particularly charged or not.1522  
 
However, the Appeals Chamber understood that sexual and gender-based 
violence could not be “defined as a harm resulting from the crimes for which Mr 
Lubanga was convicted” and, therefore, the individuals who suffered this type of 
violence could not be considered victims (in the terms of rule 85 (a) of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence,“natural persons who have suffered harm as a result 
of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court”).1523 
 
The Appeals Chamber considered that the Trial Chamber’s understanding that 
the sexual violence acts could not be imputed to Lubanga led to the conclusion 
that the Trial Chamber did not determine that harm from sexual and gender-
based violence arose from the crimes for which Lubanga was condemned, within 
the terms of rule 85 (a) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.1524  
 
Regarding reparations, even though the Trial Chamber I had stipulated that 
reparations awards which “are appropriate for the victims of sexual and gender-
based violence” should be formulated and implemented by the Court, the Appeals 
Chamber overruled such decision. It stated that, since the Trial Chamber I               
“did not establish that harm from sexual and gender-based violence resulted from 
the crimes for which Mr Lubanga was convicted,” it should have explained how it 
still rendered that he “should be liable for reparations in respect of the harm of 
sexual and gender-based violence.” The TCI failed to do it. Consequently, the 
Appeals Chamber understood that Lubanga could not be held responsible for 
reparations related to this harm, and amended the Impugned Decision in this 
regard.1525   
 
The Appeals Chamber clarified that its finding on Lubanga’s liability for 
reparations in relation to the harm arising from sexual and gender-based violence 
did not prevent these victims from benefitting from assistance activities 
undertaken by the Trust Fund. 1526   
 
 
1522 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals against the “Decision establishing the principles and 
procedures to be applied to reparations” of 7 August 2012 with AMENDED order for reparations 
(Annex A) and public annexes 1 and 2, p. 76, para. 195 
1523 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals against the “Decision establishing the principles and 
procedures to be applied to reparations” of 7 August 2012 with AMENDED order for reparations 
(Annex A) and public annexes 1 and 2, p. 76, para. 196; Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
International Criminal Court, Rule 85 (a) 
1524 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals against the “Decision establishing the principles and 
procedures to be applied to reparations” of 7 August 2012 with AMENDED order for reparations 
(Annex A) and public annexes 1 and 2, p. 77, para. 198 
1525 Ibidem 
1526 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals against the “Decision establishing the principles and 
procedures to be applied to reparations” of 7 August 2012 with AMENDED order for reparations 
(Annex A) and public annexes 1 and 2, p. 77, para. 199 
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Actually, in the amended Order for Reparations dated 3 March 2015, the Appeals 
Chamber established that  
 
“[i]t is appropriate for the Board of Directors of the Trust Fund to 
consider, in its discretion, the possibility of including victims of 
sexual and gender-based violence in the assistance activities 
undertaken according to its mandate under regulation 50 (a) of 
the Regulations of the Trust Fund. It is also appropriate for the 
draft implementation plan to include a referral process to other 
competent NGOs in the affected areas that offer services to 
victims of sexual and gender-based violence.”1527 
 
Therefore, the Appeals Chamber established that sexual and gender-based 
violence could not be conceived as a harm arising from the crimes for which 
Lubanga was condemned, but allowed the inclusion of victims that suffered 
damage as a consequence of sexual and gender-based violence in the TFV’s 
assistance mandate, at its discretion.  
 
On 3 November 2015, the Trust Fund for Victims submitted its Filing on 
Reparations and Draft Implementation Plan, to which was annexed the Draft 
Implementation Plan for collective reparations to victims.1528   
 
The TFV proposed to develop reparation programmes, apart from the 
programmes under the assistance mandate, directed at the reintegration of 
former child soldiers into their communities, particularly by means of vocational 
training and accelerated literacy courses. The TFV also proposed to develop a 
training to boost the resolution of disputes and conflicts between the victims, their 
families and their communities, apart from a gender-sensitive training. The TFV 
planned as well to install a programme of targeted psychological assistance and 
treatment intended to foster community ties and to contribute to healing and 
acceptance.1529 
 
On 9 February 2016, the Trial Chamber II understood that, even though the TFV’s 
proposals were in line with the types of reparations ordered by the Appeals 
Chamber, the later had presented solely a summary description of the 
prospective programmes and how they would be developed and managed, and 




1527 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Order for Reparations (amended), p. 14, para. 64 
1528 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Filing on Reparations and Draft Implementation Plan (3 November 2015); ICC. The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals Chamber, Annex 
A to Filing on Reparations and Draft Implementation Plan (3 November 2015) 
1529 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Filing on Reparations and Draft Implementation Plan, p. 34, paras. 68-69 
1530 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 
Order instructing the Trust Fund for Victims to supplement the draft implementation plan, p. 9, 
para. 20.  
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Accordingly, the Chamber instructed the TFV to submit, up to 7 May2016, a 
proposal of a set of collective reparation programmes in accordance with the 
Appeals Chamber´s order. The Trial Chamber II stated that the programmes must 
be aimed at direct and indirect victims of the crimes of which Lubanga had been 
convicted and must give specific attention to the gender-specific results of the 
crimes, as the TFV had indicated. The Chamber also agreed that such 
programmes must be conceived so as to include as many victims as possible.1531 
 
After been granted an extension, on 7 June 2016, the Trust Fund for Victims 
submitted the Additional Programme Information Filing. It sustained that the strict 
procedural approach adopted by the Trial Chamber in relation to victims’ eligibility 
and harm (a “legal procedure prior to programme approval or implementation, 
with eligibility determinations to be made by the Trial Chamber, requiring the 
compilation of individual victim dossiers, including both detailed victimization 
information and a harm assessment at the individual level, as well as informed 
consent by each victim to agree to have his or her identity revealed and 
challenged by the convicted person”) in its Order of 9 February 2016 meant that 
a considerably lower number of victims would be eligible to benefit from 
reparations than the original number estimated by the TFV when it submitted the 
Draft Implementation Plan (in accordance with the latter, the eligibility screening 
would consist in an administrative procedure undertaken during the programme 
implementation).1532  
 
In fact, stakeholder factors as the potential quantity of 3,000 victims (direct and 
indirect), and their screening and enrolment play a determinant role in the 
feasibility of implementing the collective reparations programme designed by TVF 
in accordance with the findings and information obtained from a very detailed and 
consistent contextual assessment.1533    
 
Further, the TFV argued that such approach of the Trial Chamber would cause 
the exclusion of particular vulnerable victims, as, for example, female victims or 
victims that are still stigmatised nowadays as a consequence of the harm they 
endured.1534 
 
A €1 million complement had been offered by the Trust Fund Board of Directors 
in the 3 November 2015 Draft Implementation Plan. Nevertheless, the TVF 
clarified that this sum would be invalidated if the Trial Chamber´s approach was 
actually implemented causing the number of eligible victims to be drastically 
reduced when compared with the number previously estimated in the Draft Plan. 
Certainly, if this situation did concretise, the Board of Directors might feel impelled 
to modify downward the 1 million complement that funds reparations in proportion 
 
1531 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 
Order instructing the Trust Fund for Victims to supplement the draft implementation plan, p. 9, 
para. 21 
1532 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 
Additional Programme Information Filing, p. 6, paras. 15, 17 (7 June 2016) 
1533 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 
Additional Programme Information Filing, pp. 5-6, paras. 12-13 (7 June 2016) 
1534 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 
Additional Programme Information Filing, pp. 6-7, paras. 17 (7 June 2016) 
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with the diminution in the standard of programming demanded for a significant 
lower number of victims.1535  
 
The viewpoint of the Board of Directors was that to carry out the collective 
reparation programme in accordance with Chamber’s approach would do more 
harm than good, because it would potentially benefit a disproportionally limited 
number of victims able to benefit from reparations and it would promote re-
traumatisation, fear, and a sense of unfairness in the victim population, 
circumstances that would force the Board of Directors to review the proposed 
draft plan and the total amount of the financial complement.1536 
 
The fundamental modification in the method of the victim identification process 
and its expected outcome brought as consequence a level of uncertainty, both 
legal and procedural, which impeded the Trust Fund of proposing any viable 
further details of the design, planning and implementation of the programme.1537  
 
As a consequence, the TFV affirmed that the victim eligibility process of the Trial 
Chamber straight affected the Trust Fund’s programming and undermined the 
feasibility of the Draft Implementation Plan dated 3 November 2015, and, thus, 
called for it to be substantially revised.1538 
 
Certainly, the Trust Fund submitted that the Draft Implementation Plan already 
contained all the essential components needed to tackle programmatic 
uncertainties, while concomitantly being able to address the distinct redress 
needs of the victims. Consonantly, the Trust Fund requested the Trial Chamber 
to give up on its procedural approach and to permit the Draft Implementation Plan 
to be fully implemented, inclusive of the screening mechanism established 
therein.1539   
 
Also, the Trust Fund stressed that the differences between its reparations 
mandate and its assistance mandate must be kept in mind so that the inherent 
advantages of both mandates do not terminate damaged.1540   
 
Subsequently, on 15 July 2016, the Trial Chamber II, by majority, issued a 
Request Concerning the Feasibility of Applying Symbolic Collective Reparations.  
The majority of the Chamber, agreeing with TFV´s statement that symbolic 
interventions and programs directed at the promotion of reconciliation and non-
repetition constitute a central element of reparations awards, endorsed the 
 
1535 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 
Additional Programme Information Filing, pp. 6-8, paras. 16, 19 (7 June 2016) 
1536 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 
Additional Programme Information Filing, pp. 7-8, para. 19 (7 June 2016) 
1537 Ibidem, p. 10, para. 26 
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 
Additional Programme Information Filing, p. 10, para. 26 (7 June 2016) 
1538 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 
Additional Programme Information Filing, p. 8, para. 17 (7 June 2016) 
1539 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 
Additional Programme Information Filing, p. 14, para. 42 (7 June 2016) 
1540 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 
Additional Programme Information Filing, p. 21, para. 71 (7 June 2016) 
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OPCV´s viewpoint that symbolic activities, which are aimed at affected 
communities, could be implemented at the same time as other projects for 
victims, and have the benefit of not demanding prior identification of 
beneficiaries.1541 
 
In view of that, the Chamber requested the TFV to verify the practicability of 
advancing an actual project directed at providing responsive symbolic reparations 
(in the shape of a commemoration and/or constructing a statue for child soldiers 
that have suffered due to the events, “inter alia”) and requested precise 
information on the approximated costs of this project, the time frame for its 
finalisation, and any detailed proposal(s) related to the issue.1542  
 
In accordance with the Request of 15 July 2016, the Trust Fund submitted a Filing 
regarding symbolic collective reparations projects on 19 September 2016. The 
Trust Fund proposed a carefully planned and particularised project framework for 
symbolic collective reparations involving two main elements:1543  
 
“a. The development and construction of symbolic structures, in 
the form of commemoration centres that will host interactive 
symbolic activities, in three communities; and    
 
b. The development and implementation of mobile 
memorialization initiatives in five additional communities that will 
promote awareness raising of the crimes and resulting harms, 
reintegration, reconciliation, and memorialization.”1544  
 
The central goal of these projects is that  
 
“the reintegration and rehabilitation of former child soldiers in the 
Lubanga case are enabled by the awareness and 
acknowledgement of the affected communities that the 
enlistment, conscription and use of child soldiers under the age 
of 15 are crimes, causing enduring harm to the former child 
 
1541 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 
Additional Programme Information Filing, p. 19, para. 65 (7 June 2016); ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, Request Concerning the 
Feasibility of Applying Symbolic Collective Reparations, p. 6, para. 11 (15 July 2016); ICC. The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, Consolidated 
response to the submissions filed on 31 March and 7 June 2016 by the Trust Fund for Victims, 
p.12, para. 37 (1 July 2016) 
1542 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 
Request Concerning the Feasibility of Applying Symbolic Collective Reparations, p. 7, para. 12 
1543 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 
Filing regarding symbolic collective reparations projects with Confidential Annex: Draft Request 
for Proposals, p. 26, para. 61 (19 September 2016) 
1544 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 
Filing regarding symbolic collective reparations projects with Confidential Annex: Draft Request 
for Proposals, p. 26, para. 63 (19 September 2016) 
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soldiers and their families and consequently continuing to disturb 
the wellbeing of the communities.”1545 
 
Additionally, it is envisaged that such projects will contribute to significantly 
reduce the stigma attributed to former child soldiers in their communities, thus, 
positively affecting their capability of reintegration and rehabilitation. In fact, 
former child soldiers were feared by their own families and communities. They 
were the target of a strong negative perception, been seen as incapable of 
readjusting to civilian life and carrying a stigmatizing reputation (are regarded as 
thieves, violent, “sullied” girls, etc). Further, social stigma and lower social status 
are a frequent consequence especially endured by girls and young women when 
returning to their communities as ex child soldiers.1546  
 
Also, it is expected that the that the affected communities’ awareness and 
acknowledgement of the pertinent crimes and resulting damages grants a 
propitious environment to establish and carry pout service-based collective 
reparations awards to both direct and indirect victims in the Lubanga case.1547  
 
Finally, it is foreseen that the goals and the results achieved of such collective 
symbolic reparations project can inform other stakeholders and be appreciated 
by them, as an initial expression of the joint reparative justice mandates of the 
International Criminal Court and the Trust Fund.1548 
 
In the consecution of the projects, women and girls should be justly represented 
and be involved in all elements of planning and implementation.1549 
 
On 21 October 2016, the TC II issued an “order approving the proposed plan of 
the Trust Fund for Victims (the "TFV") in relation to symbolic collective reparation” 
for the victims in the Lubanga case. The Trial Chamber II specifically agreed with 
the TFV´s submission that implementing symbolic reparations1550    
 
"paves the way for the social acceptance of reparations awards 
in the affected communities, and it creates a safe environment 
for victims to come forward and voluntarily participate in the 
 
1545 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 
Filing regarding symbolic collective reparations projects with Confidential Annex: Draft Request 
for Proposals, pp. 25-26, para. 61 (19 September 2016) 
1546 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 
Filing regarding symbolic collective reparations projects with Confidential Annex: Draft Request 
for Proposals, pp. 11-13, 26, paras. 18, 23, 62 (19 September 2016) 
1547 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 
Filing regarding symbolic collective reparations projects with Confidential Annex: Draft Request 
for Proposals, p. 26, para. 62 (19 September 2016) 
1548 Ibidem 
1549 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 
Filing regarding symbolic collective reparations projects with Confidential Annex: Draft Request 
for Proposals, p. 18, paras. 36, 39 (19 September 2016) 
1550 International Criminal Court website, Case Information Sheet, Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo; ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, Order approving the 
proposed plan of the Trust Fund for Victims in relation to symbolic collective reparations, p. 7, 
para. 12  (21 October 2016)  
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service- based collective awards without undue fear for their 
safety or reputation."1551   
 
On 15 December 2017, Trial Chamber II established that Lubanga's liability for 
collective reparations amounted to USD 10,000,000 in relation to 425 victims it 
found eligible for reparations and other victims who can be eventually identified. 
However, in face of his indigence, the TC II1552   
 
“invited the Board of Directors of the Trust Fund for Victims to 
examine the possibility of earmarking an additional amount for 
the implementation of collective reparations and/or continuing its 
efforts to raise additional funds. The Chamber also instructed the 
Trust Fund to make contact with the Government of the DRC to 
explore how the Government might contribute to the reparations 
process.”1553 
 
The legal representatives of the V01 group of victims and of Mr Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo appealed against Trial Chamber II´s “Decision Setting the Size of the 
Reparations Award for which Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is Liable” issued in 
December 2017. On 18 July 2019, the Appeals Chamber confirmed TC II´s 
decision, only amending it so that1554   
 
“the victims whom Trial Chamber II found ineligible to receive 
reparations, and who consider that their failure to sufficiently 
substantiate their allegations, including by supporting 
documentation, resulted from insufficient notice of the 
requirements for eligibility, may seek a new assessment of their 
eligibility by the Trust Fund for Victims, together with other victims 





1551 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 
Order approving the proposed plan of the Trust Fund for Victims in relation to symbolic collective 
reparations, p. 7, para. 12 (21 October 2016) 
1552 International Criminal Court website, Case Information Sheet, Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo; ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  The Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the 
appeals against Trial Chamber II’s ‘Decision Setting the Size of the Reparations Award for which 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is Liable’, p. 4 (18 July 2019); ICC website, Press Release, Lubanga case: 
Appeals Chamber confirms Trial Chamber II’s ‘Decision Setting the Size of the Reparations Award 
for which Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is Liable’ (18 July 2019) 
1553 International Criminal Court website, Case Information Sheet, Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
1554 Ibidem; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  The 
Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeals against Trial Chamber II’s ‘Decision Setting the Size 
of the Reparations Award for which Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is Liable’, p. 4 (18 July 2019); ICC 
website, Press Release, Lubanga case: Appeals Chamber confirms Trial Chamber II’s ‘Decision 
Setting the Size of the Reparations Award for which Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is Liable’ (18 July 
2019) 
1555 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals against Trial Chamber II’s ‘Decision Setting the Size of the 





In this landmark case (the first in which the ICC has not only dealt sexual and 
gender-based crimes but also entered a conviction), the Court faltered in what 
concerns the investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes. 
It was permeated by flaws of the Prosecution in relation to the charging of sexual 
and gender-based crimes. It is no wonder it tarnished the reputation of the ICC 
and put at stake its ability to translate into practical actions the victimological 
forefront provisions of the Rome Statute, and bring justice to victims. Moreover, 
the case meant a blow for victims and those who advocate for the prosecution of 










































7. Case the Prosecutor v. Gemain Katanga 
 
7.1. Background and overview of the case 
 
Likewise the Lubanga case, the background of the Katanga case (Case No.: ICC-
01/04-01/07) is also the armed conflict of a non-international character which took 
place in the Ituri region between 2002 and 2003.1556  
 
Such conflict involved armed groups that had hierarchical organisaton and the 
capability of planning and carrying out military operations. Among these groups 
were the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) / Force Patriotique pour la 
Libération du Congo (FPLC), whose president was Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the 
Force de resistance pratiotique en Ituri  (FRPI), whose highest ranking 
commander was Germain Katanga, the Front des nationalistes et 
intégrationnistes (FNI), the Part pour l´unité et la sauvegarde de l´intégrité du 
Congo (PUSIC) as well as the Uganda  People’s Defence Force (UPDF ).1557 
 
Between January 2003 and at least March 2003, the FNI and FRPI perpetrated 
an attack directed against the civilian population of determined parts of the 
territory of Ituri, mainly of Hema ethnicity. In this context, and moved by a common 
purpose, the FNI and FRPI committed an indiscriminate attack against the village 
of Bogoro that began on or around 24 February 2003. There have been critics 
that the scope of the charges was actually narrow as it covered solely this specific 
massacre.1558   
 
In fact, during the attack against the village and in its aftermath, members of the 
FNI and FRPI carried out various crimes against civilians (principally of Hema 
ethnicity), specifically,1559 
 
“i) the murder of about 200 civilians, ii) causing serious bodily 
harm to civilians, iii) arresting, threatening with weapons and 
imprisoning civilians in a room filled with corpses, iv) pillaging, v) 
the sexual enslavement of several women and girls and vi) the 
active participation of children under the age of fifteen years in 
hostilities, were part of the common plan, or, were, at the very 
least, a probable and accepted consequence of the 
implementation of said common plan.”1560 
 
 
1556 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Document Containing the Charges, Article 61(3) (a), pp. 3-7, paras.4-5, 12-14, 19; 
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Warrant of Arrest for Germain Katanga, p. 3 (2 July 2007) 
1557 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Warrant of Arrest for Germain Katanga, p. 3 (2 July 2007) 
1558 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Warrant of Arrest for Germain Katanga, pp. 3-4; van den Berg, S., & Sengenya, C. (2019) 
1559 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Warrant of Arrest for Germain Katanga, p. 4 (2 July 2007) 
1560 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Warrant of Arrest for Germain Katanga, p. 5 (2 July 2007) 
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The Pre-Trial Chamber I, considering that, together with other senior FNI and 
FRPI military commanders, Germain Katanga devised a common plan for the 
Bogoro attack and ordered his subordinates to carry it out, regarded that 
Katanga´s contribution was of paramount importance for the attack´s 
implementation and, thus, that he was1561   
 
“criminally responsible under article 25(3)(a) or, in the alternative, 
under article 25(3)(b of the Statute, for:  
 
i) murder as a crime against humanity, punishable under article 
7(1)(a) of the Statute;  
 
ii) wilful killing as a war crime, punishable under article 8(2)(a)(i) or 
article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Statute; 
 
iii) inhumane acts as a crime against humanity, punishable under 
article 7(1)(k) of the Statute;  
 
iv) inhuman treatment as a war crime, punishable under article 
8(2)(a)(ii) or cruel treatment as a war crime, punishable under 
article 8(2)(c) (i) of the Statute;   
 
v) the war crime of using children under the age of fifteen years to 
participate actively in hostilities, punishable under article 
8(2)(b)(xxvi) or article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Statute; 
 
vi) sexual slavery as a crime against humanity, punishable under        
article 7(1)(g) of the Statute;   
       
vii) sexual slavery as a war crime, punishable under article 8(2)(b) 
(xxii) or article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Statute;   
 
viii) the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against the civilian 
population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct 
part in hostilities, punishable under article 8(2)(b)(i) or article 
8(2)(e)(i) of the Statute;  
 
ix) pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault as a war 
crime, punishable under article 8(2)(b)(xvi) or article 8(2)(e)(v) of 
the Statute.”1562 
 
In face of that, on 2 July 2007, the Pre-Trial Chamber I issued the warrant of 
arrest for Katanga.1563 
 
 
1561 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Warrant of Arrest for Germain Katanga, pp. 5-6 (2 July 2007) 
1562 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 




In the Decision on the evidence and information provided by the Prosecution for 
the issuance of a warrant of arrest for Germain Katanga, the PTC I found, among 
other things, that there were 
 
“reasonable grounds to believe that in the aftermath of the joint 
indiscriminate attack by the FRPI and the FNI upon the village of 
Bogoro on or about 24 February 2003, members of the FRPI and 
the FNI abducted women and girls to be used as their "wives" 
and serve as sexual slaves for them and other commanders.”1564 
 
The crimes purportedly perpetrated by Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (allegedly FNI/ 
Lendu militia of BeduEzekere leader) arose from the same background facts of 
the Katanga case- the "joint attack of the village of Bogoro by the FNI and FRP 1 
on 24 February 2003." As a consequence, on 10 March 2008, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber I rendered a decision joining the cases against Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui so as to prevent replication of the proceedings before the 
International Criminal Court. On 9 June 2008, the Appeals Chamber issued a 
judgment confirming the Pre-Trial Chamber I´s decision on joinder.1565 
 
It is noteworthy that the Registrar did not admit Witnesses 132, 163, 238 and 287 
(on whom the Prosecution had intention to rely for the confirmation of the 
charges) into the Court's Witness Protection Programme. The Prosecution, 
diverging from the approach of the Victims and Witnesses Unit, considered that 
these witnesses demanded protection before their identity could be disclosed to 
the Defence and, hence, carried out preventive relocation of witnesses.1566 
 
The Single Judge requested the Prosecution to expand on the type of protection 
offered to these witnesses by the Office of the Prosecutor before their statements 
could be accepted as evidence at the confirmation hearing.1567 
 
On 16 April 2008, the Prosecution filed its Submission of Information on the 
Preventive Relocation of Witnesses 132,163, 238 and 287, in which the OTP 
informed the particularities of the preventive relocation measures that were being 
 
1564 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on the evidence and information provided by the Prosecution for the issuance of a 
warrant of arrest for Germain Katanga, p. 20, para. 48. ICC-01/04-01/07 (6 July 2007) 
1565 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/07. Pre-
Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Joinder of the Cases against Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, p. 3 (10 March 2008); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 6. The Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal 
Against the Decision on Joinder rendered on 10 March 2008 by the Pre-Trial Chamber in the 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui Cases, pp. 3-4, para. 1 (9 June 2008) 
1566 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecution's Submission of Information on the Preventive Relocation 
of Witnesses 132,163, 238 and 287, pp.3-4, paras. 3-4 (16 April 2008); ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07.  Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Corrigendum to the Decision on Evidentiary Scope of the Confirmation Hearing, Preventive 
Relocation and Disclosure under Article 67(2) of the Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules, p. 26, 
paras. 53-55 (25 April 2008) 
1567 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecution's Submission of Information on the Preventive Relocation 
of Witnesses 132,163, 238 and 287, p.4, para. 4 
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adopted for these witnesses so that the Prosecution could “be in a position to fulfil 
its disclosure Obligations.” In the following day, Prosecution filed another 
document, its Submission of Information regarding the Preventive Relocation of 
Witness 132.1568 
 
The Single Judge understood that 
 
“in implementing the practice of preventive relocation, as defined 
by the Prosecution, the latter is not only exceeding its mandate 
under the Statute and the Rules but it is also misusing its 
mandate in order to de facto shift the power to decide on the 
relocation of a given witness from the Registry to the 
Prosecution.  
 
33. Furthermore, the implementation of such a practice also 
constitutes an ineffective use of the limited resources of the 
Court. The tasks carried out by [REDACTED] during the 
preventive relocations are similar to those carried out by the 
members of the VWU during the actual relocations.”1569 
 
After examining the Prosecution's unauthorised preventive relocations of 
Witnesses 132 and 287 (who provided the OTP with evidence on sexual 
offences), the Single Judge decided that the adequate remedy was to exclude 
the statements, interview notes and interview transcripts of these witnesses for 
the ends of the confirmation hearing.1570 
 
As a consequence, in its Submission of the Document Containing the Charges 
and List of Evidence on 21 April 2008, the Prosecution did not include the charge 
of sexual slavery although sexual enslavement of several women and girls was 
one of the basis of the Warrant of Arrest for Katanga and the Warrant of Arrest 
for Ngudjolo. In fact, since the Prosecution could not rely on the evidence 
provided by Witnesses 132 and 287, the OTP found that, regarding the crime of 
sexual slavery, it was not in a position to meet the threshold of proof demanded 
at the trial stage.1571  
 
1568 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecution's Submission of Information on the Preventive Relocation 
of Witnesses 132,163, 238 and 287, 1, p. 3; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07.  Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecution's 
Submission of Information regarding the Preventive Relocation of Witness 132 (17 April 2008) 
1569 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Corrigendum to the Decision on Evidentiary Scope of the 
Confirmation Hearing, Preventive Relocation and Disclosure under Article 67(2) of the Statute 
and Rule 77 of the Rules, 1, p. 20, paras. 32-33 
1570 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Corrigendum to the Decision on Evidentiary Scope of the 
Confirmation Hearing, Preventive Relocation and Disclosure under Article 67(2) of the Statute 
and Rule 77 of the Rules, 1, p. 22, para. 39 
1571 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Warrant of Arrest for Germain Katanga, p. 6; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecution's 
Submission of the Document Containing the Charges and List of Evidence, p. 5. (21 April 2008); 
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Nonetheless, the Prosecution clarified that it would be  
 
“seeking leave to appeal the 18 April Decision regarding the 
exclusion of evidence in support of the allegation of sexual 
slavery and the decision-making process and the implementation 
of protective measures. Should the appeal be granted, the 
Prosecution will be in a position to reintroduce the charges of 
sexual slavery and add the charges of rape and outrage upon 
personal dignity.”1572 
 
Also, the Prosecution clearly stated that it maintained  
 
“the factual underpinnings of these sexual offences, which the 
Prosecution intends to level against both persons charged in the 
Document Containing the Charges. These allegations serve as 
notice to the Defence that the Prosecution will pursue such 
charges at the Confirmation Hearing if relevant aspects of the 18 
April Decision are reversed. For that reason the Prosecution will 
seek leave to appeal the 18 April Decision.”1573 
 
In the Annex 1 to the Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to Article 
61(3)(a) of the Statute dated 21 April 2008, with respect to sexual offences, the 
Prosecution affirmed that  
 
“[s]ome women, who were captured at Bogoro and spared 
because they hid their ethnicity, were raped and forcibly taken to 
military camps. Once there, they were sometimes given as a 
"wife" to their captors or kept in the camp's prison, which was a 
hole dug in the ground. The women detained in these prisons 
were repeatedly raped by soldiers and commanders alike and 
also by soldiers who were punished and sent to prison. The fate 
reserved to captured women was widely known.”1574 
 
On 19 May 2008, the Registrar issued a Report informing the Pre-Trial Chamber 
I that Witnesses 132 and 287 had been accepted into the ICCPP and, 
accordingly, had been relocated within the extent of the programme.1575 
 
 
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Warrant of arrest Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, p. 6 (6 July 2007) 
1572 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecution's Submission of the Document Containing the Charges 
and List of Evidence, p. 3 
1573 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecution's Submission of the Document Containing the Charges 
and List of Evidence, p. 6 
1574 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to Article 61(3)(a) of the 
Statute, p. 28, para. 89 (21 April 2008)  
1575 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Registrar´s Report on the Protective Measures Afforded to Witnesses 
132, 238 and 287 (19 May 2008) 
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In fact, the Registrar stated that the VWU had solid grounds not to accept 
Witnesses 132 and 287 in the ICCPP, arguing that this should be the last instance 
measure in the appropriate protection of witnesses of the Court. Nevertheless, 
the Registry ultimately understood that these two witnesses should be accepted 
into the ICCPP.1576 
 
“due to the fact that the witnesses had been preventively 
relocated by the Prosecution and taking into account the 
unknown result of the current legal proceedings before the 
Court.”1577 
 
In the Decision on Leave to Appeal, the Single Judge further expanded on its 
prior decision of not accepting the evidence provided by Witnesses 132 and 287 
and said that: 
 
“in the Decision, the Single Judge found that the type of 
protection provided for Witnesses 132 and 287 was only their 
unlawful relocation by the Prosecution; that therefore they were 
to be considered at the time the Decision was issued as being 
unprotected; and that as Witnesses 132 and 287 were 
unprotected even redacted or summary versions of their 
evidence could not be admitted for the purpose of the 
confirmation hearing in order to ensure their protection since the 
content of their statements would inevitably disclose their 
identities.”1578 
 
On 27 May 2008 the Prosecution filed an Urgent Application for the Admission of 
the Evidence of Witnesses 132 and 287.1579 
 
Subsequently, in the Decision on Prosecution's Urgent Application for the 
Admission of the Evidence of Witnesses 132 and 287, the Single Judge found 
that, since the VWU had admitted these witnesses in the ICCPP, the concerns 
regarding security, which had led to the exclusion of evidence provided 
Witnesses 132 and 287, did not exist anymore. Certainly, because the previous 
security concerns no longer constituted an obstacle to including the statements, 
interview notes and interview transcripts of Witnesses 132 and 287 in the 
 
1576 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Defence Application for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge’s Decision 
on the “Decision on Prosecution’s Urgent Application for the Admission of the Evidence of 
Witnesses 132 and 287”, p.8, footnote 21 (3 June 2008); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Registrar´s 
Report on the Protective Measures Afforded to Witnesses 132, 238 and 287, paras. 3 and 4 
1577 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Registrar´s Report on the Protective Measures Afforded to Witnesses 
132, 238 and 287, paras. 3 and 4 
1578 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Requests for Leave to Appeal the Decision on 
Evidentiary Scope of the Confirmation Hearing, Preventive Relocation and Disclosure under 
Article 67 (2) of the Statute and Rules 77 of the Rules, p. 10 (20 May 2008) 
1579 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecution's Urgent Application for the Admission of the Evidence 
of Witnesses 132 and 287 (28 May 2008) 
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Prosecution's Amended List Evidence, the Single Judge decided that such 
evidence would be acceptable for the ends of the confirmation hearing.1580   
 
It is relevant to note that, in the Confirmation of Charges, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
I decided that 
 
“the preventive relocations of Witnesses 28, 132, 287 and 250 by 
the Prosecution do not affect the probative value accorded to 
their statements.”1581 
 
The Amended Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to Article 61(3)(a) of 
the Statute (26 June 2008), explicitly included sexual slavery, rape and outrages 
upon personal dignity among the 13 counts.1582 
 
Surely, “Sexual Slavery following the Bogoro attack” was included as constituting 
a crime against humanity and a war crime in counts 6 and 7, respectively: 
 
“On or about 24 February 2003, Germain KATANGA and 
Mathieu NGUDJOLO, committed, jointly with others, or each 
ordered the commission of crimes against humanity which in fact 
occurred, namely, the sexual enslavement of civilian female 
residents or civilian women present at Bogoro village, in the 
Bahema Sud collectivité, Irumu territory, Ituri district, including W-
132 and VV-249.”1583 
 
The crime of “Rape following the attack on Bogoro village” was inserted also as 
a crime against humanity (count 8) and as a war crime (count 9): 
 
“On or about 24 February 2003, Germain KATANGA and 
Mathieu NGUDJOLO, committed, jointly with others, or each 
ordered the commission of war crimes which in fact occurred, 
namely, the rape of civilian female residents or civilian women 
present at Bogoro village, in the Bahema Sud collectivité, Irumu 
territory, Ituri district, including W-132 and W-249.”1584 
 
The crime of “Outrages upon personal dignity at Bogoro” was included as a war 
crime (count 10): 
 
 
1580 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecution's Urgent Application for the Admission of the Evidence 
of Witnesses 132 and 287, p. 8 (28 May 2008); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the 
confirmation of charges, p. 54, para. 169 (30 September 2008) 
1581 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, p. 209 
1582 Ibidem, p. 112, para. 345 and footnote 449 
1583 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Amended Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to Article 
61(3)(a) of the Statute, p. 32 (26 June 2008) 
1584 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Amended Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to Article 
61(3)(a) of the Statute, p. 33 (26 June 2008) 
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“outrages upon personal dignity of civilian female residents or 
civilian women present at Bogoro village, in the Bahema Sud 
collectivité, Irumu District, including W-287.”1585 
 
Therefore, in the amendment to the charges, Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui were further charged by the Prosecution with the crimes of rape 
and sexual slavery as both crimes against humanity and war crimes (in the terms 
of Article 7(l)(g), Article 8(2)(e)(vi) or Article 8(2)(b)(xxii), and Article 25(3)(a) or 
(b) of the Rome Statute), as well as the war crime of outrages upon personal 
dignity (Article 8(2)(b)(xxi) or Article 8(2)(c)(ii), and Article 25(3)(a) or (b) of the 
Statute).  
 
As expressed by the Prosecutor, the charge of sexual slavery was actually 
reinstated for it had been withdrawn by the Prosecution before the confirmation 
of charges hearing due to the Single Judge´s decision to exclude the evidence 
presented by Witnesses P-132 and P-287 who had been relocated by the 
Prosecution. The new charges submitted were the charge of rape and the charge 
outrages upon personal dignity. By including these two charges, the OTP 
enlarged the prosecution of the sexual and gender-based crimes in the case.1586 
 
It constituted an important advance in relation to the Lubanga case since, as seen 
in the previous chapter, in that case there was no charge for sexual and gender-
based crimes in spite of the existence of evidence of the commitment of this kind 
of crimes.     
 
In its Decision on the confirmation of charges, the Pre-Trial Chamber I 
unanimously confirmed that 
 
“on the basis of the evidence admitted for the purposes of the 
confirmation hearing, that there is sufficient evidence to establish 
substantial grounds to believe that Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui”1587 
 
were responsible, under article 25(3)(a) of the Statute, for the following charges: 
 
- murder constituting a crime against humanity within the meaning of article 7(1)(a) 
of the Statute; 
 
- wilful killing as a war crime within the meaning of article 8(2)(a)(i) of the Statute; 
 
 
1585 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Amended Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to Article 
61(3)(a) of the Statute, p. 33 (26 June 2008) 
1586 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecution's Submission of the Document Containing the Charges 
and List of Evidence, 7, p. 3; Women´s Initiative for Gender Justice. Partial Conviction of Katanga 
by ICC, Acquittals for Sexual Violence and Use of Child Soldiers, The Prosecutor vs. Germain 
Katanga (7 March 2014). 
1587 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, pp. 209-211 
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- using children to participate actively in hostilities, as a war crime within the 
meaning of article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Statute; 
 
- intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population of Bogoro village, 
constituting a war crime within the meaning of article 8(2)(b)(i) of the Statute; 
 
- pillaging constituting a war crime within the meaning of article 8(2)(b)(xvi) of the 
Statute; 
 
- charge of destruction of property constituting a war crime within the meaning of 
article 8(2)(b)(xiii) of the Statute.1588 
The PTC I  also unanimously declined to confirm the charge of inhuman treatment 
as a war crime (within the meaning of article 8(2)(a)(ii)) on the basis of article 
61(7)(b) of the Rome Statute) as well as the charge of outrages upon personal 
dignity as a war crime (within the meaning of article 8(2)(b)(xxxi) of the Statute), 
on the basis of article 61(7)(b) of the Rome Statute).1589 
 
In relation to these two charges, the Pre-Trial Chamber I affirmed that there was 
enough evidence to establish substantial basis to believe that FNI/FRPI members 
carried out war crimes of outrages upon personal dignity and of inhuman 
treatment. Nonetheless, in the Chamber´s view, the Prosecution did not present 
evidence demonstrating that the perpetration of these crimes was intended by 
the accused as a constituting part of the common plan to destruct the Bogoro 
village. For this reason, the PTC I did not confirm the charges.1590  
 
Regarding the crimes of a sexual nature, the Chamber took into account that  
 
“Witness 249 is a Hema civilian woman [REDACTED]. She was 
abducted, undressed, and raped by an Ngiti combatant at the 
village of Bogoro. Following death threats, she became the 'wife' 
of an Ngiti combatant, and was repeatedly raped. She had a child 
as a result of these rapes during her captivity. 
 
b. Witness 132 is a Hema civilian woman [REDACTED]. She fled 
the village of Bogoro during the attack and was still in hiding 
when she was abducted by the combatants. She was repeatedly 
raped at the site of her abduction and while in captivity. She had 
a child as a result of these rapes during her captivity”1591 
 
and found that there was a substantial basis indicating that the criminal offences 
of rape and sexual slavery (as crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
 
1588 Ibidem  
1589 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, p. 211 
1590 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, pp. 204, 211  
1591 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, p. 114, para. 353 
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respectively, under article 7(1)(g) and article 8(2)(e)(vi) or 8(2)(b)(xxii)) were 
perpetrated by FNI/FRPI members against civilian women in the following of the 
24 February 2003 attack on the village of Bogoro.1592 
 
Indeed, the Pre-Trial Chamber I stated that in its view 
 
“the evidence is sufficient to establish substantial grounds to 
believe that, following the 24 February 2003 attack on the village 
of Bogoro, FNI/FRPI combatants committed rape and sexual 
enslavement of civilian women. 
 
348. The Chamber finds that there is sufficient evidence to 
establish substantial grounds to believe that civilian women were 
abducted from the village of Bogoro after the attack, imprisoned, 
and forced into becoming the 'wives' of FNI/FRPI combatants, 
required to cook for and obey the orders of FNI or FPRI 
combatants. 
 
349. The Chamber also finds that there is sufficient evidence to 
establish substantial grounds to believe that these civilian 
women were forced to engage in acts of a sexual nature, 
… 
351. The Chamber also finds that there is sufficient evidence to 
establish substantial grounds to believe that these rapes resulted 
in the invasion of the body of these civilian women by the 
penetration of the perpetrator's sexual organ or other body parts. 
 
352. The evidence admitted for the purposes of the confirmation 
hearing also gives substantial grounds to believe that these 
invasions were committed by force, threat or fear of violence or 
death, and/or detention. 
… 
354. In conclusion, the Chamber finds that there are substantial 
grounds to believe that the war crimes of rape and sexual 
slavery, as denned in article 8(2)(b)(xxii) of the Statute, were 
committed by FNI/FRPI members in the aftermath of the 24 
February 2003 attack on the village of Bogoro.”1593  
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber I clarified that 
 
“551. In relation to the crimes of rape and sexual slavery, the 
majority of the Chamber, Judge Anita Usacka dissenting, also 
finds that although the evidence tendered by the Prosecution is 
not sufficient to establish substantial grounds to believe that the 
 
1592 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, pp. 113-115, 145-149, paras. 
347, 350, 354, 434-444 
1593 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, pp. 113- 115, paras. 347-
349, 351, 352, 354 
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agreement or common plan specifically instructed the soldiers to 
rape or sexually enslave the civilian women there, the majority of 
the Chamber finds that there is sufficient evidence to establish 
substantial grounds to believe that, in the ordinary course of 
events, the implementation of the common plan would inevitably 
result in the rape or sexual enslavement of civilian women 
there.”1594 
 
The majority of the Chamber also understood that there was 
 
“sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe 
that from the Aveba meeting in early 2003 to the day of the attack 
on 24 February 2003, Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui knew that, as a consequence of the common plan, rape and 
sexual slavery of women and girls would occur in the ordinary 
course of the events. 
 
568. Accordingly, in the view of the majority of the Chamber, this 
conclusion, in relation to the crimes against humanity of rape and 
sexual slavery of women and girls, is also substantiated by the 
fact that: 
 
(i) rape and sexual slavery against of women and girls constituted 
a common practice in the region of Ituri throughout the protracted 
armed conflict; 
 
(ii) such common practice was widely acknowledged amongst 
the soldiers and the commanders; 
 
(iii) in previous and subsequent attacks against the civilian 
population, the militias led and used by the suspects to 
perpetrate attacks repeatedly committed rape and sexual slavery 
against women and girls living in Ituri; 
 
(iv) the soldiers and child soldiers were trained (and grew up) in 
camps in which women and girls were constantly raped and kept 
in conditions to ease sexual slavery; 
 
(v) Germain Katanga, Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui and their 
commanders visited the camps under their control, frequently 
received reports of the activities of the camps by the camps 
commanders under their command, and were in permanent 
contact with the combatants during the attacks, including the 
attack on Bogoro; 
 
(vi) the fate reserved to captured women and girls was widely 
known amongst combatants; and 
 
 
1594 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, p. 192, para. 551 
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(vii) the suspects and the combatants were aware, for example, 
which camps and which commanders more frequently engaged 
in this practice. 
 
569. Therefore, the majority of the Chamber, Judge Anita Usacka 
dissenting, finds that there is sufficient evidence to establish 
substantial grounds to believe that when they planned, ordered 
and monitored the attack on Bogoro and on other villages 
inhabited mainly by Hema population, the suspects knew that 
rape and sexual slavery would be committed in the ordinary 
course of the events.”1595 
 
Except for Judge Anita Usacka, the majority of the Chamber found that the 
evidence submitted was consistent enough, enabling the establishment of 
substantial basis to believe that on 24 February 2003, the accused jointly 
committed through other persons (within the meaning of article 25(3)(a) of the 
Statute) the crimes of sexual slavery and rape (as war crimes under article 
8(2)(b)(xxii) of the Rome Statute, and as crimes against humanity under article 
7(l)(g) of the Statute) “with knowledge that the following crimes would occur in the 
ordinary course of events (dolus directus of the second degree)”.1596 
 
The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui case was the 
first instance in which sexual crimes were charged at the International Criminal 
Court.1597  
 
In spite of this development, it is noteworthy that the sexual crimes were the only 
category of offences that brought about divergence among the judges.  
 
As aforementioned, in her Partly Dissenting Opinion, Judge Anita Usacka found 
that the evidence presented by the Prosecution was not enough in order to 
determine the suspects' criminal responsibility for the war crimes and crimes 
against humanity of rape and sexual slavery.  
 
She asserted that   
 
“the Chamber finds that there is sufficient evidence to establish 
substantial grounds to believe that the objective elements of the 
war crimes and crimes against humanity of rape and sexual 
slavery, as described in counts 6, 7,8, and 9, were committed. 
 
14. While I agree with this conclusion, I am not "thoroughly 
satisfied" that the Prosecution's allegations are sufficiently strong 
 
1595 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, pp. 202-204, paras. 567-
569 
1596 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, pp. 205-206, paras. 576, 
580 
1597 ICC Women website, Partial Conviction of Katanga by ICC, Acquittals for Sexual Violence 
and Use of Child Soldiers, The Prosecutor vs. Germain Katanga; Opinio Juris website, Sane, J., 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui: reflections on the ICC’s first acquittal 
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to establish substantial grounds to believe that the suspects were 
criminally responsible for the commission of those crimes. In 
particular, I do not find that the evidence presented is sufficient 
to establish substantial grounds to believe that the suspects 
intended for rape and sexual slavery to be committed during the 
attack on Bogoro village, or even in the aftermath of the Bogoro 
attack, or to establish the suspects' knowledge that rape and 
sexual slavery would be committed by the combatants in the 
ordinary course of events.”1598 
 
The judge openly appreciated 
 
“the difficulty the Prosecution must face in acquiring evidence 
which would directly link a suspect to these types of crimes when 
criminal responsibility is alleged under article 25(3)(a) of the 
Statute on the basis of the existence of a common plan. I also 
appreciate that the Prosecution has a substantial burden under 
article 30 of the Statute in presenting evidence that the suspects 
either intended for rapes and sexual slavery to occur when it is 
not alleged that they were the direct perpetrators, or were aware 
that rapes and sexual slavery would occur in the ordinary course 
of events, when the basis for criminal responsibility is that they 
jointly committed the crimes through other persons, within the 
meaning of article 25(3)(a) of the Statute.”1599 
 
In spite of that, she asserted that  
 
“[o]n the basis of the evidence presented, I am not "thoroughly 
satisfied" that there are substantial grounds to believe that the 
suspects intended for rape and sexual slavery to be included in 
the common plan to attack Bogoro village on 24 February 2003. 
In my view, the evidence presented is insufficient to directly or 
closely link Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui to 
these crimes.”1600  
 
The trial commenced on 24 November 2009. The parties and participants 
submitted their closing statements from 15 to 23 May 2012.1601 
 
1598 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, Partly Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Anita Ušacka, p. 218, paras. 13-14 (30 September 2008) 
1599 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, Partly Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Anita Ušacka, pp. 223-224, para.28 (30 September 2008) 
1600 Ibidem 
1601 ICC website, Case information sheet, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga (20 March 2018) 
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As previously stated, the case against Germain Katanga was joined to the case 
against Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui. Nonetheless, on 21 November 2012, the Trial 
Chamber II decided to severe the charges against the two defendants.1602   
 
The Majority of Trial Chamber II decided to trigger regulation 55 of the 
Regulations of the Court and notified the parties and participants that the mode 
of liability under which Germain Katanga stood charged was subject to legal 
recharacterisation on the grounds of article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute.1603 
 
The triggering of the recharacterisation under regulation 55 of the Regulations of 
the Court came as an unfold of Germain Katanga’s own testimony in which “he 
spontaneously presented various accounts, explanations and comments to the 
Chamber … that they might later be used to incriminate him.”1604 
 
Katanga did not have his statement taken at the investigative stage. He  
 
“chose to testify as a witness under oath at the end of the trial, 
having heard all of the viva voce evidence. As a result, the 
uniqueness of his statement at the final stage of the hearings did 
not put the Chamber in a position to compare the account he 
gave at that time with previous statements.”1605 
 
The Majority of Trial Chamber II (Judge Van den Wyngaert dissenting on this 
regard), after analysing the evidence, understood that 
 
“Germain Katanga’s mode of participation could be considered 
from a different perspective from that underlying the Confirmation 
Decision and it was therefore appropriate to implement regulation 
55 of the Regulations of the Court while ensuring that the 
Defence is able to exercise its rights effectively, in accordance 
with regulation 55(2) and 55(3).”1606  
 
The Chamber stated that it was  
 
“prohibited from exceeding the facts and the circumstances 
described in the charges, but it may give them a different legal 
characterisation if it considers it necessary to assess them 
 
1602 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Trial Chamber II, Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the 
Court and severing the charges against the accused persons (21 November 2012) 
1603 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Trial Chamber II, Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the 
Court and severing the charges against the accused persons, p. 29 (21 November 2012) 
1604 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Trial Chamber II, Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the 
Court and severing the charges against the accused persons, pp. 11, 25 (21 November 2012) 
1605 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 38, para. 64 (7 March 2014) 
1606 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Trial Chamber II, Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the 
Court and severing the charges against the accused persons, p. 6, para. 6 
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differently, in accordance with regulation 55 of the Regulations of 
the Court.”1607 
 
Following, it explained that  
 
“the triggering of regulation 55 in respect solely of Germain 
Katanga necessarily now leads the Chamber to order 
unanimously, pursuant to article 64(5) of the Statute, that the 
charges against Mathieu Ngudjolo be severed.”1608 
 
In fact, the triggering of regulation 55 in respect of Germain Katanga had 
 
“the potential consequence of prolonging the proceedings 
against him. The Chamber therefore considers that no purpose 
would be served by deferring the decision on Mathieu Ngudjolo 
until a ruling is made in respect of Germain Katanga, and in 
respect of Mathieu Ngudjolo, in the wording of rule 136(1), it is 
necessary “to avoid serious prejudice to” him, which requires that 
the proceedings against him be brought to an end promptly. 
 
62. Consequently, separate treatment of Mathieu Ngudjolo’s 
case, which also meets the dual requirement of fairness and 
expeditiousness established by article 64 of the Statute, 
necessarily leads the Chamber to order the severance of the 
charges against him and to rule separately on their merits without 
the need for him to make submissions on the recharacterisation 
being considered for his co-Accused.” 1609 
 
It is important to stress that, unlike the recharacterisation, the severance of the 
two cases was ordered unanimously by Trial Chamber II.1610  
 
Regarding Katanga, the Majority of Trial Chamber II found that it was 
 
“possible to enable the Accused to prepare an efficient and 
effective defence under regulation 55(3), without prolonging the 
proceedings such as to entail an undue delay.”1611 
 
 
1607 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Trial Chamber II, Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the 
Court and severing the charges against the accused persons, p.8, para. 10 
1608 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Trial Chamber II, Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the 
Court and severing the charges against the accused persons, p. 27, para. 59 
1609 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Trial Chamber II, Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the 
Court and severing the charges against the accused persons, pp. 27-28, paras. 61-62 
1610 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Trial Chamber II, Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the 
Court and severing the charges against the accused persons, p.27, para. 59 
1611 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Trial Chamber II, Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the 
Court and severing the charges against the accused persons, p. 22, para. 44 
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Therefore, as an outcome of Katanga´s testimony, the Majority of the Chamber 
found that it was possible to confer a distinct legal characterisation of the facts 
and the circumstances expounded in the charges without going beyond their 
limits, though. Nonetheless, so as to avoid undue delay in the proceedings to 
Ngudjolo, the Chamber, by unanimity, severed the proceedings of the trials 
against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui. 
 
It is also noteworthy that the Majority of Trial Chamber II ruled that the victims 
who had been allowed to participate in the initial proceedings were granted 
permission to remain participating in the two severed proceedings.1612 
 
On 18 December 2012, the Trial Chamber II pronounced the verdict in the case 
against Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui and acquitted him of all charges, including the 
sexual offences.1613  
 
The Chamber noted that there was  
 
“a wealth of evidence to show that during and after the 24 
February 2003 attack, inhabitants of Bogoro were killed, women 
were raped and some were kept in captivity by the attackers, 
property was pillaged and, lastly, buildings were attacked and 
destroyed.”1614 
 
The attack was carried out by the Lendu and Ngiti militias (comprising the FRPI 
and the Lendu militia of BeduEzekere) against the UPC forces and the 
predominantly Hema civilian population of Bogoro on 24 February 2003, and took 
place in the background of an on-going armed conflict opposing these groups 
against each other.1615 
 
In accordance with the Prosecution, Germain Katanga had the control of the FRPI 
and Mathieu Ngudjolo of the Lendu militia of BeduEzekere.1616 
 
Nevertheless, when analysing the evidence related to Ngudjolo’s authority over 
the Lendu combatants from Bedu-Ezekere, the Chamber stated that it could not  
 
“discount the possibility that, at the time of the events under 
consideration, he was one of the military commanders who held 
a senior position among the Lendu combatants from Bedu-
Ezekere groupement, but emphasises that it is not in a position 
to establish this fact beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
1612 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Trial Chamber II, Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the 
Court and severing the charges against the accused persons, p. 28, para. 64 
1613 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute,  
1614 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 125-126, para. 338 
1615 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 29, para. 73 
1616 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12. Trial Chamber II, 




502. Furthermore, the Chamber underscores that, in any event, 
its analysis has not provided it with credible evidence to find that 
Mathieu Ngudjolo had issued military orders or instructions, 
taken steps to enforce such orders or instructions, initiated 
disciplinary proceedings or ordered sanctions of this kind. 
 
503. Consequently, the Chamber cannot, on the basis of all the 
evidence in the case record, find beyond reasonable doubt that 
the Accused was the leader of the Lendu combatants who took 
part in the 24 February 2003 attack on Bogoro.”1617 
 
In fact, Mathieu Ngudjolo´s “rank of colonel was only mentioned during the 
signing of the 18 March 2003 Agreement to end Hostilities.” The Chamber found 
no proof that he was already a senior military leader previously to this 
appointment and, specifically, before the attack of 24 February 2003.1618   
 
Regarding the participation of child soldiers from Bedu-Ezekere group in the 
attack on Bogoro of 24 February 2003, in particular, the Trial Chamber II noted 
that  
 
“children under the age of 15 years, including some bearing 
bladed weapons, from Bedu-Ezekere groupement were present 
at the 24 February 2003 attack on Bogoro. However, it also notes 
that there is insufficient evidence to establish, for example, that 
military training had been given to the children under the age of 
15 years on the Accused’s orders, that he used them as personal 
bodyguards or for any other purpose prior to, during or following 
the attack. Consequently, the Chamber is unable to establish 
beyond reasonable doubt a link between the Accused and the 
children who were in Bogoro on 24 February 2003.”1619 
 
As a consequence, the Chamber found Mathieu Ngudjolo not guilty and acquitted 
him of all charges, including the ones of war crimes and crimes against humanity 
of rape and sexual slavery.1620 
 
This judgment was the second rendered by the International Criminal Court and 
its first acquittal (previously it had condemned Lubanga on 15 March 2012). The 
lack of authority of Mathieu Ngudjolo grounded the Chamber´s decision, and, 




1617 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12. Trial Chamber II, 
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On 7 March 2014, the Trial Chamber II rendered its judgment on the Prosecution 
v. Germain Katanga case.1622  
 
In the part of the decision where the Chamber analysed the crimes committed 
during the attack on Bogoro on 24 February 2003, when addressing the crimes 
of rape and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity and war crimes, the 
Chamber stated that 
  
“[i]n the Decision on the confirmation of charges, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber found that there was sufficient evidence to establish 
substantial grounds to believe that during and after the attack on 
the village of Bogoro on 24 February 2003, members of the FNI 
and the FRPI committed acts of rape and sexual slavery 
constituting war crimes under article 8(2)(b)(xxii) of the Statute 
and crimes against humanity under article 7(1)(g) of the Statute. 
According to the Pre-Trial Chamber, combatants of those two 
movements raped civilians during and after the attack, and some 
of the women who had been subjected to these acts were also 
abducted, imprisoned and forced to become the wives of the 
combatants, to engage in acts of a sexual nature, to carry out 
household chores for them and, generally, to obey them.” 1623  
 
The Prosecution argued that 
 
“evidence on record established beyond reasonable doubt that 
during and after the attack on Bogoro, Witnesses P-132, P249 
and P-353 and other young women were raped by Lendu and 
Ngiti combatants.  … they were abducted by the combatants and 
taken to their camps, where they were sexually enslaved. There 
they were forcibly married to commanders and combatants and 
raped repeatedly, physically abused, deprived of liberty and 
forced to do household chores. The Prosecution submitted that 
the women were severely affected both physically and mentally 
by this experience and that they were rejected by their 
community. According to the Prosecution, they endured this fate 
because they had convinced their abductors that they were not 
Hema. Lastly, according to the Prosecution, these acts were not 
isolated incidents but common practice among the Lendu 




1622 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute,  
1623 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 359, para. 958  
1624  ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
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Surely, during the trial proceedings, the Prosecution presented evidence that 
during and subsequently to the attack on Bogoro, Witnesses P-132, P-249 and 
P-353 as well as other young women were raped by Lendu and Ngiti combatants. 
They were also abducted by the attackers and taken to their camps to be sexually 
enslaved. Once in the camps, these women were forcibly married to commanders 
and combatants, being raped frequently, enduring physical abuse and 
deprivation of liberty, and being obligated to carry out domestic tasks, such as 
sweeping and washing. As a consequence of this experience, they were 
extremely affected not only physically but also mentally, and, upon returning to 
their community, faced rejection. These women were subject to such hardships 
(instead of being killed) because they had persuaded their abductors into 
believing that they were not of Hema ethnicity.1625     
 
The Defence rebutted by saying that the evidence produced established neither 
that the crime of rape had been carried out by combatants under Katanga’s 
orders, immediately prior, during and/or in the aftermath of the 24 February 2003 
attack on Bogoro nor that women abducted from Bogoro had been subjected to 
sexual slavery by the combatants.  
 
The Defence also submitted that the Prosecution had failed to prove, in relation 
to the crimes against humanity, that rape and sexual enslavement were 
commonly practiced by the FRPI combatants. Moreover, the Defence sustained 
that, regarding war crimes the Prosecution had not proved either that the acts 
were linked to an international armed conflict.1626 
 
In its findings of fact and legal characterisation on the crimes of rape and sexual 
slavery, the Trial Chamber II determined that, in relation to the charges that such 
crimes were perpetrated during and after the 24 February 2003 attack on Bogoro, 
and particularly by Ngiti combatants from Walendu-Bindi “collectivité,” its 
decisions would be mainly based on the “viva voce” evidence of Witnesses P-
132, P-249 and P-353, who testified as direct victims of these crimes.1627   
 
The TC II also added:  
 
“the evidence of other witnesses may also be relevant, especially 
in confirming or corroborating the abduction of certain women 
during the attack, their captivity and their allocation to Ngiti 
combatants. The Chamber must, however, underscore that 
 
1625 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, Office 
of the Prosecutor, Corrigendum du mémoire final ‐ ICC‐01/04‐01/07‐3251‐Conf, pp. 40-45, 
paras. 76-89 (3 July 2012); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. 
Trial Chamber II, Office of the Prosecutor, Closing Statements, T. 336, pp. 7-8, 50-59 (15 May 
2012); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Common Legal Representative of the main group of Victims, Second Corrigendum Conclusions 
Finales, pp. 7-8, 74-77, paras. 6-9, 194-201 (16 March 2012); ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, Judgment pursuant to article 74 
of the Statute, p. 359, para. 959  
1626 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 360, para. 960  
1627 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 368, para. 986 
335 
 
under rule 63(4) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence there is 
no legal requirement that corroboration is required to prove 
crimes of sexual violence.”1628  
 
Certainly, as noted by the Chamber,   
 
“the initial investigative documents in its possession date back to 
mid-2006 and therefore post-date by three years the sub judice 
facts. Yet, the taking of testimonies that are as close as possible 
to the date of the events is of critical importance. It is equally 
desirable, where practicable, to make as many factual findings 
as possible − in particular, forensic findings which are often 
crucial to the identification of victims − expeditiously and at the 
loci in quo. In the case at bar, the absence of such evidence 
made it necessary to rely primarily on the statements of witness 
and reports of MONUC investigators.”1629 
 
Moreover, the Trial Chamber II affirmed that  
 
“[h]aving regard to the specific nature of evidence peculiar to the 
crimes of rape and sexual slavery, the Chamber will apply a 
specific modus operandi to the analysis of their commission. 
First, it will undertake a factual scrutiny and provide a legal 
characterisation of the three sub judice testimonies. It will then 
present its conclusions of law on the commission of the two types 
of crimes as a crime against humanity (article 7(1)(g) of the 
Statute) and a war crime (article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Statute.”1630 
 
Therefore, in relation to the crimes of rape and sexual slavery, because a long 
time had passed since the allegedly commission of these crimes and there was 
no forensic examination available, the Trial Chamber II had to rely chiefly on the 
victims´ testimonies. In this context, and taking into account the particularities of 
the evidence of sexual and gender based crimes, the Chamber decided to 
proceed to a close examination of the facts and then provide a legal 
characterisation of the “sub judice” testimonies of Witnesses P-132, P-249 and 
P-353 so as to be able to reach conclusions regarding the perpetration of crimes 
of rape and sexual slavery during the offensive against Bogoro and in its 
aftermath. 
 
It is relevant to stress that the Trial Chamber II also proceeded to an analysis of 
the credibility of specific witnesses, including Witnesses P-132 and P-353, which 
encompassed a detailed examination of the conditions under which they testified 




1630ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
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Indeed, the Chamber stated that  
 
“since the Prosecution’s case with regard to Germain Katanga is 
for the most part based upon the testimony of two key witnesses, 
P-219 and P-28, whose credibility is vigorously impugned, the 
Chamber is of the view that the conditions under which they 
testified and the substance of their testimony should be 
thoroughly analysed. It adopted the same approach for 
Witnesses P-12, P-132, P-161, P-250, P-279, P-280, P-317 and 
P-353, who were also called to testify by the Prosecution.”1632 
 
As a result, the Chamber made an extensive assessment of the statements of P-
132 and P-353, who provided their testimonies as direct victims of the crimes of 
rape and sexual slavery.1633  
 
- Witness P-132  
 
Witness P-132’s affirmed in her testimony that she was in her family house in 
Bogoro on 24 February 2003 and awoke to gunfire at about 5 a.m. She saw that 
the city was been attacked and then ran away in direction of the valley, towards 
Waka mountain, and hid in the grass near the river. While trying to escape, P-
132 was hit by gunfire and saw that several people had been killed.1634 
 
Witness P-132 narrated that she was found hiding in the bush by 6 combatants 
(who carried knives, guns and spears) and convinced them that she was not part 
of the Hema ethnic group. Subsequently, she was sexually abused by three of 
her attackers, who in turn penetrated her vagina. The witness endured 
considerable pain and trauma as a result of these actions.1635  
 
P-132 was forced to follow her attackers to a Ngiti camp in Walendu-Bindi. There, 
after being questioned about why she was in Bogoro, she was sent to prison and 
obligated to perform domestic tasks. The witness said that, while in the camp, 
she was forced by some members of the militia to have sexual intercourse in the 
bush and also that other members entered the prison and raped the female 
prisoners.1636 
 
P-132 also stated that the head of the camp determined where she would live 
and ordered her to “marry” to one of the men in the camp. She affirmed as well 
 
1632 Ibidem 
1633 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 52, 368, paras. 111, 986 
1634 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 81, paras. 199, 200 
1635 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7(1)(g)-2, footnote 17; 8(2)(e)(vi)-
2, footnote 65; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial 
Chamber II, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 369-370, para. 989 
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that she saw Germain Katanga three times in the camp where she was 
imprisoned.1637 
 
In its analysis, the Chamber observed that during her meetings with the 
investigators of the Office of the Prosecutor, P-132 gave different accounts of 
what she had experienced following the attack on Bogoro.1638  
 
In fact, the witness indicated two distinct places of birth and modified the name 
of the camp where she was held as a prisoner. She also changed the place and 
preliminary information she had given regarding the people with whom she had 
been held. Moreover, P-132 affirmed that she had admitted to her captors that 
she was of Hema ethnicity, but later stated that she had concealed her ethnicity 
from them.1639 
 
The Chamber noted that in spite of such contradictions, the version that P-132 
provided before the Court coincides with her last statement at the Office of the 
Prosecutor. Additionally, she recognised by herself the inconsistency and 
explained that she was scared of telling the truth to the investigators.1640  
 
When addressing the Prosecution´s investigations, the Trial Chamber II 
expressly recognised that witnesses can be overtaken by fear when recollecting 
the events. Certainly, it affirmed that 
 
“59. The investigation in the case of The Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga, is along with those in the cases of The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga and The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo, one 
of the first investigations conducted by the Office of the 
Prosecutor. The Chamber is mindful that the investigation had to 
be carried out in a region with a high degree of insecurity. It 
therefore acknowledges the difficulties which the Office of the 
Prosecutor may have encountered in finding witnesses with a 
sufficiently precise recollection of the events and ready to testify 
without fear, as well as gathering − absent infrastructure, 
archives or public information – reliable documentary evidence 
which can be used to determine the truth.”1641 
 
Moreover, the Chamber recalled that  
 
“victims of sexual violence are particularly vulnerable witnesses. 
Of note is that the Court’s Victims and Witnesses Unit 
underscored that P-132 was still highly traumatised by her 
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experience and that it required “[TRANSLATION ] considerable 
effort” for her to testify before the Court. Moreover, a member of 
that Unit’s staff remained by her side throughout her testimony. 
The Chamber is alive to the fact, as recalled by the witness, that 
women who are victims of such acts run a very high risk of being 
rejected by their own community when they decide to tell the truth 
about their ordeal. It is therefore understandable that P-132 
wished to know which guarantees and protective measures the 
Court could provide her before telling the truth to the 
Prosecution’s investigators.”1642 
 
The Chamber noted that, during the trial, P-132 stuck to the account of events 
that she had gradually narrated to the OTP investigators and did not importantly 
contradict herself when providing evidence. According to the Chamber, this 
consistency is worth of emphasis because, in spite of the specific care in the 
conduction of the proceedings, on several moments during her testimony in court, 
P-132 emotionally broke down in tears and had to stop, causing adjournment.1643 
 
Therefore, notwithstanding the undeniable difficulties that P-132 faced in 
remembering those tragic circumstances and, what is more, describing them, the 
Chamber regarded that the coherence of her testimony supports her 
credibility.1644 
 
 Further, the TC II noted that  
 
“on the subject of P-132, several witnesses stated that they had 
heard an account which corresponds in many respects to the 
witness’s testimony before the Chamber.”1645 
 
With respect to the circumstances of Witness P-132´s abduction, there was 
discrepancy between her account of the events and P-353´s testimony. In fact, in 
accordance with Witness P-353, she, P-132 and two other young women were 
hiding in a house when they were apprehended.  On a photograph presented to 
her in court, P-353 recognised P-132 as being one of the four persons who 
survived the massacre of the inhabitants of the house in which, in consonance 
with P-353, they had been hiding. P-353 also confirmed that the woman in the 
photograph was one those whose first name she had formerly furnished. P-132, 
by her turn, affirmed that she had been captured by combatants in the bush, 
where she was hiding after running away from her family home. P-353 then said 
that P-132 had been captured with her and conducted to the Institute before being 
separate into distinct groups and parting ways.1646 
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The Defence argued that P-132 had not been forcibly married but rather 
maintained a consensual relationship with one of the men in the camp. In spite of 
the fact that the Defence several times attempted to make her agree to this 
version of the events, P-132 sustained her account.1647 
 
In relation to P-132’s personal experience, the Chamber noted that  
 
“several details she provided were corroborated by testimonies 
of various other witnesses,”1648  
 
inclusive of her assertion that she was abducted by combatants on patrol, that 
she had denied that she was Hema when enquired about her ethnicity, and the 
name of the camp where she was held as a prisoner.1649  
 
Moreover, P-132 testified that she was hit by gunfire being wounded in a 
determined part of her body when fleeing. The bullet wound could be seen on 
photographs that were accepted into the record. Also, another witness affirmed 
that a woman who was the namesake of P-132 and whom he had taken to the 
camp presented a bullet wound exactly on the same part of the body as P-132 
mentioned. In view of that, the Chamber established that “on 24 February 2003, 
P-132 sustained a bullet wound in Bogoro.”1650 
 
The Trial Chamber II asserted that Witness P-132 gave a somewhat thorough 
narrative of both her flight and the period that she was hiding, recalling what she 
had heard, and offering clarification when solicited. The Chamber also observed 
numerous coincidences in P-132 and P-249’s testimonies regarding what the 
former heard and saw during the 24 February 2003 attack. As a result, even 
though P-353’s testimony could cast some doubt in relation to P-132’s version of 
the events surrounding her capture, the Chamber understood that it could not 
wholly affect P-132’s testimony.1651 
 
In fact, the Chamber attributed the divergences between the testimonies of P-353 
and P-132, and the uncertainties which arise from the incongruent points, to the 
situation of vulnerability of the witnesses at the time of the events and also when 
giving testimonies before the Court. In this context, the Chamber, after finding 
that none of the testimonies should be given precedence over the other in n 
relation to the circumstances of P-132’s capture, decided to rely exclusively on 
the parts that it regarded that were consistent and trustworthy.1652 
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The Chamber understood that, based on either P-132’s statement or P-353´s, it 
was established that P-132 was in Bogoro during the attack on 24 February 2003 
and, thus, was in a position to see what was occurring there. It was further 
established that she was captured in Bogoro (although the precise circumstances 
of her capture and the route she took were not aligned with P-353’s testimony). 
In accordance with P-132´s testimony and that of Witness D02-148, she was 
abducted in Bogoro and then forcedly taken to a Ngiti camp where she was 
sexually enslaved.1653 
 
In connection to the crime of rape, Trial Chamber II considered that it could 
 
“rely on those parts of Witness P-132’s testimony concerning the 
sexual violence which she claimed to have suffered in Bogoro, 
despite apparent contradictions identified in her previous 
statements and discrepancies discerned between her 
statements and certain aspects of P-353’s account. The 
Chamber will not hold against the witness her somewhat unclear 
in-court testimony, which may be explained by her difficulty in 
describing such intimate scenes to the Chamber. However, the 
Chamber will highlight the detailed nature of the information 
provided by P-132 about what she allegedly saw and heard from 
her hiding-place in the Waka plain and note that several details 
she provided were corroborated by testimonies of various other 
witnesses.”1654 
 
Thus, in spite of the existence of some discrepancies among Witness P-132’s 
testimony and determined parts of Witness P-353’s testimony, the Chamber 
admitted the former´s account on the sexual violence she had suffered. In fact, 
the Trial Chamber II decided to disregard the fact that Witness P-132’s “sub 
judice” testimony presented some cloudiness for considering that it was caused 
by the witness´ embarrassment to describe highly intimate scenes. Also, the 
Chamber took into account the circumstance that Witness P-132 provided a very 
detailed account of what she had seen and heard while hiding in the Waka plain 
and noted that numerous particularities she provided were corroborated by other 
witnesses` testimonies (D02-148 and Witness P-249).  
 
Although it was very difficult for the Witness P-132 to describe before the Court 
the precise circumstances of her suffering, she seemed to be conscious that she 
could not resist the attackers under the penalty of being killed. Surely, the Trial 
Chamber II noted that the witness had heard that other persons who were trying 
to escape were being murdered, and that, convinced that death was imminent, 
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- Witness P-353 
 
In relation to Witness P-353, she affirmed that the attack on Bogoro began in the 
morning and that she took refuge in her house with other fleeing neighbours. The 
combatants, after breaking down the front door, entered in the house and start 
shooting and killing the people who were hiding there.1656 
 
Witness P-353 and three other young women who were hiding with her denied 
being Hema to the attackers, so the latter asked them to leave the house. Two 
attackers started to argue regarding to whom P-353 would be assigned. She was 
taken by the combatants to a Ngiti camp in Walendu-Bindi. After arriving at the 
camp, P-353 was forced to have sexual intercourse with two men, and thereafter 
on a daily basis during many months.1657 
 
Witness P-353 also affirmed that, around three months after she had been taken 
to the camp, she heard someone arriving by car, to whom the combatants 
shouted “[TRANSLATION] President”.1658 
 
The Trial Chamber II observed that  
 
“333. P-353 replied frankly and candidly to the questions put to 
her by the Prosecution and the Defence. When overwhelmed by 
emotion at certain questions, she would inform the parties and 
participants. The Chamber considered her testimony to be very 
coherent and noted that she testified clearly, despite the extreme 
gravity of the crimes of which she claims to have been a 
victim.”1659 
 
The analysis made by the Defence of Witness P-353’s testimony casted doubt 
on various points, namely: 
 
“the witness did not recognise the CECA 20 church in Bogoro 
from a photograph shown to her; she claimed to have attended 
school in 2002 at a time when her school had been moved to 
Bunia; she confused the Bogoro Institute with the Muzora 
Institute and, lastly, P-353 claimed that Ugandan soldiers were 
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The Chamber noted that some of contextual information furnished by Witness P-
353 was not correct. However, among other arguments, the Chamber affirmed 
that these were  
 
"distant events and P-353 was under the age of 18 on 24 
February 2003 which, in the Chamber’s view, explains why she 
was unable to identify precisely which armed group was 
defending Bogoro at the material time.”1661 
 
In conclusion, the Trial Chamber II recalled that  
 
“P-353 is a vulnerable witness who did her utmost to try to forget 
the events she experienced in Bogoro on 24 February 2003 and 
their tragic consequences. In particular, she stated that out of 
shame she systematically avoided any conversation on the 
attack; she wished never to return to the village; her father had 
asked her never to bring up what had happened; and she put 
great effort into erasing these painful events from her memory. 
Given the circumstances, the Chamber considers that the 
inaccuracies noted in P-353’s evidence only reflect her difficulty 
in recalling in court events that she had endeavoured to forget in 
order to survive in a particularly harsh social environment, which 
is hostile to women who have been raped.”1662 
 
The Chamber, considering Witness P-353´s testimony consistent and her replies 
precise, rendered that was credible and reliable.1663 
 
- The Crime of Rape 
 
In its findings of fact and legal characterisation regarding the crime of rape, the 
Trial Chamber II found that, based on Witness P-132’s testimony, during the 
attack on Bogoro on 24 February 2003, 3 combatants forced her to have sexual 
intercourse with them.1664 
 
Indeed, the Trial Chamber II was satisfied that Witness P-132 was sexually 
abused (forced to vaginal penetration) by 3 attackers and that1665   
 
“such penetrations could only have taken place with violence and 
coercion, since in any event the perpetrators told the witness that 
she had become “[TRANSLATION] their wife”. In the view of the 
Chamber, such acts of a sexual nature committed by attackers 
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during an armed offensive against civilians are necessarily 
coercive. In that instance, the coercion was all the more 
significant in that the crimes were committed collectively against 
a single victim.”1666 
 
In accordance with the Chamber, the witness “was aware of the risks which non-
compliance entailed, she had no choice but to suffer in silence.” In fact, the 
Chamber noted that  
 
“the witness had heard that other persons who had taken flight 
were being killed and was convinced that death was looming, she 
was in a state of complete submission at that moment.”1667 
 
In sum, the Chamber considered that  
 
“although P-132’s testimony about the events is at times 
inconsistent due to, and this must be repeated, her difficulty in 
reviving such painful memories, it can be relied on to establish 
that the three persons who attacked her in Bogoro intentionally 
committed the crime of rape. In fact, it can be inferred from the 
circumstances of the events that the aforementioned subjective 
elements are established, as the men had the intention of 
engaging in sexual intercourse with the woman and were fully 
aware of the coercive environment in which she found 
herself.”1668 
 
- Witness P-249 
 
The Chamber noted that, during the attack on Bogoro village, Witness P-249 was 
found hiding in the bush by 6 armed combatants, who chased and dragged her 
through the bush. She was forced to have sexual intercourse with them. Certainly, 
she was undressed, assaulted, threatened with death by those men. They twice 
forcibly penetrated her vagina. Then, the group of combatants took the witness 
to a place where she was held against her will. There the witness was again hit 
and raped, although she asked her attackers to kill her instead of treating her in 
that way.1669 
 
The Chamber also noted that Witness P-249 was extremely vulnerable and had 
strong grounds to be afraid of being killed.1670 
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The Defence pointed out some differences between P-249’s statement to the 
Office of the Prosecutor and her testimony before the court. Nevertheless, the 
Chamber noted that  
 
“the Witness met with the investigators twice and that although 
her second account does differ from the first, it is to a great extent 
identical to her in court testimony. The Chamber is of the view, 
furthermore, particularly in the light of the witness’s own 
explanations, that the contradictions were due to her initial 
reluctance to reveal personal information and the place where 
she lived, to recount her ordeal and to provide details about the 
number, names and conduct of her attackers. In the view of the 
Chamber, these inconsistencies − essentially arising from the 
witness’s sense of shame at having to reveal what she had 
endured and her security concerns − do not therefore undermine 
her credibility. Furthermore, although the witness stated that the 
events had taken place the “[TRANSLATION] day after” the 
attack, the Chamber has no doubt that the assault did take place 
on 24 February 2003. In fact, P-249’s testimony shows that she 
considered the attack to have begun on the night of 23 to 24 
February 2003 and that what she calls the “[TRANSLATION] day 
after” actually denotes the day of the 24th.”1671 
 
In face of that, the Chamber found that Witness P-249 was forced by combatants 
to engage in sexual intercourse during the attack on Bogoro on 24 February 2003. 
In the Chamber´s view, the body of evidence was sufficient to establish the first 
two objective elements of the crime of rape.1672  
 
Further, P-249’s attackers perpetrated acts of violence (physical and 
psychological) against her and humiliated her, circumstances which allowed the 
Chamber to find that the mental elements demanded by article 30 of the Rome 
Statute were also established. Additionally, the attackers could not have been 
oblivious to her verbal objections.1673   
 
Accordingly, the Chamber considered that  
 
“in Bogoro on 24 February 2003, six combatants intentionally 
invaded P-249’s body in the knowledge of the force, threats and 
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In relation to Witness P-353, the TC II affirmed that  
 
“[a]fter witnessing the very violent murders in Bogoro of those 
with whom she had been hiding, P-353 was forced to go with the 
perpetrators and transport for them property they had just stolen. 
The combatants then declared that she was thenceforth 
“[TRANSLATION] their wife”. Abused physically and spared for 
the sole reason that she was not Hema, the witness 
subsequently found herself alone, deprived of liberty in the 
combatants’ camp, several hours’ walk from her village. Two of 
them, who were part of the group that she had had to go along 
with to the camp, in turn engaged in sexual intercourse with her 
on the evening of her arrival. In the light of her in-court testimony, 
the Chamber considers that both men forced her to engage in 
sexual intercourse. P-353 did state, it should be recalled, that the 
first of them declared that she had become “[TRANSLATION] his 
wife”, further stating that after threatening and undressing her, he 
forcibly penetrated her vagina.”1675 
 
The Chamber stated that Witness P-353 feared for her life and had no option left 
but to obey her attackers. The Chamber understood that she was assaulted both 
physically and verbally by the combatants during the attack on Bogoro, and, upon 
arrival at the camp, was forced to engage in sexual intercourse with them by 
means of threat and coercion.1676   
 
Indeed, the Trial Chamber II asserted that  
 
“P-353, who was under 18 years of age at the material time, was 
forced by two combatants in the camp in Walendu-Bindi 
collectivité to engage in sexual intercourse with them from 24 
February 2003.”1677 
 
In consonance, the Chamber found that  
 
“two combatants, who were members of that Walendu-Bindi 
militia camp, intentionally raped P-353 on 24 February 2003: they 
were aware of the circumstances in which she found herself but 
nevertheless deliberately engaged in sexual intercourse with 
her.”1678 
 
“In the light of the foregoing and the Chamber’s findings following its assessment 
of the contextual elements of crimes against humanity and war crimes,” 1679 the 
Chamber understood that the evidence established  
 
1675 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 373-374, para. 997  
1676 Ibidem  
1677 Ibidem  
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Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 374, para. 998 
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“beyond reasonable doubt that during the attack on Bogoro on 
24 February 2003, combatants from the military camps of the 
Ngiti militia of Walendu-Bindi intentionally committed against P-
132, P-249 and P-353, crimes of rape constituting crimes against 
humanity and war crimes under articles 8(2)(e)(vi) and 7(1)(g) of 
the Statute.”1680 
 
- Sexual Slavery 
 
In its findings of fact and legal characterisation, when addressing the crime of 
sexual slavery, the TCII noted that the term “wife”, which was employed by the 
attackers to refer to the witnesses they had raped by way of predetermining their 
fate, had a very particular meaning in the circumstances under scrutiny. In fact, 
Witnesses P-132, P-249 and P-353, who had testified before the Court as victims 
of sexual violence, used the term “wife”, that is especially important to the 
examination of the crime of sexual slavery.1681 
 
In the Chamber´s view, in the particular context of the events that took place 
immediately after of the attack on Bogoro, the affirmation that a women had been 
“taken as a wife” by a combatant or that she was to “become his wife” was an 
unequivocal reference to coercive circumstances which almost certainly entailed 
the engagement in acts of a sexual character.  
 
- Witness P-132 
 
Witness P-132 affirmed that  
 
“[TRANSLATION] You know full well that when someone takes 
you for his wife, he can have sexual intercourse whenever and 
however he wishes. He told me that I had become his wife. I 
could not refuse.”1682 
 
She also asserted that when being raped by the attackers for the first time in the 
bush, she instantly thought that she had become their wife.1683 
 
In accordance with the Trial Chamber II´s understanding, the circumstance that 
the combatants explicitly considered the women who they had abducted in 
Bogoro and forcibly taken to their military camps as “their wives” demonstrates 
 
1680 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 374, para. 999 
1681 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 374-375, para. 1000  
1682 Ibidem; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber 
II, Witness P -132, T. 140, p. 21 
1683 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Witness P -132, T. 139, p. 20; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Trial Chamber II, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 375, para. 1000  
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that “they all harboured the intention to treat the victims as if they owned them 
and obtain sexual favours from them.”1684 
 
The Chamber recalled that, in her testimony, Witness P-132 affirmed that, after 
being raped by the combatants and taken to their military camp, she spent many 
days in a hole dug in the ground, until the commander of the camp decided her 
fate and forced her to live behind his house. She was then forced to perform 
domestic chores, inclusive of helping the combatants’ wives in their daily 
tasks.1685  
 
The Chamber also recalled that P-132 regarded herself a hostage and wanted to 
flee the camp, but was scared to disobey the orders of her commander.1686 
 
Certainly, P-132 narrated that  
 
“on the orders of the “[TRANSLATION] superior”, she was 
compelled to marry a militia member living at the camp, live with 
him and follow him when he was reassigned to other Ngiti camps. 
The witness claimed that she feared him and that she had 
thought about how she might escape but was unable to do 
so.”1687 
 
The testimony of Witnesses P-132´s on being captured by the combatants in 
Bogoro in the aftermath of the attack and subsequently being taken by them as 
a hostage to a camp where she was forced to “marry” a combatant was 
corroborated by the testimonies of D02-148, P-28 and P-233.1688     
 
It is noteworthy that the Defence to Katanga argued that Witness P-132 had 
consented to marry to [REDACTED]. Surely, the Defence stated that she had 
maintained a consensual relationship with a combatant in the camp and 
subsequently married him, argument which was supported by the testimony of 
D02-148.1689 
 
In spite of the Defence´s efforts to make P-132 accept this version, she sustained 
that she had never agreed to a relationship and that it could not be regarded as 
marriage in those circumstances. Indeed, the witness explained in a logical 
manner that there was no room for her not to acquiesce to the “marriage”.1690 
 
1684 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 375, para. 1001  
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Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 375-376, para. 1002  
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Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 376, para. 1004 
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01/07. Trial Chamber II, Second Corrigendum to Defence Closing Brief, p. 266, para. 980 (29 
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The Trial Chamber II noted that P-132 was deeply moved when confronted with 
the arguments of the Defence calling into question the consensual character of 
the union. The Witness was also upset when it was presented a photograph of 
the person who, in accordance with the Defence, was her husband.1691  
 
The Chamber did not exclude  
 
“the possibility that he was the man to whom she may have been 
married and that her emotional response to the photograph could 
be explained by the trauma she suffered, since it can indeed be 
disturbing or painful to have to recall such experiences. 
Combatants at the camp where she was held captive wielded 
powers over her resulting from a veritable right of ownership, and 
the circumstances in which the union took place did not leave her 
the necessary discretion to enter into such an arrangement, even 
though D02-148, who was at the camp, thought that he discerned 
emotional ties between her and the man.”1692 
 
Therefore, apart from all the suffering experienced by Witness P-132 due to the 
rapes and sexual enslavement, when giving her testimony before the Court, she 
was confronted with the Defence´s argument that she had willingly taken part in 
the “marriage”, as if her consent was not vitiated, as if the circumstances allowed 
her to make her self-determination prevail. In the Defense´s argument it is implied 
that, to some extent, she concurred to the violent acts that followed the 
“marriage”- the frequent rapes, the physical abuse, the forced household chores.  
 
Certainly, upon giving an emotional and very detailed testimony of all her anguish 
and suffering in the hands of the combatants, Witness P-132 had to withstand 
the underlying notion that, instead of being a victim of sexual slavery, she had 
actually freely agreed to the circumstances she had to endure.1693  
 
This situation can produce an important negative psychological impact, especially 
on someone who was already patently vulnerable. The negative effects can have 
an in-depth reach independently of both the witness´ immediate ability to rebut 
the Defence´s argument and the Court´s findings.1694  
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Hence, the possibility of the occurrence of re-victimisation of victims of sexual 
and gender-based crimes- as a consequence of they providing their testimonies 
before the Court- is a downside which should not be downplayed.    
 
In fact, as the Witnesses and Victims Unit noted, Witness P-132 (likewise Witness 
P-353) was particular vulnerable and, due to the severe trauma she experienced, 
attempted to forget what had happened to her. Not rarely victims of sexual/ 
gender-based crimes seek to dismiss from their mind the circumstances of the 
crimes they endured, what can lead to omissions in their accounts of the facts or 
even to what might be regarded as inconsistencies.1695  
 
Moreover, when testifying about such events, these witnesses are flooded by 
turbulent emotions (such as rage, sadness, and shame) upon awakening their 
tragic memories. This circumstance can also impair their accountability of the 
facts. 
 
However, the unintentional gaps caused by the seriousness of the psychological 
trauma can make it harder to prove the occurrence of sexual/ gender-based 
crimes. 
 
The TC II recalled that once Witness P-132 realised that the circumstances had 
become favourable and that the conditions were appropriate, she ran away from 
the military camp where she had been living with the militia member, and went to 
a different region.1696 
 
With regards the second material element, the Chamber noted that Witness P-
132 was raped many times by militia members during the attack on Bogoro, at 
the military camp where she was taken and, more broadly, while in captivity. 
Indeed, the TCII noted that during her incarceration, P-132 was often assaulted, 
on occasions by various combatants in turn, and these events caused her grave 
mental and physical harm. During that time, apart from being raped on a regular 
basis by the combatant who had taken her as his wife, Witness P-132 was also 
raped by men who, under threat, took her into the bush. After fleeing, she gave 
birth to a child who was conceived while she was held captive in the camp.1697  
 
In the view of the Chamber, such facts established that  
 
“combatants from the camp where P-132 was kept wielded 
powers over her attaching to the right of ownership: the witness, 
who was held at the camp, was extremely vulnerable. She did 
not have freedom of movement, nor was she able to decide 
where she lived, and she in fact belonged to the camp 
combatants. The Chamber further considers that it has sufficient 
material to satisfy it that the man who became her “husband” was 
given P-132 and exercised powers over her attaching to the right 
 
1695 Ibidem 
1696 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
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of ownership. It can thus be established from the available 
evidence that this state of enslavement lasted over a year and a 
half. Furthermore, in the light of the evidence placed before it, the 
Chamber is satisfied that P-132 was constantly compelled to 
performed sexual acts whilst in captivity.”1698 
 
The TC II understood that, in face of all the evidence presented, it was possible 
to establish that the militia members that raped P-132 purposefully compelled her 
to have sexual intercourse with them. They were conscious that she, who had 
been living as a captive in their military camp for an extensive period, did not have 
freedom of movement. This was particular applicable for those who raped P-132 
whilst she was incarcerated and for the combatant who took her as his wife.  He 
could not have been oblivious to the fact that he exercised such power over P-
132 that she was actually completely subjugated to his control. For example, 
when P-132 opposed his advances, he told her that she would become his wife 
anyway, and, allegedly, as a result the camp commander ordered so.1699  
 
Therefore, the Chamber found that it had been demonstrated that these militia 
members intentionally perpetrated the crime of sexual slavery against P-132 and 
that the mental elements demanded in article 30 of the Rome Statute had been 
satisfied.1700 
 
- Witness P-249  
 
The Chamber noted that, during the 24 February 2003 offensive against Bogoro, 
six Ngiti combatants physically assaulted and raped Witness P-249. She was 
then taken to a camp, where she was raped again by her attackers. There P-249 
was told by the commander that because she refused to tell him where the Hema 
were, she would either be killed or become their wife, meaning that she would 
have to do as they wanted. As a consequence, she was “[TRANSLATION] 
consigned” to one of his bodyguards. While held in captivity, she was obliged to 
live with and serve the combatants from this group, and, particularly, be available 
to the commander´s bodyguard. Being threatened with death, P-249 was under 
the control of the militia members, who denied her any freedom of movement 
since they kept her under constant surveillance. Afraid of retaliation, she also 
forcibly carried out several household tasks for them despite the fact that she 
presented a leg wound. P-249 affirmed that she only managed to escape due to 
a lapse in the vigilance of the combatants.1701  
 
 
1698 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, Witness 
P-132, T. 139, pp. 13-14, 18-21, 39, 46-53, T. 140, pp. 18, 20-21, 23, T. 141, pp. 37-40 and 43, 
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Even though P-249 affirmed that she has met a commander named Yuda on the 
day of the Bogoro attack and subsequently had lived alongside him, she was not 
able to identify him in a photograph showed by the Defence in court. As a 
consequence, the Chamber was not satisfied that the commander to whom she 
referred was in fact that Yuda. However, the Chamber understood that the 
situation that P-249 considered him to be Yuda did not interfere on the credibility 
or reliability of her testimony in relation to the events that she narrated and 
allegedly experienced.1702 
 
The Chamber further noted that the Witness P-249 was raped by many Ngiti 
combatants, on several occasions, beginning on 24 February 2003 and 
subsequently every night during the period she was at the military camp in 
Bogoro, especially by the bodyguard of the commander. She asserted that men 
looked for her at night with the exclusive objective of having sexual intercourse 
with her, without even talking to her.1703 
 
Consequently, the Chamber regarded that this evidence established that not only 
the commander’s bodyguard but also many other military members collectively 
exercised prerogatives over Witness P-249 attaching to the right of ownership. It 
was also established that P-249 was seen by the combatants as a woman who 
was available for their sexual gratification and, hence, she was forced to engage 
in acts of a sexual character with various men, inclusive of the bodyguard.1704 
 
The Trial Chamber II rendered doubtless the fact that the bodyguard wished to 
maintain sexual intercourse with Witness P-249, and so did the other men at the 
Bogoro camp, and they knew that she was denied any freedom of movement and 
autonomy. The Chamber was satisfied that all of them were aware that they 
collectively disposed of powers attaching to the right of ownership. As a result, 
the TCII found that Witness P-249 was intentionally sexually enslaved by the 
combatants at the Bogoro camp.1705  
 
- Witness P-353 
 
The Chamber noted that, after murdering people who had been hiding in a house 
during the Bogoro attack, the combatants ordered P-353 as well as two other 
women (whom they believed not to be Hema) to leave the house and assigned 
the 3 to themselves.  Two combatants disagreed in relation to who should keep 
P-353 and then decided to share her as a wife. After being beaten and abducted 
in Bogoro, P-353 was obliged to follow those men and transport the property they 
had just stolen. During the way to the camp, P-353 thought that she was going to 
be killed by the combatants. The Chamber recalled that upon her arrival at the 
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camp in Walendu-Bindi “collectivité”, P-353 was forced to have sexual 
intercourse with two of her attackers.1706 
 
Following, P-353 found herself alone at the camp for around three months, being 
confined to a house and scared to go out in case they discovered she was actually 
Hema and killed her. Her “husbands” made sure she could not flee. Certainly, 
one of them controlled her daily life to such an extent that he actually wished that 
the single activity P-353 performed was to have sexual intercourse with him. The 
Chamber noted that P-353 did not see a way to escape, because she was 
convinced that the combatants would recapture and kill her. Ultimately, after 
obtaining permission from her “[TRANSLATION] husband” to temporarily leave 
the camp, she managed to escape captivity assisted by a woman.1707   
 
The Chamber understood that the status of “[TRANSLATION] wife” imposed on 
Witness P-353 entailed that her two “husbands” could obtain sexual favours from 
her. As she affirmed, her only task was to have sexual intercourse with the two 
of them.1708   
 
Even though Witness P-353 affirmed that she was not threatened by her 
“husbands” the Chamber noted that she had stated that she was forced to 
second-guess what were their expectations every time they came to her, and it 
recalled that, on 24 February 2003, she was raped under threat. The Chamber 
also noted here that she was raped on a regular basis during a period of 
approximately three months, first by two combatants and later by only one of 
them.1709 
 
In the Chamber’s view, the testimony of P-353 “per se” allowed to establish that, 
after she was incarcerated on 24 February 2003, the two combatants who had 
made her their wife exercised over her prerogatives attaching to the right of 
ownership. In consonance, the Chamber also found that starting on 24 February 
2003 and constantly thereafter, the two men (who belonged to the group that had 
obliged the witness to go to their military camp subsequently to the attack on 
Bogoro) forced P-353 to have sexual intercourse with them.1710 
 
They could have not been unaware that while at the camp P-353, whom they had 
abducted in Bogoro and were holding captive, was dispossessed of all freedom 
of movement. They purposefully compelled her to engage in acts of a sexual 
character. In this regard, the first man that raped her at the camp explicitly said 
that she his wife henceforth, and, to guarantee she understood precisely what 
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being a “wife” entailed, he said that he wanted her body, and, pushing her onto 
the bed, raped her while she cried.1711 
 
Consequently, the Chamber rendered it was established that two combatants, 
who were based at a Ngiti military camp in Walendu-Bindi “collectivité”, 
perpetrated the crime of the sexual enslavement against Witness P-353 for an 
interval of around three months as of 24 February 2003.1712 
 
Moreover, the Chamber found that the evidence arising from the testimonies of 
P-353, P-132, P-268, and P-233 permitted to confirm that (apart from P-132, P-
353, and P-249) other women were also sexually enslaved by Ngiti combatants 
in the aftermath of the 24 February 2003 attack on Bogoro.1713 
 
In what concerns the perpetrators of these acts, in the opinion of the Chamber it 
was established that the crimes of rape and sexual slavery committed against 
Witnesses P-132, P-249 and P-353 were carried out by Ngiti combatants.1714 
 
In face of the aforesaid, the Chamber found that the evidence established beyond 
reasonable doubt that crimes of sexual slavery as both a war crime (Article 
8(2)(e)(vi)  of the Rome Statute) and a crime against humanity (Article 7(1)(g) of 
the Statute) were intentionally committed following the attack on Bogoro on 24 
February 2003, by combatants stationed at camps belonging to the Ngiti militia 
of Walendu-Bindi and by others in these camps.1715 
 
- Contextual Elements 
 
Following, the Trial Chamber II examined the contextual elements of the crimes.  
In connection with the crimes against humanity, the TC II recalled that Article 7 
(1) of the Rome Statute determined the contextual elements of crimes against 
humanity by disposing that 
 
“[f]or the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means 
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack,”1716 
 
whereas Article 7(2)(a) of the Statute defined an attack directed against a civilian 
population as being 
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“a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts 
referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, 
pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to 
commit such attack.”1717 
 
The Chamber considered appropriate to recapitulate the three phases of 
reasoning that the application of Article 7 of the Statute involves.1718  
 
The first stage of reasoning consists in verifying the existence of an attack. So 
that it can be concluded that an attack took place, it is necessary, in the terms of 
Article 7 (2) (a) the fulfilment of following elements: 
  
“(1) establishment of the existence of an operation or course of 
conduct involving, notably, the multiple commission of acts 
referred to in article 7(1) aforecited; (2) that the operation or 
course of conduct be directed against a civilian population; and 
(3) that it be proved that the operation or course of conduct took 
place pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organisational 
policy.”1719 
 
The second phase refers to characterisation of the attack, specifically the 
evaluation of whether or not it was widespread or systematic. The Chamber 
clarified that, in general, the term “widespread” relates to the large-scale 
character of the attack, whilst the term “systematic” is entwined with the organised 
character of the violent acts.1720 
 
In fact, the Chamber stated that  
 
“[t]he attack must be widespread or systematic, implying that the 
acts of violence are not spontaneous or isolated. An established 
line of authority holds that the adjective “widespread” adverts to 
the large-scale nature of the attack and to the number of targeted 
persons, whereas the adjective “systematic” reflects the 
organised nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of 
their random occurrence. It has also been consistently held that 
the “systematic” character of the attack refers to the existence of 
“patterns of crimes” reflected in the nonaccidental repetition of 
similar criminal conduct on a regular basis.”1721 
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Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 415, para. 1098  
1721 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 426, para. 1123 
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The goal of the last stage is to ascertain, in first place, if there is nexus between 
the widespread or systematic attack and the act of violence, and, in second place, 
if the perpetrator of the act had knowledge of the nexus.1722   
 
In relation to the nexus, the Trial Chamber II recalled that  
 
“the individual act must be committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack. In determining whether an act within the ambit 
of article 7(1) of the Statute forms part of a widespread or 
systematic attack, the bench must, with due regard for the nature 
of the act at issue, the aims it pursues and the consequences it 
occasions, inquire as to whether it is part of the widespread or 
systematic attack, considered as a whole, and in respect of the 
various components of the attack (i.e. not only the policy but also, 
where relevant, the pattern of crimes, the type of victims, etc.). 
Isolated acts that clearly differ in their nature, aims and 
consequences from other acts that form part of an attack, fall out 
with article 7(1) of the Statute.”1723   
 
Indeed, the requirement of nexus entails that a direct link must exist “between the 
course of conduct or operation and the policy.”1724   
 
Further, as preconised in Article 7 (2) (a), the attack must be directed against 
civilians, in accordance with or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy 
to perpetrate this attack. 
 
Therefore, the main target of the attack must be the civilian population. Certainly, 
the victimisation of civilians must be the central objective of the offensive action. 
Thus, if the civilian population is just collaterally afflicted, it is not a case of an 
attack as defined by Article 7 of the Statute.1725   
 
In what concerns the requirement that the attack must be carried out in 
accordance with or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit 
such attack, the view of TC II was that  
 
““policy”, within the meaning of article 7(2)(a) of the Statute, 
refers essentially to the fact that a State or organisation intends 
to carry out an attack against a civilian population, whether 
through action or deliberate failure to take action.”1726   
 
 
1722 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 427, para. 1124 
1723 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 415, para. 1099 
1724 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 422, para. 1116  
1725 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 417, para. 1104  
1726 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 419, para. 1108 
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The Chamber also explained that even though the adjectives “policy” (“the State 
or organisation meant to commit an attack against a civilian population”) and 
“systematic” (“pattern of repeated conduct or the recurring or continuous 
perpetration of interlinked, non-random acts of violence”) are not to be considered 
as synonymous,1727   
 
“the demonstration of, first, the existence of a policy and, second, 
of the systematic character of the attack do ultimately form part 
of the same requirement: the requirement to establish that the 
individual act is the link in a chain and that it is connected to a 
system or plan.”1728   
 
Therefore, so as to subsume to Article 7 of the Statute, the act of violence must 
be a connected to a larger system or plan conceived by the State or an 
organisation.  
 
In its findings of fact and legal characterisation, the TC II established that the 
contextual elements of crimes against humanity were met.  
 
- Existence of the attack 
 
In relation to the existence of the attack, the Chamber considered that:  
 
The assault against the Bogoro village on 24 February 2003 involved the 
commission of multiple acts within the terms of Article 7(1) of the Rome 
Statute1729     
 
The main object of such assault was the civilian population (more specifically, the 
individuals of Hema ethnicity) occupying the area. Certainly, the Ngiti combatants 
of Walendu-Bindi “collectivité” (who advocated an anti-Hema ideology) harboured 
the specific design to eliminate from Bogoro1730 
 
“not only UPC troops but also the predominantly Hema civilian 
population of the village and whom the Ngiti combatants 
considered synonymous with the UPC.”1731   
 
Therefore, “the civilian population was the principal target and not solely the UPC 
troops or a group of randomly selected individuals.”1732  
  
 
1727 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 420, paras. 1111-1113 
1728 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 420, para. 1112 
1729 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 432, para. 1134-1135  
1730 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 435, para. 1143  
1731 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 434-435, para. 1142 
1732 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 433, para. 1138  
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The Walendu-Bindi “collectivité” (whose Ngiti combatants were organised within 
a single militia) formed an organisation in accordance with the meaning set out in 
Article 7(2) of the Statute.1733   
 
The assault was carried out pursuant to or in furtherance of the Walendu-Bindi 
“collectivité” organisation policy, specifically to wipe out from Bogoro the civilians 
of Hema ethnic group. Undoubtedly the Chamber considered that  
 
“preparations within the collectivité preceding the attack and the 
ultimate modus operandi of the attack demonstrate that the 
Bogoro operation ensued from the design harboured specifically 
by the Ngiti militia to target the predominantly Hema civilian 
population of Bogoro.”1734   
 
In the Chamber´s words: 
 
“in the light of the foregoing, it appears that the Ngiti militia of 
Walendu-Bindi collectivité fully intended to direct an attack 
against Bogoro’s civilian population and mete out acts of violence 
to the village’s Hema inhabitants. Accordingly, the Chamber finds 
that the attack which took place in that village was executed 
pursuant to an organisational policy to attack it with a view to not 
only wiping out the UPC troops there but also, and first and 
foremost, the Hema civilians who were present, this design 
forming part of a wider operation to reconquer Ituri.”1735   
 
As a consequence, present all the elements exposed above, the Chamber 
concluded that it rested demonstrated that on 24 February 2003 an attack was 
directed against the Bogoro village’s civilian population in accordance with the 
terms established in Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute.1736   
 
- The attack on Bogoro was systematic 
 
The Chamber found that the attack on Bogoro was systematic by 
affirming that  
 
“[f]rom the sequence of attack and, specifically, from how the 
troops deployed, attacked the village and committed the crimes; 
the number of Hema civilians targeted; the pursuit of the Hema 
population who had survived the assault during the battle and 
thereafter; and lastly the destruction and pillaging of property, it 
 
1733 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 434, paras. 1139-1141  
1734 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 437, para. 1150 
1735 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 439, para. 1155  
1736 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 439, para. 1156 
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is apparent that the attack was carried out in a coordinated and 
organised fashion.”1737   
 
In this respect, the TC II also stated that it had established that 
 
“the Lendu and Ngiti combatants pursued anyone who crossed 
their path, making no distinction between ordinary villagers and 
UPC soldiers. It recalls that from the start of the attack, during 
the capture of the military camp and even after the fighting had 
ended, the attackers pursued the villagers, wounding or killing 
them by machete and firearms. Men, women, elderly people, 
children and, at times, babies were attacked in their homes, 
whilst in flight or seeking refuge at the Institute or in the bush, 
even though they took no part in the fighting. … The attackers 
also captured several civilians and sexually assaulted women 
who had concealed that they were Hema in order to escape 
certain death.”1738 
 
- Nexus between the crimes perpetrated and the attack 
 
In relation to the crime of murder as a crime against humanity (Article 7(1)(a) of 
the Statute), the Chamber considered it was established that murders were 
committed by the group of Ngiti combatants of Walendu-Bindi “collectivité” as part 
of the attack against the predominantly Hema civilian population. This crime was 
the principal means of execution of the attack and was elemental to it. The victims 
died in consonance with the plan conceived by the Ngiti combatants of Walendu-
Bindi to annihilate the Hema civilians of Bogoro.1739 
  
In what concerns the acts of sexual violence perpetrated against women who 
pretended not to be Hema so as to escape certain death, the Chamber recalled 
that it must be established a nexus between the attack and the violent act (being 
expendable to demonstrate that each act was carried out pursuant to or in 
furtherance of the policy).1740  
 
The Chamber considered that  
 
“the acts of sexual violence during the operation to wipe out 
Bogoro’s civilian population were committed with a same 
objective and objectively formed part of that operation. By no 
means could they constitute isolated acts.”1741 
 
 
1737 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 439-440, para. 1158  
1738 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 440-441, para. 1160  
1739 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 441-442, para. 1164  
1740 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 




Finally, the Chamber rendered that the perpetrators of the acts were combatants 
of the militia of Walendu-Bindi “collectivité”, and they carried out the murders, 
rapes and sexual slavery knowing about the attack and being aware that their 
acts integrated it.1742 
 
Therefore, both the requisite of nexus between the act of violence and the attack 
and   the requisite of knowledge of the perpetrator were satisfied.  
 
In light of the exposed above, the Trial Chamber II concluded that the murders 
and rapes perpetrated in Bogoro on 24 February 2003 and the sexual 
enslavement which arose from day were part of the systematic attack targeting 
the predominantly Hema civilian population of Bogoro and that was executed in 
line with a policy of the Walendu-Bindi Ngiti militia.1743 
 
Consequently, the Chamber regarded that the crimes of rape and sexual slavery 
as crimes against humanity were committed during the systematic attack 
undertaken by Ngiti combatants of the Walendu-Bindi “collectivité” organisation 
against the predominantly Hema civilian population of Bogoro on 24 February 
2003 and in its aftermath.  
  
- War Crimes 
 
The Trial Chamber II stated that, in the case at bar, the Pre-Trial Chamber I had 
found in its Decision on the confirmation of charges, that there was substantial 
evidence indicating that between August 2002 and May 2003, in the territory of 
Ituri an armed conflict took place between several local organised armed groups, 
such as the UPC/FPLC, the FNI, the FRPI and PUSIC, among others.  Taking 
into account that Uganda was directly involved in this armed conflict by means of 
the UPDF and that it was one of the principal suppliers of weapons and 
ammunition for the armed groups, the Pre-Trial Chamber regarded that the 
conflict presented an international character.1744 
 
However, the arguments sustained by the parties and participants in their closing 
briefs, especially in face of the judgment rendered by the ICC in the Lubanga 
case, put in doubt characterisation on the Pre-Trial Chamber of the conflict as 
presenting an international nature.1745 
 
In view of that, the Trial Chamber II notified the parties and participants of a 
possibility of changing the legal characterisation of the facts in consonance with 
 
1742 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 442, para. 1166  
1743 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 442, para. 1167  
1744 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 442-443, para. 1168; ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on the confirmation of charges, paras. 239-240 
1745 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 443, para. 1169; ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on the confirmation of charges, paras. 239-240  
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regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court. The Chamber invited them to 
expose in the closing statements their views on the compatibility of the application 
of regulation 55 with the accused´s right to a fair trial, as well as to furnish their 
opinion about a possible recharacterisation of the armed conflict as being of non-
international nature.1746   
 
In its observations, the Defence affirmed that the Prosecution had the burden of 
proving that the crimes had been perpetrated in an international or non-
international armed conflict, and, for this reason, the Defence should not recall 
witnesses or tender new evidence, under the penalty of reversing the burden of 
proof.1747   
 
On 7 May 2012 decision, the Chamber issued a decision confirming that it would 
entertain these observations made by the Defence in its Article 74 judgment, but 
that it would not inquire the latter anymore about its views on the need to present 
further evidence.1748   
 
In the Judgment, the Trial Chamber II found that law of non-international armed 
conflict was the applicable one to the hostilities that occurred in Ituri between 
armed groups, inclusive of the Ngiti militia and the UPC, during the material time, 
and particularly between January and May 2003. It also found that the attack on 
Bogoro constituted an elementary part of the armed conflict.1749  
 
Moreover, the Chamber understood that, in the case at stake, the 
recharacterisation of the nature of the armed conflict as determined by the Pre-
Trial Chamber in its “Decision on the confirmation of charges” did not infringe 
Katanga´s rights. The Chamber underscored that the novel characterisation of 
the armed conflict did not entail a substantial modification of the legal elements 
of the alleged crimes. In addition, it observed that the facts and circumstances at 
issue were the same. 1750      
 
The TC II determined that the crimes of murder, attack against a civilian 
population, acts of pillaging and destruction (Article 8 (2) (c) (i) (2) (e)(i) (2)(e)(V) 
(2)(e)(xii)) were deeply connected to the ongoing armed conflict and that the 
perpetrators (some of whom were Ngiti militia members), in undertaking these 
 
1746 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 443, para. 1170; ; ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on the confirmation of charges, paras. 239-240 
1747 Ibidem, Ibidem 
1748 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 443, para. 1171; ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, Décision sur la mise en oeuvre 
de l’ordonnance relative aux modalités de présentation des conclusions orales, para. 6 (7 May 
2012) 
1749 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 465-466, para. 1129  
1750 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 466, para. 1130; ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, Décision sur la mise en oeuvre 
de l’ordonnance relative aux modalités de présentation des conclusions orales, para. 6. 
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acts, were conscious of the factual circumstances which established the 
existence of such conflict.1751 
 
Surely, the Chamber noted that, in the particular context of the case, due to the 
extension of the conflict and its impact in the Ituri region, it is hard to conceive 
that someone “could be oblivious to the factual circumstances establishing the 
existence of an armed conflict.”1752 
 
In what concerns the crime of rape (Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Statute), the Chamber 
observed that were militia members who carried out the rapes against the victims, 
and, furthermore, that the crimes occurred during the attack or just thereafter. 
The Chamber noted as well that the combatants who had abducted Witnesses 
P- 249, P-353 and P-132 were the ones who brought them to one of the Ngiti 
commanders in Bogoro. Moreover, the Chamber rendered that the existence, use 
and threat of weapons increased the coercive character of the environment 
surrounding the victims, and, thus, aggravated the death threats which they 
received.  The Chamber´s opinion was that the crimes of rape were linked to the 
ongoing hostilities, and that the combatants, who had assumed an active role in 
that armed conflict by perpetrating the crimes of the rapes, had knowledge of the 
circumstances of fact that established the existence of the conflict.1753 
 
With respect to the crime of sexual slavery (Article 8(2) (e) (vi) of the Rome 
Statute), the Chamber considered that Witnesses P-132, P-249 and P-353 were 
sexual enslaved by Ngiti combatants who had attacked Bogoro or by men who 
were living in military camps and that, likewise the crimes of rape, these acts 
occurred in the context of and was associated with the armed conflict. It also 
noted that the capture of the 3 victims was intimately related to the fighting and 
that their sexual enslavement took place in military camps. As a consequence, 
the Chamber understood that the criminal acts were entwined with the hostilities, 
and the perpetrators of those acts (who in incurring in such acts took on an active 
part in the armed conflict) were conscious of the factual circumstances that set 
out the existence of the conflict.1754 
 
- Germain Katanga´s criminal responsibility 
 
Criminal responsibility within the meaning of Article 25(3)(a) (indirect 
commission) 
 
As aforementioned, on 26 September 2008, the Pre-Trial Chamber I rendered 
the Decision on the confirmation of charges in which it found by unanimity that 
there was enough evidence to establish substantial basis to believe that, during 
the attack against the Bogoro village on 24 February 2003, Germain Katanga and 
 
1751 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 466, paras. 1231-1232  
1752 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 466, para. 1231  
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Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 467, para. 1233 
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Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 467, para. 1234 
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Mathieu Ngudjolo jointly perpetrated through other persons, within the terms of 
Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, the subsequent crimes with intent:1755 
 
- the war crime of wilful killing (Article 8(2)(a)(i) of the Statute); 
 
- the crime against humanity of murder (Article 7(1)(a) of the Statute); 
 
- the war crime of directing an attack against a civilian population as such or 
against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities (Article 8(2)(b)(i) of 
the Statute); and 
 
- the war crime of destruction of property (Article 8(2)(b)(xiii) of the Statute).1756 
 
Germain Katanga also stood accused of having perpetrated jointly with Mathieu 
Ngudjolo through other persons, within the terms of Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute, 
the war crime of pillaging (Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) of the Statute), knowing that the 
offence would occur in the regular course of events.1757 
 
Moreover, Germain Katanga stood accused of having perpetrated jointly with 
Mathieu Ngudjolo, within the terms of Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute, the war crime 
of using children under the age of fifteen years to participate actively in hostilities 
(Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Statute).1758 
 
Nonetheless, solely a majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber (Judge Anita Ušacka 
rendered an Dissenting Opinion) understood that there was enough evidence to 
establish substantial grounds to believe that, during the Bogoro attack of 24 
February 2003, Germain Katanga jointly perpetrated with Mathieu Ngudjolo 
through other persons, within the terms of Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute, the 
subsequent crimes, with the knowledge that they would take place in the ordinary 
course of events: 1759 
 
- the war crime of sexual slavery (Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) of the Statute); 
 
- the crime against humanity of sexual slavery (Article 7(1)(g) of the 
Statute); 
 
- the war crime of rape (Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) of the Statute); and 
 
 
1755 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, pp. 209-211, ICC-01/04-
01/07 
1756 Ibidem 
1757 Ibidem; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 16, para. 8 
1758 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, pp. 209-211, ICC-01/04-
01/07; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber 
I, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 16, para. 9  
1759 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, pp. 209-211, ICC-01/04-
01/07; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber 
I, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 16, para. 10  
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- the crime against humanity of rape (Article 7(1)(g) of the Statute).1760 
 
As a consequence, Germain Katanga was initially charged with basis on Article 
25(3)(a) of the Statute that disposes about indirect commission by stating that 
 
“[i]n accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally 
responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court if that person: 
 
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with 
another or through another person, regardless of whether that 
other person is criminally responsible;”1761  
 
In this respect, the Trial Chamber II concluded in its Judgment pursuant to Article 
74 that, so as to subsume in the criminal responsibility as an indirect perpetrator 
(within the meaning of Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute), the person must: 
 
“- exert control over the crime whose material elements were 
brought about by one or more persons, which, in the case at bar, 
will be met where the commission of the crime is secured through 
the exertion of control over an apparatus of power; 
 
- meet the mental elements prescribed by article 30 of the Statute 
and the mental elements specific to the crime at issue; and 
 
- be aware of the factual circumstances which allow the person 
to exert control over the crime.”1762 
 
Even though it was established that Germain Katanga was in fact at the top of 
the Walendu-Bindi “collectivité” organisation, the lack of a systematised and 
effective commandment chain led to some conclusions.1763   
 
Firstly, it was not established that in February 2003, the Ngiti militia consisted in 
an organised mechanism of power. Secondly, it was not established that Germain 
Katanga, at that period, held control over the militia to a degree to exercise control 
over the crimes for the ends of Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute. As a result, 
it was not necessary, the Chamber to continue inquiring whether the other 
constitutive elements of commission were present.1764 
 
 
1760 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 16-17, para. 10 (7 March 2014); ICC. The 
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As a result, the Chamber found that the Prosecution had not demonstrated that 
Germain Katanga perpetrated the alleged crimes, within the terms of Article 
25(3)(a) of the Statute.1765 
 
- Recharacterisation  
 
In its decision of 21 November 2012, the Trial Chamber II, by majority, decided 
to put into action regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court, and gave notice 
to the parties and participants to the proceedings that the mode of liability under 
which the Germain Katanga initially stood charged  (Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome 
Statute) could be subject to legal recharacterised on the grounds of Article 
25(3)(d) of the Statute. On 27 March 2013, the Appeals Chamber confirmed this 
decision by majority.1766 
 
In the Judgment pursuant to Article 74, the TC II understood that the proposed 
recharacterisation could be effected without outreaching the facts and 
circumstances delineated in the charges and that, in face of all of the 
circumstances of the case, implementation of regulation 55 did not cause 
unfairness of the proceedings against Germain Katanga, being upheld the 
minimum guarantees enlisted in Article 67(1) of the Rome Statute.1767 
 
The Trial Chamber II affirmed that the factual allegations that supported the 
recharacterisation were essentially those laid in the Decision on the confirmation 
of charges and which founded the Pre-Trial Chamber’s conclusions of law with 
respect to Germain Katanga on the grounds of Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome 
Statute.1768  
 
Taking into account the circumstances and details determined in the ´Decision 
on the confirmation of charges´ and the distinguishing measures adopted during 
the Pre-trial proceedings and as from the implementation of regulation 55, the 
Chamber regarded that Germain Katanga was properly informed in detail of the 
character, cause and content of the charges.1769 
 
Moreover, the Chamber considered that it had overseen the fair and expeditious 
conduct of the trial in the case at bar, paying due regard for Katanga´s rights.1770 
 
1765 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 545, para. 1421 
1766Ibidem; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 13. The 
Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Germain Katanga against the decision of Trial 
Chamber II of 21 November 2012 entitled "Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the 
Regulations of the Court and severing the charges against the accused persons". ICC-01/04-
01/07-3363 (27 March 2013); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, Decision on the implementation of regulation 
55 of the Regulations of the Court and severing the charges against the accused persons, p. 11  
1767 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 545, para. 1421 
1768 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 573, para. 1484,  
1769 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 589, para. 1527 
1770 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 




Hence, the Trial Chamber concluded that the proposed recharacterisation was 
totally congruent with the dispositions of regulation 55 (1) of the Regulations of 
the Court and Articles 67(1) and 74(2) of the Statute.1771 
 
- Criminal responsibility within the meaning of Article 25(3)(d) (accessoryship) 
 
As a result of such finding, the Trial Court II had to address the issue of 
responsibility within the meaning of Article 25(3)(d) (accessoryship). Certainly, 
the Chamber had to consider whether Germain Katanga had incurred in criminal 
responsibility in the terms of Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute.1772 
 
Article 25(3)(d) of the Statute sets out that  
 
“[i]n accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally 
responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court if that person: 
 
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted 
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a 
common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall 
either: 
 
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or 
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose 
involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court; or  
 
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to 
commit the crime;”1773  
 
As the Chamber had already noted in its 15 May 2013 Decision, implementation 
in the case at stake of Article 25(3)(d)(ii) required that:1774 
 
“- a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court was committed; 
 
- the persons who committed the crime belonged to a group 
acting with a common purpose; 
 
- the accused made a significant contribution to the commission 
of the crime; 
 
- the contribution was intentional; and 
 
1771 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 573, para. 1484 
1772 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 616, para.1596 
1773 Rome Statute, Art. 25(3)(d) 
1774 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II,i 
Decision transmitting additional legal and factual material (regulation 55(2) and 55(3) of the 




- the accused’s contribution was made in the knowledge of the 
intention of the group to commit the crime.”1775 
 
Surely, so that a person can be held criminally responsible for a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court on the basis of Article 25(3)(d)(ii) 
of the Rome Statute, these 5 constituting elements (the first three being objective 
elements and the last two subjective ones) must be ascertained beyond 
reasonable doubt.1776 
 
As a consequence, the Chamber passed to verify the presence of these 
constitutive elements in the instant case. 
 
In what concerns the requisite “a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court was 
committed,” the Chamber clarified that it must satisfy itself that it has been proven 
beyond reasonable doubt that the offences confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
were indeed perpetrated. In consonance, it must be determined both the objective 
and subjective elements particular to the crimes and their contextual 
elements.1777  
 
In what regards the element “the persons who committed the crime belonged to 
a group acting with a common purpose”, the Chamber asserted that  
 
“it is a sine qua non of the application of article 25(3)(d) of the 
Statute that the existence of a group of persons driven by and 
acting with a common purpose be established. Further, the 
persons who committed the crime must belong to the group, 
whether they form all or part of it.”1778 
 
Further, the Chamber decided that, so as to define the coordinated action of the 
group acting with a common purpose, it would refer to the jurisprudence of the 
“ad hoc” tribunals on joint criminal enterprise, a mode of liability which also leans 
on the idea of “common purpose”. The Chamber considered that it might take into 
account the jurisprudence on that, especially in order to adequately ascertain the 
meaning of the expression “common purpose”.1779 
 
In accordance with the Chamber’s view,   
  
“that definition of the criminal purpose of the group presupposes 
specification of the criminal goal pursued; its scope, by 
pinpointing its temporal and geographic purview; the type, origins 
 
1775 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 625, para. 1620  
1776 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 624, 625, paras. 1617, 1621  
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Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 626, para. 1622 
1778 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 626, para. 1624  
1779 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 626-627, para. 1625 
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or characteristics of the victims pursued; and the identity of the 
members of group, although each person need not be identified 
by name. To its mind, the group of persons acting with a common 
purpose may be evinced without necessarily establishing the 
existence of an organisation incorporated into a military, political 
or administrative structure. Proof that the common purpose was 
previously arranged or formulated is not required. It may 
materialise extemporaneously and be inferred from the 
subsequent concerted action of the group of persons.”1780 
 
In relation to the criminality of such purpose, the Chamber considered that the 
purpose must be to perpetrate the crime or must encompass its execution.1781  
 
To the Chamber’s mind, the participants in the common purpose must have the 
same intent. Indeed, they must want to cause the result that consists in the crime 
or be aware that the crime will happen in the ordinary course of events. The 
shared intent can be determined by, “inter alia”, collective decisions of the group 
and consequent action, or its omissions.1782 
 
In addition, the Chamber affirmed that  
 
“since article 25(3)(d) of the Statute provides for individual 
responsibility as an accessory to a crime which ensued from the 
concerted action of a group of persons, it must be established 
that the persons who committed the crime, in any of the manners 
enumerated in article 25(3)(a), belonged to the group.”1783 
 
The Chamber noted that the existence of a “common plan” (as defined by various 
benches of the ICC and considered as an objective element of joint commission 
within the terms of Article 25(3) (a) of the Rome Statute) can determine 
pursuance of a common purpose (without needing to specifically prove the 
existence of this “common plan” among the members of the group).1784 
 
Moreover, so as to be satisfied that the perpetrator’s acts were covered by the 
common purpose, it is necessary to demonstrate that the crime was part of the 
common purpose. Certainly, crimes arising from opportunistic acts by members 
of the group and that are foreign the common purpose do not integrate the 
group´s coordinated action. 
 
“Only those crimes which the group harboured the intention to 
commit (the common purpose being to commit the crime or 
encompassing its execution), and falling within the ordinary 
 
1780 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 627, para. 1626 
1781 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 627-628, para. 1627 
1782 Ibidem 
1783 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 628, para. 1628 
1784 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
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course of events, can therefore be attributed to the said group 
and incur the accused’s liability under article 25(3)(d).”1785 
 
The requisite “the accused made a significant contribution to the commission of 
the crime” entails that it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt the accused`s 
significant contribution (a contribution that can influence the perpetration of the 
crime) with respect to each crime.1786  
 
For that ends, it is necessary to analyse the conduct of a person in the context in 
which he or she acted or failed to act so as to determine whether or not the 
conduct had a bear in the perpetration of the crime and, if that is the case, to 
which extension. The influence can be linked to the material elements of the 
crimes (as for instance, to furnish weapons to the direct perpetrators of the crimes 
of murder) or to subjective elements (as for example, encouragement). 
 
In fact, the Chamber considered that proximity to the crime is not an important 
criterion, being rendered criminally responsible those persons who, while 
physically, structurally or causally distant from the physical perpetrators of the 
crimes, indirectly perpetrated them or facilitated their perpetration by deploying 
the position they enjoyed, notwithstanding its remoteness.1787 
 
In connection with the requirement that “the contribution was intentional”, the 
Chamber asserted that Article 25(3)(d), particularly at paragraphs (i) and (ii), sets 
out a distinct mental element than the provided by Article 30 of the Statute, and, 
thus, is an exception to the general rule.1788  
 
Even though the mental element of Article 30 does not apply in the instant case, 
the Chamber can make use of such article so as to construct the boundaries the 
terms “intention” and “knowledge” inserted in Article 25(3)(d).1789   
 
The Chamber affirmed too that the contribution must be “intentional” so as to 
subsume in the mode of liability laid down in Article 25(3)(d). However, the 
requirement of intentionality should not overlap with paragraph (i) or paragraph 
(ii) of the Article 25 (3) (d). As a result, this requirement applies solely to the 
conduct that amounts to the contribution and not to the activity, purpose or 
criminal intention, which are referred to at paragraphs (i) and (ii) of the Article 25 
(3) (d), respectively.1790   
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In the Chamber´s view, it must be demonstrated that the accused had the 
intention to engage in the conduct that amounts to a contribution as well as that 
he or she knew that his/her conduct contributed to the activities of the group of 
persons acting in consonance with a common purpose.1791 
 
Finally, as regards the last element “the accused’s contribution was made in the 
knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime”, the Chamber 
highlighted that the Rome Statute offers an alternative in Article 25(3)(d), since 
the contribution must either (i)“be made with the aim of furthering the criminal 
activity or criminal purpose of the group” or (ii) “be made in the knowledge of the 
intention of the group to commit the crime”. In the case at bar, the Chamber opted 
for the latter (Article 25(3)(d)(ii)).1792 
  
The Chamber also underlined its understanding that the group of persons acting 
with a common purpose must have had the intention to carry out the crime, in 
agreement with the meaning of Article 30(2)(b) of the Rome Statute. Surely, 
Article 30(2) disposes: 
 
“For the purpose of this article, a person has the intent where: 
 
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the 
conduct;  
 
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that 
consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course 
of events.”1793 
 
In the Chamber´s view, and in consonance with Article 30 (2) (b), in what refers 
to the consequence that constitutes the offence, the group must mean to bring 
about such consequence or know that the offence will take place in the ordinary 
unfolding of events.1794 
 
The Chamber opinion was that, in line with Article 30(3) of the Statute, the 
requirement of the accused’s knowledge means that he or she must be aware of 
the existence of the intention of the group to undertake the crime by the time of 
his/her engagement in the conduct which amounted to the contribution.1795 
 
 
1791 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
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It should be called attention to the fact that it must be established the accused’s 
knowledge for each specific crime. Indeed, knowledge of a general criminal 
intention will not be enough to prove, within the terms of article 25(3)(d)(ii), that 
the accused knew of the group’s intention to carry out each of the crimes 
integrating the common purpose. Moreover, so as to subsume in liability as an 
accessory, the accused’s knowledge must be ascertained from the important 
facts and circumstances, and be linked to the group’s intention (as defined in 
Article 30(2)(b) of the Rome Statute) to perpetrate the specific offences.1796 
 
In its conclusions of fact and legal characterisation, the Trial Chamber II passed 
to determine the presence in the instant case of each of the aforementioned 5 
elements that are essential to the characterisation of criminal responsibility within 
the meaning of Article 25(3)(d) (accessoryship). 
 
In relation to the element “crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court were 
committed”, the TC II recalled  
 
“its finding that, on 24 February 2003, Ngiti combatants from 
Walendu-Bindi collectivité committed the crimes of murder as a 
crime against humanity and as a war crime; attack against 
civilians as a war crime; pillaging and destruction as war crimes; 
and lastly, rape and, as of 24 February 2003, sexual slavery as 
war crimes and as crimes against humanity.”1797 
 
Therefore, it was established that those crimes were perpetrated, including rape 
and sexual slavery (as war crimes and crimes against humanity). 
 
Concerning the element “the persons who committed the crimes belonged to a 
group acting with a common purpose”, the Chamber asserted that it would verify 
in first place if it was established that the Ngiti militia of Walendu-Bindi 
“collectivité” formed a group of persons acting with a common purpose at the 
material period. Secondly, it would determine if each of the charged crimes 
integrated the common purpose. Finally, the Chamber would address the 
question of whether the evidence submitted before it allowed the establishment 
that the physical perpetrators of the crimes were members of the militia.1798 
 
The Chamber recalled then its finding that the Ngiti combatants and commanders 
of Walendu-Bindi “collectivité” were part of a militia that amounted to an 
organisation within the terms of Article 7(2)3 of the Rome Statute and to an armed 
group as conceived in the law of armed conflict.1799 
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In fact, the Trial Chamber II found that  
 
“the Ngiti combatants and commanders of Walendu-Bindi 
collectivité were part of a militia, which constituted an 
organisation within the meaning of article 7(2) of the Statute and 
an armed group within the meaning of the law of armed conflict. 
This militia harboured its own design, which, although part of a 
wider design to reconquer territory, was to attack the village of 
Bogoro so as to wipe out from that place not only the UPC troops 
but also, and, first and foremost, the Hema civilians.”1800 
 
Consequently, the common purpose, the goal of the Ngiti militia was to reconquer 
Bogoro by eliminating the UPC troops and, mainly, the Hema civilian population 
that was living there at the beginning of 2003.1801 
 
Following, the TC II determined whether each of the charged crime formed part 
of the common purpose of the Ngiti militia.1802 
 
In this regard, the Chamber recapitulated how the 24 February 2003 attack on 
Bogoro proceeded and understood that it was 
 
“established that the Ngiti attackers did not confine themselves 
to seizing control of Bogoro by attacking the UPC, but that they 
also considered it necessary during combat and after 
overrunning Bogoro, to pursue and kill the population, destroy its 
houses and steal its property. In the aftermath of the assault, the 
village of Bogoro was cleared of its predominantly Hema 
population. 
 
1657. In the Chamber’s view, the manner in which Bogoro was 
attacked and that Hema civilians, who had no part in combat, 
were pursued and killed, confirms the existence of a common 
purpose of a criminal nature vis-à-vis the population of the 
village.”1803 
 
In face of that, the Chamber considered it was established that the crime of 
murder (as a crime against humanity and as a war crime) and the crime of attack 
against civilians (as a war crime) integrated the common purpose of the Ngiti 
militia. Moreover, the “modus operandi” of the Ngiti group both before the 24 
February 2003 attack on Bogoro and thereafter corroborated that they meant to 
perpetrate these crimes.1804 
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Further, the Chamber observed that on 24 February 2003, acts of destruction of 
houses (demolishing and/or setting ablaze) took place throughout the Bogoro 
village all day long (even after it had been dominated the attackers) and that there 
was an extensive pillage of the civilians´ belongings (such as roofing sheets of 
houses, livestock and other animals).1805 
 
The Chamber also noted that, in Ituri, the destruction of houses (frequently by 
setting them ablaze) and the seizing of enemy property were common practices, 
especially among Ngiti combatants.1806    
 
Thus, the Chamber found that the crimes of destruction of the property and pillage 
conducted by the Nigti combatants during the attack on Bogoro constituted “an 
integral part of the operation, which consisted of wiping out Bogoro by attacking 
its Hema civilian population.”1807   
 
In fact, the Chamber asserted that  
 
“the Ngiti combatants of Walendu-Bindi collectivité harboured the 
intention to pillage the property and livestock, and more 
specifically, that they knew that such acts of pillaging would occur 
on 24 February 2003 in the ordinary course of events. 
Accordingly, the Chamber is of the view that the crime of pillaging 
as a war crime was part of the common purpose. Similarly, the 
crime of destruction of property as a war crime was also part of 
the common purpose, which was specific to the militia, namely to 
eliminate from Bogoro the predominantly Hema civilian 
population.”1808   
 
In addition, the Trial Chamber II recalled that, on the day of the aforementioned 
attack, the Ngiti combatants raped women who claimed not to be Hema (in order 
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Nevertheless, the Chamber understood that there was no evidence that allowed  
 
“it to find that the acts of rape and enslavement were committed 
on a wide scale and repeatedly on 24 February 2003.”1810 
 
It is important to highlight that, after establishing that the attack on Bogoro was 
systematic, the Trial Chamber II when analysing the existence of the nexus 
between the act and the attack, found 
 
“that the acts of sexual violence during the operation to wipe out 
Bogoro’s civilian population were committed with a same 
objective and objectively formed part of that operation. By no 
means could they constitute isolated acts. 
 
1166. Furthermore, the perpetrators of the acts were members 
of the militia of Walendu-Bindi collectivité, and they committed 
the murders, rapes and sexual slavery in the knowledge of that 
attack and that their acts formed part of it.”1811 
 
It concluded that   
 
“the murders and rapes committed in Bogoro on 24 February 
2003 and the enslavement which ensued that day formed part of 
a systematic attack principally directed against the village’s 
predominantly Hema civilian population that was launched 
pursuant to a policy of the Walendu-Bindi Ngiti militia.”1812 
 
Therefore, the TC II first affirmed that the acts of sexual violence during the attack 
to destruct Bogoro’s civilian population were perpetrated with the same objective 
and objectively constituted part of that operation, not being isolated acts. From 
this affirmation, one could infer that the acts of sexual violence were part of the 
common purpose for they were carried out with the same aim of the attack and 
were not to be regarded as isolated acts.  
 
However, in this part of the judgment the Chamber asserted that the acts of rape 
and enslavement were not committed on a wide scale and repeatedly on the date 
of the attack.  
 
It seems that, although the Trial Chamber II had found that the attack on Bogoro 
was systematic and that the acts of sexual violence were part of the operation to 
wipe out Bogoro’s civilian population, it decided to apply the requirement of 
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widespread as a threshold to being a part of the common purpose to attack 
Bogoro.  
 
Surely, as aforementioned, the requirement that the attack is widespread refers 
to the wide scale character of the attack as well as the number of persons who 
were targeted.1813  
 
In this part of its reasoning, the Chamber argued that the acts of rape and sexual 
slavery were perpetrated in a small scale and not repeatedly. As a consequence, 
the Chamber found that such acts could not be regarded as part of the common 
purpose of the Ngiti militia to wipe out Bogoro of its predominantly Hema 
population.  
 
Also, in support of its finding, the Chamber affirmed that the destruction of the 
Bogoro village did not necessarily entail the perpetration of these acts.1814   
 
In fact, the TC II found that the perpetration of crimes of rape and sexual slavery 
was not indispensable in the consecution of the Ngiti militia´s goal of wiping out 
Bogoro and its Hema population and observed that, unlike the other offences that 
integrate the common purpose, it was not proved that the Ngiti militia members 
of Walendu-Bindi “collectivité” had perpetrated the crimes of rape or sexual 
slavery before the battle of Bogoro.1815   
 
The absence of proof that the Ngiti militia had previously incurred in the 
perpetration of the crimes of rape and sexual slavery meant that such crimes 
could not be considered part of the militia´s “modus operandi” to carry out attacks.  
 
The Chamber also noted that  
 
“the lives of those women who were raped, abducted and 
enslaved were specifically “spared” and they evaded certain 
death by claiming to be other than of Hema ethnicity.”1816 
 
 
1813 Rome Statute, Art. 7(1)(a); Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 7 (1) 
(g)-1; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber 
I, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 420, paras. 1111, 1113  
1814 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 319, 329, 369-370, 373-374, 379-382, 643, 
paras. 853, 876, 989, 997, 1009, 1014, 1663; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, Second Corrigendum to 
Defence Closing Brief, paras. 996-1001; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, Defence Closing Statements, pp. 
64-68 
1815 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 643, para. 1663; ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Second Corrigendum to Defence Closing Brief, paras. 996-1001; ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Defence Closing Statements, pp. 64-68 
1816 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 319, 329, 369-370, 373-374, 379-382, 643-
644, paras. 853, 876, 989, 997, 1009, 1014, 1663 
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In view of that, the Chamber considered that the perpetration of rape and sexual 
slavery was incidental, not being part of the group´s common purpose. 
 
Certainly, the Trial Chamber affirmed that even though the acts of rape and 
sexual enslavement amounted to an integral component of the Ngiti militia’s goal 
of attacking the Hemas who were living in the village of Bogoro, the evidence 
presented did not support the finding that the criminal purpose pursued on 24 
February 2003 obligatorily included the perpetration of the crimes of rape and 
sexual slavery.1817  
 
In spite of the allegations that to carry out the crimes of rape and sexual slavery 
was not indispensable in the consecution of the Ngiti militia´s goal and that it was 
not proved that the Ngiti militia members of Walendu-Bindi “collectivité” normally 
used rape and sexual slavery as a war weapon, it seems that the Trial Chamber 
II did contradict itself in relation to the crimes of rape and sexual slavery. The 
affirmation that they were not committed in a large scale and repeatedly did not 
suffice to exclude them from the common purpose. As the own Chamber stated, 
by no means they could be regarded as isolated acts, but, instead, formed part 
of that operation.  
 
Nonetheless, since these crimes were not essential for achieving the goal of wipe 
out the Hemas from Bogoro, they could have been considered as being in the 
ordinary course of events, which would make Katanga’s liable for them within the 
terms of Article 25(3)(d).1818 
 
However, based on the arguments above, the Chamber stated that it could not 
find that rape and sexual slavery were part of the common purpose of the Ngiti 
militia when it attacked the predominantly Hema civilian population of Bogoro on 
24 February 2003. Therefore, the TC II´s view was aligned with the dissenting 
opinion rendered by Judge Anita Ušacka in the Decision on the confirmation of 
charges.1819 
 
The Trial Chamber II understood that the crimes of rape and sexual slavery were 
perpetrated during the attack on Bogoro and in its aftermath. Nevertheless, in the 
Chamber´s view, these crimes were not an integrating part of the criminal 
purpose of the Ngiti militia of Walendu-Bindi “collectivité” that led to the attack on 
Bogoro.  
 
In this respect, the Chamber asserted that 
  
“[t]o be satisfied that the perpetrator’s acts were encompassed 
by the common purpose, it will also be necessary to show that 
the crime at hand formed part of the common purpose. Crimes 
 
1817 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 644, para. 1664 
1818 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 628-629, para. 1630 
1819 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 644, para. 1664; ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on the confirmation of charges, pp. 209-211 
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ensuing solely from opportunistic acts by members of the group 
and which fall out with the common purpose cannot be attributed 
to the group’s concerted action. Only those crimes which the 
group harboured the intention to commit (the common purpose 
being to commit the crime or encompassing its execution), and 
falling within the ordinary course of events, can therefore be 
attributed to the said group and incur the accused’s liability under 
article 25(3)(d).”1820 
 
Consequently, Germain Katanga could not be considered criminally responsible 
for the crimes of rape and sexual slavery within the terms of Article 25(3)(d)(ii) of 
the Rome Statute.  
 
In fact, those crimes, albeit perpetrated during the 24 February 2003 attack on 
Bogoro and in its aftermath, were considered by the Chamber as not being part 
of the common purpose of the Ngiti militia of Walendu-Bindi “collectivité” and, 
hence, the accused could not be held responsible for them. 
 
In face of the commitment of the crimes of rape and sexual slavery, on the one 
hand, and the impossibility of regarding such crimes as being part of the Ngiti 
militia’s common purpose, on the other hand, the Trial Chamber II decided to 
include some of these acts in the crime of attack against civilians as a war crime 
(Article 8 (2)(e)(I) of the Statute).1821  
 
Undoubtedly, when addressing the crimes committed during the attack on Bogoro 
on 24 February 2003, in the conclusions on the crime of attack against civilians 
as a crime war, the TC II affirmed that 
 
“although the UPC combatants had retreated, the Lendu and 
Ngiti combatants continued to pursue the population of Bogoro 
who were still hiding in the bush, killed some of them and sexually 
assaulted two women.”1822 
 
Thus, the Chamber decided to insert the pursuit and rapes of Witness P-132 and 







1820 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 628-629, para. 1630 
1821 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 319, 329, 369-370, 373-374, 379-382, 643, 
paras. 853, 876, 989, 997, 1009, 1014, 1663; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, Second Corrigendum to 
Defence Closing Brief, paras. 996-1001; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, Defence Closing Statements, pp. 
64-68 
1822 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 309-310, 329, paras. 829, 876 
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The Trial Chamber found  
 
“beyond reasonable doubt that Ngiti combatants directly targeted 
the predominantly Hema civilian population of Bogoro on 24 
February 2003. 
 
879. In the light of the above and its findings on the contextual 
elements of war crimes, the Chamber is therefore satisfied 
beyond reasonable doubt that the civilian population and civilians 
not taking direct part in hostilities were attacked intentionally in 
Bogoro on 24 February 2003 and that the crime defined in article 
8(2)(e)(i) was committed by Ngiti combatants.”1823 
 
Therefore, to circumvent the situation, it treated the crime of rape (sexual assault 
of two women) as being subsumed in the war crime of attack against civilians.   
  
In conclusion, in spite of the fact that the Trial Chamber II did find that there was 
a common purpose (namely, to wipe out from the Bogoro village the UPC military 
elements as well as the Hema civilian population), it understood that solely the 
crimes of murder (as a crime against humanity and as a war crime), attack against 
civilians (as a war crime), pillaging and destruction (as war crimes) were part of 
this common purpose.1824 
 
Certainly, the TC II established that the crimes of murder (as a crime against 
humanity and as a war crime), attack against civilians (as a war crime), pillaging 
and destruction (as war crimes) were committed by members of the Ngiti militia 
of Walendu-Bindi “collectivité”, when they, moved by a common purpose, 
attacked Bogoro on 24 February 2003.1825 
 
In this respect, the Chamber stated that there was  
 
“perfect concordance between: (1) the attack, that is, the 
operation against Bogoro; (2) the group’s common purpose, 
which in this instance was to wipe out from that area the UPC 
military elements and the Hema civilians there; and (3) the 
commission of the crimes by the Ngiti combatants.”1826 
 
Germain Katanga was found criminally responsible for these crimes, within the 
terms of Article 25 3 (d) (II) of the Rome Statute, for he was aware of the intention 
 
1823 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 329, paras. 878, 879 
1824 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 647, para. 1672; CC. The Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Second Corrigendum to Defence Closing Brief, paras. 996-1001; ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Defence Closing Statements, pp. 64-68 
1825 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 644-645, paras. 1665, 1669 
1826 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 647, para. 1672 
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of the Ngiti militia to commit such crimes and intentionally made a significant 
contribution to their perpetration.1827   
 
In this respect, the Chamber affirmed that  
 
“Germain Katanga’s contribution proved to be of particular 
relevance to the commission of the crimes which form part of the 
common purpose, since that contribution had considerable 
influence on their occurrence and the manner of their 
commission. His involvement allowed the militia to avail itself of 
logistical means which it did not possess and which, however, 
were of paramount importance in attacking Bogoro. His 
involvement, therefore, had a truly significant part in bringing 
about the crimes. Germain Katanga’s contribution secured the 
military superiority of the Ngiti combatants over their adversary, 
the UPC, and allowed them to see through their purpose of 
eliminating from Bogoro the predominantly Hema civilian 
population.”1828   
 
The Chamber regarded that, in the context of the case, Katanga´s influence (his 
activities in totality and the numerous forms that his contribution assumed) clearly 
had an important weigh in the commission of the crimes of murder (as a war crime 
and as a crime against humanity) attack against civilians, pillaging and 
destruction of property (as war crimes) during the massacre in Bogoro.1829   
 
Further, there was no doubt that the accused meant to make his contribution. The 
Chamber recalled that in his “viva voce” evidence, Germain Katanga   
 
“explained that his contribution to the design to attack Bogoro 
was made with awareness and that he had a part in its 
conception in Beni in November 2002 and thereafter during 
subsequent trips to the area. 
 
1683. Germain Katanga further testified that had he not been 
forced to remain in Aveba during the assault on Bogoro, he 
would, moreover, have taken part in the attack. …  Hence the 
Accused acted deliberately and was fully aware that his conduct 
contributed to the activities of the Ngiti militia.”1830   
 
In relation to the question if the accused knew of the intention of the group to 
perpetrate the crimes that formed the common purpose, the Chamber asserted 
that Katanga  
 
 
1827 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 625, para. 1620, 1621 
1828 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 650, para. 1679 
1829 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 651, para. 1681 
1830 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 651, para. 1682-1683 
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“knew of the anti-Hema ideology which, in February 2003, drove 
and mobilised the Ngiti commanders and combatants of 
Walendu-Bindi….  the Accused’s testimony shows in no 
uncertain terms that he wholeheartedly espoused that 
ideology.”1831   
 
The Chamber concluded that 
 
“… Germain Katanga, in his capacity as President of the Ngiti 
militia of Walendu-Bindi collectivité, knew that a military attack 
against Bogoro was being prepared and that the weapons 
supplies were intended for that battle. He also knew that the 
methods of warfare generally deployed in Ituri, and in Walendu-
Bindi specifically, by all of the armed groups entailed acts of 
violence against the civilian population. More specifically, he 
knew that Ngiti combatants from Walendu-Bindi had already 
violently attacked the civilian population and were driven by an 
ideology inimical to the Hema and that certain commanders of 
that militia had already fought in Nyakunde in September 2002. 
Accordingly, the Chamber must find that Germain Katanga knew 
that the attack on Bogoro would proceed as it did and that the 
Ngiti militia would commit the crimes of murder, attack against 
civilians, destruction of property and pillaging.”1832   
 
The Chamber considered that its findings established beyond reasonable doubt 
that Katanga made an intentional contribution to the crimes of murder (as both 
war crime and crime against humanity), attack against civilians, destruction of 
property and pillaging (as war crimes), and that such contribution was significant 
and made in the knowledge of the group´s intention to perpetrate such crimes.1833 
 
It is noteworthy that, in the case at bench, the Defence raised the question of 
cumulative convictions for the crimes of rape and sexual slavery arguing that two 
convictions could not be entered in relation to each one of these crimes. The 
Defence contended that if it was established Katanga´s responsibility for the 
crimes of rape and sexual slavery, he should only be convicted with respect to 
these crimes as constituting crimes against humanity and not with respect to the 
same crimes if they amount to war crimes too.1834  
 
The Chamber recalled its finding that the crimes of rape and sexual slavery did 
not integrate the common purpose and, thus, Katanga could not be rendered 
guilty of any of the four correlating charges.1835 
 
1831 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 654-655, para. 1688 
1832 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 655, para. 1689 
1833 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 655, para. 1691 
1834 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 656, para. 1692 
1835 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 




Although none of the parties raised the issue of whether it was possible to enter 
cumulative convictions for the crimes of murder amounting to crimes against 
humanity and war crimes (for which the Chamber understood that all the 
constituting elements of Article 25(3)(d) of the Statue were established), the 
Chamber addressed the question and asserted that it would allow cumulative 
convictions solely when the conduct at issue notably infringes two different 
provisions of the Rome Statute, each requiring proof of a “materially distinct” 
element not demanded by the other. An element will be regarded different if it 
demands proof of a fact not demanded by the others.1836 
 
The TC II noted that the crime of murder as a crime against humanity contains a 
different material element than the crime of murder as a war crime. The former 
demands 
 
“the existence of a widespread or systematic attack against a 
civilian population, and the demonstration of a nexus between 
the perpetrator’s conduct and the attack, in respect of both the 
objective and the subjective elements.”1837 
 
Conversely, the war crime of murder requires  
 
“demonstration that the person killed was “hors de combat” or 
was not actively participating in hostilities and establishment that 
the conduct in question was connected to an armed conflict.”1838 
 
Therefore, the Chamber ruled that multiple convictions could be entered for the 
crimes of murder amounting to crimes against humanity (Article 7(1)(a)) and war 
crimes (Article 8(2)(c)(i)).1839 
 
- Disposition  
 
In the disposition, the Chamber, in accordance with regulation 55 of the 
Regulations of the Court, unanimously modified the legal characterisation of the 
facts, establishing that the armed conflict linked to the charges was not of an 
international character between August 2002 and May 2003.1840  
 
It was the first time in which the International Criminal Court modified the legal 
characterisation of the facts in accordance with regulation 55 of the Regulations 
of the Court (as seen in the previous chapter, in the Lubanga case the Trial 
Chamber I did not allow the legal re-characterisation of the facts as sexual 
 
1836 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 657, paras. 1693, 1695 
1837 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 657, para. 1695 
1838 Ibidem 
1839 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 657, para. 1696 
1840 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 658 
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slavery and inhuman and/or cruel treatment so as to include charges of sexual 
and gender-based crimes).1841   
 
The Chamber, in accordance with regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court 
(and except for the crime of using children under the age of 15 years to participate 
actively in hostilities), modified, by majority, the legal characterisation of the mode 
of liability firstly applied to Germain Katanga under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome 
Statute (indirect co-perpetration) in order to apply instead Article 25(3)(d) of the 
Statute (accessoryship by means of a contribution made “in any other way to the 
commission of a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose”).1842  
 
The Chamber, by majority, rejected the Defence´s application for a permanent 
stay of proceedings.1843 
 
The Chamber found, by majority, Germain Katanga guilty, within the terms of 
Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute, as an accessory to the following crimes 
perpetrated on 24 February 2003: 
 
- Murder as a crime against humanity (Article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute); 
 
- Murder as a war crime (Article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute); 
 
- Attack against a civilian population as such or against individual civilians not 
taking direct part in hostilities, as a war crime (Article 8(2)(e)(i) of the Rome 
Statute);                                                                                               
 
- Destruction of enemy property as a war crime (Article 8(2)(e)(xii) of the Rome 
Statute); and                                                                                                                                
 
- Pillaging as a war crime (Article 8(2)(e)(v) of the Rome Statute).1844 
 
The Chamber unanimously found German Katanga not guilty, within the terms of 
Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute, as an accessory to the crimes of rape and 
sexual slavery as crimes against humanity (Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute) 
and as war crimes (Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute), thus, acquitting him 
of those charges.1845 
 
The Chamber unanimously found Germain Katanga not guilty, within the terms 
of Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, of the crime of using children under the 
 
1841 ICC Women website, Partial Conviction of Katanga by ICC, Acquittals for Sexual Violence 
and Use of Child Soldiers, The Prosecutor vs. Germain Katanga 
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age of 15 years to participate actively in hostilities as a war crime (Article 
8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute), hence, acquitting him of that charge.1846 
 
Therefore, German Katanga was partially convicted, solely being rendered guilty 
as an accessory to one count of one crime against humanity (murder) and four 
counts of war crimes (murder, attacking a civilian population, destruction of 
property and pillaging).1847 
 
On 23 May 2014, Germain Katanga was sentenced, by the majority of Trial 
Chamber II, to a total of 12 years' imprisonment. The time he had already spent 
in detention at the International Criminal Court (from 18 September 2007 to 23 
May 2014) was deducted from the12 years. Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert 
issued a dissenting opinion.1848  
 
7.3. Post judgment 
 
On 25 June 2014, both the Defence and the Prosecutor withdrew their appeal on 
the Judgment. They also indicated that they did not have the intention of 
appealing the Chamber’s Sentencing decision.1849 
 
On 13 November 2015, the Appeals Chamber decided, in accordance with the 
review conducted under Article 110 (3) of the Statute, to reduce the original 
sentence of Germain Katanga by 3 years and 8 months.1850  
 
In fact, a Panel of three judges of the Appeals Chamber was appointed for the 
review (under Article 110 (3) of the Statute) concerning reduction of sentence in 
face of the fact that Germain Katanga had served two thirds of his sentence (8 
years). The Panel found that the following factors were present:  
 
“(i) an early and continuing willingness by Mr Katanga to 
cooperate with the Court in its investigations and prosecutions 
(article 110 (4) (a) of the Statute); (ii) a genuine dissociation from 
his crimes demonstrated by Mr Katanga’s conduct while in 
detention (rule 223 (a) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence); 
(iii) the prospect of resocialisation and successful resettlement of 
Mr Katanga (rule 223 (b) of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence); (iv) the prospect that Mr Katanga’s early release 
 
1846 Ibidem 
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would give rise to some level of social instability in the DRC, 
though not to the level of “significant” (rule 223 (c) of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence); and (v) the individual circumstance of 
an increase in familial responsibilities due to recent deaths in Mr 
Katanga’s family (rule 223 (e) of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.”1851 
 
As a consequence of these positive factors, the Panel decided to reduce the 
original sentence of Mr Germain Katanga by 3 years and 8 months.1852 
 
On 19 December 2015 Katanga was transferred to a prison facility in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo to serve the final part of his imprisonment 
sentence.1853 
 
The reparations proceedings began on 7 August 2012. On 24 March 2017 the 
Trial Chamber II, by unanimity, handed down an “Order for Reparations pursuant 
to Article 75 of the Statute” against Germain Katanga. Certainly, the Chamber 
found that out of the 341 Applicants, 297 had shown to the standard of proof of a 
balance of probabilities that they are victims of the crimes for which Germain 
Katanga was condemned. Accordingly, the Chamber awarded reparations in the 
case to the 297 victims.1854  
 
The Chamber assessed that the total monetary value of the extent of the harm 
suffered by them to be USD 3.752.620, and set the reparations award for which 
Germain Katanga is liable at USD 1 million. However, the Chamber found that he 
was indigent for the purposes of reparations at the time of the award. In view of 
that, the Chamber directed the Presidency (with the Registrar´s assistance) to 
monitor Germain Katanga’s financial situation on a regular basis in the terms of 
regulation 117 of the Regulations of the Court.1855   
 
Moreover, the Chamber awarded individual reparations, consisting in 
compensation in the form of a symbolic award of USD 250, as well as collective 
reparations aimed at benefitting each victim, embodied in support for housing, 
support for an income-generating activity, support for education as well as 
psychological support.1856 
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Criminal Court website, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Situation in the Democratic Republic 
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The TC II also directed the Trust Fund for Victims to elaborate, with basis on the 
Chamber’s rulings on the kinds and modalities of reparations, a draft 
implementation plan to be submitted by 27 June 2017, establishing a programme 
containing the projects the TFV intends to carry out. It also directed the Legal 
Representative and the Defence to submit observations with respect to the Draft 
Plan up to 28 July 2017.1857 
 
The Trial Chamber II further directed the Defence to contact the TFV in order to 
discuss the contribution of Germain Katanga, in case he so wished, to the types 
of reparations, and directed the TFV to contact the Government of the DRC in 
relation to how it could collaborate so as to give effect to and implement the 
reparations.1858   
 
Additionally, the Chamber, considering Katanga’s financial situation, directed the 
Board of Directors of the TFV to inform the Bench if it is minded to use its “other 
resources” so as to fund and implement individual and collective reparations, as 
well as to estimate it in the Draft Plan of the monetary amount.1859 
 
The Chamber invited the TFV to take into account, as part of its assistance 
mandate, wherever appropriate, the harm endured by the Applicants as a 
consequence of violence of a sexual character or as a consequence of 
transgenerational psychological trauma, and the harm suffered by the former 
child soldiers, that the Chamber had not been in a position to examine in the 
case.1860 
 
The TC II directed the Registrar to take all the necessary measures in order to 
give appropriate publicity to its order for reparations. Germain Katanga, the Legal 
Representative of Victims and the Office of Public Counsel appealed against such 
Reparations Order, but the latter was mostly upheld by the Appeals Chamber (“is 
reversed to the extent that it rejected the applications for reparation of applicants 
a/25094/16, a/25096/16, a/25097/16, a/25098/16 and a/25099/16. The Trial 
Chamber is directed to carry out a new assessment of these applications, 
providing sufficient reasons for its eventual conclusion thereon”).1861 
 
It is noteworthy that the Trial Chamber specifically advised the TFV that, in the 
implementation of its assistance mandate, it should bear in mind the harm 
endured by the Applicants as a consequence of violence of a sexual character or 
 
1857 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07.  Trial Chamber II, Order 
for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, pp. 118-119 (24 March 2017) 
1858 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07.  Trial Chamber II, Order 
for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, p. 119 (24 March 2017) 
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1861 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07.  Trial Chamber II, Order 
for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, p. 120 (24 March 2017); 
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as a consequence of transgenerational psychological trauma, as well as the harm 
suffered by the former child soldiers.1862 
 
It must be stressed that, due to Katanga´s acquittal for the crimes of rape and 
sexual slavery, this invitation of the TC II to the TFV was related to its assistance 
mandate. It demonstrates the Chamber´s concern with the harm brought about 
by sexual violence.  
 
What is more, the Chamber stated that the TFV should take into consideration 
such harm not only with respect to the 297 victims but also in relation to the other 
applicants who were not considered victims of the crimes of which Katanga was 
convicted. The TFV´s attempt to decrease the suffering caused by violent acts of 
sexual nature should be broad, embracing as high a number of persons as 
possible, inclusive those not admitted as victims for the ends of reparations.   
 
On 18 May 2017, the he Board of Directors of the Trust Fund for Victims decided 
to provide USD 1 million for the collective and individual reparations awarded to 
victims in the case, thus, covering all the costs of the TC II Order for Reparations 
of 24 March 2017. The Netherlands contributed to such amount with a donation 
of 200.000 euros, which included earmarked funding that should be allocated to 
the payment of individual awards.1863 
 
Certainly,  in face of the Trial Chamber II´s finding that Germain Katanga was 
indigent for purposes of reparations, it requested the Board to contemplate the 
possibility of making use of the “other resources of the Trust Fund” to complement  
the payment of individual and collective awards, in the terms of regulation 56 of 
the TFV Regulations. It was the first time in the ICC´s history that the Board of 
Directors of the TVF received such a request from a Trial Chamber, including in 
relation to the payment of individual awards ordered in accordance with rule 98 
(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.1864  
 
The Trial Chamber awarded individual reparations to the 297 victims in the form 
of a symbolic compensation of $250 per person (amounting to USD 74,250) as 
well as four collective awards (which combined amount to USD 925,750) in the 
form of education assistance, housing assistance, income-generating activities, 
and psychological rehabilitation.1865 
 
 
1862 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07.  Trial Chamber II, Order 
for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, p. 119 
1863 ICC website, Press Release, Trust Fund for Victims decides to provide $1 million for the 
reparations awarded to victims in the Katanga case, welcomes earmarked donations of €200,000 
from the Netherlands (18 May 2017) 
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It demonstrates that the ICC is committed to its goal of providing justice to victims, 
not only through the trial and eventual conviction of the accused persons, but also 
in a concrete, tangible way. In fact, the ICC is seeking to promote and find means 
to materialise its restorative justice and make it meaningful, by providing 
monetary compensation, albeit symbolic, to each victim individually as well as 
financing programmes that will revert in the benefit of victims, promoting their 
healing, rehabilitation and reintegration.   
 
"The Rome Statute's innovative inclusion of the potential to 
award reparations to victims following a criminal conviction 
underscores the victim-centred approach of the entire Rome 
Statute system. ... Reparations therefore are a critical part of the 
reparative justice afforded to victims under the Rome Statute. 
 
In light of Mr Katanga's indigence and while recalling that he 
nonetheless remains liable for the reparations ordered against 
him, it is our sincerest hope that the Trust Fund's complement of 
$1,000,000 USD to the payment of the awards for reparations 
will ensure that the victims in the Katanga case receive the real 
tangible benefits of these awards and that they are received in a 
timely manner."1866 
 
On 25 July 2017 the TVF presented a draft plan for reparations in the case.  
 
In the explanation of the intake process of such plan, it was stated that  
 
“The Trust Fund and the implementing partner will endeavour to 
ensure that the composition of participants are gender inclusive, 
and that participants are sensitive to gender specific issues 
during the intake process. Participants will also identify various 
channels for women and girls’ access to registration and services 
of their preference that ensure confidentiality as needed and 
avoid stigmatization.”1867 
 
Regarding the individual compensation award, the Trust Fund affirmed that it was  
 
“aware of potential gender and power dynamics that may affect 
victims. Accordingly, the Trust Fund will take steps to ensure that 
the individual compensation award is received by the victim 
regardless of their gender and age, unless the individual wishes 
to proceed differently. The Trust Fund will furthermore ensure 
that the modes of distribution permit female victims to not only 
 
1866 Ibidem 
1867 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, Draft 
implementation plan relevant to Trial Chamber II’s order for reparations of 24 March 2017, p. 35, 
para. 114 (25 July 2017) 
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have the same access, but also retain control over, the benefits 
that are preferable to them.”1868 
 
Further, as stated, the plan encompassed, housing assistance, education 
assistance, income-generating activities, and psychological rehabilitation.  
 
In connection with housing assistance, the TVF requested to its prospective 
implementing partners the inclusion (among other items) in their project 
proposals of ability to assist with any necessary legal registration inclusive of any 
certificates that the victims need, inclusive of guaranteeing that women victims 
keep ownership, if they wish so.1869 
 
In relation to income-generating activities, the TVF requested its prospective 
implementing partners to include (amidst other elements) in their project 
proposals of additional income generating activities grounded on a market survey 
of the ongoing economic activities where the victims are established, inclusive of 
particular activities for women victims.1870  
 
When addressing psychological rehabilitation, the TFV proposed the specific 
activities of individual trauma-based counselling sessions as well as group 
counselling sessions. In relation to prospective implementing partners, the Trust 
Fund requested them to include in their project proposals, among others 
requirements, the CV of the project proposed counsellor evincing expertise to 
provide trauma-related counselling, including in terms of gender-sensitive 
methods to guarantee that female victims will participate of both individual and 
group counselling.1871  
 
Moreover, even though the TVF affirmed that 
 
“[m]isunderstandings and disinformation about the exact scope 
of reparations awards to victims, as well as about the 
implementation of the awards, may cause jealousy and 
stigmatisation towards victims, jeopardise the integrity of the 
reparations programme, and cause damage to the reputation of 
the Court and the Trust Fund.”1872   
 
 
1868 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, Draft 
implementation plan relevant to Trial Chamber II’s order for reparations of 24 March 2017, pp. 
35-36, para. 115 (25 July 2017) 
1869 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, Draft 
implementation plan relevant to Trial Chamber II’s order for reparations of 24 March 2017, p. 39, 
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para. 129 (25 July 2017)  
1871 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, Draft 
implementation plan relevant to Trial Chamber II’s order for reparations of 24 March 2017, p. 41, 
para. 130-131 (25 July 2017) 
1872 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, Draft 
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and, consequently, constituted a risk informing the draft implementation plan, the 
TVF also reckoned that its proposed implementation of the reparations order 
would successfully decrease the risks of jealousy and stigmatisation for 
victims.1873   
 
In what concerns monitoring and evaluation, the Trust Fund for Victims affirmed 
that, during the implementation of the programme, its headquarters staff and field 
programme managers would, among other assigned tasks, 
 
“[a]nalyze performance monitoring indicator data to identify 
gender gaps (the extent to which females and males are 
participating in and benefiting from the reparations programme 
and specific projects).”1874    
 
As a result, the TVF was attuned to gender issues and the question of 
stigmatisation in the elaboration of the draft implementation plan. Indeed, it 
deliberately adopted measures destined to protect women victims and diminish 
the gap between them and men.  
 
7.4. Importance of the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga case for the 
prosecution of the sexual and gender-based cases  
 
The case the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga consisted in a step forward in the 
prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes before the International Criminal 
Court. 
 
Certainly, for the first time in the history of the ICC accused persons (while 
Germain Katanga was still being jointly prosecuted with Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 
ICC-01/04-01/07) were charged with sexual and gender-based crimes, namely, 
the crimes of rape and sexual slavery, as both war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. It was an improvement in relation to the Lubanga case, since in that 
case the Prosecution did not present charges for sexual and gender-based 
crimes (as seen in the previous chapter).    
 
In this regard, it is relevant to highlight that even though in the beginning the 
Prosecution intended to charge Katanga with the crime of sexual slavery, in the 
Amendment of the Charges it reinstated this crime (that had been withdrawn as 
previously explained) and also included the charges of the crimes of rape and 
outrage upon personal dignity.  
 
The charge of the crime of outrage upon personal dignity had a gender informed 
nature, but, as seen, was not confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber I. It stems that, 
in relation to the charging sexual and gender-based, the Prosecution adopted an 
 
1873 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, Draft 
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approach which was broader than its initial one (which does not mean that it could 
not have been even more inclusive, as it will be discussed below). 
 
As aforementioned, in the severed case against Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, the Trial 
Chamber II did not have to entertain whether or not the crimes had been 
committed because its view was that the accused lacked of authority, and, 
accordingly, acquitted him of all charges, inclusive of the crimes of rape and 
sexual slavery.1875 
 
However, in the severed case against Germain Katanga, the TC II did analyse if 
the crimes of rape and sexual slavery had been perpetrated. It was the first time 
in which the Court had to examine evidence presented in relation to the crimes 
of rape and sexual slavery so as to establish whether the perpetration of such 
crimes had occurred.   
 
The Chamber seemed sensitive to the specificities that the sexual and gender-
based crimes entail.  
 
Certainly, the Trial Chamber II asserted that  
 
“[h]aving regard to the specific nature of evidence peculiar to the 
crimes of rape and sexual slavery, the Chamber will apply a 
specific modus operandi to the analysis of their commission. 
First, it will undertake a factual scrutiny and provide a legal 
characterisation of the three sub judice testimonies. It will then 
present its conclusions of law on the commission of the two types 
of crimes as a crime against humanity (article 7(1)(g) of the 
Statute) and a war crime (article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Statute).”1876 
 
Hence, the Chamber´s approach reflected the view that the gathering and 
analysis of evidence of gender-based violence can be conducted under different 
circumstances than the gathering and examine of other types of evidence, and 
that such difference should be taken into consideration when appropriate.1877 
 
Further, the Chamber recalled that  
 
“victims of sexual violence are particularly vulnerable witnesses. 
... The Chamber is alive to the fact, as recalled by the witness, 
that women who are victims of such acts run a very high risk of 
being rejected by their own community when they decide to tell 
the truth about their ordeal. It is therefore understandable that P-
132 wished to know which guarantees and protective measures 
 
1875 Opinio Juris website, Sane, J., Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui: reflections on the ICC’s first acquittal 
1876  Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g)-2, footnote 17; 8 (2) (e) 
(vi)-2, footnote 65; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-
Trial Chamber I, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 368-369, paras. 986-987 
1877 Oosterveld, V. (2009), pp. 407-430 
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the Court could provide her before telling the truth to the 
Prosecution’s investigators.”1878 
 
It is especially difficult for victims of sexual and gender-based crimes to come 
forward and give their testimonies. These victims fear to suffer rejection from their 
community upon exposing the acts of violence carried out against them. Further, 
in some circumstances, it is the very existence of the indictment and the 
subsequent imprisonment of the accused person that generate favourable 
conditions, providing the necessary safety for witnesses (who previously were not 
disposed to provide evidence) to finally come forward and testify. Thus, the 
feeling of insecurity and uncertainty can lead victims to provide misleading 
information in the beginning of the Prosecutor´s investigations.1879 
 
As a result, it is important for the prosecution of sexual and gender-related crimes 
before the ICC that Trial Chamber II was attuned to special vulnerability of the 
witnesses who were victims of sexual violence and took it into account (not only 
in the conduction of the trial proceedings but also when analysing and giving 
credibility to those witnesses´ testimonies).  
 
Surely, the TC II adopted an extra careful attitude in relation to the testimonies of 
this type of witnesses who were victims of sexual and gender-based offences so 
as to alleviate the difficulty they find in recalling their ordeal and also in an attempt 
to avoid revictimisation.  
 
Furthermore, the Chamber understood that the extreme vulnerability of these 
victims and their pursuit in forgetting the violence they suffered must be 
considered in the analysis of the evidence provided by them.   
 
Thus, the TC II regarded the sexual crimes as been extremely serious and 
considered that their gravity could impact one´s testimony, fact that should be 
taken into consideration when assessing its credibility and reliability.  
 
The Chamber also acknowledged that apart from the psychological and physical 
impact caused by sexual and gender-based crimes, the victims of these offences 
also face other challenges, such as stigmatisation and marginalisation by their 
communities.    
 
In spite of said progresses, some critics can be made regarding the conduction 
of the case. 
 
Firstly, there was a divergence between the Prosecution and the Registry 
(specifically the Victims and Witnesses Unit) regarding relocation of Witnesses 
132 and 287 (who provided the OTP with evidence on sexual offences).1880   
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Surely, the Registrar did not admitted Witnesses 132, 163, 238 and 287 (on 
whom the Prosecution had intention to rely for the confirmation of the charges) 
into the Court's Witness Protection Programme. The Prosecution, diverging from 
this approach of the Victims and Witnesses Unit, considered that these witnesses 
demanded protection before their identity could be disclosed to the defence and, 
hence, carried out preventive relocation of witnesses.1881 
 
As a consequence of the Prosecution's unauthorised preventive relocations of 
Witnesses 132 and 287, the Single Judge, after criticising the Prosecution for 
carrying out preventive relocation of witnesses, decided that the adequate 
remedy was to exclude the statements, interview notes and interview transcripts 
of these witnesses for the ends of the confirmation hearing.1882 
 
Indeed, the Single Judge did not accept the evidence provided by Witnesses 132 
and 287 for regarding that these witnesses were actually unprotected at the time 
of the confirmation hearing since the only safeguard they had received was their 
unlawful relocation by the Prosecution. Surely, the inclusion of their statements 
would necessarily implicate the disclosure of their identities.1883 
 
On 19 May 2008, the Registrar issued a Report informing the Pre-Trial Chamber 
I that Witnesses 132 and 287 had been accepted into the ICCPP and, 
accordingly, had been relocated within the extent of the programme.1884 
 
Once there were no more security concerns in relation to Witnesses 132 and 287, 
the Single Judge accepted the statements, interview notes and interview 
transcripts of these witnesses for the ends of the confirmation hearing.1885   
 
Submission of the Document Containing the Charges and List of Evidence, 7, p. 5; ICC. The 
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Decision on Evidentiary Scope of the Confirmation Hearing, Preventive Relocation and Disclosure 
under Article 67(2) of the Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules, 1, p. 26, paras. 53-55  
1882 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Corrigendum to the Decision on Evidentiary Scope of the 
Confirmation Hearing, Preventive Relocation and Disclosure under Article 67(2) of the Statute 
and Rule 77 of the Rules, 1, p. 22, para. 39 
1883 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Requests for Leave to Appeal the Decision on 
Evidentiary Scope of the Confirmation Hearing, Preventive Relocation and Disclosure under 
Article 67 (2) of the Statute and Rules 77 of the Rules, p. 10 
1884 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Registrar´s Report on the Protective Measures Afforded to Witnesses 
132, 238 and 287 
1885 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecution's Urgent Application for the Admission of the Evidence 
of Witnesses 132 and 287, p. 8; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on Prosecution's Urgent 
Application for the Admission of the Evidence of Witnesses 132 and 287; ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 




The Amended Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to Article 61(3)(a) of 
the Statute (26 June 2008), included rape, sexual slavery, and outrage upon 
personal dignity among the 13 counts.1886 
 
Therefore, there was not a unified course of action between the Prosecution and 
the VWU regarding the type of protection that should be granted to Witnesses 
who were victims of sexual and gender-based offences. Further, the Prosecution 
decided to promote a preventive relocation on its own, exceeding its mandate 
under the Rome Statute and the Rules. What is more, it misused its mandate, 
shifting the power to decide on the relocation of witnesses from the Registry to 
the Prosecution.  
 
It is also noteworthy that in spite of the VWU affirmation that it had solid grounds 
not to accept Witnesses 132 and 287 in the ICCPP, it seems that these Witnesses 
should have been included in this Protection Programme since the beginning.  
 
Indeed, the Single Judge refused to accept the evidence furnished by these 
Witnesses in the presentation of charges against the accused by the Prosecution 
for considering that the preventive relocation promoted by the Prosecution (the 
unique protection measure that they had received) was insufficient to guarantee 
their security, and that the inclusion of their statements would entail the disclosure 
of their identities.  
 
However, once the Registry accepted Witnesses 132 and 287 into the ICCPP, 
the Single Judge understood that there were not concerns regarding their security 
anymore, and, accordingly, admitted the inclusion of the evidence provided by 
them.   
 
In view of the circumstance that the inclusion Witnesses 132 and 287 in the ICC 
Protection Programme led the Single Judge to regard that they were safe and, 
hence, accept their statements, interview notes and interview transcripts for the 
ends of the confirmation hearing, it stems that this protection was essential for 
the prosecution of the sexual and gender-based crimes, and the VWU should 
have granted it from the start, avoiding delay in the proceedings.1887 
 
The Prosecution should, on the one hand, respect the VWU´s mandate and, on 
the other hand, obey the boundaries of its own mandate (even if its goal is 
purportedly to protect the witnesses of sexual and gender-based crimes, as it 
happened when it unduly promoted the preventive relocation of Witnesses 132 
and 287).  
 
1886 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
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The VWU, by its turn, should promptly furnish the necessary protection to 
witnesses who were victims of sexual and gender-based offences in those 
situations that so require, as in the present case in which the witnesses´ 
protection was needed so as to enable the inclusion of evidence and consequent 
charging of sexual and gender-based crimes. 
 
In conclusion, there should be a concerted action between the Prosecution and 
the VWU regarding the protection that should be granted to witnesses who were 
victims of sexual and gender-based offences.  
 
Another critic is that, although there is explicit mention to the occurrence of forced 
marriage, the Prosecutor decided to charge the sexual and gender-based 
violence suffered by the victims in the camps exclusively as sexual slavery.  
 
In fact, Oosterveld when addressing the case at stake affirmed that  
 
“the Prosecutor has chosen to charge only the sexual slavery 
aspect of forced marriage and not the other aspects. In the 
confirmation of charges hearing, he successfully used evidence 
of forced marriage to prove that there is sufficient evidence to 
establish substantial grounds to believe that civilian women were 
subjected to the crime against humanity of sexual slavery.”1888 
 
Forced marriage is a kind of gender-based crime that involves sexual elements 
(for instance, frequent rape) as well as various non-sexual elements (for instance, 
forced child-bearing and cooking). It demands an understanding of gender in its 
full complexity, without simplistic reducing it to sex.1889 
 
Nevertheless, in the present case, the Prosecution decided to charge facts that 
amounted to forced marriage exclusively as sexual slavery. Such choice denotes 
that the Prosecution gave too much emphasis to the sexual elements of the crime 
and not enough relevance to the harm caused by the non-sexual elements.1890 
 
Indeed, by prosecuting the acts of sexual and gender-based violence at stake 
solely under the head of sexual slavery, the Prosecution gave prominence to the 
sexual facet, which is undeniably serious. However, other grave aspects, such 
as forced pregnancy and compulsory household labour, were relegated to 
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Oosterveld affirmed that the Pre-Trial Chamber I used 
 
“evidence of non-sexual acts such as abduction, imprisonment 
and forced cooking as proof of the exercise of powers attaching 
to the right of ownership.”1892 
 
Certainly, gender-specific activities were presented as a form of proof of the 
sexual crimes instead of considering it a separate proof of the harm suffered by 
the victims.1893  
 
Furthermore, the fact that Witness P-132 bore a child as a result of the frequent 
rapes she was subjected to was also included among the evidence that the Ngiti 
combatants intentionally carried out the crime of sexual slavery.1894  
 
Therefore, the charging of sexual and gender-based crimes in the case was 
limited. It could have been wider so as to recognise not only the sexual element 
(that is built in the crime of sexual slavery) but also non-sexual elements that are 
gender-related and should be equally considered in the analysis of the violence 
endured by the victims.  
 
Undoubtedly, the Prosecution could have adopted a broader approach when 
addressing the violence perpetrated by the Ngiti combatants from Walendu-Bindi 
against Witnesses P- 132, P-249 and P-353 in the camps.  
 
For instance, the Prosecution could have charged the acts of violence suffered 
by Witnesses P-132, P-249 and P-353 in the camps not only as the crime of 
sexual slavery but also as the crime of forced marriage under the head “any other 
form of sexual violence” (Articles 7 (1) (g) and 8 (e) (vi) of the Rome Statute).     
 
In addition, the circumstance that Witness P-132 bore a child as a result of the 
often rapes she suffered eventually could have been be charged as the crime of 
forced pregnancy (Articles 7 (1) (g) and 8 (e) (vi) of the Rome Statute).    
 
In this regard, the same author asserted that 
 
“[p]erhaps in future cases the Prosecutor could instead charge 
all of the acts relating to forced marriage, and not only the sexual 
acts, in order to better capture the entire harm.”1895 
 
And, so as to achieve this goal, suggests that 
 
“[t]his could be done through the charge of inhumane acts as a 
crime against humanity, as was done in the Special Court, or by 
 
1892 Oosterveld, V. (2009), pp. 407-430 
1893 Ibidem; SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, Santigie Borbor 
Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T. Trial Chamber II, Jugdement, Separate Concurring Opinion of 
the Hon. Justice Julia Sebutinde Appended to Judgment Pursuant to Rule 88 (C), p. 580, para. 
16 
1894  ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 378, para. 1006 
1895 Oosterveld, V. (2009), pp. 407-430 
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coupling charges of the crimes against humanity of enslavement 
and sexual slavery. Another option, where warranted, is to 
charge forced marriage as the crime against humanity of gender-
based persecution.”1896 
 
Moreover, it must be stressed the issue of secondary victimisation that, although 
deeply related to sexual and gender-based crimes, must be born in mind. Indeed, 
apart from all the suffering experienced by Witness P-132 as a decurrence of the 
rapes and sexual enslavement, and the expected (although undesirable) 
suffering arising from the recollection of these acts during her testimony, in this 
instance she was confronted with the Defense´s assertion that she had willingly 
accepted the “marriage”, as if her consent was not impaired, as if her, a hostage 
in a situation of confinement, was actually allowed to make her will prevail.  
 
Undoubtedly, the argument raised by the Defense that the union of P-132 and 
her “husband” was consensual signifies that she had freely agreed to a sequence 
of violent crimes that followed their “marriage”- the repeated rapes, the physical 
abuse, the obligatory performance of domestic tasks.  
 
Such situation can produce a relevant negative psychological impact, especially 
on someone who was already notably vulnerable. The negative effects can have 
an in-depth reach independently of both the witness´ instantaneous ability to 
rebut the Defence´s argument and the Court´s ruling. Thus, the occurrence of 
secondary victimisation of witnesses who were victims of sexual and gender-
based when testifying before the Court, although predictable, is a negative aspect 
that should not be minimised.1897 
 
Further, there were critics with respect to the Trial Chamber II´s finding that the 
crimes of murder, attack against civilians, pillaging and destruction were part of 
the Ngiti militia´s common purpose, but that the crimes of rape and sexual slavery 
did not fall within this common purpose.  
 
On this subject, it has been noted that  
 
“[f]rom the early stages of this case, there were indications that 
some of the judges considered the evidence linking the charges 
of rape and sexual slavery to Mr Katanga to be insufficient. In the 
confirmation of charges decision, the sexual violence charges 
were the only crimes confirmed by a majority of judges and not 
by the full bench. This was an early and important indication that 
the evidence underpinning Mr Katanga’s role in the commission 





1897 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Common Legal Representative of the main group of Victims, Second Corrigendum Conclusions 
Finales, p. 7, para. 6 
1898 ICC Women website, Partial Conviction of Katanga by ICC, Acquittals for Sexual Violence 
and Use of Child Soldiers, The Prosecutor vs. Germain Katanga 
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It has been argued that 
 
“it is possible that a higher standard of evidence was expected in 
relation to sexual violence, including requiring a more deliberate 
intention to commit these crimes in the Bogoro attack, which they 
did not require in convicting Mr Katanga for the crimes of 
directing an attack against a civilian population, pillaging, murder 
and destruction of property.”1899  
 
It could be asserted that the crimes of directing an attack against a civilian 
population, pillaging, murder and destruction of property are more apparent than 
the crimes of rape and sexual slavery. The occurrence of former is supported by 
material evidence whilst the last two crimes do not present material evidence. 
Indeed, so as to prove of the crimes of rape and sexual slavery before the Court, 
it is necessary to resort to the testimonies of victims, who many times are not 
willing to testify or do not clearly recollect the facts due to the time lapse between 
the perpetration of the crimes and the trial as well as their endeavours to forget 
the violence they suffered. 
 
Undoubtedly, absent forensic evidence, the proof of the crimes of rape and sexual 
slavery depends almost exclusively on the victims´ testimonies, so actually this 
type of crimes is harder to prove.  
 
The arguments of the Trial Chamber II to support its finding that the crimes of 
rape and sexual slavery were not part of the Ngiti militia of the Walendu-Bindi 
“collectivité” ´s common purpose are the subsequent ones: 
 
- The crimes of rape and sexual slavery did not occur repeatedly and/or in a broad 
scale;  
 
- The achievement of the goal of destructing the Hemas living in Bogoro village 
did not necessarily entail the perpetration of these acts of sexual violence;  
 
- It did not rest proved that the Ngiti militia of Walendu-Bindi “collectivité” had 
incurred in such acts in its previous attacks, fact that indicated that rape and 
sexual enslavement were not part of its criminal strategy when undertaking an 
attack.  
 
In spite of these arguments, it does not seem correct the Chamber´s 
understanding that such crimes did not form part of the militia´s common purpose.  
 
As mentioned before, the Chamber should have stuck to its initial finding that the 
acts of sexual violence during the operation to destruct Bogoro’s civilian 
population were not isolated acts, but had been perpetrated with a same objective 
and objectively constituted part of that operation. It should not have adopted 
widespread as a threshold to determine whether rape was a constitutive part of 






Indeed, the Trial Chamber II should have regarded that, in the ordinary course of 
events, the implementation of the common purpose would bring about crimes of 
rape and sexual slavery (as did the majority of the Pre-Trial I). In such case, 
irrespectively of not being perpetrated in a large scale or against a high number 
of victims, these crimes would be considered as part of the Ngiti militia´s common 
purpose. Accordingly, Katanga would have been found guilty as an accessory of 
the crimes of rape and sexual slavery.1900 
 
In conclusion, even though there was some room for improvement in the handling 
of sexual and gender-based crimes, and despite the acquittal of Germain 
Katanga in relation to the charges of rape and sexual slavery, the case was an 
advance in the prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes before the 
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8. Case the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
 
8.1. Situation in the Central African Republic (ICC-01/05) 
 
On 3 October 2001 the Rome Statute was ratified by the Central African Republic 
(CAR). On 22 December 2004, “[t]he CAR Government referred the situation to 
the Office of the Prosecutor”.1901  
 
“In June 2005, the Government of the Central African Republic 
provided the Prosecutor with documents concerning the crimes 
committed in its territory in 2002 - 2003, and the records of 
judicial proceedings held in Bangui in relation to these crimes.  
 
The Prosecutor undertook a detailed analysis of the information 
received from the Government of the Central African Republic, 
and also requested and obtained additional information from 
various sources. After reviewing the information received, the 
Prosecutor found that the conditions required by the Rome 
Statute for launching an investigation were satisfied.”1902   
 
In view of that, on 10 May 2007, the Government of the Central African Republic, 
Pre-Trial Chamber III and the President of the Court were informed of the 
Prosecutor´s decision to launch an investigation. Twelve days later, it was made 
public the information regarding the opening of referred investigation.1903 
 
The focus of the investigation was alleged war crimes and crimes against 
humanity carried out in the context of an armed conflict between the Government 
of Central African Republic and rebel forces from 1 July 2002 onwards. It is 
relevant to point out that there have been critics to the circumstance that, 
although Bemba was a politician and militia leader from DRC, he was not charged 
for crimes carried out by this subordinated in Congo. Surely, he was prosecuted 
and judged exclusively for crimes perpetrated in bordering Central African 
Republic, where his troops were operating for a restricted period.1904 
 
It is important to highlight that the renewed wave of violence that started in the 
country in 2012 gave rise to the Situation in the Central African Republic II (ICC-
01/14) before the Court.1905 
 
The violence peaked in 2002/2003. In fact, some of the worst allegations 
connected to the crimes of killing, looting and rape took place during intense 
combat in October/November 2002 and February/March 2003. Subsequently to 
 
1901 ICC, the Office of the Prosecutor. Background, Situation in the Central African Republic (22 
May 2007) 
1902 Ibidem; ICC website, Case Information Sheet, Situation in the Central African Republic, The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo ICC-01/05-01/08 (March 2019)  
1903 ICC, the Office of the Prosecutor. Background, Situation in the Central African Republic (22 
May 2007) 
1904 ICC website, Central African Republic, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05; 
van den Berg, S., & Sengenya, C. (2019)  
1905 ICC website, Central African Republic, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05; 
ICC website, Central African Republic, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/14 
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the attacks against civilians, there was a failed coup attempt. Then came out a 
pattern of extensive rape as well as the perpetration of sexual violence by armed 
individuals. Sexual violence figured as a main feature of the conflict.1906    
 
In the launching of the investigation into the situation in the Central African 
Republic (May 2007), the following press release was issued by the OTP:1907  
 
"[b]ased on a preliminary analysis of alleged crimes, the peak of 
violence and criminality occurred in 2002 and 2003. Civilians 
were killed and raped; and homes and stores were looted. The 
alleged crimes occurred in the context of an armed conflict 
between the government and rebel forces. This is the first time 
the Prosecutor is opening an investigation in which allegations of 
sexual crimes far outnumber alleged killings. (…) Hundreds of 
rape victims have come forward to tell their stories, recounting 
crimes acted out with particular cruelty. Reports detailing their 
accounts were ultimately provided to the Prosecutor's Office. 
Victims described being raped in public; being attacked by 
multiple perpetrators; being raped in the presence of family 
members; and being abused in other ways if they resisted their 
attackers. Many of the victims were subsequently shunned by 
their families and communities."1908 
 
Indeed, the then Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo affirmed that, in the context of 
supra mentioned armed conflict, preliminary analysis indicated that civilians were 
murdered, homes and stores were looted, and comprehensive and substantiated 
allegations of sexual crimes considerably exceeded alleged murders.1909  
 
The Prosecutor explicitly stated that  
 
“[t]he information we have now suggests that the rape of civilians 
was committed in numbers that cannot be ignored under 
international law."1910  
 
He also pointed out that there were public and multiple rapes and abuse which 
caused victims to be rejected by their families and communities and added that 
“[t]hese victims are calling for justice.”1911 
 
Therefore, the distinctive characteristic of the Situation in the Central African 
Republic consists in the high reported number of victims of rape (at least 600 
victims during a 5-month period).1912  
 
1906 ICC, the Office of the Prosecutor. Background, Situation in the Central African Republic; 
ICC website, Central African Republic, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05 
1907 ICC website, Central African Republic, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05 
1908 ICC website, Statement, Prosecutor opens investigation in the Central African Republic (22 
May 2007) 
1909 Ibidem                                       
1910 The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court quoted in ICC website, Statement, 
Prosecutor opens investigation in the Central African Republic (22 May 2007) 
1911 Ibidem 




In accordance with credible reports, rape had been perpetrated against civilians, 
including young girls, elderly women, and men. Aggravating circumstances of 
cruelty were present, as, for example, the fact that rapes were carried out in front 
of third persons, that relatives were forced to engage, as well as the circumstance 
that rapes were conducted by multiple perpetrators. The social impact seemed 
devastating since several victims were stigmatised, and contracted the HIV 
virus.1913   
 
The Office of the Prosecutor stated that  
 
“[t]his is the first time the Prosecutor is opening an investigation 
in which allegations of sexual crimes far outnumber alleged 
killings.”1914 
 
The investigation brought about the case against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
(Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08) which involved the charges of 3 war crimes (namely, 
murder, rape and pillaging) and 2 crimes against humanity (specifically, murder 
and rape).1915 
 
Besides this main case, another case- the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle 
Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido (ICC-01/05-01/13)- was installed in relation to 
charges for offences against the administration of justice purportedly carried out 
in respect of the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo case.1916  
 
8.2. Background and overview of the case 
“An armed conflict not of an international character took place in 
the Central African Republic (CAR) from 26 October 2002 to 15 
March 2003, during which part of the national armed forces of 
Ange-Félix Patassé, the then President of the CAR, allied with 
combatants of the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC) led 
by Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, was confronted by a rebel 
movement led by François Bozizé, former Chief-of-Staff of the 
Central African armed forces.”1917 
In 2002, at the request and in support of Ange-Félix Patassé, Jean-Pierre Bemba 
deployed a MLC contingent of three battalions (in a total of approximately 1.500 
men) to CAR in order to oppose forces faithful to François Bozizé. During the 
 
1913 Ibidem 
1914 ICC website, Statement, Prosecutor opens investigation in the Central African Republic9 
1915 ICC website, Central African Republic, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05,  
1916 Ibidem; ICC website, Case Information Sheet, Situation in the Central African Republic, The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda 
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conflict, a contingent of MLC troops purportedly carried out the crimes of murder, 
rape and pillaging.1918 
 
Jean-Pierre Bemba was the President and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Mouvement de Libération du Congo. He occupied the position of military 
commander, disposing of effective authority and control over the MLC troops that 
allegedly incurred in these crimes.1919  
 
On 9 May 2008 the Prosecutor filed before the Pre-Trial Chamber III (PTC III) the 
“Application for Warrant of Arrest under Article 58” for Jean‐Pierre Bemba 
Gombo.1920    
 
However, on 21 May 2008, the PTC III rendered a decision in which it requested 
to the Prosecutor further information and supporting material on several aspects 
of his application, particularly on the counts of other forms of sexual violence and 
murder (both being regarded as crimes against humanity and war crimes).1921   
 
On 23 May 2008 the Pre-Trial Chamber III issued a Warrant of Arrest stating that 
there were reasonable grounds to believe that Bemba was criminally responsible, 
jointly with another person or through other persons in the terms of article 25(3) 
of the Rome Statute, for:1922     
 
“(i) rape as a crime against humanity, punishable under article 
7(1)(g) of the Statute;  
 
(ii) rape as a war crime, punishable under article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the 
Statute;  
 
(iii) torture as a crime against humanity, punishable under article 
7(1)(f) of the Statute;  
 
 
1918 ICC website, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Bemba Case, The Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08; ICC website, Case Information Sheet, Situation in 
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(iv) torture as a war crime, punishable under article 8(2)(c)(i) of 
the Statute;  
 
(v) committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment, as a war crime, punishable 
under article 8(2)(c)(ii) of the Statute;  
 
(vi) pillaging a town or place as a war crime, punishable under 
article 8(2)(e)(v) of the Statute.”1923  
 
In the same Warrant of Arrest, the PTC III also stated that it would consider the 
additional evidence and information presented by the Prosecutor in a subsequent 
decision.1924   
 
On 27 May 2008, the Prosecutor, in consonance with the PTC III´s Decision of 
21 May 2008, submitted additional supporting material in its Informations 
supplémentaires soumises par le Procureur.1925   
 
On 10 June 2008, the Chamber issued the “Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo”. In this 
decision, after analysing all the supporting material supplied by the Prosecutor, 
the Chamber rendered necessary to issue another warrant of arrest to replace 
that of 23 May 2008.1926   
 
Therefore, the Warrant of Arrest of 23 May 2008 was substituted by the “Warrant 
of Arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo replacing the Warrant of Arrest issued 
on 23 May 2008”, dated 10 June 2008, and which related to the very 
circumstances that occurred in the Central African Republic during the same time 
period (specifically, from 25 October 2002 to 15 March 2003). Such Warrant of 
Arrest, besides containing the crimes included in the Warrant of Arrest of 23 May 
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2008, also set up two counts of murder, typified as both crimes against humanity 
and war crimes.1927   
 
Certainly, the Pre-Trial Chamber III rendered that there was considerable basis 
to conceive that Jean‐Pierre Bemba was criminally responsible, jointly with 
another person or through other persons, in accordance with article 25(3)(a) of 
the Statute, for:1928   
 
“(i) rape as a crime against humanity, punishable under article 
7(1)(g) of the Statute;  
 
(ii) rape as a war crime, punishable under article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the 
Statute;  
 
(iii) torture as a crime against humanity, punishable under article 
7(1)(f) of the Statute;  
 
(iv) torture as a war crime, punishable under article 8(2)(c)(i) of 
the Statute;  
 
(v) committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment, as a war crime, punishable 
under article 8(2)(c)(ii) of the    Statute;  
 
(vi) murder as a crime against humanity, punishable under article 
7(1)(a) of the Statute;  
 
(vii) murder as a war crime, punishable under article 8(2)(c)(i) of 
the Statute;  
 
(viii) pillaging a town or place as a war crime, punishable under 
article 8(2)(e)(v) of the Statute.”1929  
 
As a consequence, Bemba was charged with the crime of rape under the heads 
of war crime and crime against humanity.   
 
The Confirmation of charges hearing took place between 12-15 January 2009.1930  
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On 3 March 2009, the PTC III issued the Decision Adjourning the Hearing 
pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute. In this decision, the 
Chamber´s view was that the evidence presented seemed to establish a distinct 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, in consonance with article 61(7) (c) (ii) 
of the Rome Statute.1931  
 
In considering the Evidence and the Arguments of the Parties and Participants, 
the Chamber observed that, in paragraph 57 of the Amended Document 
Containing the Charges dated 17 October 2008, the Prosecutor did not rule out 
"any other applicable mode of liability" apart from article 25 of the Rome 
Statute.1932 
 
Moreover, the PTC III enlisted several points, inclusive of the Prosecutor´s 
closing statements at the Hearing, the Defence´s arguments, and witnesses´ 
statements corroborated by NGO reports, that seem to indicate a distinct mode 
of liability as established in article 28 of the Rome Statute.1933 
 
Based on these elements (and without any forethought in relation to the possible 
application of the mode of participation inserted by the Prosecutor in the 
Amended Document Containing the Charges, namely article 25(3)(a) of the 
Rome Statute), the Chamber considered that the legal characterisation of the 
facts of the case could correspond to a different form of liability under article 28 
of the Rome Statute.1934 
 
In view of that, and so as to be in a position to issue a decision regarding the 
merits as to whether or not Bemba should be committed to trial, the Chamber 
rendered it was necessary for the Prosecution to hand in some written elaboration 
on this specific type of participation based on the evidence that had already been 
disclosed. The Chamber clarified that any further evidence presented by the 
Prosecutor would not be considered.1935 
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Hence, the PTC III decided to adjourn the hearing and requested the Prosecutor 
to consider amending the charges since the evidence presented seemed to 
establish a distinct crime (mode of liability), specifically the form of liability under 
article 28 of the Rome Statute, in the context and within the terms of article 
61(7)(c) (ii) of the Rome Statute.1936 
 
On 19 March 2009 the Presidency took the decision of merging Pre-Trial 
Chamber III with Pre-Trial Chamber II, and assigned the situation in the Central 
African Republic to Pre-Trial Chamber II.1937 
 
On 30 March 2009, in accordance with the Pre-Trial Chamber III´s request when 
it adjourned the Hearing pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute, the 
Prosecutor submitted an amended document which contained the charges, an 
amended list of evidence and an amended related in-depth analysis chart of the 
evidence.1938 
 
Nevertheless, the Prosecutor continued sustaining that Bemba was primarily 
responsible for the charges of murder, rape, torture, and pillaging pursuant to 
article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, meaning as a co-perpetrator. The Prosecutor 
stated that, alternatively, Bemba was criminally responsible by reason of his 
superior-subordinate relationship with MLC troops (pursuant to article 28 (a), or 
in the alternative article 28(b), of the Rome Statute).  
 
Indeed, the Prosecution asserted that  
 
“[p]rimarily, BEMBA is individually criminally responsible 
pursuant to Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, for the crimes 
against humanity and war crimes referred to in Articles 7 and 8 
of the Statute, as described in this Amended DCC, which he 
committed jointly with Patassé through MLC troops. Alternatively, 
BEMBA is criminally responsible by virtue of his superior-
subordinate relationship with MLC troops pursuant to Article 28 
(a), or in the alternative Article 28(b), of the Statute, for crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, as described in this Amended 
DCC and enumerated in Counts 1 to 8, which were committed by 
MLC troops under his effective command, or authority, and 
 
1936 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber III, Decision Adjourning the Hearing pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute, 
p. 19, para. 49 
1937 International Criminal Court, Presidency. Decision on the constitution of Pre-trial Chambers 
and on the assignment of the Central African Republic situation.TCC-Pres-01-09 (19 March 
2009); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, p. 8, para. 16 
1938 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, p. 8, para. 17; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial Chamber II, Prosecution's 
Submission of Amended Document Containing the Charges, Amended List of Evidence and 




control as a result of his failure to exercise control properly over 
these forces.”1939 
 
Therefore, the Prosecutor charged Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba as being criminally 
responsible as a co-perpetrator/indirect perpetrator, within the meaning of article 
25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, or, in the alternative, as a military commander or 
individual effectually acting as a military commander or superior in the terms 
article 28(a) or (b) of the Rome Statute,  for the crimes of murder, rape, torture 
and pillaging (as war crimes and crimes against humanity).1940 
 
Regarding the crime of rape, the Prosecutor affirmed that  
 
“… [f]rom approximately 26 October 2002 to 15 March 2003, the 
MLC troops perpetrated mass rapes, mass looting and killings 
against the CAR civilian population in specific locations as they 
advanced in, and retreated out of the CAR. These locations 
include but are not limited to Bangui - PK 12, Boy-Rabé, Fou 
(also written as Fouh) - Mongoumba, Bossangoa, Damara, 
Bossembélé, Sibut, Bozoum and Bossemptele.   
 
39. In the locations identified in paragraph 38, the MLC troops 
looted, raped, and killed CAR civilians. Civilian properties were 
systematically looted, and civilians were forced to cook and clean 
for the MLC troops against their will and with no payment. Men, 
women and children were raped by multiple MLC perpetrators in 
their homes, raped in front of family members, forced to watch 
rapes of family members, and raped in public locations including 
streets, fields and farms. Many of the women victims of rapes 
and gang-rapes contracted HIV, and became pregnant as a 
result of these rapes. Civilians that were killed included those 
who tried to prevent or resist rapes, attacks or lootings. 
 
… One CAR official conservatively estimates the number of 
victims to be about one thousand (1,000), a majority of which 
were rape victims. Of these, about two hundred and fifty (250) 
dare reported cases of looting. The MLC troops also killed 





1939 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Prosecution's Submission of Amended Document Containing the Charges, Amended 
List of Evidence and Amended In-Depth Analysis Chart of Incriminatory Evidence, and its related 
Annexes, p.16, para. 57 
1940 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, p. 114, para. 341 
1941 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Prosecution's Submission of Amended Document Containing the Charges, Amended 
List of Evidence and Amended In-Depth Analysis Chart of Incriminatory Evidence, and its related 
Annexes, pp. 12-13, paras. 38-40 
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And added that  
 
“[o]nce the MLC troops established control over former rebel held 
territories, they systematically targeted the civilian population by 
conducting house to house searches, and raping, looting and 
killing civilians. Lootings, rapes and murders occurred as MLC 
troops sought to punish perceived rebel sympathizers. Women 
were raped on the pretext that they were rebel sympathizers. 
Men were also raped as a deliberate tactic to humiliate civilian 
men, and demonstrate their powerlessness to protect their 
families. Many of the women and girls who were raped feared 
being shot by combatants. 
 
42. These crimes were used as a tool, or one of the means 
necessary to maintain Patassé’s Presidency. By subjecting the 
CAR civilian population to cruel, inhuman and humiliating 
attacks, the MLC troops instilled a general climate of fear in the 
CAR population, with the hope of effectively destabilizing the 
opposing army.   
 
43. At all times relevant to this Amended DCC, BEMBA knew that 
his conduct was part of, or intended for his conduct to be part of 
a widespread or systematic attack on the CAR civilian 
population.”1942 
 
This charging consisted in a landmark for the international criminal law. For first 
time in its history, sexual violence perpetrated against men was expressly 
charged as rape, instead of being prosecuted as the crimes of torture or cruel 
treatment (as in the ICTY the Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mucić also 
known as “Pavo”, Hazim Delić, and Esad Landžo also known as “Zenga” case) 
or even under the heads of the crime of humiliating and degrading treatment and 
the crime other forms of sexual assault (as in the ICTY the Prosecutor v.  Češić 
case).1943  
 
It is noteworthy that there were 5.708 individual applications for participation and 
5.229 victims were allowed to participate in the case, an unprecedented number 
in the history of the ICC. So as to guarantee the effectiveness and 
expeditiousness of the trial proceedings, two legal representatives represented 
all participating victims. Furthermore, the Amnesty International was granted 
leave to submit “amicus curiae” observations in accordance to rule 103 of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence.1944 
 
1942 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Prosecution's Submission of Amended Document Containing the Charges, Amended 
List of Evidence and Amended In-Depth Analysis Chart of Incriminatory Evidence, and its related 
Annexes, p. 13, paras. 41-43 
1943  ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T. Trial Chamber, Judgment, 
p. 3 (16 November 1998); ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Ranko Češić, Case No. IT-95-10/1-PT. Third 
Amended Indictment, Counts 7-8, Sexual Assault (26 Nov 2002); Hayes, N. (2016) 
1944 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber II, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, pp.16-17, paras. 18-20 (21 March 




In relation to the scope of the victims´ participation, they were 
 
“authorised to participate at hearings and status conferences, to 
make opening and closing statements, to file written 
submissions, to introduce evidence, to question witnesses 
subject to a discrete written application decided upon in advance 
by the Chamber, and to have access to confidential documents 




“the Chamber authorised the Legal Representative to call two 
victims to give evidence as witnesses during the trial and invited 
three further victims to present their views and concerns in 
person.”1946 
 
Nevertheless, there was a divergence among the Judges regarding the quantity 
of victims who should be allowed to give evidence as witnesses or to present their 
views and concerns in person, as well as the requirements for such purposes. 
Undoubtedly, the presiding Judge partly dissented from the Majority Decision in 
relation to the demands for the presentation by victims of evidence and the refusal 
to permit some of the victims to provide evidence and to present their views and 
concerns.1947 
 
The presiding Judge´s partial disagreement with the decision of the Majority of 
the Chamber concerned, particularly,   
 
 
Chamber III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the 
supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the 
views and concerns of victims, pp. 4, 5, 9, paras. 7, 19, 21 (22 February 2012); ICC. The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Decision 
on common legal representation of victims for the purpose of trial. ICC-01/05-01/08-1005 (12 
November 2010); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-
01/08. Pre-Trial Chamber III, Fourth Decision on Victims' Participation, pp. 36-37. ICC-01/05-
01/08-320 (12 December 2008); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. 
ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial Chamber II, Application for leave to submit amicus curiae 
observations under rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (6 April 2009); ICC. The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial Chamber II, 
Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of Prosecutor 
against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, p. 9, para. 19 
1945 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Corrigendum to Decision on the participation of victims in the trial and on 86 
applications by victims to participate in the proceedings, paras. 38-40 (12 July 2010); ICC. The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Decision 
on Directions for the Conduct of the Proceedings, paras. 17-20 (19 November 2010); ICC. The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, 
Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p.19, para. 24 
1946 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p.19, para. 24 
1947 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the 
supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the 
views and concerns of victims, p.3 
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“(i) the adoption, in paragraph 23 of the Decision, of the strict 
condition according to which the testimony of a victim "needs to 
be considered to make a genuine contribution to the 
ascertainment of the truth"; (ii) the adoption, in paragraph 24 of 
the Decision, of the strict criteria quoted from a decision of Trial 
Chamber II, which requires the victim's testimony to "bring to light 
substantial new information that is relevant to issues which the 
Chamber must consider in its assessment of the charges" ; and 
(iii) the subsequent assessment of the proposed victims’ 
applications and the decision not to allow some of them to testify 
or present their views and concerns before the Chamber.”1948 
 
Certainly, the requirements established by the Majority of the Judges for the 
presentation of evidence by victims were considered too restrict by the presiding 
Judge Steiner.1949 
 
She was contrary to the demands of the Majority that the presentation of evidence 
by an individual victim should be "useful" for the Trial Chamber, "make a genuine 
contribution to the ascertainment of the truth" or 
 
"bring to light substantial new information that is relevant to 
issues which the Chamber must consider in its assessment of 
the charges."1950  
 
In regard to the assessment of the proposed victims’ applications and the 
decision not to permit some of them to testify or present their views and concerns 
before the Chamber, in its Order dated 21 November 2011, the TC III established 
the procedure to be observed by the 2 legal representatives of victims in case 
they wanted to seek leave to provide evidence or for individual victims to submit 
their views and concerns before the Chamber.1951 
 
1948 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the 
supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the 
views and concerns of victims, p. 6, para. 10 
1949 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Decision on the supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to 
present evidence and the views and concerns of victims (22 February 2012); ICC. The Prosecutor 
v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Partly Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the supplemented applications by the legal 
representatives of victims to present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, p. 6, para. 
11; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, pp.19-20, footnote 80 
1950 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the 
supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the 
views and concerns of victims, pp. 7-8, paras. 10,13 
1951 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the 
supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the 
views and concerns of victims, p.3, para. 1; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Order regarding applications by victims to present 





The Legal Representatives of the victims initially made an application for 17 
victims to testify and/or to present their views and concerns. It was calculated that 
it would take approximately 345 hours of court time (equivalent to roughly 77 
sitting days, or 15 and a half weeks) to hear the testimony and/or views and 
concerns of the 17 victims enlisted by the Legal Representatives.1952  
 
The TCIII stressed that even though victims´ participation should be significant, 
such participation must not be detrimental to or conflict with the accused´s rights 
and a just and impartial trial (particularly the right of accused to be tried without 
unjustifiable delay).1953 
 
Based on such argument, the Chamber understood that hearing the 17 victims 
put forward by the Legal Representatives would considerably increase the 
duration of the trial and might cause undue delay prohibited by Article 67(l)(c) of 
the Statute. Accordingly, it instructed the legal representatives to reduce their lists 
to a maximum of 8 victims in total.1954  
 
In fact, the TC III stated that  
 
“… the Legal Representatives are instructed to work together to 
narrow the list of 17 victims included in the Applications into a 
short list of no more than eight individuals (together, "Relevant 
Victims"). The Relevant Victims should be those who, in the 
Legal Representatives' view, are (i) best-placed to assist the 
Chamber in the determination of the truth in this case; (ii) able to 
present evidence and/or views and concerns that affect the 
personal interests of the greatest number of participating victims; 
(iii) best-placed to present testimony that will not be cumulative 
 
1952 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Second order regarding the applications of the legal representatives of victims to 
present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, p. 6, para. 10 (21 December 2011); ICC. 
The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, 
Application by the Legal Representative of Victims for leave to call victims to appear as witnesses 
and present their views and concerns to the Chamber, para. 2 (9 December 2011); ICC. The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, 
Rectificatif à la justification relative à "Requête afin d'autorisation de présentation d'éléments de 
preuves et subsidiairement de présentation de vues et préoccupations par les victims”, para. 8 
(12 December 2011) 
1953 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Second order regarding the applications of the legal representatives of victims to 
present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, p. 5, para. 9 (21 December 2011); ICC. 
The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, 
Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the supplemented 
applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the views and 
concerns of victims, pp. 3-4, para. 2 
1954 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Second order regarding the applications of the legal representatives of victims to 
present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, pp. 6, 7, paras. 11, 12; ICC. The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Partly 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the supplemented applications by 
the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, 
pp. 3-4, para. 2 
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of that which has already been presented in this case; and (iv) 
willing for their identity to be disclosed to the parties in the event 
that they are permitted to testify and/or present their views and 
concerns.  
 
13. After receiving the additional information described below 
and after hearing from the parties, the Chamber will make a final 
determination on which of the Relevant Victims, if any, should be 
permitted to testify and/or present their views and concerns.”1955 
 
As a result, the Legal Representatives of the victims, complying with the 
Chamber's Second Order, cut down the number of victims proposed to be called 
to a total of 8 victims.  Furthermore, the questioning time was estimated to last 
32 hours (as opposed to the 138 hours that had been estimated to conduct the 
questioning of 17 victims). Following, the victims´ Legal Representatives 
collected and presented written statements for 7 out of the 8 victims they 
proposed to call. For that ends, the victims were contacted in their individual 
locations and gave specific accounts of the events and the damage they had 
suffered.1956 
 
Consequently, it seemed that the Court had  
 
“led the legal representatives to believe and to have a legitimate 
expectation that, by following all the specific instructions given by 
the Chamber in the Second Order, the victims would be 
authorised to testify and to present their views and concerns in 
person.”1957 
 
Nonetheless, of the already narrowed down list of victims submitted by the 
victims´ legal representatives, solely 2 victims were permitted to give evidence 
and 3 other victims were granted authorisation to present their views and 
 
1955 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Second order regarding the applications of the legal representatives of victims to 
present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, p. 7, paras. 12, 13 
1956 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Second order regarding the applications of the legal representatives of victims to 
present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, p. 6, para. 10; ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Complément de la 
requête afin d'autorisation de présentation d'éléments de preuves et subsidiairement de 
présentation de vues et préoccupations par les victimes du 6 décembre 2012 (23 January 2012); 
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber 
III, Requête de la Représentante légale de victims concernant des informations supplémentaires 
à sa requête du 6 décembre 2011 afin d'autoriser des victimes à témoigner et à faire valoir leurs 
vues et préoccupations devant la Chambre (23 January 2012); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Partly Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the supplemented applications by the legal 
representatives of victims to present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, p. 4, paras. 
3-5 
1957 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the 
supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the 
views and concerns of victims, p. 4, para. 6 
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concerns, in accordance with the decision of the Majority of the Trial Chamber 
III.1958 
 
In fact, only 2 victims (a/0866/10 and a/1317/10) were allowed to give evidence 
(meaning to give evidence under oath from the witness box so as contribute to 
the evidence in the trial) and appeared before the Trial Chamber III. These 
witnesses presented their testimonies without protective measures and were 
questioned by the Legal Representatives, the Prosecution, the Defence, and the 
TCIII.1959 
 
Three victims (a/0542/08, a/0394/08 and a/0511/) were granted permission to 
present their views and concerns before the Chamber (“the equivalent of 
presenting submissions, and although any views and concerns of the victims may 
assist the Chamber in its approach to the evidence in the case, these statements 
by victims … will not form part of the trial evidence”).1960  
 
However, the presiding Judge Steiner considered that “the participatory rights of 
the victims are arbitrarily limited to two victims allowed to give testimony” and 
stated that1961    
 
“the use of these criteria which are unduly and unfairly curtailing 
the victims’ rights to present evidence. These criteria have no 
legal basis and cannot be deduced from the statutory framework 
pursuant to its literal, systematic or teleological interpretation. In 
my view, the adoption of these criteria by the Majority reflects a 
utilitarian approach to victims’ rights rather than an attempt to 
ensure that the rights granted under the statutory provisions are 
exercised effectively and only within the limits specifically set out 
in these provisions.  
 
15. It should be sufficient, in my view, to recall that the Appeals 
Chamber has detailed the requirements that are necessary in 
order to allow victims to present evidence, notably and most 
importantly for the purposes of my partly dissenting opinion: the 
demonstration of the personal interests that are affected by the 
 
1958 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the 
supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the 
views and concerns of victims, p. 5, para. 9 
1959 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 20, para. 27; ICC. The Prosecutor 
v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Decision on the 
supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the 
views and concerns of victims, p. 11, para. 19, quoting ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx, para. 25  
1960 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Decision on the supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to 
present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, p. 11, para. 19, quoting ICC-01/04-
01/06-2032-Anx, para. 25. 
1961 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the 
supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the 
views and concerns of victims, p. 7, paras. 13, 16 
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specific proceedings; a determination of the appropriateness of 
the victim's specific participation; and the consistency with the 
rights of the accused and the requirements of a fair trial.”1962 
 
The same Judge asserted that  
 
“the strict limitations imposed by the Majority to the presentation 
of evidence by victims and the ‘case-by-case’ analysis of the 
victims’ right to present their views and concerns reflect a 
utilitarian approach towards the role of victims before the Court, 
which has no legal basis and appears to unreasonably restrict 
the rights recognised for victims by the drafters of the 
Statute.”1963 
 
Furthermore, although the dissenting Judge recognised that, in view of the 
elevate number of victims participating of the proceedings, it was necessary to 
restrict the number of victims authorised to present their views and concerns in 
order to ensure expeditiousness of the trial, she could not understand how to 
allow 7 victims (out of a total of 2287 whose participation in the proceeding had 
already been authorised by TC III) to present their views and concerns in person 
would jeopardise the expeditiousness of the proceedings.1964 
 
In addition, referring to precedents of the other Trial Chambers of the ICC, the 
Judge recalled that Trial Chamber I had authorised 3 victims out of 129 
participating victims to present evidence, whereas Trial Chamber II had initially 
authorised 4 victims out of 370 participating victims to present evidence.1965  
 
Hence, to allow only 2 out of 2287 victims who had been granted participation in 
the proceedings up to that point to present evidence seems quite 
disproportionate.  
 
Also, this Judge did not understand how permitting 7 victims to express their 
views and concerns in person would jeopardise the rapidity of the proceedings if 
 
1962 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the 
supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the 
views and concerns of victims, p. 7, paras. 14-15 
1963 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the 
supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the 
views and concerns of victims, p.6, paragraph 11 
1964 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the 
supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the 
views and concerns of victims, pp. 9-10, para. 21 
1965 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the 
supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the 
views and concerns of victims, p. 10, para. 22 
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177 hearing days had already been spent in the presentation of the Prosecution's 
evidence.1966 
 
In face of that, the presiding Judge considered that the Majority of the Trial 
Chamber III  
 
“without any factual elements on which to base its assessment of 
the effect of the victims’ participation on the expeditiousness of 
the trial, denied a number of victims their statutory rights to 
present their views and concerns which, depending on the 
modalities of participation that could be set by the Chamber at a 
later stage, could have been fully consistent with and not 
prejudicial to the rights of the accused.”1967 
 
Indeed, she affirmed that, although the Majority refers largely to these 
requirements and to the importance of the avoiding "undue" delays in the 
proceedings, in none of their findings they presented a justification or a factual 
elements basis so as to support them.1968  
 
Judge Steiner sustained that the Majority´s demands were unjustly limiting rights 
of the victims to present evidence. She would have assessed the applications of 
the victims to present evidence in accordance with the requirements previously 
established by the Appeals Chamber in the Lubanga case (namely, 
“demonstration of the personal interests that are affected by the specific 
proceedings; a determination of the appropriateness of the victim's specific 
participation; and the consistency with the rights of the accused and the 
requirements of a fair trial”) and after would have established whether the 
evidence was important and carried probative value.1969 
 
Finally, the Judge also disagreed with the Majority in relation to their decision to 
hear via video-link technology the 3 victims who were authorised to present their 
views and concerns. She would have preferred to call1970   
 
1966 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the 
supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the 
views and concerns of victims, pp.9-10, para. 21; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Second order regarding the applications 
of the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, 
p. 6, para. 10  
1967 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the 
supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the 
views and concerns of victims, p. 10, para.23 
1968 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the 
supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the 
views and concerns of victims, pp. 7-8, paras. 13,16 
1969 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the 
supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the 
views and concerns of victims, pp. 7-8, paras. 15-16 
1970 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 




“the victims to present their views and concerns by way of their 
appearance in person in the courtroom in The Hague, rather than 
by way of video-link.”1971 
 
The Decision Pursuant to Article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the 
Charges of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo was issued on 15 
June 2009. The Chamber expressly stated that Bemba's criminal responsibility 
under article 28 of the Statute would only be examined in case there was not 
enough evidence establishing substantial grounds to believe that the he was 
criminally responsible as an indirect perpetrator (within the terms of article 
25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute) for the crimes enumerated in the Amended 
DCC.1972 
 
However, once the PTC II understood that, in face of the threshold of proof 
demanded at the Pre-Trial stage, Bemba's criminal responsibility for the crimes 
at bar could not be determined under article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, it 
proceed to the analysis of his criminal responsibility within the meaning of article 
28 of the Statute.1973 
 
In fact, the PTC II understood that there was no foundation to prosecute Bemba 
for the crimes of murder, rape and pillage as an indirect perpetrator within the 
meaning of article 25 (3) of the Rome Statute. Hence, it rejected the Prosecutor´s 
main argument in respect of Bemba´s mode of criminal responsibility. In view of 
that, it proceeded to the analysis of the accused´s criminal liability on the basis of 
article 28 of the Statute.  
 
Therefore, if the PTC III had not adjourned the hearing and requested the 
Prosecutor to consider amending the charges so as to establish that Bemba was 
criminally liable by reason of his superior-subordinate relationship with MLC 
troops (in the terms of article 28 of the Rome Statute), the Chamber would not 
have confirmed the charges of murder, rape and pillaging against Bemba. In fact, 
the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba case would not have made to the trial 
phase, and, thus, the latter would not be judged for the mentioned crimes due to 
a fail of the Prosecution to include the adequate mode of liability in the charge.1974   
 
In view of the Disclosed Evidence, the Chamber was satisfied that there was 
enough evidence to establish substantial basis to believe that an extensive 
 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Decision 
on the presentation of views and concerns by victims a/0542/08, a/0394/08 and a/0511/0, pp. 5, 
6, 8, footnote 14, paras. 7, 13(a). ICC-01/0501/08-2220 (24 May 2012) 
1971 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Decision on the presentation of views and concerns by victims a/0542/08, a/0394/08 
and a/0511/07, pp. 5, 6, 8, footnote 14, paras. 7, 13(a) 
1972 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, pp. 114, 115, 139, paras. 341, 342, 402  
1973 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, p. 139, para. 403  
1974 Heller, K. J. (22 March 2016) 
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number of Central African Republic civilians were victims of crimes specified in 
the Amended Document Containing the Charges, including murder and that a 
majority were victims of rapes during a five-month period. Nevertheless, the 
Chamber rejected the Prosecutor´s cumulative charging approach and did not 
confirm count 3 of torture as a crime against humanity (pursuant to article 7(1)(f) 
of the Rome Statute).1975  
 
When entertaining the existence of the attack (within the concept of crimes of 
against humanity), the PTC III observed that the Defence did not challenge the 
fact that civilians of the Central African Republic were victims of several crimes, 
particularly rapes, that took place during the conflict.1976 
 
Along the same lines, the PTC III observed that the Defence did not disclose 
evidence so as to deny the widespread or systematic nature of the attack, but 
even referred to "300, 400, 2000 rapes". In fact, as stressed by one the legal 
representatives of the victims, the Defence´s strategy was instead concentrated 
on showing Bemba´s lack of knowledge of the widespread or systematic attack 
targeting CAR civil population.1977 
 
Regarding the act of rape as a crime against humanity (count I), In the Amended 
Document Containing the Charges, the Prosecutor sustained that 
 
“[f]rom on or about 26 October 2002 to 15 March 2003, Jean-
Pierre Bemba committed, jointly with another, Ange-Félix 
Pattasé, crimes against humanity through acts of rape upon 
civilian men, women and children in the Central African Republic, 
in violation of Articles 7(1)(g) and 25(3)(a) or 28(a) or 28(b) of the 
Rome Statute.”1978  
 
In its Decision on the Charges, the Pre-Trial Chamber II considered that there 
was 
 
“sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe 
that acts of rape constituting crimes against humanity directed 
 
1975 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
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Chamber III, Transcript, p. 49, lines 16-17 (13 January 2009); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 
(7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, p. 31, para. 92 
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of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, p. 42, para. 118; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-
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30 March 2009, pp. 33-34 (30 March 2009)  
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against CAR civilians were committed by MLC soldiers as part of 
the widespread attack against the CAR civilian population from 
on or about 26 October 2002 to 15 March 2003, with the 
knowledge of the attack by MLC soldiers.”1979  
 
In fact, the Chamber asserted that 
 
“[h]aving reviewed the Disclosed Evidence, and in particular, the 
statements of direct witnesses 23, 29, 42, 68, 80, 81, 87 and 22, 
the Chamber finds that they consistently describe the multiple 
acts of rape they directly suffered from and detail the invasion of 
their body by the sexual organ of MLC soldiers, resulting in 
vaginal or anal penetration. The evidence shows that direct 
witnesses were raped by several MLC perpetrators in turn, that 
their clothes were ripped off by force, that they were pushed to 
the ground, immobilised by MLC soldiers standing on or holding 
them, raped at gunpoint, in public or in front of or near their family 
members. The element of force, threat of force or coercion was 
thus a prevailing factor.”1980 
 
After concluding that the perpetrators of the acts of rape were MLC soldiers, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber II established its view on some questions raised by the 
Defence. At the Hearing, the Defence, alluding to the statement of witness 9, 
argued that victims of rape had maintained sexual relations with soldiers on a 
voluntary basis, hence disputing the force requirement.1981   
 
The Defence challenged the Prosecutor's Amended Document Containing the 
Charges by sustaining that  
 
“alleged rapes of unidentified victims 1 to 35 (the "Unidentified 
Victims 1 to 35") as reported by witness 47 occurred at dates 
either not specified or contradictory. In the same line, the 
Defence underlined inconsistencies in witness 22's statement as 
to the alleged date of her rape by MLC soldiers.”1982 
 
1979 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
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of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, p.  57, para. 160 
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Defense en Reponse a L’acte D’accusation Amende Du 30 Mars 2009, pp. 5-8, paras. 15,18, 24-
29, 32 (24 April 2009); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-




In connection with the Defence´s first challenge, the Pre-Trial Chamber II 
rendered it ungrounded the argument that CAR women had voluntarily engaged 
into sexual relations with soldiers. The Chamber reaffirmed that, in view of the 
corroborating evidence, the statement of witness 9 had enough probative value 
to be taken into consideration in its findings. Nevertheless, in relation to the 
witness's affirmation that a number of CAR women had willingly maintained 
sexual relations with soldiers on the ground, the Chamber observed that the own 
witness had explained that this applied to a small number of women and that 
several CAR civilian women had been victims of rape from on or about 26 
October 2002 to 15 March 2003. Witness 9 also furnished information that, as a 
result of the rapes, many women became pregnant. The Chamber noted that the 
victims had freely told the witness what had happened to them. Further, the 
Chamber observed that, in relation to other witnesses presented by the 
Prosecutor, that were purportedly raped, the Defence had not raised this 
challenge and neither had it showed that they willingly had engaged in sexual 
relations with MLC soldiers.1983 
 
The PTC II dismissed without addressing the challenge regarding the lack of 
specificity of the dates of the purported rapes of Unidentified Victims 1 to 35 for it 
was based on the statement witness 47, to which the Chamber attached a rather 
low probative value since this witness was anonymous and his statement was not 
corroborated. Certainly, the Chamber did not rely on such statement so as to 
confirm the charge of rape as a crime against humanity and, thus, did not enter 
in the merit of the challenge.1984   
 
As a consequence, the Pre-Trial Chamber III understood that the challenges 
raised by the Defence did not bear a weigh on the facts.1985   
 
The PTC II drew attention to some events and the related evidence. 
 
In relation to witness 23, on 8 November 2002, he was in his house in PK 12, 
when 8 MLC soldiers entered with guns and accused him of giving protection to 
rebels. The witness denied protecting rebels and suddenly heard a gunshot. The 
witness was threatened with death by an MLC soldier, who told him "Ok, you will 
live but we will have to fuck your anus". In view of that, witness 23 was ordered 
to adopt the position of a horse and then was raped successively by three MLC 
soldiers in the garden of his house in front of his three wives and children. Such 
 
1983 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
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evidence demonstrates that the rapes of witness 23 were perpetrated by threat 
of force and by coercion.1986  
 
The same witness furnished information that, in the same place and the same 
date, MLC soldiers also raped at least two of his daughters in front of him. Such 
information was backed up by witness 80`s statement. The Chamber observed 
that the acts endured by witness 23 took place in front of his three wives and 
children and that their fearful reactions (the kids were crying and one of the wives 
broke down due to the shootings). In view of that, the Chamber understood that 
its findings in relation to the force element and the perpetrators´ identity also 
applied to the rapes of the two daughters of witness 23.1987 
 
On 5 March 2003, Witness 29 was in her father's house in Mongoumba when 3 
MLC soldiers entered the house and, in succession, vaginally raped her. Indeed, 
witness 29 was told by them to lie down on the floor, but she did not obey. 
Subsequently, the first soldier who raped her tore her clothes and shoved her to 
the ground. The witness cried during the attacks. While she was being raped by 
the third MLC soldier, gunfires were heard and the soldiers fled.1988 
 
The ten years-old daughter of witness 42 was successively raped by two MLC 
soldiers in Begoa (PK 12). The rape took place in a small shelter located behind 
the house of the witness. A group of MLC soldiers invaded his house and, after 
obligating him, his wife and children to lie face down on the floor, took his 
daughter by force outside the house. Following, the witness saw that his 
daughter's dress was stained with blood. Afterwards, the girl confided in her 
mother who, in turn, told witness 42 that their daughter had been raped by the 
soldiers.1989 
 
On 27 October 2002, two MLC soldiers vaginally raped witness 68 close to 
Miskine high school in Fouh. The witness accounted that during the rape, a third 
MLC soldier stood on her arms with his feet, forcing her to the ground. She 
explained that, while fleeing from home with her sister-in-law, they ran into group 
of MLC soldiers. Witness 68 reported as well that her sister-in-law was also raped 
in the same occasion. Indeed, upon stumbling across the group of MLC soldiers, 
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three of them took her sister-in-law.  She heard the sister-in-law screaming while 
being raped.1990 
 
Three MLC soldiers vaginally raped witness 80 in the presence her family. They 
entered the house with guns, hence exerting coercion on the witness, and 
intimidated and slapped her in the face when she resisted rape. Witness 80's 
husband (witness 23) attempted to intervene but the soldiers bet him and 
threatened him with rape.1991 
 
Four MLC soldiers vaginally raped witness 81 in her house at PK 12 in front of 
her husband, her offspring, her mother and her brother. The first attacker 
("Leopard") beat her on the thigh using a gun and obliged her to get naked before 
he raped her. The witness told them that she had recently given birth, and, thus, 
expressed total lack of consent. Subsequently, she was successively raped by 3 
other soldiers, what caused her to bleed. Whereas the witness was being raped, 
the soldiers also lashed her brother 50 times by using a rope.1992 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber II observed that the witness did not furnish information on 
the date of these acts but mentioned an event, particularly Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo´s visit to Begoa school in PK 12, from which the date of the rape can be 
deducted. PTC II also noted that, throughout the witness´ statement, on many 
occasions she did not provide information regarding time periods or dates. The 
Chamber further observed that the witness was young when such events 
happened. The Chamber took into account other corroborating evidence which 
contained important information in relation to the date at stake. The Chamber 
noted that witness 23 and witness 80 are neighbours, and relied on the statement 
of witness 23 (who provided an indication on the date of witness 80´s rape) so as 
to draw the conclusion that both witnesses were raped in the same day, 
specifically 8 November 2002.1993 
 
On 30 October 2002, witness 87 was vaginally raped by 3 MLC soldiers outside 
her house, located in BoyRabe. Although the witness did not clarify in her 
statement whether or not she was threatened with death by the assailants who 
entered her house, the Chamber found there was enough evidence to determine 
that the MLC soldiers entered the witness´ house with their guns, and threatened 
her. The first MLC soldier undressed the witness, then she was forced on the 
ground (and was kept without freedom of movements during all the acts carried 
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out by the 3 soldiers) and raped. While raping the witness, the MLC soldiers kept 
their arms close to the witness.1994 
 
Three MLC soldiers successively vaginally raped witness 22 while she was in her 
uncle's house close to PK 12. The witness affirmed that the attack took place on 
26 October 2002. The witness accounted that the soldiers pushed her into the 
bedroom and, deploying a knife, threatened her. They ordered her to undress but 
she did not comply. Then the soldiers shoved her on to the bed cut her tights with 
the knife. The first assailant pointed his gun at the throat of the witness whereas 
raping her. After the first rape, the witness wanted to leave but was not allowed. 
The other two MLC soldiers raped witness 22 and the gun remained directed at 
her throat.1995 
 
The Chamber addressed specific challenge raised by the Defence in relation to 
the exact date of the rape of witness 22. She stated the rape occurred on 26 
October 2002 in PK12. However, in accordance with the Defence, MLC troops 
solely arrived at PK12 on 30 October 2002.1996 
 
The PTC II considered that imprecision in dates could occur by reason of the 
horrid events the witnesses underwent and the time that had passed between the 
rapes and they giving their testimonies (nearly six years). In view of that, the 
Chamber opted for assessing the trustworthiness of the witnesses' statements 
on the whole and pay special regard to the account of the acts of rape and the 
information provided by the witnesses that permitted the Chamber to identify with 
certitude the aggressors.1997 
 
The Chamber was convinced of the reliability of the information furnished by 
witness 22. It stated that she had provided accurate and conclusive information 
showing that she had been raped. She was also capable to differentiate the 
distinct parties in the conflict and clearly recognised that the attackers were MLC 
soldiers. The Chamber considered that, independently of the precise date of the 
events, the acts of rape endured by witness 22 were imputed to MLC soldiers. 
With basis on the evidence, the Chamber concluded that rape of witness 22 took 
place at the end of October 2002 in the context of the attack targeting CAR civilian 
population from on or about 26 October 2002 until 15 March 2003. Therefore, the 
Chamber rejected the Defence´s challenge of the in this respect.1998 
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Additionally to direct evidence, the Chamber acknowledged that indirect evidence 
(as, for example, hearsay evidence and numerous NGO and UN reports) holds 
backing up nature and shows the extensive number of acts of rape perpetrated 
in the same locations specified by direct witnesses during the same time period, 
precisely from on or about 26 October 2002 until 15 March 2003.1999  
 
The PTC II found, in relation to the MLC soldiers' requisite “mens rea”, that the 
intent and knowledge of these soldiers to rape the aforementioned CAR civilians 
can be drawn from the factual circumstances. The seven direct witnesses that 
were raped persistently identified the MLC soldiers as being the direct 
perpetrators. The Chamber understood that the MLC soldiers threatened to rape 
the civilian population, employed force, inclusive of arms against unarmed 
civilians, and, hence, intended to rape CAR civilians.2000  
 
Regarding the requirement of nexus, the Chamber´s view was that the acts of 
rape were carried out as part of the widespread attack targeting the CAR 
population from on or about 26 October 2002 until 15 March 2003. Rapes were 
committed when the civilians objected the MLC soldiers looting their goods. MLC 
soldiers used the repeated practice of rape as a weapon to terrorise the 
population. The evidence demonstrated that rapes were perpetrated as MLC 
troops were advancing into or withdrawing from CAR territory. Further, the 
Disclosed Evidence indicated the occurrence of rapes in the localities (as Boy-
Rabe, Fouh, Mongoumba and PK 12) that were being attacked by MLC soldiers 
at the relevant time period.2001  
 
Thus, the Chamber found that there was enough evidence to establish substantial 
basis to believe that during the widespread attack targeting the CAR population 
from approximately 26 October 2002 to 15 March 2003 acts of rape amounting 
to crime against humanity (in the terms of article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute) 
were carried by MLC soldiers.   
 
Upon reviewing the whole of the Disclosed Evidence, the Pre-Trial Chamber II 
also found that there was enough evidence to establish substantial basis to 
believe that an armed conflict not of an international character took place 
between, on the one hand, Mr Bozizé´s organized armed group, and, on the other 
hand, troops supporting Mr Patassé, inclusive of the “Unité de Sécurité 
Présidentielle” (the "USP") and the FACA (a group composed by 500 
predominantly Chadian mercenaries, 100 Libyan troops, as well roughly 1,500 
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of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, p. 66, para. 186; Amnesty International (2004 
a). Central African Republic, Five months of war against women, pp. 6-14; Fédération 
internationale des ligues des droits de l’Homme (FIDH) report (2003); FIDH report (2006); 
Reliefweb, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for the Central African Republic, Central 
African Republic, Weekly Humanitarian Update (17 December 2002). 
2000 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, p. 66, para. 187 
2001 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, pp. 66-67, para. 188 
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MLC soldiers) in the period from on or about 26 October 2002 to 15 March 2003 
on the Central African Republic`s territory.2002  
 
Moreover, the Chamber found that there was enough evidence to establish 
substantial basis to believe that during such armed conflict acts of murder, rape 
and pillaging amounting to war crimes (in the terms of article 8(2)(c)(i), 8(2)(e)(vi) 
and 8(2)(e)(v) of the Rome Statute) were perpetrated by MLC soldiers. 
Nonetheless, the Chamber did not confirm count 4 of torture and count 5 of 
outrage upon personal dignity as war crimes as established in article 8(2)(c)(i) 
and (ii) of the Rome Statute.2003 
 
Certainly, after exposing the reasons that supported its findings in relation to the 
existence of an armed conflict not of an international character and the 
awareness of the perpetrators of the existence such conflict, the PTC II started 
to analyse the specific elements constituting war crimes. In what concerns the 
specific elements of rape as a war crime (count 2), the Chamber, based on the 
aforementioned evidence provided by the victims, understood that2004  
 
“civilian women and men were raped from on or about 26 
October 2002 to 15 March 2003 by MLC soldiers on the CAR 
territory. More specifically, the evidence shows that as MLC 
soldiers moved in battle throughout the CAR territory civilians 
were raped by force, or by threat of force or coercion.”2005 
 
The Chamber recollected that in respect of article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute, 
the Elements of Crimes demand in respect of the “actus reus” that 
 
“(1) The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct 
resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of 
the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal 
or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part 
of the body;  
 
(2) The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or 
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, 
detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against 
such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a 
coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a 
person incapable of giving genuine consent.”2006 
 
 
2002 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, pp. 74-75, para. 212 
2003 Ibidem 
2004 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, pp. 83-92, 97, paras. 240-264, para. 286 
2005 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, p. 9, para. 286 
2006  Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8 (2) (e) (vi)-1, Elements 1, 2 
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In relation to “mens rea”, regarding the mental element established in article 30 
of the Statute, the Chamber was convinced that the MLC soldiers acted with both 
intent and knowledge when they raped CAR civilians.2007  
 
As to the nexus requirement, the PTC II was convinced that these acts of rape 
occurred in the context of and were associated with the armed conflict not of an 
international character in the CAR which lasted from on or about 26 October 2002 
up to 15 March 2003. The evidence demonstrated that the rapes took place at 
the same time as MLC soldiers were advancing in battle through the territory of 
the CAR.2008 
 
As mentioned above, the Pre-Trial Chamber II understood that Jean-Pierre 
Bemba´s criminal responsibility was based on Article 28 of the Rome Statute (and 
not Article 25 (3) as firstly sustained for the Prosecution).  
 
Indeed, the Chamber stated that so that a person can be held criminally 
responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes, it does not suffice that 
the objective elements are present. In this regard, the Rome Statute does not 
allow attribution of criminal responsibility on the grounds of strict liability. Instead, 
it also demands the presence of a determined state of guilty mind (“actus non 
facit reum nisi mens rea”) usually called “mens rea”, which comprises the 
subjective elements. In the case at bench, besides the objective elements, three 
cumulative subjective elements must be met so as to permit to make a finding on 
Jean-Pierre Bemba´s criminal responsibility as a co-perpetrator within the ambit 
of the evidentiary standard demanded at the pre-trial stage as established in 
article 61(7) of the Rome Statute. Particularly, Bemba must  
 
“(a) fulfil the subjective elements of the crimes charged, namely 
intent and knowledge as required under article 30 of the Statute;  
 
(b) be aware and accept that implementing the common plan will 
result in the fulfilment of the material elements of the crimes; and  
 
(c) be aware of the factual circumstances enabling him to control 
the crimes jointly with the other co-perpetrator.”2009 
 
The Chamber´s view was that Jean-Pierre Bemba did not have intent and 
knowledge in the terms of article 30 of the Statute. Surely, after analysing the 9 
elements introduced by the Prosecutor so as to sustain the suspect´s intent and 
knowledge, the Chamber concluded that there was not enough evidence to 
establish substantial grounds to believe that, when Jean-Pierre Bemba sent the 
MLC troops from on or about 26 October 2002 to the CAR and kept them there 
 
2007 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, pp. 66, 98, paras. 187, 287 
2008 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, p. 98, para. 288 
2009 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, p. 118, para. 351 
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up to their withdrawal on 15 March 2003, he was aware that the crimes against 
humanity and war crimes perpetrated by the MLC soldiers would occur in the 
ordinary course of events.2010  
 
In accordance with the Pre-Trial Chamber II, the fact that Jean-Pierre Bemba 
continued to implement the alleged common plan did not allow to infer that he 
harboured intent. Surely, the Chamber sustained that it was not possible to infer 
that, by maintaining his troops in the Central African Republic, the suspect was 
aware that it was an almost certain consequence that these crimes would be 
perpetrated in the ordinary course of events. The maximum that can be inferred 
from the Disclosed Evidence is that he may have foreseen the risk of occurrence 
of these crimes as a simple possibility and accepted it in order to achieve his 
mains goal, namely to help Mr Patassé to keep power. In the Chamber's view, 
this does amount to “dolus directus” in the second degree (that “does not require 
that the suspect has the actual intent or will to bring about the material elements 
of the crime, but that he or she is aware that those elements will be the almost 
inevitable outcome of his acts or omissions”) which is the demanded standard for 
article 30 of the Rome Statute.2011 
 
In view of the absence of the first of the 3 cumulative subjective elements, the 
Chamber did not deem necessary to consider the other two, and, disregarding 
Bemba´s criminal responsibility in terms of article 25 (3) of the Rome Statute, 
passed to analyse Bemba´s alternative purportedly criminal responsibility under 
article 28 of the Statute.2012   
 
In the light of the Disclosed Evidence, the Pre-Trial Chamber II found that the 
accused met the requirements to incur in the type of responsibility preconised in 
Article 28 (a) of the Statute, specifically that he2013 
  
1) “was effectively acting as a military commander” and had “effective 
command and control” over the MLC troops that perpetrated the crimes; 
 
2) “knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that” 
the MLC troops “were committing or about to commit such crime”; 
 
3) “failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within” his “power 
to prevent or repress” the commission of the crimes by the MLC troops.2014   
 
2010 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, pp. 138-139, paras. 400-401 
2011 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, pp. 121, 138-139, paras. 359, 400-401 
2012 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, pp. 128, 139, paras. 374, 403 
2013 Rome Statute, Art. 28 (a) (i) (ii); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case 
No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the 
Rome Statute on the Charges of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, pp. 141-142, 
para. 407 




In fact, the Chamber considered that there was “sufficient evidence to establish 
substantial grounds to believe” that Bemba,2015 
 
“at all times relevant to the charges, effectively acted as a military 
commander and had effective authority and control over the MLC 
troops who committed the crimes against humanity of murder 
and rape and the war crimes of murder, rape and pillaging in the 
CAR from on or about 26 October 2002 to 15 March 2003;”2016 
 
“knew that the MLC troops were committing or were about to 
commit the crimes against humanity of murder and rape and the 
war crimes of murder, rape and pillaging in the CAR from on or 




“failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his 
power to prevent or repress the commission by the MLC troops 
of the crimes against humanity of murder and rape and the war 
crimes of murder, rape and pillaging in the CAR from on or about 
26 October 2002 to 15 March 2003.”2018 
 
As a result, the Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed the charges against Jean-Pierre 
Bemba on the basis of command responsibility (in the terms of article 28(a) of the  
Rome Statute) for the crimes of murder (as crimes against humanity- article 
7(1)(a) of the Statute, and as war crimes- article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Statute), rape 
(as crimes against humanity- article 7(1)(g) of the Statute, and as war crimes- 
article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Statute), and pillaging (as war crimes- article 8(2)(e)(v) of 
the Statute), perpetrated by MLC troops in the CAR from on or about 26 October 
2002 until 15 March 2003.2019 
 
However, for the reasons aforementioned, the Pre-Trial Chamber II did not to 
confirm that Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo was criminally responsible in the terms 
of article 28 (a) of the Rome Statute for the charges of 
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of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, p. 159, para. 444 
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of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, p. 160, para. 446 
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of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, p. 160, para. 478 
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“(i) torture constituting a crime against humanity (count 3) within 
the meaning of article 7(1) (f) of the Statute; 
 
(ii) torture constituting a war crime (count 4) within the meaning 
of article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Statute; 
 
(iii) outrages upon personal dignity constituting a war crime 
(count 5) within the meaning of article 8(2)(c)(ii) of the 
Statute.”2020 
 
8.3. Trial Chamber III´s Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the 
Statute dated 21 March 2016 
 
In its judgment, the Trial Chamber addressed both rape as a war crime and rape 
as a crime against humanity in the same section in view of the fact that only the 
contextual elements are different.2021  
 
Regarding the material elements (“actus reus”), the Chamber after recalling that 
the first element “invasion of the body of a person” must result in2022   
 
“penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim 
or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital 
opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the 
body,”2023 
 
stressed that such invasion was constructed sufficiently wise so as to be gender-
neutral. Thus, it covers same-sex penetration, and includes both male and/or 
female offenders and victims.2024 
 
The TC III observed that “the definition of rape encompasses acts of “invasion” 
of any part of a victim’s body, including the victim’s mouth, by a sexual organ.” In 
fact, “as supported by the jurisprudence” of the ICTY, oral penetration by a sexual 
organ can constitute rape and consists in a fundamental attack against human 
dignity that can be as abusive and horrid as vaginal or anal penetration.2025   
 
2020 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, p. 185 (e) 
2021 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 52, para. 98 
2022 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7(1)(g)-1, Element 1; 8 (2) (e) 
(vi)-1, Element 1; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. 
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2023 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7(1)(g)-1, Element 1; 8 (2) (e) 
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2024 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 53, para. 100; Elements of Crimes 
of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g)-1, Element 1, footnote 15; 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-1, 
Element 1, footnote 50, (e) (vi)-1, Element 1, footnote 63 
2025 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 




The second material element of rape refers to the circumstances and conditions 
that confer a criminal nature to the invasion of the body of the victim or of the 
offender.  For the invasion of the body of a person to amount to rape, it has to be 
perpetrated under at least one of four possible situations:2026    
 
“by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused 
by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression 
or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by 
taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was 
committed against a person incapable of giving genuine 
consent.”2027  
 
Addressing the circumstance “by taking advantage of a coercive environment”, 
the TC III asserted that it adopted the same line of the ICTR in the Trial Judgment 
of the Akayesu case in relation to “coercive circumstances”, specifically that2028  
 
“coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of 
physical force. Threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of 
duress which prey on fear or desperation may constitute 
coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances, 
such as armed conflict or the military presence of Interahamwe 
among refugee Tutsi women at the bureau communal.”2029 
 
Thus, the Chamber did not rule out  
 
“the possibility that, in addition to the military presence of hostile 
forces among the civilian population, there are other coercive 
environments of which a perpetrator may take advantage to 
commit rape. Further, the Chamber considers that several factors 
may contribute to create a coercive environment. It may include, 
for instance, the number of people involved in the commission of 
the crime, or whether the rape is committed during or 
immediately following a combat situation, or is committed 
together with other crimes. In addition, the Chamber emphasises 
that, in relation to the requirement of the existence of a “coercive 
 
Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T. Trial Chamber, Judgment, pp. 72-73, 
paras. 183-185 (10 December 1998); ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, et al., Case No. IT-
96-21-T. Trial Chamber, Judgment, p. 364, para. 1066 (16 November 1998) 
2026 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, pp. 53-54, para. 102 
2027 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g)-1, Element 2; 8 (2) (e) 
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2028 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
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v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision 
Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of Prosecutor against 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, pp. 57-58, para. 162 
2029 ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4. Chamber I, Judgment, 
para. 688 (2 September 1998). 
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environment”, it must be proven that the perpetrator’s conduct 
involved “taking advantage” of such a coercive environment.”2030 
 
Furthermore, the Trial Chamber observed that the lack of consent of the victim is 
not one of the legal elements of the crime of rape in the terms of the Rome 
Statute.2031 
 
In connection with the mental elements (“mens rea”), the requirements are the 
standard ones, established in Article 30 of the Statute. In relation to “intent”,  
 
“it must be proven that the perpetrator intentionally committed the 
act of rape. Intent will be established where it is proven that the 
perpetrator meant to engage in the conduct in order for the 
penetration to take place.   
 
112. As to the requirement of “knowledge”, it must be proven that 
the perpetrator was aware that the act was committed by force, 
by the threat of force or coercion, by taking advantage of a 
coercive environment, or against a person incapable of giving 
genuine consent.”2032 
 
In the Confirmation Decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber understood  
 
“that there was sufficient evidence to establish substantial 
grounds to believe that MLC soldiers committed the crime 
against humanity of rape as part of a widespread attack directed 
against the civilian population in the CAR from on or about 26 
October 2002 to 15 March 2003”, 2033  
 
as well as 
 
“that there was sufficient evidence to establish substantial 
grounds to believe that, … MLC soldiers committed the war crime 
of rape in the context of, and in association with, an armed 
conflict not of an international character.”2034 
 
Following the PCT´s findings in the Confirmation Decision, the Trial Chamber III 
analysed the alleged underlying acts of rape that fell within the boundaries of the 
charges and of which the Defence had had appropriate notice.2035 
 
 
2030 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, pp. 54-55, para. 104 
2031 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p.55, para. 105 
2032 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 56, paras. 110-112 
2033 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 316, para. 631 
2034 Ibidem 
2035 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 316, para. 631 
430 
 
The TC III considered that it could not enter findings related the alleged second 
and third rape incidents about which witness P47 had testified. Therefore, the 
Chamber did not take such alleged acts into consideration when deciding on the 
charges of rape.2036  
 
Nevertheless, the Chamber understood that  
 
“perpetrator(s), by force, invaded the bodies of the following 
victims by penetrating their vaginas and/or anuses, and/or other 
bodily openings with their penises: 
 
a. P68 and P68’s sister-in-law in Bangui at the end of October 
2002; 
 
b. two unidentified girls aged 12 and 13 years in Bangui on or 
around 30 October 2002; 
 
c. P87 in Bangui on or around 30 October 2002; 
 
d. eight unidentified women at the Port Beach naval base in 
Bangui at the end of October or beginning of November 2002; 
 
e. P23, P80, P81, P82, and two of P23’s other daughters in PK12 
in early November 2002; 
 
f. P69 and his wife in PK12 at the end of November 2002; 
 
g. P22 in PK12 on or around 6 or 7 November 2002; 
 
h. P79 and her daughter in PK12 several days after the MLC 
arrived in PK12; 
 
i. P42’s daughter in PK12 around the end of November 2002; 
 
j. a woman in the bush outside of PK22 in November 2002; 
 
k. P29 in Mongoumba on 5 March 2003; and 
 
l. V1 in Mongoumba on 5 March 2003.”2037 
 
a. P68 and P68’s sister-in-law in Bangui at the end of October 2002; 
 
The Chamber found that, at the end of October 2002, two MLC soldiers, by force, 
invaded P68’s body and penetrated her vagina with their penises, in a compound 
in the Bondoro neighbourhood of Bangui. P68 explained she suffered 
psychological and medical consequences of these acts, which encompassed 
 
2036 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, pp. 235, 316-317, paras. 484, 632 
2037 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, pp. 317-318, para. 633 
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depression, a fear of armed soldiers, stomach and vaginal ailments, as well as 
HIV.2038 
 
The Chamber also understood that, at the end of October 2002, in a compound 
in the Bondoro neighbourhood of Bangui, three MLC soldiers, by force, 
penetrated the body of P68’s sister-in-law with a sexual organ or penetrated her 
anal or genital opening with any object or any other part of the body. After that, 
she presented health problems.2039  
 
b. two unidentified girls aged 12 and 13 years in Bangui on or around 30 October 
2002; 
 
Witness P119 testified regarding the rape of two not identified girls aged 12 and 
13 years in Bangui on or approximately 30 October 2002. She stated that CAR 
soldiers arrived at her compound saying that they had been sent by “Papa 
Bemba”. Subsequently, P119 listening to girls shouting and, following the noise, 
saw several soldiers who were aligned in 2 columns by a canal waiting to have 
sex with two girls. She hid behind plants and saw the soldiers penetrate two girls 
with their penises. P119 affirmed that she pushed a big stone on one perpetrator, 
what made him scream and caused the soldiers to escape. The girls were crying 
and had blood in their vaginas, and told her their ages (12 and 13 years old).2040 
 
The Defence resisted P119 account saying that it was unconvincing that P119 
had helped the two girls in the canal without finding out their names or suffering 
harm. P119 sustained that she did not have the opportunity to ask their names in 
view of the circumstances at the time. The Chamber, considering that the 
circumstances were chaotic and traumatic at the time, accepted her explanation 
and regarded that the fact that P119 did not ask the names of the victims did not 
jeopardize the trustworthiness of her account.2041 
 
In relation to P119’s testimony that she had pushed a large stone on one soldier, 
the Defence demonstrated incredulity that she had managed then to escape from 
harm. The Chamber, although recalling that P119 was hidden from view during 
the facts, understood that the portion of the testimony in which she purportedly 
threw a large stone onto a soldier could have been exaggerated.2042  
 
Apart from that, the Chamber regarded that her testimony was otherwise 
generally trustworthy.2043 
 
As a result, the Chamber found that, on or around 30 October 2002, two soldiers, 
by force, used their penises to penetrate the vaginas of two unidentified girls, 
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thus, invading the latter´s bodies, in a canal close to P119’s compound in the 
Boy-Rabé neighbourhood of Bangui.2044 
 
c. P87 in Bangui on or around 30 October 2002; 
 
On or around 30 October 2002, 3 different groups of armed CAR soldiers came 
to P87´s house. While the first 2 groups only stole goods from the house, the 
soldiers of the last group raped her. One soldier who carried a gun, threw her on 
the floor, took off her underwear and penetrated her vagina with his penis. 2 other 
soldiers subsequently also penetrated her vagina with their penises, and one of 
them inclusive pointed the barrel of his rifle at the witness. 
 
P87 endured medical and psychological consequences, which includes pelvic 
pain, skin disorders, and depression.2045 
 
In what concerns the submissions of the Defence sustaining that P87 had omitted 
any reference of rape in an antecedent report to the family lawyer, the Chamber 
observed that she testified that, due to feelings of shame, she had decided not to 
tell her neighbours about the rapes immediately after the facts. Also out of shame, 
she did not include information regarding the rapes she suffered in a complaint 
submitted with the CAR “Procureur general” and in her ICC victim application. 
The Chamber accepted her explanation, and rendered that such omissions did 
not affect the reliability of P87´s testimony. In view of the above, the Chamber 
found that, on or around 30 October 2002, three soldiers, by force, invaded P87’s 
body by penetrating her vagina with their penises.2046 
 
d. eight unidentified women at the Port Beach naval base in Bangui at the end of 
October or beginning of November 2002; 
 
P47, who worked as a mechanic for a river transport company that ferried MLC 
troops to the CAR, affirmed that, after the MLC were in control of Bangui, he 
witnessed two or three incidents of rape at the naval base at Port Beach.2047 
 
The first incident took place between 15.00 and 19.00, at the end of October or 
beginning of November 2002. Twenty-two MLC soldiers brought eight women to 
the deck of a ferry. After beating, kicking and undressing these women, the 
soldiers, in turns, penetrated the women’s vaginas with their penises whilst 
holding weapons. After these facts, P47 talked to the women, who were from the 
regions of Boy-Rabé and PK12 in CAR.2048 
 
The Defence challenged the credibility of P47’s account alleging, “inter alia”, that 
there were incongruences in his testimony. The Chamber recalling that it had 
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already dismissed the general allegations of the Defence in relation to P47´s 
reliability, also recognised that evidence provided by P47 was at times confusing 
on determined minor issues.2049 
 
In connection with the first incident, the Defence stated that there was an 
inconsistency regarding the time of day it occurred (P47 first affirmed the facts 
had taken place at 17.30 and in an ulterior statement that they took place at 
19.00). The Chamber regarded that the inconsistency identified by the Defence 
in connection with the timing of the first incident did not undermine the credibility 
of P47´s testimony. The TC III exposed several reasons to support its finding 
among which P47’s demeanour in his testimony about this incident, his coherent 
description of the facts, the traumatic nature of the circumstances, the relatively 
limited character of the incongruence. Hence, the Chamber understood that at 
the end of October/ beginning of November 2002, on a ferry docked at the Port 
Beach naval base in Bangui, soldiers, invaded the bodies of eight women, who 
were from Boy-Rabé and PK12, by penetrating their vaginas with their penises, 
by deploying force.2050  
 
Nonetheless, the Chamber did not rely on P47´s testimony in relation to two other 
alleged incidents of rape. The Chamber asserted that his testimony was 
confusing and incongruent regarding the quantity of perpetrators and victims, if a 
woman was killed by the MLC soldiers during the second incident, and even if 
the third incident did take place. Since there was not any other evidence in 
relation to the second and third incidents, the Chamber was unable to enter any 
finding in relation to them.2051 
 
e. P23, P80, P81, P82, and two of P23’s other daughters in PK12 in early 
November 2002; 
 
In early November 2002, eight soldiers armed with guns entered P23’s compound 
and threatened his family. Three of these soldiers started to assault P80, who 
was P23`s wife, in front of their children. Whilst holding P80 at gunpoint, the three 
soldiers invaded her body by penetrating her vagina with their penises. After the 
events, P80 presented physical injuries to her vagina, back, eyes, kidneys, and 
pelvis, and suffered social stigmatisation since people pointed and derided 
her.2052 
 
In the same day, one soldier got hold of P82 (who was P23’s granddaughter and 
was aged between 10 and 13 years old). She was taken outside where soldiers 
hit her with batons, and then at least two of soldiers penetrated her vagina with 
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their penises in turns. As a result, P82 presented physical injuries to her vagina, 
endured pain, and rested socially excluded by other girls of the same age.2053 
 
The Chamber observed that there were inconsistencies regarding P82’s precise 
age, the time the facts took place, and the number of perpetrators. Nonetheless, 
in light of the witness´ demeanour, the time that had passed between the facts 
and her testimony, her young age at the time of the facts, the traumatic character 
of the events and the fact that her narrative was corroborated by her relatives and 
a neighbour, the Chamber did not find that such inconsistencies invalidated her 
testimony, which it regarded to be overall credible. Therefore, the Chamber found 
that, at the beginning of November 2002, in P23’s compound in PK12, a minimum 
of two soldiers, by force, invaded P82’s body and penetrated her vagina with their 
penises.2054 
 
P23’s daughter, P81, was also raped by a group of soldiers armed with 
Kalashnikovs on the same day, in a distinct house in the same compound. Four 
soldiers vaginally penetrated the witness while another soldier did not do it 
because she was bleeding. As a result, P81 had abdominal pains, difficulties 
conceiving, and suffered social stigma.2055 
 
The Chamber rendered that the inconsistences in P81’s testimony, (as for 
instance, in relation to her age at the time of the facts) were down to the length 
of time between the facts and the account, the traumatic nature of the events, 
and her difficulties in narrating these personal scenes in court. Thus, for the TC 
III the incongruences did not undermine P81’s reliability. In light of the above, the 
Chamber found that in the same date and place, four soldiers, by force, invaded 
P81’s body and penetrated her vagina with their penises.2056 
   
Moreover, in accordance with P23 testimony, two of his other daughters, aged 14 
and 16 years old, were also raped by vaginal penetration during the attack on the 
family’s compound.  In spite of the lack of certain details in P23´S testimony in 
relation to the rape of these 2 daughters, it was supported by P80, P81, and P82. 
Also, it agreed with the general circumstances of the attack on the family 
compound.  As a result, the Chamber rendered his testimony reliable and found 
that in the same date and place, one or more perpetrators, by force, invaded the 
bodies of two of P23’s daughters, aged 14 and 16 years, and penetrated their 
vaginas with their penises.2057 
 
Also, in the same day in the compound, three armed soldiers forcefully penetrated 
P23’s anus with their penises in front of his relatives and neighbour. After these 
facts, P23 could not walk due to the injuries to his anus and suffered 
 
2053 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 239, para. 489 
2054 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, pp. 239-240, para. 490 
2055 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 240, paras. 491-492 
2056 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 240, para. 492 
2057 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 240, para. 493 
435 
 
psychological damage. Community people did not respect him. Thus, the 
Chamber found that three perpetrators, by force, invaded P23’s body and 
penetrated his anus with their penises.2058  
 
f. P69 and his wife in PK12 at the end of November 2002; 
 
In accordance with P69´s narrative, 6 armed soldiers entered his compound. At 
least four of them raped his wife by penetrating her vagina and anus with their 
penises. When P69 protested, two soldiers held him at gunpoint and raped him 
by penetrating his anus and mouth with their penises. After, P69 presented 
severe damage to his anus, and his wife had a surgery.2059   
 
The Chamber observed that the evidence submitted by the Prosecution 
presented inconsistences in relation several issues, including if P69´s wife was 
inside or outside the house at the time of the facts, the number of soldiers who 
purportedly raped her and P69´s narrative of his own purported rape.2060    
 
P69 clarified that there might have been mistakes on these points in the record 
of his previous statements. He testified that he was illiterate and as a result did 
not realise such these inconsistencies so as to correct them. Upon being 
challenged, P69 consistently sustained the account he had provided to TC III.  In 
view of the time that had passed between the events and testimony, the traumatic 
nature of the events, P69’s manner, his explanations for incongruences, and the 
spontaneity of his responses, the Chamber regarded that P69’s testimony was 
reliable. Therefore, the Chamber found that at the end of November 2002, in 
P69’s compound in PK12, perpetrators, by force, invaded the body of P69’s wife 
and penetrated her vagina and anus with their penises; and two perpetrators, by 
force, invaded the body of P69 and penetrated his anus and mouth with their 
penises.2061 
 
g. P22 in PK12 on or around 6 or 7 November 2002; 
 
P22 lived in her uncle´s house in PK12. On or around 6 or 7 November 2002, a 
group of more than 20 CAR soldiers broke into the house, and 6 of them came to 
the room where she was and asked her to give them money. Subsequently, she 
was held at gunpoint, pushed onto bed and, after opening her legs with their 
boots, 3 soldiers penetrated her with their penises in turns.  As a result, P22 had 
suicidal thoughts, was reluctant to maintain any sexual relationship, and 
presented symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. Thus, the Chamber found 
that, in the aforementioned date and place, three perpetrators, by force, invaded 
the body of P22 and penetrated her vagina with their penises.2062  
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h. P79 and her daughter in PK12 several days after the MLC arrived in PK12; 
 
Some days after the MLC had arrived in PK12, five armed soldiers invaded P79’s 
house while she was sleeping. Whereas one soldier held her at gunpoint, two 
others took turns in forcibly penetrating her vagina with their penises. Afterwards, 
P79 presented both physical and psychological symptoms, inclusive of gastric 
problems, high blood pressure, hypertension, and nightmares. In the same 
circumstances, in another room, a soldier penetrated P79’s 11-year-old 
daughter´s vagina with his penis in front of other children. The children tried to 
shout, but the soldiers threated to shoot them.  Immediately after the rapes, P79 
saw that her daughter had blood in the vagina.2063 
 
The Chamber considered if it should accord weigh to the “procès verbal” which 
purported related to P79 and her daughter. P79 denied that these documents 
were authentic and affirmed that neither she nor her daughter had reported the 
violence they alleged suffered to the authorities appearing in the documents. P79 
clarified that revealing the purported rape of her daughter, who was a Muslim girl, 
would keep her from finding a husband. Moreover, when comparing her signature 
with her previous statement, P79 denied that she had signed the “procès verbal 
d’audition de victime”. Further, the letter head of the “procès verbal de constat” 
purported connected to P79’s daughter did not present any determinate date, and 
these documents did not contain signatures or other information identifying P79 
or her daughter. As a consequence, the Chamber did not give any weight to such 
documents when analysing the testimony of P79. 2064  
 
Accordingly, the Chamber found that, several days after the MLC arrived in PK12, 
she was raped by two perpetrators, who, by force, invaded her body by 
penetrating her vagina with their penises. The Chamber also found that P79’s 
daughter was raped by a perpetrator, who, by force, invaded her body by 
penetrating her vagina. 2065  
 
i. P42’s daughter in PK12 around the end of November 2002; 
 
On a determinate date, at the end of November, the soldiers came to P42’s 
house, and, his son asked them to pay for supplies they were taking from his 
business. As a consequence of this demonstration of resistance, the soldiers beat 
P42´s son, and then took him away to the military headquarters. More soldiers 
arrived at the house and, after accusing P42 of being a “rebel”, forced him and 
his relatives to lie down facing the ground. The soldiers took P42’s 10-year-old 
daughter to a shelter situated behind the house, where P42 could hear her crying 
out. The girl was vaginally penetrated by 2 soldiers- one did so with his finger 
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while the other employed his penis. Later, P42’s wife told him that the girl was 
bleeding from her vagina and that her dress was stained with blood.2066   
 
As a result, the Chamber found that, around the end of November 2002, at P42’s 
compound in PK12, two perpetrators, by force, invaded the body of P42’s 
daughter and penetrated her vagina.2067   
 
j. a woman in the bush outside of PK22 in November 2002; 
 
In November 2002, a woman identified by P75 encountered a group of four MLC 
soldiers and a woman in the bush outside PK22.  After asking for money to the 
latter, the attackers threw her on the floor, beat her, and threatened her using 
arms. One soldier wiped his penis on the woman´s face, obliging her to lick it, 
whilst the other men were pulling her hair. When the woman resisted, they tore 
her clothes, pulled her legs apart, and three soldiers penetrated her vagina and 
one soldier penetrated her anus. After these facts, the woman was ashamed and 
presented several medical problems, inclusive of pelvic pain.2068   
 
As a consequence, the TC III found that, in November 2002, in the bush outside 
PK22, three perpetrators, by force, invaded the body of a woman and penetrated 
her mouth, vagina, and anus with their penises.2069   
 
k. P29 in Mongoumba on 5 March 2003;  
 
On 5 March 2003, P29 was getting ready to run away, but she was forced to go 
back into the house by three soldiers. After kicking her to the ground, and pushing 
her legs apart, in spite of P29´s cries, the 3 men penetrated her vagina with their 
penises, in turns. Following the events, P29 felt sad constantly and found out that 
she had contracted HIV/AIDS.2070   
 
In view of that, the Chamber found that, on 5 March 2003, in P29´s house in 
Mongoumba, three perpetrators, by force, invaded P29’s body and penetrated 
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l. V1 in Mongoumba on 5 March 2003 
 
In the same date, a group of approximately 20 armed soldiers entered in the local 
hospital in Mongoumba and there intercepted Ms Pulchérie Makiandakama (V1) 
and other persons, who were hiding under beds.2072    
 
Since V1 spoke Lingala, the soldiers took her from the hospital with them so as 
to serve as their interpreter. Following, the soldiers took V1 to a camp, close to 
the river bank, where 2 soldiers removed her trousers and underwear, and beat 
her onto the floor when she tried to resist. Then, the 2 men “slept with” and “raped" 
the witness in turns, in front of other soldiers.2073  
 
V1 had to follow the soldiers back to Mongoumba, where they kept looting. 
Subsequently, the soldiers and V1 went back to the camp with the looted goods. 
There, V1 was thrown on the floor and stripped naked, and then 4 armed soldiers 
raped her in turns until she lost her conscious. When she recovered the 
conscious, she saw that the soldiers were continuing to attack her. A total of 12 
men invaded her body by penetrating her mouth, vagina and anus with their 
penises. V1 was bleeding from her vagina and subsequently experienced pain in 
both her vagina and lungs, and also presented psychological issues. She affirmed 
she felt like as if she was no longer treated as a human being and was being 
called “Banyamulengué wife” in her community. This stigmatisation led her to lose 
her job, and, hence, be unable to support her children.2074        
 
The Defence sustained that V1’s account was not reliable in view of its scale, and 
stressed numerous purportedly inconsistencies/omissions with her statement to 
the Legal Representative and victim application. The TCIII observed that V1’s 
victim application was written in French even though she does not understand 
this language. Further, V1 testified that the mentioned application was not re-read 
to her in Sango (the language commonly spoken in the Central African Republic). 
In relation to her previous statement to the Legal Representative, V1 admitted 
that she may have forgotten to mention some particularities. The Chamber 
asserted that in view of the time passed between the facts and testimony, the 
traumatic events, the V1´s explanations in relation to purported incongruences 
and omissions, her demeanour and consistent account under oath, the Chamber 
understood that such incongruences and omissions did not invalidate her 
testimony, which it regarded to be generally credible.2075    
 
The Chamber observed that V1 did not clarify the meaning of her affirmation that 
the 2 soldiers had “slept with” her and “raped” her in the first incident. 
Nevertheless, the Chamber understood that her testimony that the 2 men had 
stripped off her clothes, including her underwear, and her testimony in relation to 
the second episode of rape, indicated that V1 employed the terms “slept with” 
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and “raped” in a manner that covered the penetration of her body by the soldiers 
with their penises. Consequently, the Chamber found that, on 5 March 2003, at 
a camp on the riverbank in Mongoumba, two perpetrators, by force, invaded V1’s 
body and penetrated her with their penises. Concerning the second incident, the 
Chamber found that, in the same date and place, 12 perpetrators, by force, 
invaded V1’s body and penetrated her vagina, anus and mouth with their 
penises.2076    
 
Concerning the identity of the perpetrators of the rapes described above (as well 
as the charged murders and looting), the TC III found beyond reasonable doubt 
that they were MLC soldiers. The Chamber based its finding on several elements 
such as the soldiers´ uniform, the language they spoke to each other and the 
victims (Lingala, which is the language commonly spoken in the DRC or French), 
the circumstance that the victims and witnesses identified the attackers as 
“Banyamulengués” or MLC, the fact that their actions agreed with evidence of the 
“modus operandi” of MLC, the movements of the troop and exclusive presence 
of the MLC in the relevant places at the time of the crimes.  Moreover, P119 
affirmed that soldiers who arrived at her house in PK12 told her that “Papa 
Bemba” had sent them.2077    
 
The Chamber observed that P29 had affirmed in her testimony that the foreign 
dialect spoken by the men who attacked her was probably not Lingala. However, 
the Chamber observed that she could neither identify nor understand the 
language the attackers spoke, that they communicate with her by using hand 
gestures, and that the other elements exposed above were also applicable to 
such perpetrators. As a consequence, the Chamber considered that there were 
enough elements which permitted to identify the perpetrators of rape against 
P29.2078    
 
In view of these mentioned factors, considered together, the Chamber found 
beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators of the aforementioned rapes were 
MLC soldiers.2079    
 
Further, the TC III, taking into account its finding beyond reasonable doubt that 
the contextual elements of both war crimes and crimes against humanity were 
satisfied, found2080   
 
“beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators knowingly and 
intentionally invaded the bodies of the victims by forcefully 
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penetrating their vaginas and/or anuses, and/or other bodily 
openings with their penises.”2081    
 
Therefore, the Chamber found beyond reasonable doubt that MLC soldiers 
perpetrated the war crime of rape and the crime against humanity of rape in the 
Central African Republic from on or about 26 October 2002 to 15 March 2003.2082 
 
Moreover, the Chamber found beyond reasonable doubt that MLC soldiers 
perpetrated the war crime of murder and the crime against humanity of murder 
as well as the war crime of pillaging a town or place in the Central African 
Republic from on or about 26 October 2002 to 15 March 2003.2083 
 
Regarding the command responsibility established in Article 28(a) of the Statute, 
the TC III disposed that the necessary elements were the following: 
 
1-) The crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court must have been perpetrated by 
forces; 
 
2-) The accused must have been either a military commander or someone 
effectively acting as a military commander; 
 
3-) The accused must have had effective command and control, or effective 
authority and control, over the forces who perpetrated the crimes; 
 
4-) Knowledge that the forces were perpetrating or about to perpetrate these 
crimes;  
 
5-) The commander failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures that 
were within his power, which encompasses   
 
a) Failure to prevent the perpetration of crimes; 
  
b) Failure to repress the perpetration of crimes or submit the question to the 
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution;  
 
6-) The crimes perpetrated by the forces must have resulted from the failure of 
the accused to exercise control properly over them.2084 
 
The Trial Chamber found that such elements were present in the case at bench. 
In fact, the crimes of rape, murder and pillaging were perpetrated by forces (MLC 
troops). Bemba effectively acted as a military commander and had effective 
authority and control over the contingent of MLC troops in the Central African 
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Republic during the 2002-2003 CAR Operation. Further, the TC III found that he 
had knowledge that the forces were perpetrating or about to perpetrate these 
crimes. Surely, in view of the overall evidence, as well as the notoriety of the 
crimes, the accused’s position, his regular contact with MLC officials in the CAR, 
the available communication channels, general sources of information regarding 
crimes committed by MLC soldiers (inclusive of media, NGO, and intelligence 
reports of the MLC), and Bemba’s direct knowledge of claims of murder, rape, 
and pillaging by MLC soldiers at determined times during the 2002-2003 CAR 
Operation, the Chamber found beyond reasonable doubt that, during the 2002-
2003 CAR Operation, Bemba knew that the MLC forces under his effective 
authority and control were perpetrating or about to perpetrate the crimes of rape, 
murder (as both crimes against humanity and war crimes) and pillaging (war 
crime).2085 
 
Also, the TC III regarded that, although the accused had a broad range of 
available measures at his disposal, he took measures which plainly fell short of 
“all necessary and reasonable measures” within his material ability to prevent and 
repress the perpetration of crimes by his subordinates in the course of the 2002-
2003 CAR Operation. Indeed, in spite of  the existence of consistent internal 
(within the MLC organization) and external information (reported in the media) 
about crimes of murder, rape, and pillaging carried out by MLC soldiers during 
the 2002-2003 CAR Operation, Bemba took only minimal and inadequate 
measures (his reactions were restricted to general, public warnings to his troops 
not to mistreat the civilians, the establishment of two investigative commissions, 
the trial of seven low-ranking soldiers for pillaging of goods of rather limited value, 
and the Sibut Mission, that was not an investigation) to theoretically tackle all 
allegations of crimes. His real goal, in accordance with TC III´s finding, was to 
protect the MLC image and not to deter the commitment of these crimes.2086  
 
What is more, the crimes were perpetrated as a consequence of Bemba failing 
to exercise control properly over the MLC troops. The Chamber found that, if the 
accused had taken appropriate measures, the crimes would have been avoided 
or would not have been perpetrated in the same circumstances. The Chamber, 
thus, found beyond reasonable doubt that the crimes of rape, murder (as both 
crimes against humanity and war crimes) and pillaging (war crime) carried out by 
the MLC forces during the 2002-2003 CAR Operation were a result of Bemba’s 
failure to exercise control adequately.2087 
 
Since the TC III´s found that the required elements of command responsibility of 
Article 28 (a) were present in the case at bench, it considered that Bemba could 





2085 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, pp. 345, 349-350, para. 705, 717 
2086 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, pp. 350-356, paras. 719-734 
2087 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p.359, para. 741 
442 
 
Surely, the Trial Chamber found  
 
“beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Bemba is criminally 
responsible under Article 28(a) for the crimes against humanity 
of murder and rape, and the war crimes of murder, rape, and 
pillaging committed by his forces in the course of the 2002-2003 
CAR Operation.”2088 
 
In the disposition, “pursuant to Article 74(2)of the Statute,” the TC III considered 
that Bemba was guilty, “under Article 28(a) of the Statute, as a person effectively 
acting as a military commander,” of the crimes of murder (as crime against 
humanity and as war crime), rape (as crime against humanity and war crime), 
and pillaging (as war crime).2089  
 
Judge Sylvia Steiner and Judge Kuniko Ozaki append separate opinions to the 
Judgment on minor questions concerning the reasoning, but not the outcome.2090 
 
On 21 June 2016 the Trial Chamber III issued Decision on Sentence pursuant to 
Article 76 of the Statute. The Chamber affirmed that so as to sufficiently and 
adequately acknowledge the harm caused to the victims and achieve the goals 
of sentencing, the sentence imposed must be proportionate to the seriousness of 
the crimes, and the individual circumstances and culpability of the person found 
guilty. In this assessment, the Chamber regarded that, in the case at bench, the 
crimes of rape, murder, and pillaging were of serious gravity. The Chamber found 
that 2 aggravating circumstances were applicable to the crimes of rape, namely 
that it was perpetrated against especially defenceless victims, and that it was 
perpetrated with special cruelty. The Chamber also understood that Bemba 
Gombo´s culpable conduct was of serious gravity, and that there were not any 
mitigating circumstances in the case. In view of these and other factors analysed 
by the Chamber, Bemba Gombo was sentenced to 18 years of imprisonment.2091 
 
This finding was a milestone in the history of the international persecution of 
sexual and gender-based crimes. Undoubtedly, 14 years after the beginning of 
the works of the International Criminal Court, for the first time an accused was 
tried and condemned by the Court for the perpetration of rape (and sexual and 
gender-based crimes “lato sensu”).   
 
 
2088 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 359, para. 742 
2089 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 364, para. 752 
2090 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 364, para. 753; ICC. The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner (21 March 2016); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Separate Opinion of Judge Kuniko 
Ozaki (21 March 2016) 
2091 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, pp. 43, 44, 45, paras. 
91, 93, 94.  ICC-01/05-01/08-3399 (21 June 2016) 
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Moreover, it was the first time that the ICC convicted a defendant based on the 
command responsibility for the actions of his/her troops.2092 
 
The Chamber, recalling the disposition of the Elements of Crimes, reaffirmed that 
the concept of invasion inserted in the Rome Statute was intended to be 
sufficiently ample so as to be genderless. Therefore, it encompasses same-sex 
penetration, and is applicable to both male and/or female offenders and victims. 
Furthermore, it covers acts of invasion culminating in penetration of any part of 
the body of the victim (including the mouth) by a sexual organ, or of the victim´s 
anal or genital opening with any object or any other part of the body.2093 
 
As a result, it allowed for the penetration of a man´s anus to be tried as the crime 
of rape. In fact, although in different circumstances, 3 male witnesses (PK12, P23 
and P69) testified that MLC soldiers had invaded their bodies by penetrating their 
anuses with their penises. The soldiers who attacked P69 also penetrated his 
mouth with their penises.  
 
These acts were tried as rapes. This was a paramount development for never 
before in the international scenario sexual violence perpetrated against men had 
been prosecuted as rape “per se”.  
 
Indeed, in the “Zenga” case, the ICTY held Landzo responsible for criminal acts 
he had incurred in, inclusive of obliging two brothers to commit fellatio on each 
other in front of other detainees. This act was regarded by the Trial Chamber as 
constituting the offences of inhuman treatment and cruel treatment (Articles 2 and 
3 of the ICTY Statute). Nonetheless, the own Trial Chamber observed that such 
act could amount to rape for which culpability could have found if it had been 
pleaded in the adequate way.2094  
 
In the Prosecutor v.  Češić case, the same tribunal considered the event in which 
Češić, deploying a gun, forced 2 Muslim detainees who were brothers to beat 
each other and mutually perform sexual acts in front of other people, as violation 
of the laws or customs of war (recognised by Article 3 of the ICTY Statute and 
Article 3 (1) (c)-humiliating and degrading treatment- of the Geneva Conventions) 
and the crime against humanity inserted in Article 5 (g), which enlisted rape, but 
in the modality other forms of sexual assault.2095  
 
2092 The Guardian (2018). Jean-Pierre Bemba 's war crimes conviction overturned. In the 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial Chamber, Annex 
E to the Mr. Bemba’s claim for compensation and damages. ICC-01/05-01/08-3673-AnxE (19 
March 2019)                                                                
2093 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 53, paras. 99-101; Elements of 
Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7 (1) (g)-1, Element 1, footnote 15; 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-
1, Element 1, footnote 50, (e)(vi)-1, Element 1, footnote 63; ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Anto 
Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T. Trial Chamber, Judgment, pp. 72-73, paras. 183-185 (10 
December 1998); ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et al. (Celebici Case). Trial Chamber, 
Judgment, p. 364, para. 1066 
2094 ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et al. (Celebici Case). Trial Chamber, Judgment, pp. 3, 
363-364, footnote 7, paras. 1062-1066 
2095 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 




Therefore, in the Bemba case, the ICC had the merit of including under the counts 
of the war crime of rape and the crime against humanity of rape the invasion 
culminating in penetration of a man´s body (anus and mouth) by the offender´s 
penis. The ICC finally put in practice the theory that the crime of rape enlisted in 
the Rome Statute was constructed so as to be gender-neutral. This is a step 
forward in the persecution of sexual crime. It places both women and men as 
putative victims of rape, instead of making a difference of terminology for the 
same act (penetration of one´s anus or mouth) in accordance with the gender of 
the victim. Thus, women and men were made equal as victims of rape even 
though women constitute the greatest majority of rape victims.  
 
Although rape is horrific and condemnable in all its forms, the fact that men are 
included as victims should entail a lower degree of stigmatisation and 
discrimination against women victims of rape. This reaffirmation of the gender-
neutral character of the crime of rape should have a positive impact on how 
women victims of rape are socially perceived. In fact, it might contribute for the 
social awareness that, independently of their gender, victims of sexual violence 
should be treated as victims, with due respect, instead of having doubts casted 
about their consent to the performance of the sexual acts and having their sexual 
past brought into discussion before the court. Hence, the Trial Chamber III´s 
Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute in the Bemba case constitutes a 
hallmark in the prosecution of sexual crimes in the international criminal scenario. 
 
In addition, this was the first ICC case in which an accused was convicted on 
basis of a sexual crime. Surely, as discussed in the ulterior two chapters, in the 
Lubanga case there were no charges of sexual crimes while in the Katanga case, 
there were charges of the crimes of rape and sexual slavery, but the accused 
was not found guilty of them. Certainly, in the latter, the Trial Chamber II 
recognised that such crimes were perpetrated during and of the 24 February 2003 
attack on Bogoro and in its aftermath. However, the Chamber found that crimes 
of rape and sexual slavery were not part of the common purpose of the Ngiti 
militia of Walendu-Bindi “collectivité” and, accordingly, the accused could not be 
held responsible for them. The TC II decided to include the pursuit and rapes of 
2 witnesses amidst the acts constituting the war crime of attack against 
civilians.2096  
 
Hence, the Trial Chamber III´s judgment finding Bemba guilty of the crimes of 
rape could pave the way for future convictions for the perpetration of sexual and 
gender-based crimes. 
 
Further, the Trial Chamber III (following the steps of Trial Chamber II in the 
Katanga case) appeared to be attuned to the specificities of sexual and gender-
based crimes, demonstrating to be attentive to the special characteristics of 
 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute, p. 240, 243, paras. 494, 498; ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Ranko Češić. 
Third Amended Indictment, Counts 7-8, Sexual Assault; Hayes, N. (2016) 
 
2096 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 309-310, 329, paras. 829, 876 
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witnesses who were victims of rape. Undoubtedly, the Chamber recognised that 
the traumatic nature of the circumstances these witnesses describe, their 
eventual young age, and the time elapsed between the events and the testimony 
are factors that bear weight on their accounts and can lead to omissions/gaps or 
apparent contradictions. Nevertheless, the Chamber adequately addressed the 
dimension and extent of the omissions and contradictions and if such elements 
could undermine the credibility and reliability of the testimony on a case by case 
basis. The Chamber also paid due regard to the difficulty the witness might have 
in recalling the obnoxious events and the violence they suffered and that it can 
affect their testimonies.     
 
It is also noteworthy that, as sustained by dissenting Judge Steiner, it seems that 
the Majority of Trial Chamber III unfairly and without a steady basis limited the 
victims’ participatory rights in the case. Indeed, when the victims’ Legal 
Representative posed for 7 victims to give evidence and present their views and 
concerns (out of a total of 2287 victims whose participation in the proceeding had 
already been authorised by the Chamber), the Majority of TC III decided to restrict 
their participation by only allowing 2 victims to give evidence and 3 other victims 
to present their views and concerns before the Court. One of the arguments used 
by the majority of the Chamber was that the proceedings would be unduly 
delayed if the 7 victims had been granted participation. Nevertheless, as Judge 
Steiner highlighted, in view of the number of victims in the case, to allow 7 victims 
to testify or present their views and concerns before the Court does not seem 
exaggerate, on the contrary. Also, bearing in mind the time that had been spent 
in the submission of evidence, it is very unlikely that permitting 2 more victims to 
submit evidence or present their views and concerns before the Court would 
negatively impact the pace of the proceedings.2097 
 
All and all, the fact that Bemba was convicted for the war crime and crime against 
humanity of rape gave rise to a rather positive prospect of the international 
persecution of sexual and gender-based crimes.  
 
The ICC appeared to be up to its mandate of enforcing international justice and 
not permitting the gravest crimes of concern to the international community go 
unpunished.  
 
This case could serve as a precedent for posterior convictions based on sexual 
and gender-based crime. Moreover, in consonance with the Court´s goal to 
contribute to the prevention to such crimes, Bemba´s conviction could have a 
deterrent effect on the rapes “stricto sensu” and sexual and gender-based crimes 
“lato sensu”. Certainly, potential perpetrators would be aware that they could 
indeed be held responsible if they incur in these crimes.  
 
2097 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the 
supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the 
views and concerns of victims, pp. 5-10, paras. 9-23; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Decision on the supplemented applications 
by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, 
p. 11, para. 19, quoting ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx, para. 25; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of 




From the victims´ viewpoint, Bemba´s conviction of rape by TC III meant that the 
sexual violence they suffered would be vindicated. 
 
By delivering such judgment, the Trial Chamber III seemed to be serving the 
interests of justice and giving an appropriate and satisfying answer to victims.  
 
The ICC seemed to have proved wrong the perceived mistrust from victims, 
NGOs and the general international criminal community in relation to its ability 
and efforts to charge and condemn those responsible for sexual crimes in the 
terms of the Rome Statute.  
 
Moreover, sexual and gender-based crimes appeared to acquire a higher status, 
being included among the crimes which can in fact grant a conviction by the 
International Criminal Court. 
 
This was a turning point decision for the previous cases involving sexual violence 
were permeated by gaps that led to lack of charges (in the Lubanga case) and of 
condemnation (in the Katanga case) of the accused charged of sexual criminal 
offences.    
 
However, Trial Chamber III´s verdict and sentence were subject to appeals. The 
Defence to Bemba appealed both whilst the Prosecutor appealed the 
sentence.2098 
 
From 9 to 12 January 2018 and on 16 January, the Appeals Chamber held 
hearings in the case in order to hear the submissions and observations of the 
Prosecution, Defence and participants on the appeals.2099  
 
8.4. The Appeals Chamber´s Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment 
pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute” 
  
On 8 June 2018, the Appeals Chamber issued its “Judgment on the appeal of Mr 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s Judgment pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute”.2100  
 
By Majority (Judge Monageng and Judge Hofmański dissented), the Appeals 
Chamber decided to reverse the Trial Chamber III´s Judgment.2101   
 
 
2098 ICC. Media Advisory, Bemba case: Appeals Chamber to issue appeals judgments on verdict 
and sentence on 8 June 2018. ICC-CPI-20180518-MA225 (18 May 2018) 
2099 ICC website, Bemba Case, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08;                                                                                                                  
ICC website, Case Information Sheet, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor 
v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (March 2019) 
2100 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute” (8 June 2018)                                                                  
2101 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 4, para. 1 
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Surely, even though the Trial Chamber III´s conviction was unanimous, the 
Appeals Chamber judgment reversing the TC´s judgment was issued by Majority, 
namely Presiding Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji  
and Judge Howard Morrison. Judge Monageng and Judge Hofmański appended 
a dissenting opinion to the Majority´s judgment in relation to both the “reasons 
and the outcome.” Further, Judge Van den Wyngaert and Judge Morrison 
appended a “joint separate opinion to this judgment”, and, subsequently, Judge 
Eboe-Osuji appended a “separate opinion to this judgment”.2102    
 
It is noteworthy that the Majority “adopted a number of modifications to the 
standard of appellate review for alleged errors of fact.”2103 
 
Surely, in relation to the “standard of review”, the Majority recalled that, in 
accordance with article 83 (2) of the Rome Statute, the Appeals Chamber can2104   
 
“intervene only if it “finds that the proceedings appealed from 
were unfair in a way that affected the reliability of the decision or 
sentence, or that the decision or sentence appealed from was 
materially affected by error of fact or law or procedural error”.”2105 
  
in the Lubanga case the Appeals Chamber established the following: 
 
“Having regard to the similarity between the Court’s legal 
framework and those under which the ad hoc tribunals operate, 
the Appeals Chamber considers it appropriate to apply the same 
standard. Accordingly, when a factual error is alleged, the 
Appeals Chamber will determine whether a reasonable Trial 
Chamber could have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as 
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Nonetheless, the Majority of the Appeals Chamber in the Bemba case stated that  
 
“[i]t has previously been stated that when a factual error is 
alleged, the Appeals Chamber’s task is to determine whether a 
reasonable trial chamber could have been satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt as to the finding in question, thereby applying 
a margin of deference to the factual findings of the trial chamber. 
However, the Appeals Chamber considers that the idea of a 
margin of deference to the factual findings of the trial chamber 
must be approached with extreme caution.”2107   
 
And continued saying that  
 
“when assessing the reasonableness of a factual finding, the 
Appeals Chamber will have regard not only to the evidence relied 
upon, but also to the trial chamber’s reasoning in analysing it. In 
particular if the supporting evidence is, on its face, weak, or if 
there is significant contradictory evidence, deficiencies in the trial 
chamber’s reasoning as to why it found that evidence persuasive 
may lead the Appeals Chamber to conclude that the finding in 
question was such that no reasonable trier of fact could have 
reached. Nevertheless, the emphasis of the Appeals Chamber’s 
assessment is on the substance: whether the evidence was such 
as to allow a reasonable trial chamber to reach the finding it did 
beyond reasonable doubt.   
 
45. Ultimately, the Appeals Chamber must be satisfied that 
factual findings that are made beyond reasonable doubt are clear 
and unassailable, both in terms of evidence and rationale… 
However, when a reasonable and objective person can articulate 
serious doubts about the accuracy of a given finding, and is able 
to support this view with specific arguments, this is a strong 
indication that the trial chamber may not have respected the 
standard of proof and, accordingly, that an error of fact may have 
been made.   
 
46. When the trial chamber is not convinced of guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt it must refrain from entering a finding. 
Accordingly, when the Appeals Chamber is able to identify 
findings that can reasonably be called into doubt, it must overturn 
them. This is not a matter of the Appeals Chamber substituting 
its own factual findings for those of the trial chamber. It is merely 
an application of the standard of proof.”2108  
 
 
2107 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p.13, para. 38 
2108 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p.15, paras. 44-46  
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Therefore, the Majority of the Appeals Chamber decided to deviate from the 
“regular” standard of review in relation to factual errors (consisting in “to 
determine whether a reasonable trial chamber could have been satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt as to the finding in question”).2109  
 
Instead, the Majority understood that when the  
 
“Appeals Chamber is able to identify findings that can reasonably 
be called into doubt, it must overturn them.”2110 
 
In relation to the merits, the Majority of the Appeals Chamber declared that the 
some of the crimes were not within the facts and circumstances described in the 
charges and that the Trial Chamber III, thus, could not render a verdict regarding 
them. Such crimes were the subsequent ones:2111 
 
“i. The murder of P69’s sister in PK12 the day after the MLC’s 
arrival in PK12;   
 
ii. Pillaging of the belongings of P69’s sister in PK12 the day after 
the MLC arrived;   
 
iii. Pillaging of the belongings of P69 in PK12 the day after the 
MLC arrived;   
 
iv. Pillaging of the belongings of P110 in PK12 the day after the 
MLC arrived;   
 
v. Pillaging of the belongings of P79 and her brother in PK12 
several days after the MLC’s arrival;   
 
vi. The rape of P79 and her daughter in PK12 several days after 
the MLC arrived in PK12;   
 
vii. Pillaging of the property of V2 in Sibut in the days after the 
MLC’s arrival.  
 
viii. Pillaging of the belongings of P108 in PK12 during the MLC’s 
presence;   
 
2109 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of the Prosecutor and Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the 
“Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute”, p. 13, para. 27; ICC. The Prosecutor 
v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals Chamber, Judgment on 
the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to 
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ix. The rape of two unidentified girls aged 12 and 13 years in 
Bangui on or around 30 October 2002;   
 
x. Pillaging of the belongings of P119 in Bangui after 30 October 
2002;   
 
xi. Pillaging of the belongings of P112 in PK12 in November 
2002;   
 
xii. The rape of a woman in the bush outside of PK22 in 
November 2002;   
 
xiii. Pillaging of the belongings of a woman in the bush outside 
PK22 in November 2002; 
 
xiv. The rape of P69 and his wife in PK12 at the end of November 
2002;  
 
xv. Pillaging of the belongings of P73 in PK12 at the end of 
November 2002;   
 
xvi. The rape of V1 in Mongoumba on 5 March 2003;   
 
xvii. Pillaging of the property of V1, a church, nuns, priests, an 
unidentified “Muslim” man and his neighbour, the gendarmerie, 
and mayor in Mongoumba on 5 March 2003; and  
 
xviii. The murder of an unidentified “Muslim” man on 5 March 
2003 in Mongoumba witnessed by V1.”2112 
 
Undoubtedly, the Majority of the Appeals Chamber recalled that these crimes of 
murder, rape and pillage were added by the Prosecutor (by way of disclosure and 
inclusion in auxiliary documents) after the confirmation of the charges against 
Bemba and the seisure of Trial Chamber III of the case. Even though the Majority 
of the AC considered that this approach seemed to be coherent with TC III’s 
understanding that the Pre-Trial Chamber had not intended to restrict the criminal 
acts reached by this case to those expressly included in the Amended Document 
Containing the Charges, it regarded that such the criminal acts could not be 
considered part of the facts and circumstances described in the charges pursuant 
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Indeed, the majority of the Appeals Chamber considered that  
 
“[s]imply listing the categories of crimes with which a person is to 
be charged or stating, in broad general terms, the temporal and 
geographical parameters of the charge is not sufficient to comply 
with the requirements of regulation 52 (b) of the Regulations of 
the Court and does not allow for a meaningful application of 
article 74 (2) of the Statute.”2114 
   
The Majority of the Appeals Chamber observed that “the Amended Document 
Containing the Charges” and the “Confirmation Decision” presented identified 
criminal acts, which amount to a more detailed factual allegations in relation to 
the crimes for which Bemba was to be prosecuted. The Majority concluded that 
the facts and circumstances connected to the crimes were described at the level 
of “individual criminal acts”. As a result, only the2115   
 
“the criminal acts that were mentioned in the Amended 
Document Containing the Charges and mentioned with approval 
in the Confirmation Decision were within the scope of this 
case.”2116 
 
The “individual criminal acts” included subsequently to the Confirmation Decision 
“were outside the scope of the charges”. Indeed, in accordance with the 
Majority,2117   
 
“adding any additional criminal acts of murder, rape and pillage 
would have required an amendment to the charges, which, 
however, did not occur in the case at hand.” 2118 
 
The Majority of the Appeals Chamber´s argument was that, in this particular case, 
the Prosecutor had devised the charges with a degree of detail which was enough 
for the ends of that provision solely in relation of the criminal acts specified in the 
Amended Document Containing the Charges. Consequently, the addition of any 
 
2114 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 39, para. 110 
2115 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, pp. 39-41, paras. 111-115 
2116 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The 
Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial 
Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 39, para. 113 
2117 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, pp. 39-41, paras. 111-115 
2118 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, pp. 41-42, para. 115 
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further criminal acts of murder, rape and pillage would have demanded an 
amendment to the charges, which was not made.2119 
 
The Majority affirmed that, in view of the manner in which the charges were 
pleaded by the Prosecutor in the case,  
 
“an amendment to the charges… was the only course of action 
that would have allowed additional criminal acts to enter the 
scope of the trial.” 2120 
 
As such amendment did not take place, the Appeals Chamber found, by Majority, 
that the “individual criminal acts” included in the case subsequently to the 
Confirmation Decision could not be considered as being subsumed in the facts 
and circumstances outlined in the charges. 2121  
 
Certainly, the Majority affirmed that   
 
“the criminal acts that were added after the Confirmation 
Decision had been issued did not form part of the “facts and 
circumstances described in the charges” – to the extent that the 
document containing the charges was not amended to reflect 
them – and Mr Bemba could therefore not be convicted of them. 
The same applies to the criminal acts put forward by the 
Victims.”2122 
 
As a result, Bemba could not be found guilty of such crimes.2123 
 
Therefore, concerning the conviction of Bemba, “the only criminal acts that the 
Trial Chamber found to be established beyond reasonable doubt” to be included 
in the “scope of the charges” were these: 2124 
   
“i. The rape of P87 in Bangui on or around 30 October 2002;  
 
 
2119 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, pp. 41-43, paras. 115-116 
2120 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, pp. 41-42, para.  115 
2121 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, pp. 41-43, paras. 115-116 
2122 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, pp. 41-42, para.  115 
2123 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, pp. 41-43, paras. 115- 116 
2124 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, pp. 43-44, para.  118 
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ii. Pillaging of the property of P87 and her family in Bangui on or 
around 30 October 2002;  
 
iii. The murder of P87’s “brother” in Bangui at the end of October 
2002;  
 
iv. The rape of P68 and P68’s sister-in-law in Bangui at the end 
of October 2002;  
 
v. The rape of P23, P80, P81, P82, and two of P23’s other 
daughters in PK12 in early November 2002;  
 
vi. Pillaging of the property of P23, P80, P81, and P82 in Bangui 
in early November 2002; 
 
vii. The rape of P22 in PK12 on or around 6 or 7 November 2002;  
 
viii. Pillaging of the property of P22 and her uncle in PK12 on or 
around 6 or 7 November 2002;   
 
ix. The rape of P42’s daughter in PK12 around the end of 
November 2002;  
 
x. Pillaging of the property of P42 and his family in PK12 at the 
end of November 2002; and  
 
xi. The rape of P29 in Mongoumba on 5 March 2003.”2125  
 
Thus, Bemba was found guilty of one murder, the rape of 20 persons and 5 acts 
of pillaging.2126 
 
The Appeals Chamber analised exclusively these crimes when examining the 
argument of the Defence that  
 
“the Trial Chamber erred when it found that he was responsible 
as a commander pursuant to article 28 (a) of the Statute for 
crimes that MLC troops had committed during the 2002-2003 
CAR Operation.”2127 
 
The Defence raised numerous arguments against the finding of TC III, and its 






2127 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 44, para. 120 
2128 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p.66, para. 166 
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“failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his 
power to prevent or repress the commission of crimes by his 
subordinates during the 2002-2003 CAR Operation, or to submit 
the matter to the competent authorities.”2129 
 
The Majority applied its novel, modified standard of appellate review in regard to 
factual errors. Indeed, the Majority rendered that whenever “the Appeals 
Chamber is able to identify findings that can reasonably be called into doubt,” it 
can “interfere with the factual findings of the first-instance chamber” so as to avoid 
a miscarriage of justice.2130 
 
Even though the application of this standard entails a lower degree of deference 
to the Trial Chamber, the Majority stated that “[w]hen a factual error is alleged, 
the Appeals Chamber will not assess the evidence de novo.”2131   
 
The Majority identified the subsequent serious errors in TC III´s analysis of 
whether or not Bemba took all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent 
or repress the perpetration of crimes by his subordinates or to submit the matter 
to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution:  
 
“(i) the Trial Chamber erred by failing to properly appreciate the 
limitations that Mr Bemba would have faced in investigating and 
prosecuting crimes as a remote commander sending troops to a 
foreign country;  
 
(ii) the Trial Chamber erred by failing to address Mr Bemba’s 
argument that he sent a letter to the CAR authorities before 
concluding that Mr Bemba had not referred allegations of crimes 
to the CAR authorities for investigation;  
 
(iii) the Trial Chamber erred in considering that the motivations 
that it attributed to Mr Bemba were indicative of a lack of 
genuineness in adopting measures to prevent and repress the 
commission of crimes; 
 
(iv) the Trial Chamber erred in attributing to Mr Bemba any 
limitations it found in the mandate, execution and/or results of the 
measures taken; 
 
(v) the Trial Chamber erred in finding that Mr Bemba failed to 
empower other MLC officials to fully and adequately investigate 
and prosecute crimes;  
 
2129 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 356, para. 734 
2130 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, pp. 13, 15, paras. 40, 46 
2131 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 





(vi) the Trial Chamber erred in failing to give any indication of the 
approximate number of the crimes committed and to assess the 
impact of this on the determination of whether Mr Bemba took all 
necessary and reasonable measures; 
 
and (vii) the Trial Chamber erred by taking into account the 
redeployment of MLC troops, for example to avoid contact with 
the civilian population as a measure available to Mr Bemba.”2132   
 
The Majority of the Appeals Chamber then assessed the cumulative material 
impact of such errors. It concluded that such errors resulted in an unreasonable 
analysis by TC III of whether Bemba failed to adopt all necessary and reasonable 
measures in the circumstances that existed at the time.2133   
 
As a consequence, the Majority found that the Trial Chamber’s errors materially 
affected the latter’s conclusion on Bemba´s failure to take all necessary and 
reasonable measures in answer to MLC crimes in the Central African Republic. 
Absent one of the elements of command responsibility under article 28 (a) of the 
Statute, Bemba cannot be considered criminally responsible pursuant to such 
article for the crimes perpetrated by MLC troops in the course of the 2002-2003 
CAR Operation.2134   
 
In fact, the Majority of the Appeals Chamber understood that TC III’s finding that 
Bemba was guilty of the aforementioned crimes (of one murder, the rape of 20 
persons and 5 acts of pillaging) was unreasonable for it presented serious 
errors.2135   
 
In sum, the Majority considered that the Trial Chamber III erred when convicted 
for the criminal acts aforementioned enumerated because such criminal acts 
were not part of the “facts and circumstances described in the charges” in 
accordance with article 74 (2) of the Statute. Moreover, In regard to the other 
criminal acts, its view was that TC III erred when finding that Bemba had failed to 
adopt all necessary and reasonable measures that were in his power to prevent 
or repress the crimes perpetrated by MLC soldiers, or to take the issue to the 
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.2136   
   
 
2132 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 77, para. 189 
2133 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, pp. 77, 78, paras. 189, 193 
2134 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 79, para. 194 
2135 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, pp. 44, 66, paras. 118, 166 
2136 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 79, para. 196 
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In these circumstances, the Majority regarded “it appropriate to reverse the 
conviction of Mr Bemba”. It declared that the aforementioned list of “criminal acts” 
were “outside the scope of this case and that the proceedings in that regard are 
discontinued”.2137    
 
In what concerns the remaining criminal acts of which Bemba was found guilty, 
the Majority of the AC reversed Bemba´s conviction and entered an acquittal. 
Indeed, it considered that the error identified in the finding of Trial Chamber III 
related to necessary and reasonable measures totally expunged Bemba´s 
criminal responsibility for such crimes.2138      
 
The Majority of the Appeals Chamber observed that upon an acquittal, the 
acquitted person should be released from detention right away. Nevertheless, 
Bemba was found guilty of offences against the administration of justice (in the 
terms of article 70 (1) (a) and (c) of the Rome Statute) by the ICC in the 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo et al. case, which is related to the 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo case. As a consequence of this other 
case, Bemba was not immediately released.2139  
 
However, on 12 June 2018, Trial Chamber VII of the ICC (that is in charge of the 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo et al case) issued a decision in which 
it ordered Bemba´s interim release (with determined conditions, including that he 
must abstain from making public statements on the case, “not change his address 
without prior notice to the Court”, “[n]ot contact any witnesses in this case,” strictly 
observe all orders in the case, and “surrender himself immediately to the relevant 
authorities” if the TC VII so determines) whilst it is pending a final decision on his 
sentence. Following arrangements, 3 days later, he was released in Belgium.2140     
 
8.5. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng and 
Judge Piotr Hofmański 
 
In the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng and Judge Piotr 
Hofmański, they affirmed that they would have confirmed Bemba´s conviction by 
Trial Chamber III in the Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute.2141     
 
 
2137 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 79, para. 197  
2138 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 79, para. 198  
2139 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 80, paras. 199-200; ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle 
Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13; ICC website, Bemba et al. case: 
Mr Bemba on interim release in Belgium pending final decision on sentence (15 June 2018) 
2140 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo et al., Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13. Trial 
Chamber VII, Decision on Mr Bemba`s Application for Release (12 June 2018) 
2141 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng and Judge Piotr Hofmański, 
p. 3, para. 1 
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These 2 Judges disagreed with both the Majority´s decision to discontinue the 
proceedings in relation to some of the criminal acts and to reverse Bemba´s 
conviction with respect to the remnant of the criminal acts. Surely, they disagreed 
with the Majority´s conclusions related to the scope of the charges and with its 
analysis if Bemba failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent, repress or punish the perpetration of crimes by his subordinates.2142  
 
In relation to change by the Majority of the established standard of appellate 
review for alleged factual findings, the Dissenting Judges affirmed that the 
Majority did  
 
“not provide any reason for departing from the established 
standard of appellate review for alleged factual findings, which 
has been applied in all judgments on final appeals before the 
Court, including the Bemba et al. Appeal Judgment of 8 March 
2018. They do not give reasons for this departure, despite the 
standard of review being a fundamental question for the 
appellate process with significant implications for the parties and 
participants.”2143    
 
In connection with the scope of the charge, Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng 
and Judge Piotr Hofmański asserted that it is possible for the facts and 
circumstances to be described in the charges at a wide plane for the ends of 
article 74 (2) of the Statute in the initial stages of a case. Their understating is 
that the Pre-Trial Chamber´s task is to establish if there is a case to be tried 
(“whether there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe 
that the person committed each of the crimes charged”) instead of confirming or 
delineating all the factual allegations grounding the charges for the ends of the 
trial.2144     
 
They regarded that the Pre-Trial Chamber can confirm the crimes charged in an 
ample manner subject to the nature of the charges. In this respect, the minority 
of the Judges affirmed that the discretion of the Prosecutor in the approach of 
formulating the charges depends on the particular circumstances of each case. 
They observed that in cases in which command responsibility is alleged for mass 
crimes perpetrated by the accused’s subordinates, the focal point of the case will 
usually be the accused person’s ability and failure to exercise control properly. 
Surely, in such cases (among which the one at hand is included)2145    
 
“the detail of the individual criminal acts alleged will usually be 
less material to the description of the charges under article 74 (2) 
 
2142 Ibidem 
2143 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng and Judge Piotr Hofmański, 
p. 4, para. 5 
2144 Rome Statute, Art.  61 (7); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. 
ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sanji Mmasenono 
Monageng and Judge Piotr Hofmański, p. 12, para. 21 
2145 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng and Judge Piotr Hofmański, 
pp. 12, 14, paras. 21, 27 
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of the Statute than in cases, for example, where the accused is 
alleged to have directly perpetrated those acts.”2146    
 
Certainly, it should be taken into account that Bemba was charged with command 
responsibility pursuant to article 28 (a) of the Rome Statute and was purported to 
have been far from the actual perpetration of crimes by MLC troops.2147     
 
These Judges also affirmed that, in the case at stake, the document containing 
the charges established the scope of the charges by means of temporal 
parameters, geographical parameters and other factual parameters. 
Nevertheless, unlike the Majority’s suggestion that “a territory of more than 
600,000 square kilometres” was encompassed by reference to the territory of the 
CAR, they understood that the temporal and geographical scope of the charges 
was narrowed down by reference to the description of the circumstance that MLC 
advanced through and withdrew from the CAR during such period of time. 
Therefore, the charges encompassed a relatively limited area, precisely, 
numerous particular localities and two axes between other particular localities. 
Further, whilst the document containing the charges enumerated a series of 
examples of particularised criminal acts, it clearly stated that the charges “include, 
but are not limited to” such acts.2148 
 
Their view was that, in the present case, the charges were formulated in a broad 
manner, not being circumscribed to the particular individual criminal acts 
appearing in the Amended Document Containing the Charges and in the 
Confirmation Decision. The totality of criminal acts was within the scope of the 
charges in the measure that they were acts of murder, rape or pillaging 
perpetrated by MLC troops from approximately 26 October 2002 until 15 March 
2003, during the movement of the forces through the CAR territory.2149 
 
Therefore, the Dissenting Judges regarded the description of the facts and 
circumstances inserted in the charges to be appropriate from the viewpoint of 
article 74 (2) of the Rome Statute in the circumstances of the case.2150     
 
 
2146 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng and Judge Piotr Hofmański, 
p. 14, para. 27 
2147 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng and Judge Piotr Hofmański, 
pp. 15-16, para. 32 
2148 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 36, para. 103; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Corrected Revised Second 
Amended Document Containing the Charges, pp. 32-34 (13 October 2010); ICC. The Prosecutor 
v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals Chamber, Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng and Judge Piotr Hofmański, pp. 14-16, paras. 29-
32 
2149 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng and Judge Piotr Hofmański, 
pp. 15-16, 18, paras. 32, 37 
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Indeed, in light of the foregoing arguments, the Dissenting Judges disagreed with 
the Majority that the charges in the present case were formulated too widely to 
constitute a meaningful description of the charges pursuant to the terms of article 
74 (2) of the Rome Statute. Such article concerns the congruence between the 
charges and the conviction, instead of the degree of detail of the charges. The 
Prosecutor has discretion when formulating the charges, thus, she can choose to 
formulate them at a broader level. The exercise of this prerogative by the 
Prosecutor does not impact the Pre-Trial Chamber´s task of confirming the crimes 
charged and committing the person for trial.2151  
  
In sum, the scope of the charges was determined by means of temporal, 
geographical and other factual parameters, being more particularised with the 
description of the advance through and retraction from the CAR of the MLC 
forces. In view of that, and taking into consideration the mode of criminal 
responsibility charged, Bemba´s remote position to the crimes charged and the 
quantity of criminal acts purported, the Dissenting Judges found that the facts 
and circumstances were adequately described in the charges.2152  
 
Undoubtedly, in face of the ample formulation of the charges, the Dissenting 
Judges understood that the conviction did not exceed the facts and 
circumstances described in the charges, pursuant to article 74 (2) of the Rome 
Statute. Consequently, they would have concluded that Bemba failed to 
demonstrate that the Trial Chamber committed a legal error.2153  
    
Accordingly, the aforementioned Judges would have found that Bemba’s 
conviction did not surpass the facts and circumstances described in the charges, 
and, therefore, would not have discontinued the proceedings connected the 
criminal acts which the Majority found that to exceeded the facts and 
circumstances portrayed in the charges.2154 
 
The Dissenting Judges also disagreed with the finding of the Majority that Bemba 
did not fail to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his power to 
prevent or repress the perpetration of crimes.  
 
Surely, they reviewed the Trial Chamber’s findings in light of the arguments raised 
by the Defence on appeal, but did not find any error in the Trial Chamber’s 
findings or any unreasonableness in the general conclusions. As a consequence, 
they would have rejected the Defence’s arguments and confirmed Trial Chamber 
III´s findings and conclusions.2155 
 
 
2151 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng and Judge Piotr Hofmański, 
pp. 18-19, para. 39 
2152 Ibidem 
2153 Ibidem 
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The Dissenting Judges affirmed that the Majority reached its conclusion after 
conducting an unacceptable and deeply flawed assessment. In relation to the 
measures adopted by Bemba, the Majority found that the Trial Chamber III: 
 
“(i) paid insufficient attention to the fact that the MLC troops were 
operating in a foreign country with the attendant difficulties on Mr 
Bemba’s ability to take measures; (ii) treated Mr Bemba’s 
motivations as determinative of the adequacy or otherwise of the 
measures; and (iii) failed to establish that Mr Bemba purposively 
limited the mandates of the commissions and inquiries.”2156 
 
In accordance with the understanding of the Dissenting Judges, the first error 
identified by the Majority was grounded  
 
“on an erroneous assessment of a limited part of the evidentiary 
record and the uncritical acceptance of Mr Bemba’s 
unsubstantiated argument, which does not point to any attempts 
to investigate that were in fact made and proved impossible.”2157  
 
The second error signalised was not raised by the Defence and seems to mirror 
the subjective view of the Majority in relation to the Trial Chamber’s reasoning.2158 
 
In relation to the third error, the Dissenting Judges considered  
 
“the Majority’s position to misconstrue the nature of criminal 
liability under article 28 of the Statute. Notably, in faulting the Trial 
Chamber for failing to make findings as to whether the 
shortcomings in the measures that Mr Bemba took could be 
attributed to him and whether he purposively limited the 
mandates of the commissions and inquiries that he set up, the 
Majority seems to lose sight of the focus of article 28 of the 
Statute, namely holding a commander responsible for his failures 
and not for his actions.”2159  
 
The Majority appeared to accept Bemba’s rather weak arguments without further 
looking into it merits in face of the evidentiary assessment and findings of the 
Trial Chamber. Surely, it neither analysed the availability of measures within 
Bemba´s reach nor did it review the appropriateness of the Trial Chamber III´s 
conclusions in light of the submitted evidence.2160   
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Instead, the Majority pinpointed some doubts regarding minor factual findings of 
the Trial Chamber, and, following, concluded that the latter´s overall finding was 
unreasonable.2161   
 
The Dissenting Judges could not agree with the Majority´s approach and 
consecutive conclusion that Bemba did not fail2162 
 
“to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his power 
to prevent or repress the commission of crimes by his 
subordinates … or to submit the matter to the competent 
authorities.”2163 
 
Hence, they would have dismissed Bemba’s arguments and confirmed the Trial 
Chamber III’s finding.2164 
 
8.6. Analysis of the decision of the Majority of the Appeals Chamber 
(Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against 
Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute” 
dated 8 June 2018) and its potential consequences 
  
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo was convicted by the Trial Chamber III in its 
Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute dated 21 March 2016, being 
subsequently sentenced to 18 years imprisonment. On 8 June 2018, Bemba was 
acquitted by the Majority of the Appeals Chamber in its Judgment on the appeal 
of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant 
to Article 74 of the Statute”.  
 
The decision of the Majority of the Appeals Chamber to reform Trial Chamber 
III´s conviction brings about important consequences. 
 
In broad terms, in the 17 years that the International Criminal Court has been in 
operation, Bemba was one of the four people (together with Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, Germain Katanga and Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi) unappealable convicted 
by the Court, and the one with the highest ranking amidst them.2165  
 
As affirmed by McKay,  
 
[t]his was the first ICC case with a major focus on the use of rape 
as a weapon of war and testing the notion of command 
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As previously stated, the fact that Bemba was found guilty of the crime of rape 
under the heads of war crime and crime against humanity by Trial Chamber III 
signalised the gravity of this type of crime and the commitment of the ICC to fight 
sexual violence and to put an end to its impunity.  
 
There was hope that this conviction would be a catalysis element for a shift in the 
culture of sexual and gender-based crimes in the international panorama both in 
terms of preventing future crimes and facilitating their criminal prosecution.      
 
Also, the victims felt that their pursuit of justice was satisfied and that reparations 
would arise from the conviction so as to alleviate their suffering.  
 
Bemba´s conviction was all an achievement in the combat of sexual and gender-
based crimes.    
 
Consequently, the reversion of the verdict by the Majority of the Appeals 
Chamber was a major setback. 
 
The positive message that the plight of victims of sexual violence had been finally 
been heard and justice had been delivered by the ICC faded.  
 
Fatou Bensouda, the ICC’s Prosecutor, in her pronouncement made clear her 
“disappointment over this decision and its impact, first and foremost, on the 
victims”.2167 
 
Bemba´s acquittal means that lack of accountability for this type of crime- in spite 
of the evidence proving its perpetration- persists.  
 
Surely, as the Prosecutor affirmed, the  
 
“judgement indeed confirms that Mr Bemba's troops committed 
grave crimes, which resulted in great suffering in the CAR. The 
carnage and suffering caused by those crimes were very 
real.”2168 
 
Further, it meant a huge disappointment for the victims, who (not without reason) 
may wonder if impunity of sexual and gender-based crimes is the order of the day 
in the ICC cases.2169 
 
It is noteworthy that the Office of the Prosecutor had been working on the case 
for over 10 years and destined vast resources to its prosecution.2170   
 
For these reasons, the seriousness and credibility of the Court has, once more, 
been tarnished.    
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With regards to the legal arguments over which the Majority of the Appeals 
Chamber grounded its reformation of Trial Chamber III´s judgment, besides the 
challenges posed by the Dissenting Judges in their well-founded opinion, there 
have been further critics.2171 
 
Sá Couto detailed the impact of the Appeals Chamber’s decision, especially on 
cases encompassing charges of sexual and gender-based violence. For that, she 
analysed the following elements and its repercussions:2172 
 
1) the circumstance that the Appeals Chamber used and applied a modified 
standard for appellate review;  
 
2) the approach of the Appeals Chamber to the Pre-Trial Chamber´s role; 
 
3) the Appeals Chamber´s interpretation of “all necessary and reasonable 
measures” that a commander is demanded to take so as to prevent liability 
pursuant Article 28 of the Rome Statute.2173 
 
In what concerns the standard for appellate review, the Appeals Chamber 
abandoned the one used up to this point by the own ICC and “ad hoc” 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.2174 
 
Indeed, instead of verifying “whether a reasonable Trial Chamber could have 
been satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the finding in question,” which 
confers a “margin of deference” to the Trial Chamber´s evaluation of the 
evidence, the Appeals Chamber decided to adopt a new standard.2175  
 
In accordance with this novel standard, the Appeals Chamber can  
 
“interfere with the factual findings of the first-instance chamber 
whenever the failure to interfere may occasion a miscarriage of 
justice”2176   
 
 
2171 ICC website, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the recent judgment of the 
ICC Appeals Chamber acquitting Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba 
2172 SáCouto, S. (2018)   
2173 Ibidem 
2174 Ibidem 
2175 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of the Prosecutor and Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the 
“Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute”, para. 27; ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals Chamber, Judgment on 
the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 13, para. 38; SáCouto, S. (2018) 
2176 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 13, para. 40 
464 
 
in the occasions in which it is “able to identify findings that can reasonably be 
called into doubt.”2177   
 
Although the application of this standard entails a lower degree of deference to 
the Trial Chamber (despite the fact that it “spent nearly four years hearing the 
case, including 77 witnesses and 773 pieces of evidence”), the Majority stated 
that “[w]hen a factual error is alleged, the Appeals Chamber will not assess the 
evidence de novo.”2178    
 
This decision entails a contradiction- even though, pursuant to the new standard 
of review, the Majority is entitled to review the record itself (instead of relying on 
the assessment of Trial Chamber, as in the typical standard of review), it did not 
assess again all evidence in the record.2179 
 
Thus, the Majority was relying on restricted evidence, and arguably important 
evidence was left out, when it disregarded the Trial Chamber III’s assessment of 
Bemba’s command responsibility, and acquitted him of all charges.2180 
 
This approach is unsatisfactory, in particular for cases encompassing crimes of 
sexual violence, that often demand a comprehensive analysis of context in order 
to gather how this violence is actually carried out in the context of conflict or mass 
violence.2181  
 
Indeed, as the Katanga case exemplifies, in practice, not unfrequently the 
impunity of the accused steams from the lack of a comprehensive analysis of the 
context, which is essential to promote the understanding how sexual violence is 
actually perpetrated in the situation of conflict or mass violence.2182  
 
In mentioned case, the Trial Chamber should have maintained the contextual 
analysis of the Pre-Trial Chamber, which led to the conclusion that although 
sexual violence initially seemed unintended, it was actually entwined with the 
perpetration of the crimes which the TC rendered to be within the common 
purpose of the Ngiti militia. Hence, the crimes of rape and sexual slavery charged 
should have been considered within the common purpose of the Ngiti militia and, 
thus, attributed to Katanga.2183 
 
It is important to stress that the risk of impunity of crimes of sexual violence “lato 
sensu” due to a limited analysis of the evidence increases if the review standard 
allows the Appeals Chamber to interfere with the Trial Chamber´s findings when 
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such findings can be called into question, but their review is rather restricted to 
select pieces of the evidence presented before the TC. 2184 
 
The choice of the Majority of the Appeals Chamber to depart “from the traditional 
model of appellate review of factual errors” and apply a new standard in which it 
can interfere with the Trial Chamber´s factual findings whenever it identifies 
findings which can reasonably be called into question seems unwise.2185   
 
Firstly, the Trial Chamber appears to be better prepared to analyse the evidence 
which was submitted before it along the trial proceedings.  
 
Secondly, the Majority of the Appeals Chamber decided not to review all the 
evidence again and, consequently, limited its assessment to some parts of 
evidence. As a result, the Majority´s findings are solely based on part of the 
evidence, approach inconsistent with the goal of rendering a fair decision.  
 
Thirdly, the application of the Majority´s new standard of review surges the 
possibilities that sexual and gender-based crimes go unpunished for such crimes 
often require a through holistic analysis of the elements of evidence so as to 
clarify the circumstances and context in which they were committed.  
 
Therefore, the shift from the ICC precedent jurisprudence and its substitution with 
novel, uncertain and untried standards is regrettable. It seems to be at odds with 
the pursuit of the Court to render a fair and just judgment. 2186  
 
Furthermore, it is very unfortunate that the change of standard review occurred 
in the gravest case of sexual and gender-based violence decided by the ICC. All 
the more so at a time when there is a critical urge to send an unequivocal warn 
globally that these despicable crimes must not remain without punishment.2187     
 
The judgment of the Majority of the Appeals Chamber constitutes the last 
instance and there is no possibility of reversing Bemba´s acquittal. The Appeals 
Chamber should be aware of its equivocal new standard of review and its 
negative consequences for all the cases, particularly for those involving sexual 
and gender-based crimes. In future cases, the AC should maintain 
 
“the cautious approach to appellate review that it has always 
adopted since the commencement of its work, adhering to its own 
precedents and standards.”2188    
 
In this regard, Bensouda also expressed “I hope that there will be, in future, a 
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Certainly, since the Appeals Chamber is the highest appellate judicial body in the 
ICC´s legal framework, and its decisions are final, it is crucially relevant that it 
continues to adopt its usual wary approach to the standard of appellate 
review.2190  
 
In what concerns the approach of the Appeals Chamber to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber´s role, it is necessary to stress that the ICC presents a unique feature 
with respect with to the Pre-Trial Chamber´s role in the confirmation of charges 
process. The PTC is required to find “substantial grounds to believe” that the 
accused perpetrated the alleged crimes. The Court has reiterated that such 
standard is rather low and aimed to prevent wrongful and patently baseless 
charges from passing to the trial stage.2191   
 
Nevertheless, in the Bemba case, the Majority of the Appeals Chamber chose a 
considerably higher standard. Apart from demanding the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
be satisfied the charges are not evidently unfounded, the Majority also required 
it to confirm every individual act underlying the charges.2192   
 
In accordance with the Majority´s understanding, the PTC must confirm all 
individual acts even when, as in the present case, the accused is given notice of 
any additional acts underlying the charges during the (frequently extensive) 
period of time between confirmation and the beginning of trial. In the Majority´s 
view, so that the additional individual acts could be considered part of the 
charges, the Prosecution must have amended the charges.2193   
 
This is prejudicial for cases that involve sexual and gender-based crimes. Due to 
numerous reasons (inclusive because, not rarely, sexual violence is erroneously 
regarded as incidental and secondary rather than as a constitutive part of the 
broader conflict or it is seen as merely adjuvant to other crimes), investigators 
often do not consider the investigation of sexual and gender-based crimes a 
priority from the outset.  In fact, as the jurisprudence of the "ad hoc" tribunals 
indicates, evidence of crimes involving sexual violence frequently is brought out 
tardy in the investigation of atrocity crimes, and sometimes even in the course of 
the trial.2194   
 
The Appeal Chamber´s rule to bar the Trial Chamber from considering acts of 
which the accused was given proper notice but which were not particularly 
confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber could give rise to undesirable effects. It 
would prolong the already lengthy process of confirmation (which is contrary to 
the right of the accused to be tried without delay by the Court) and probably would 
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Moreover, the Majority of the Appeals Chamber deviated from the antecedent 
jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber, “as well as international practice, in 
relation to the manner in which the Prosecution ought to charge cases” that 
encompass mass criminality.2196     
 
“The level of detail that the Prosecution may now be required to 
include in the charges may render it difficult to prosecute future 
cases entailing extensive campaigns of victimisation, especially 
where the accused is not a direct perpetrator, but a commander 
remote from the scene of the alleged crimes but who may bear 
criminal responsibility as the superior having effective control 
over the perpetrators, his subordinates.”2197    
 
Surely, the decision of the Majority of the Appeals Chamber of the ICC will be 
taken into consideration by other UN war crimes tribunals that have to deal with 
similar disputes in relation to legal definitions of the command responsibilities of 
generals and senior politicians who are in charge of troops that perpetrate mass 
rapes, murders, and other crimes.2198 
 
Finally, the approach of the Majority to command responsibility preconised in 
article 28 of the Rome Statute, allied to the Court´s previous approach to other 
liability modes, fuels the likelihood of impunity for crimes of sexual violence.2199   
 
The restrictive interpretation of the Appeals Chamber of indirect co-perpetration 
(Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute) probably will configure an especially high 
threshold for the prosecution of cases involving charges of sexual and gender-
based crimes. It will be hard to demonstrate that individuals accused of these 
crimes “unquestionably… conceived the crime, oversaw its preparation at 
different hierarchical levels, and controlled its performance and execution,” as 
demanded by the Court in the Katanga case. Surely, sexual violence, even in 
those cases in which it is widespread, frequently occurs because it is tolerated 
and allowed instead of being expressly ordered or planned.2200  
 
If the interpretation of the Appeals Chamber of what configures “all necessary 
and reasonable measures” of Article 28(a) continues to be applied, the liability 
modes under which a perpetrator can be held criminally responsible for sexual 
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In the Bemba case, the Majority of the Appeals Chamber reached the conclusion 
that the Trial Chamber made several errors that  
 
“resulted in an unreasonable assessment of whether Mr Bemba 
failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures in the 
circumstances existing at the time.”2202 
  
Amidst these errors was the failure of the TC to analyse the measures Bemba 
should have adopted by reference to the particular crimes that were actually 
perpetrated, which the Majority suggests (with no citation to any specific 
authority) should have been restricted to the crimes it regarded had been 
established beyond reasonable doubt, specifically one murder, 20 acts of rape, 
and 5 acts of pillaging.2203  
 
Even though the Majority highlighted that the scope of the obligation to adopt the 
measures was dependant on the number of such crimes (that in the case at stake 
was relatively low), it did not mention the sufficiency of such efforts in relation to 
the specific nature of such crimes. Certainly, in view of the fact that acts of rapes 
constituted the far majority of the crimes that were established beyond 
reasonable doubt, it is alarming that the Appeals Chamber barely mentioned the 
circumstance that 2 of the principal mechanisms established by Bemba in order 
to investigate allegations of crimes perpetrated by his troops in CAR did little to 
pursue rape reports (the Mondonga Inquiry) and were restricted to pillaging 
allegations (Zongo Commission).2204    
 
In fact, even though there is evidence in the record that Bemba was copied on a 
case file containing detailed information in relation to acts of pillaging and rape 
purportedly carried out by his troops in the CAR, the Appeals Chamber did not 
assess the adequacy or quality of such investigation in relation to the allegations 
of sexual violence.2205                                                                     
 
This approach entails that the analysis of “all reasonable and necessary 
measures” does not need to consider if and how such investigative measures 
appropriately address the specific kind of crimes perpetrated.2206    
 
Even an incipient consideration of the concept that a measure must be adopted 
independently of its competence and quality to halt and prevent future crimes 
seems rather flawed. Even more so when, pursuant to the disposition of Article 
28 of the Rome Statute, in order to evade command responsibility the accused 
person must adopt “all reasonable and necessary measures”, which entails that 
the measures which must be adopted are not any measures, but must meet a 
standard- logically, they must be satisfactory and sufficient to serve the purpose 
established by the drafters of the Rome Statute, namely prevent or repress the 
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crimes. Therefore, when assessing the measures adopted by the person holding 
command responsibility, the Appeal Chamber should consider if these measures 
were adequate bearing in mind the nature of the crimes at stake as well as if they 
were enough so as to stop or avoid the crimes.    
 
Again, the Majority´s approach seems inadequate. Also, it is unfavourable for 
cases encompassing sexual violence since war crimes investigations have 
frequently presented insufficiencies in regard to sexual violence crimes, even 
when they are appropriate with respect to other crimes.2207  
 
In conclusion, it seems that the Majority´s judgment is incorrect. Bemba should 
not have been acquitted. Instead, the Trial Chamber III´s judgment should have 
maintained, in conformity with the understanding of the Dissenting Judges in their 
opinion.  
 
In sum, the main issues in relation to the judgment of Majority of the Appeals 
Chamber are the following: 
 
1-) The usual standard of appellate review (“when a factual error is alleged, the 
Appeals Chamber will determine whether a reasonable Trial Chamber could have 
been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the finding in question”) should 
have been maintained;2208 
 
The higher-level deference to the Trial Chamber and its findings seems to be 
more appropriate for the achievement of a just decision. Indeed, the evidence 
produced by the partied is submitted before the Trial Chamber, and due to this 
first-hand, direct contact evidence, the TC is in a better position to assess it than 
the Appeals Chamber;  
 
2-) Since the Majority decided to apply a new standard of appellate review, it 
should then have analysed all the evidence, and not solely a part to make its 
findings; 
 
3-) The individual criminal acts posteriorly added by the Prosecution and of which 
Bemba received proper notice did not require specific confirmation;  
 
Such acts were within the scope of the charges, and, instead of discontinuing the 
proceedings in relation to them, the Appeals Chamber should have maintained 
the Trial Chamber´s finding that Bemba was criminally responsible for them; 
 
4-) The Majority of the Appeals Chamber´s understanding that Bemba did not fail 
“to take all reasonable and necessary measures within his or her power to prevent 
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or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities 
for investigation and prosecution” was incorrect. 
 
Actually, the measures he adopted were limited in their mandate, execution 
and/or outcomes. Accordingly, Bemba´s conviction should have been ratified by 
the Appeals Chamber.2209    
 
The implications of the Majority´s decision could be quite extensive both for the 
ICC and other courts addressing related crimes, inclusive of the Special Criminal 
Court (SCC), the court that was set up in Central African Republic and that has 
jurisdiction over the same kind of violations which appeared in the Bemba 
case.2210    
 
8.7. The impact of the Majority´s decision on the Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo et al. case  
 
After Bemba´s acquittal by the Majority of the Appeals Chamber, the Prosecution 
filed a Detailed Notice of Additional Sentencing Submissions in the case the 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo et al. (ICC-01/05-01/13). In such 
submissions, it was stated that2211 
 
“Mr Bemba’s acquittal evidences the “damage caused” by the 
conduct of the convicted persons and an “aggravating 
circumstance” pursuant to rule 145. As a ‘new fact’ particularly 
one which comprises the realisation of the very objective of the 
common criminal plan in which Messrs Bemba, Kilolo and 
Mangenda participated, it is incumbent on the Prosecution to 
raise this matter before their re-sentencing. Similarly, the Trial 
Chamber is required to give the matter consideration in their 
determination. 
 
2. This unprecedented case concerns the convicted persons’ 
execution of a sophisticated and concerted plan to obtain Mr 
Bemba’s acquittal through unlawful means—means which 
imperilled this Court’s ability fairly to adjudicate the serious 
crimes of international concern with which he was charged. 
Messrs Bemba, Kilolo, Mangenda, Babala and Arido were 
convicted by this Trial Chamber for, inter alia, corruptly 
influencing 14 Defence witnesses in the Main Case (“Corrupted 
Witnesses”). 
… 
4. However, that an impact on the outcome of a case is not 
required as a matter of law to harm the administration of justice 
does not mean there was no impact in this instance. There was. 
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… Mr Bemba’s acquittal was, at least to a discernible extent, 
resulting from, and predicated on, evidence affected by a 
pervasive campaign of witness tampering, which eventually but 
not unforeseeably, the Bemba AJ. Here, the toxic effects of the 
corrupt and tainted evidence adduced by Messrs Bemba, Kilolo 
and Mangenda at trial affected not only the immediate 
proceedings in which it was tendered, but inevitably, subsequent 
proceedings. In short, the convicted persons’ concerted and 
unlawful efforts may have ultimately succeeded, not at trial as 
originally intended, but at the appellate stage.  
 
5. Although the convicted persons could not have known that the 
Appeals Chamber would depart from the Court’s established 
appellate standard of review for factual errors or that the Appeals 
Chamber’s understanding of the scope of the charges would play 
a substantial role on quashing Mr Bemba’s conviction, this is of 
no moment. They intended and foresaw Mr Bemba’s acquittal by 
means of their illicit actions. Thus, in so far as the Bemba AJ 
disturbed the Bemba TJ to any extent on the basis of evidence 
adduced through, or the acts and conduct of, corrupted or tainted 
Defence witnesses, Mr Bemba’s acquittal comprises “the 
damage caused” or an “aggravating circumstance[ ]” within the 
contemplation of rule 145.”2212  
 
In fact, the Prosecution sustained that Bemba´s acquittal was partially based on 
the limited evaluation carried out by the Majority of an evidentiary record which 
the convicted persons had intentionally and criminally tainted and scripted. In 
particular, the Majority understood that when Trial Chamber III convicted Bemba, 
it had inadequately dismissed determined arguments, and inappropriately 
assessed and weighed determined evidence submitted by the Bemba Defence 
concerning the effective control Bemba exerted over MLC troops and the extent 
of measures within his power to tackle crimes purportedly committed by MLC. 
The Majority found that the analysis of the Trial Chamber III regarding the 
commissions and inquiries allegedly set up by Bemba was faulty, hence, implicitly 
accepting the false narrative provided by the corrupted Defence witnesses who 
were “tainted or corruptly influenced by the convicted persons”. Therefore, the 
evidence put forward by these witnesses (which was partially cited in the Bemba 
Appeals Judgment) undoubtedly influenced the Majority’s assessment of the trial 
record and bore an important role in its decision to overturn Bemba´s 
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The Prosecutor affirmed that   
 
“[a]s this Trial Chamber has found beyond reasonable doubt, the 
conduct of the convicted persons directly resulted in a scripted 
trial record encompassing at least the Corrupted Witnesses. 
Moreover, the unreliable testimonies of other non-credible 
witnesses are also related and linked to the convicted persons’ 
actions. Once the record of a case is polluted with corrupt 
evidence and false testimony, there is no way of controlling the 
reach of their toxic effect. Here, that effect reached the appellate 
stage and affected at least a significant part of the Majority’s 
assessment and conclusions. As demonstrated above, the 
factual narrative testified to by several Main Case tainted and 
Corrupted Witnesses permeated the Majority’s analysis:   
 
● consistent with D-54’s, D-15’s, D-13’s and D-25’s illicitly 
coached testimony, the Majority found that Mr Bemba, as a 
remote commander, had limited effective control; 
 
● relying on D-48’s tainted testimony and consistent with D-19’s 
unreliable and D-54’s coached narratives, the Majority found that 
the Trial Chamber had not properly assessed the measures that 
Mr Bemba took, or said he took, to address the crimes.”2214     
 
Additionally,   
 
“even if the convicted persons would not have known precisely 
how a Chamber of this Court might assess the scripted and 
tainted narrative presented by the tainted and Corrupted 
Witnesses (absent the benefit of observing their testimony 
directly, or in its application of an unconventional standard of 
appellate review), the fact is that they deliberately manipulated 
such evidence in order to be relied on by a Chamber of this Court 
with the intention to affect the outcome of the Main Case. Having 
failed before Trial Chamber III, the result achieved before the 
Appeals Chamber was not only foreseeable, but necessarily 
comprised the very objective of the witness corruption 
scheme.”2215     
 
Hence, the acquittal of Bemba for part of the charges resulted from the crimes of 
the convicted persons. It is, at least partially, a clearly identifiable “damage” 
originated from the course and scope of the criminal offences of Bemba, Kilolo, 
and Mangenda pursuant to rule 145(1)(c) or an aggravating factor in the terms of 
 
2214 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo et al., Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13. Trial 
Chamber VII, Prosecution Detailed Notice of Additional Sentencing Submissions, p. 19, para. 44 
2215 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo et al., Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13. Trial 
Chamber VII, Prosecution Detailed Notice of Additional Sentencing Submissions, p. 20, para. 46 
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rule 145(2)(b)(iv), and important for establishing the seriousness of the crimes of 
which they were found guilty and their respective sentences.2216   
   
Indeed, it is patent that the corrupted and false evidence had a corrosive effect 
on the proper administration of justice, being necessary an adequate punishment 
with its associate effective determent. Bemba, Mr Kilolo and Mr Mangenda 
deserve the punishment of five-year imprisonment and a substantial fine, as 
requested by the Prosecution.2217 
 
8.8. The Majority of the Appeals Chamber´s Judgment and the 
victims 
 
The judgment rendered by Trial Chamber III against Bemba for having command 
responsibility for the crimes of rape (as both war crime and crime against 
humanity) carried out by MLC troops during the 2002/2003 CAR operation felt 
like a long-awaited victory against sexual and gender-based violence and its 
impunity.   
 
Finally, the ICC had charged, prosecuted and condemned an accused for the 
perpetration of the crime of rape. It seemed that the historical efforts poured into 
promoting accountability, justice and reparation to victims of sexual violence and 
deterring these crimes had paid off. 
 
The Bemba case was the first case of the International Criminal Court whose 
main focus was the perpetration of sexual crimes, specifically rapes.2218 
 
5.229 victims were granted participation, an unprecedented number in the history 
of the ICC. In fact,2219 
 
“[h]undreds of rape victims have come forward to tell their stories, 
recounting crimes acted out with particular cruelty. Reports 
 
2216 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo et al., Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13. Trial 
Chamber VII, Prosecution Detailed Notice of Additional Sentencing Submissions, p. 20, para. 47 
2217 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo et al., Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13. Trial 
Chamber VII, Prosecution Detailed Notice of Additional Sentencing Submissions, pp. 20-21, para. 
48 
2218 ICC website, Central African Republic, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05,  
2219 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, pp.16-17, paras. 18-20; ICC. The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Partly 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the supplemented applications by 
the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, 
pp. 4, 5, 9, paras. 7, 19, 21; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-
01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Decision on common legal representation of victims for the 
purpose of trial; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. 
Pre-Trial Chamber III, Fourth Decision on Victims' Participation, pp. 36-37; ICC. The Prosecutor 
v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial Chamber II, Application for 
leave to submit amicus curiae observations under rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-
Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the 
Charges of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, p. 9, para. 19 
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detailing their accounts were ultimately provided to the 
Prosecutor's Office.”2220  
 
In this regard, Fatou Bensouda affirmed that  
 
“[m]any Prosecution witnesses expressed their satisfaction and 
stressed the value of being able to tell their account to the world, 
of being listened to and having their victimisation recognised.”2221     
 
Furthermore, the Trial Chamber III found in its judgment that 2 aggravating 
circumstances were applicable to the crimes of rape, namely that it was 
perpetrated against especially defenceless victims (including a 10 year-old girl 
who was successively raped by 2 MLC soldiers), and that it was perpetrated with 
particular cruelty (victims were gang raped, raped in public, raped in the presence 
of relatives, and were abused in other manner if they resisted their attackers). In 
this respect, it is certain that victims suffered physical and psychological harm, 
inclusive contracting HIV, and were “subsequently shunned by their families and 
communities.”2222  
 
In fact,  
 
“[s]ome victims contracted HIV after being gang-raped by MLC 
soldiers. Others were rejected by their families and ostracised by 
their communities, and many have been left to fend for 
themselves, without access to basic antiretroviral drugs, 
psychological or economic support.”2223 
 
Bemba’s conviction for the crime of rape appeared to indicate a change in the 
prosecution of sexual violence in the ICC. The victims could feel that their efforts 
to come forward and tell their story in spite of the all the suffering and shame 
involved was worth, that their accounts had gone to great lengths- they had 
assisted to hold Bemba criminally responsible for sexual crimes.   
 
Thus, there were high expectations that the Trial Chamber III´s judgment would 
pave the way for further convictions of sexual and gender-based crimes in both 
the ICC and the international scenario. 
 
Certainly, TC III´s decision was a reason of hope for victims of sexual violence 
and of concern to the perpetrators of sexual and gender-based crimes. 
 
 
2220 ICC website, Central African Republic, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05,  
2221 ICC website, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the recent judgment of the 
ICC Appeals Chamber acquitting Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba 
2222 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, pp. 43-45, paras. 91, 93, 
94; ICC website, Central African Republic, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05  
2223 Skilbeck, R. quoted in The Guardian (2018). Jean-Pierre Bemba 's war crimes conviction 
overturned. In the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-
Trial Chamber, Annex E to the Mr. Bemba’s claim for compensation and damages. ICC-01/05-
01/08-3673-AnxE (19 March 2019)                                                                
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However, the reversion of the Trial Chamber´s III conviction was a huge setback 
for the thousands of victims who participated in the proceedings of the case, and 
for victims of sexual violence in general. Indeed, 2224 
 
“[t]he Bemba decision has left … the victims and survivors of 
mass atrocities … confused, discouraged, and disillusioned.”2225 
 
As Skilbeck affirmed,  
 
“[t]his is a devastating outcome for the more than five thousand 
victims who participated in the trial and had waited 15 years to 
see justice done and to receive some form of redress for their 
suffering.”2226 
 
In her pronouncement, the ICC Prosecutor made clear her “disappointment over 
this decision and its impact, first and foremost, on the victims”.2227  
 
The concept that the plight of sexual violence victims had been heard was 
replaced by the immensely discouraging message that, even though we are in 
the second decade of century XXI, sexual and gender-based crimes still go 
unpunished even in cases in which such crimes are prosecuted (and proved) 
before a serious court like, the International Criminal Court.  
 
The Prosecutor further affirmed that  
 
“[t]he Bemba case will always represent an important recognition 
of the crimes of rape, murder and pillaging suffered by victims in 
CAR at the hands of Mouvement de Libération du Congo troops 
that were effectively under the authority and control of Mr Bemba 
who had knowledge of the crimes during the 2002 to 2003 CAR 
conflict. The Bemba Appeals Judgment confirms this.”2228 
 
Undoubtedly, Bemba´s acquittal means that lack of accountability for this type of 
crime- in spite of the evidence proving its perpetration- persists. It is very 
unfortunate that after prosecuting Lubanga, Katanga and Bemba, the ICC still 
has to secure and maintain a conviction for sexual and gender-based crimes. 
 
The general feeling is that, in spite of the Prosecution´s dedication and efforts in 
trying sexual and gender-based crimes (when comparing the Lubanga, Katanga 
and Bemba cases, it is evident the progress of the Prosecution´s work in trying 
sexual and gender-based crimes stands- even though there is room for 
 
2224 Amnesty International (2018); McKay, F. quoted by van den Berg, S., & Mwarabu, A. (2018) 
2225 Poutou, N. C. F., & Hayali, L. B. (2018). 
2226 Skilbeck, R., quoted in The Guardian (2018). Jean-Pierre Bemba 's war crimes conviction 
overturned. In the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-
Trial Chamber, Annex E to the Mr. Bemba’s claim for compensation and damages. ICC-01/05-
01/08-3673-AnxE (19 March 2019)                                                                
2227 ICC website, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the recent judgment of the 




improvement), the ICC came short of living up to the very core of its establishment 
and functioning:2229 
 
“that the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their 
effective prosecution must be ensured.”2230 
 
Even though  
 
“[t]he long journey for justice in the Bemba case is a testament to 
the unwavering courage and determination of the victims of CAR 
to fight against impunity,”2231  
 
in view of the Majority of the Appeals Chamber´s acquittal, the ICC seems not to 
have delivered justice in the case (likewise in the Lubanga and Katanga cases).  
 
In regard to the victims, it was affirmed that  
 
“5229 survivors of Bemba’s atrocities participated in the ICC 
proceedings – for these brave individuals, as well as thousands 
of other victims in CAR, the pursuit of truth, justice and 
reparations will continue.”2232 
 
It has been said that  
 
“[t]he Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC and judicial authorities 
in CAR must learn from this decision and redouble their efforts to 
investigate and prosecute alleged perpetrators of crimes under 
international law, with full respect for their rights to a fair trial.”2233 
 
Notwithstanding that, the victims of sexual violence can only feel that they were 
left forsaken by the ICC. Surely, as SáSouto stated,  
 
“[i]f the ICC could not hold Bemba responsible for the sexual 
violence crimes committed in CAR, how will the SCC hold other 




2229 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber III, Decision Adjourning the Hearing pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute, 
p. 19, para. 49; 
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Prosecution's Submission of Amended Document Containing the Charges, Amended 
List of Evidence and Amended In-Depth Analysis Chart of Incriminatory Evidence, and its related 
Annexes, p.16, para. 57 
2230 Rome Statute, Preamble  
2231 ICC website, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the recent judgment of the 
ICC Appeals Chamber acquitting Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba 
2232 Amnesty International (2018) 
2233 Ibidem 
2234 ICC website, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the recent judgment of the 
ICC Appeals Chamber acquitting Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba 
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It is necessary to highlight, though, the Prosecutor´s assertion:  
 
“[i]n spite of Bemba´s acquittal and its consequent effect of 
stopping the reparations proceedings, the Trust Fund for Victims 
at the ICC can, in its assistance mandate, supply a “reparative 
response” to the victims. In fact, on 8 June 2018, the Board of 
Directors of the TFV decided to expedite the launch of its 
programme of assistance mandate in the CAR. Such programme 
will take into account the harms endured by victims in the Bemba 
case as well as harms arising from further sexual and gender-
based violence that proceeded from the situation.”2235 
 
Therefore, the Trust Fund for Victims will adopt reparative measures to alleviate 
the suffering of victims, including damage caused by the furtherance of sexual 
and gender-based violence derived from the situation.   
 
In what concerns the ICC as a Court, the reversal of Bemba´s conviction seriously 
undermined the overall confidence in its prosecution of cases, and damaged the 
victims and public´s trust, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based 
crimes. 
 
It does not suffice the ICC´s theoretical commitment to  
 
“continue with renewed determination its fight against impunity 
for perpetrators of the most serious crimes.”2236    
 
Warranting a final and irreversible conviction for sexual and gender-based crimes 
is the only way for the ICC to recover its respectability as a Court which can 
achieve its purpose in relation to such crimes.  
 
When that happens, victims of sexual violence will harbour hope that they can 
trust the ICC to hold accountable those responsible for the crimes they endured. 
Also, the pursued deterrent effect against sexual and gender-based crimes will 




















9. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
As seen throughout the present work, the prosecution of sexual and gender-
based crimes had virtually no place in the international scenario up to the 
previous century. 
 
Except for very few pinpointed actions (specifically, the 1474 Peter von 
Hagenbach’s conviction for rape among other crimes, the 1863 Lieber Code rape 
forbiddance, and the introduction of the Martens Clause and the respect to the 
“laws of humanity’ by the 1899 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land), the main legal developments in relation to the 
criminalisation and punishment of the sexual and gender-based crimes in the 
International Criminal Law scenario only started in the 20th century. Thus, it 
constitutes a relatively new subject. 
 
Along the last century such crimes progressively started to occupy a more 
prominent role in International Criminal Law. The enacted international 
documents (such as the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and 
Additional Protocols) reflected the increase in the attention dispensed by the 
International Community towards sexual and gender-based crimes, contributing 
to the protection of women.  
 
This process led to the incorporation of sexual and gender-based crimes among 
the offenses over which the “ad hoc” International Criminal Tribunals have 
jurisdiction. The statute of the ICTY and the statute of the ICTR classified the 
crime of rape as a crime against humanity. Furthermore, the cases of these 
tribunals were of great importance for the prosecution of sexual and gender-
based crimes in the international scenario. For instance, the ICTY case the 
Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić (which “was the first international war crimes trial 
involving charges of sexual violence” and included “[i]ncidents of sexual violence 
against men”), and the ICTR case the Prosecutor v. Akayesu (which established 
that rape may constitute genocide, and differentiated this type of offence from 
sexual violence) were landmarks.2237 
 
The establishment of the International Criminal Court coronated the evolving 
process of the internationally criminalizing sexual and gender-based crimes. The 
drafters of the Rome Statute attached great importance to the relevance of 
gender in the commission of criminal offences under the Statute. As a result, the 
Rome Statute was the inaugural instrument in international law to present a broad 
roster of sexual and gender-based crimes and regard them as war crimes (in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts).2238   
 
 
2237 ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4. Chamber I, Judgment, 
para. 598 (2 September 1998); ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T. 
Trial Chamber, Judgment, pp. 62, 63, 67, paras. 160, 171 (10 December 1998); ICTY website, 
Landmark Cases; United Nations, Security Council. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (1993), Art. 5 (g); United Nations, Security Council. Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 3 (g) 
2238 ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4. Chamber I, Judgment, 
para. 598 (2 September 1998); International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor. Policy 
Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes (9 June 2014) 
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Moreover, the Rome Statute extended the list of sexual and gender-based crimes 
which constitute crimes against humanity, so as to include sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form 
of sexual violence of comparable gravity, and persecution on the grounds of 
gender. Also, the commission of sexual and gender-based crimes with intent to 
destroy, either in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group can 
amount to genocidal acts.2239 
 
It should be remarked that the drafters of the Rome Statute lost an important 
opportunity to grant further protection to victims against sexual and gender-based 
crimes when they did not include gender, rape or any other form of sexual 
violence among the basis for the crime of genocide in the definition of genocide 
provided in Article 6 of the Rome Statute. For the ends of prosecution of 
genocide, the sexual and gender-based crimes can only be regarded as 
genocidal acts subsumed in the acts of causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, and imposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group.  
 
From a broad point of view, the Rome Statute considerably expanded the range 
of situations in which one can be regarded responsible for committing sexual and 
gender-based crimes. It generated hope that the prosecution of the International 
Criminal Court´s cases would embody the culmination of condemnation of those 
responsible for perpetration of sexual and gender-based crimes, having a 
deterrent effect as well. There was expectation from the victims and the 
international criminal community that the ICC´s judgments would bring 
accountability for such crimes and promote justice. 
 
The enactment of the Rome Statute brought groundbreaking protection and 
assistance to victims in general. Also, observed certain conditions, victims were 
allowed to participate at all stages of the proceedings. Further, the drafters of the 
Rome Statute envisaged that the Court would offer a complementary restorative 
answer to victims in the International Criminal Law scenario, in which, 
traditionally, victims have had a secondary role.2240  
 
It is remarkable that specific norms (particular investigative, procedural, and 
evidentiary measures) were inserted in the Statute and its related legal 
instruments with a view to specifically protect and support victims of sexual and 
gender-based crime. The International Criminal Court scheme sought to promote 
procedural justice to these especially vulnerable victims (which includes to make 
sure that victims receive a fair, respectful, and dignified treatment during the 
proceedings and have access to reparations) and provide them with a meaningful 
role in the International Criminal Justice process.2241  
 
2239 International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes (9 June 2014); Rome Statute, Art. 5 (g) (h), 6 
2240 International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes (9 June 2014); Rome Statute, Arts. 5 (g) (h), 6, 7 (1) (g), 8 (2) (b) (xxii), and 8 (2) 
(e) (vi); Varona Martínez, G. (2012 a) 
2241 Benhassine, S. (2015), p. 47; Bedont, B., & Martinez, K. H. (1999), pp. 65-85; Moffett, L.  




In view of the innovations introduced by Rome Statute, it could be theoretically 
suggested that international criminal justice is at last in a position to permit all 
victims, particularly victims of sexual and gender-based violence, to have access 
to retributive, restorative, practical and procedural aspects of justice.2242   
 
9.1. In the light of the ICC cases 
 
So as to ascertain if these theoretical expectations have been held up by the 
practice of the International Criminal Court, we analysed the three ICC cases 
which are relevant from the perspective sexual and gender-based crimes in which 
final judgments have been rendered by the Court, namely, the Prosecutor v.  
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, and the Prosecutor 
v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo.  
 
9.1.1. Case the Prosecutor v. Lubanga 
 
In the first case, the Office of the Prosecutor only charged Lubanga with the 
crimes of enlistment, conscription and use of child soldiers.  Even though more 
crimes- including rape and sexual slavery- were allegedly perpetrated by 
Lubanga, they were not among the charges. 
 
This was the ICC´s first case to be prosecuted. One of the problems faced by the 
Office of the Prosecutor was how to carry out investigations into situations of 
continuous violence, that entailed remarkable logistical difficulties. So as to 
address this challenge, the Office adopted critical measures. It decided to 
decrease the length and the amplitude of the investigation, and to request a 
warrant arrest against Lubanga after 18 months of investigations.2243  
 
In this regard, it is necessary to highlight that the impending release of Lubanga 
(who had been under arrest in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since March 
2005) weighed on the Prosecutor´s decision to concentrate on the crimes of 
conscripting, enlisting, and using children under fifteen years old to actively 
participate in hostilities.2244  
 
It is also noteworthy that, at the time of the investigation of the Lubanga case, the 
Prosecutor had not appointed a Gender Legal Adviser yet. The deficiency of 
gender expertise in handling the investigations into gender-based crimes was an 





2242 Benhassine, S. (2015), pp. 11-12 
2243 International Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor. Report on the activities performed 
during the first three years (June 2003 – June 2006), pp. 2, 7 
2244 International Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor. Report on the activities performed 
during the first three years (June 2003 – June 2006), pp. 2-3 
2245 Rome Statute, Art.42 (9); ICC, OTP, Fatou Bensouda, Launch of the Gender Report Card on 
the International Criminal Court 2011, pp. 2-3; O’Connell, S. (2010), pp. 69-80 
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The Prosecutor's Information on Further Investigation of 28 June 2006 stated that 
it was not possible to complement the gathering of evidence to the extent required 
to amend the charges respecting the time frames set up in Articles 61(4) and 
61(9) of the Rome Statute in face of limited possibilities to investigate more into 
crimes which were allegedly perpetrated by Lubanga. It was argued that the 
amendment of the charges would contribute to further delay the pace of the 
proceedings, causing significant delays, which would be at odds the accused´s 
rights to be tried without undue delay.2246 
 
These arguments go to show that the Prosecutor´s decision to solely try Lubanga 
on the charges of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen years 
into the FPLC and using them to participate actively in hostilities was not specially 
grounded on the gravity of these offences, but rather on which crimes the 
investigators were able to quickly collect evidence so as to guarantee a warrant 
arrest against Lubanga.2247   
 
The Prosecutor´s preference for a practical approach is rather clear in what 
concerns the lack of charges for sexual and gender-based crimes in the case. He 
failed to include sexual violence or sexual slavery in the original charges and did 
not request their addition at posterior stages of the proceedings either. 
Additionally, he forcibly objected their inclusion during the trial by submitting that 
it would be unfair to the defendant if he was convicted on such grounds.2248 
 
However, this course of action does not seem justifiable. Surely, when dealing 
with sexual and gender-based crimes, the OTP could have used two approaches: 
 
1-) the fact that members of UPC/ FPLC- including the conscripted and enlisted 
child soldiers who were being used to participate actively in the hostilities- 
committed rape as a form of propagating violence during the armed conflict; 
 
2-) the circumstance that girls soldiers were victims of sexual violence, being 
subject to rape and sexual slavery by the UPC/ FPLC.  
 
Regarding the use of rape as a weapon of war by the UPC/ FPLC, the Document 
Containing the Charges clearly stated that the child recruits had been permission 
by a commander to rape Lendu women.2249  
 
Thus, the OTP had a strong indication that members of the FPLC inclusive of 
child soldiers perpetrated rape against Lendu women during the attack on Lipri. 
It surfaces that the own child victims could have shed a light (and furnished the 
OTP with evidence during the investigation stage) on the question so as to 
 
2246 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Prosecutor’s Information on Further Investigation, p. 5, paras. 8-9 
2247 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Prosecutor’s Information on Further Investigation, p. 4, para. 7; Kambale, P. K. (2015). 
In De Vos, C., Kendall, S., & Stahn, C., (eds.), pp. 171-197 
2248 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, p. 24, para. 60 
2249 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Document Containing the Charges, Article 61(3) (a), p. 17, para. 55 
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establish if rapes were in fact carried out by the UPC/FPLC during the armed 
conflict. 
 
Additionally, on 15 August 2006, the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice sent 
a letter to the Prosecutor and “submitted a report to the Prosecutor detailing 
gender-based crimes committed in eastern DRC”, which included a list of 31 
victims/survivors of acts of rape and sexual slavery committed by the UPC who 
were disposed to come forward.2250 
 
As a result, the OTP could have ascertained with both the presumed perpetrators 
of rapes (children who were victims of enlistment, conscription, and use by the 
UPC/FPLC militia) and with alleged victims (women interviewed in the Women’s 
Initiatives for Gender Justice`s report) whether rapes were committed by the 
UPC/FPLC during the course of the attacks in the Ituri region.  
 
In what concerns the sexual abuse of girls soldiers, it is well known that the crimes 
of enlisting and conscripting children into armed forces is entwined with the 
crimes of sexual slavery.2251    
 
Consequently, there was “substantial and available evidence” of the widespread 
practice of sexual and gender-based crimes in the Lubanga case.2252  
 
Despite the Prosecution´s allegations that it was not possible to complement the 
gathering of evidence to the level demanded to amend the charges within the 
time frames of the Statute, apparently the obtainment of the necessary evidence 
on the perpetration of rape by the UPC/FPLC so as to charge Lubanga with 
sexual crimes would be neither very cumbersome nor too time consuming. 
 
The Prosecution´s unilateral decision of not pursuing to charge Lubanga with 
sexual and gender-based crimes caused the repudiation of the victims and of 
large part of the international community involved in gender issues.2253  
 
In spite of his previous posture towards the sexual violence issue throughout the 
proceedings, the Prosecutor submitted that sexual violence ought to be taken into 
 
2250 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Request for leave to participate as amicus curiae in the Article 61 Confirmation of 
Charges proceedings, p.16, para. 27; Letter from Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice to the 
Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo (15 August 2006) 
2251 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Observations from the Legal Representatives of the Victims in response to the 
documents filed by the Prosecution and the Defence in support of their appeals against the 
Decision of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009, p. 11-12, para. 30; 
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the Decision 
of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009 entitled "Decision giving notice to the parties and participants 
that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 
55(2) of the Regulations of the Cour,  p.23, para. 59 
2252 Letter from Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice to the Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo 
(15 August 2006) 




account for the purposes of sentencing. Such attitude was strongly deprecated 
by the Trial Chamber I.2254 
 
In the view of the Majority of TC I, it was not established beyond reasonable doubt 
the connection between Lubanga and sexual violence in the context of the 
charges. This outcome arose as consequence of the Prosecutor´s recklessness 
in relation to sexual violence in the Lubanga case: he failed to introduce evidence 
on this issue during the sentencing hearing, and to refer to relevant evidence 
given during the trial.2255 
 
Even though sexual violence took place in the context of the crimes of which 
Lubanga was convicted, as a result of the lack of demonstration of a link between 
the accused and sexual violence, the Majority understood that there was not an 
adequate ground to hold Lubanga responsible for it. Thus, sexual violence could 
not be rendered as an aggravating circumstance for the purposes of 
sentencing.2256  
 
Nevertheless, in her dissenting opinion, Judge Odio Benito (contrarily to the 
Majority of the Chamber) defended that sexual violence and punishment should 
be considered as aggravating circumstances in the elaboration of the sentence 
against Lubanga because these acts caused grave and frequently irreparable 
damage to the victims and their families, and even affected future generations.2257 
 
Regarding reparations, even though the Trial Chamber I had stipulated that 
reparations awards which “are appropriate for the victims of sexual and gender-
based violence” should be formulated and implemented by the Court, the Appeals 
Chamber overruled such decision. It stated that, since the Trial Chamber I               
“did not establish that harm from sexual and gender-based violence resulted from 
the crimes for which Mr Lubanga was convicted,” it should have explained how it 
still rendered that he “should be liable for reparations in respect of the harm of 
sexual and gender-based violence.” The TCI failed to do it. For this reason, the 
Appeals Chamber understood that Lubanga could not be held responsible for 
reparations related to this harm, and amended the Impugned Decision in this 
regard.2258   
 
The Appeals Chamber clarified that its finding on Lubanga’s liability for 
reparations in relation to the harm arising from sexual and gender-based violence 
 
2254 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, p. 24, para. 60 
2255 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, p. 28, paras. 75-76 
2256 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, pp. 26, 28, paras. 66, 74-75  
2257 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Odio Benito in Public Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 
of the Statute, pp. 42-46, 49, 50, paras. 6-9, 13, 19-22 
2258 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, p. 72, para. 207; 
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals against the “Decision establishing the principles and 
procedures to be applied to reparations” of 7 August 2012 with AMENDED order for reparations 
(Annex A) and public annexes 1 and 2, p. 77, para. 198 
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did not prevent these victims from benefitting from assistance activities 
undertaken by the Trust Fund. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber allowed the 
inclusion of victims that suffered damage as a consequence of sexual and 
gender-based violence in the TFV’s assistance mandate.2259 
 
Further, the TFV and the Trial Chamber determined that the former´s 
programmes must be aimed at direct and indirect victims of the crimes of which 
Lubanga had been convicted and must give specific attention to the gender-
specific results of the crimes, and would include a gender-sensitive training.2260 
 
Therefore, in relation to the Lubanga case, it is possible to conclude that: 
 
- The OTP incorrectly opted for a practical approach when handling the 
crimes charged in the Lubanga case, obstructing the prosecution of sexual 
and gender-based crimes; 
 
- The Prosecutor should have appointed a Gender Legal Adviser since the 
beginning of the investigation of the case; 
 
- The OTP should have ascertained with both the presumed perpetrators of 
rapes (children who were victims of enlistment, conscription, and use by 
the UPC/FPLC militia) and with alleged victims (women interviewed in the 
Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice`s report) whether rapes were 
committed by the UPC/FPLC in the course of the attacks in the Ituri region; 
 
- Upon collecting this easily available evidence on the commitment of rape 
and sexual slavery, the Prosecutor should have requested the inclusion of 
these crimes among the offences charged at a posterior stage of the 
proceedings; 
 
- The Prosecutor should not have objected the inclusion of charges of 
sexual slavery and inhuman and/or cruel treatment when the issue of the 
recharacterization of the facts arose;2261 
 
2259 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals against the “Decision establishing the principles and 
procedures to be applied to reparations” of 7 August 2012 with AMENDED order for reparations 
(Annex A) and public annexes 1 and 2, p. 77, para. 199 
2260 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Filing on Reparations and Draft Implementation Plan, p. 34, paras. 68-69; 
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 
Order instructing the Trust Fund for Victims to supplement the draft implementation plan, p. 9, 
para. 21 
2261  ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber 
I, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, p. 24, para. 60; ICC. The Prosecutor 
v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, Prosecution’s Application 
for Leave to Appeal the “Decision giving notice to the parties and participants that the legal 
characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the 
Regulations of the Court", pp. 8-9, paras. 22-23; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, Prosecution's Further Observations Regarding the 





- When submitting that sexual violence ought to be taken into account for 
the purposes of sentencing, the Prosecutor should have introduced 
evidence on this issue during the sentencing hearing, or referred to 
relevant evidence that had been given during the trial, in order to establish 
beyond reasonable doubt the existence of a link between the accused and 
sexual violence, in the context of the charges; 
 
- The Trial Chamber I, the Appeals Chamber and the TVF were adequately 
aware of the need to pay due regard to gender specificities and to include 
victims suffered damage as a consequence of sexual and gender-based 
violence in the programmes conducted under the TFV’s assistance 
mandate.    
This first case was permeated by flaws of the Prosecution in relation to the 
charging of sexual and gender-based crimes. It is no wonder it tarnished the 
reputation of the ICC and put at stake its ability to translate into practical actions 
the victimological forefront provisions of the Rome Statute, and bring justice to 
victims. Moreover, the case meant a blow for victims and those who advocate for 
the prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes in the international criminal 
scenario. 
 
9.1.2. Case the Prosecutor v. Katanga  
 
The case the Prosecutor v. Katanga consisted in first time in the history of the 
ICC in which accused persons (while Germain Katanga was still being jointly 
prosecuted with Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07) were charged with 
sexual and gender-based crimes, specifically, the crimes of rape and sexual 
slavery, as both war crimes and crimes against humanity. It was an improvement 
in relation to the Lubanga case, since in the latter the Prosecution did not present 
charges. 
 
In the severed case against Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, the Trial Chamber II did not 
have to entertain whether or not the crimes had been committed because its view 
was that the accused lacked of authority, and, accordingly, acquitted him of all 
charges, inclusive of the crimes of rape and sexual slavery.2262 
 
However, in the severed case against Germain Katanga, the TC II did analyse if 
the crimes of rape and sexual slavery had been perpetrated. It was the first time 
in which the Court examined evidence presented in relation to the crimes of rape 
and sexual slavery so as to establish whether the perpetration of such crimes had 
occurred.   
 
Trial Chamber II was attuned to special vulnerability of the witnesses who were 
victims of sexual violence, and took it into account (not only in the conduction of 
the trial proceedings but also when analysing and giving credibility to those 
witnesses´ testimonies). Its approach was oriented to alleviate the difficulty the 
 
2262 Opinio Juris website, Sane, J., Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui: reflections on the ICC’s first acquittal,  
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victims find in recalling their ordeal and, hence, avoid revictimization for the 
prosecution of sexual and gender-related crimes. The Chamber also 
acknowledged that, apart from the psychological and physical impact caused by 
sexual and gender-based crimes, the victims of these offences face other 
challenges, such as stigmatisation and marginalisation by their communities.2263     
 
In spite of said progresses, some critics can be made regarding the conduction 
of the case. 
 
Firstly, the lack of a unified course of action between the Prosecution and the 
VWU regarding the type of protection that should be granted to witnesses who 
were victims of sexual and gender-based offences caused delay in the 
proceedings.2264  
  
Another critic is that the charging of sexual and gender-based crimes in the case 
was limited. Although there is explicit mention to the occurrence of forced 
marriage and forced pregnancy, the Prosecutor decided to charge the sexual and 
gender-based violence suffered by the victims in the camps exclusively as sexual 
slavery. Gender-specific activities were presented as a form of proof of the sexual 
crimes instead of considering it a separate proof of the harm suffered by the 
victims.2265 
 
The Prosecution´s choice to charge facts that amounted to forced marriage and 
forced pregnancy as sexual slavery denotes that it gave too much emphasis to 
the sexual elements of the crime and not enough relevance to the harm caused 
by the non-sexual (for instance, forced child-bearing and cooking). Other grave 
aspects, such as forced pregnancy and compulsory household labour, were 
relegated to second plan, being presented as a form of proof of the sexual crimes 
instead of considering it a separate proof of the harm endured by the victims 2266  
 
There were critics with respect to the Trial Chamber II´s finding that the crimes of 
murder, attack against civilians, pillaging and destruction were part of the Ngiti 
militia´s common purpose, but that the crimes of rape and sexual slavery did not 
fall within this common purpose.  
 
The Chamber ultimately decided for this approach, despite its initial affirmation 
that acts of sexual violence during the operation to destruct Bogoro’s civilian 
 
2263 Oosterveld, V. (2009), pp. 407-430 
2264 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Warrant of Arrest for Germain Katanga, p. 6; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-02/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Warrant of arrest Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 7, p. 
6; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecution's Submission of the Document Containing the Charges 
and List of Evidence, 7, p. 5, para. 5 
2265 Oosterveld, V. (2009), pp. 407-430; SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy 
Kamara, Santigie Borbor Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T. Trial Chamber II, Jugdement, Separate 
Concurring Opinion of the Hon. Justice Julia Sebutinde Appended to Judgment Pursuant to Rule 
88 (C), p. 580, para. 16 
2266 Oosterveld, V. (2009), pp. 407-430; SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy 
Kamara, Santigie Borbor Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T. Trial Chamber II, Jugdement, Separate 
Concurring Opinion of the Hon. Justice Julia Sebutinde Appended to Judgment Pursuant to Rule 
88 (C), p. 580, para. 16 
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population were not isolated acts, but had been perpetrated with a same objective 
and objectively constituted part of that operation. This first understanding was in 
accordance with the Majority of the Pre-Trial I´s finding that, in the ordinary course 
of events, the implementation of the common purpose would bring about crimes 
of rape and sexual slavery. If the TC II had maintained its primary conclusion 
regarding the nature of the crimes of rape and sexual slavery, they would be 
considered as part of the Ngiti militia´s common purpose, and, accordingly, 
Katanga would have been found guilty as an accessory of these crimes.2267 
 
The TC II adopted a restrictive interpretation of indirect co-perpetration (Article 
25 (3)(a)), demanding proof that the accused undoubtedly devised the crime, 
supervised its preparation at distinct hierarchical levels, and was in charge of its 
performance and execution. This approach configures an especially high 
threshold for the prosecution of cases involving charges of sexual and gender-
based crimes. Sexual violence, even in those cases in which it is widespread, 
frequently occurs because it is tolerated and allowed instead of being expressly 
ordered or planned.2268  
 
Regarding reparations to victims, the Chamber specifically invited the TFV to take 
into account, as part of its assistance mandate, wherever appropriate, the harm 
endured by the applicants (and not only with respect to the 297 persons who were 
admitted by the Court as victims of Katanga’s crimes) as a consequence of 
violence of a sexual character.2269 
 
The Trial Chamber II awarded individual reparations to the 297 victims in the form 
of a symbolic compensation of $250 per person (amounting to USD 74,250) as 
well as four collective awards (which combined amount to USD 925,750) in the 
form of education assistance, housing assistance, income-generating activities, 
and psychological rehabilitation.2270 
 
The ICC sought to promote and find means to materialise its restorative justice 
mandate, by providing monetary compensation (which, albeit symbolic, is 
concrete, tangible) to each victim individually, as well as financing programmes 
that will revert in the benefit of victims, by promoting their healing, rehabilitation 
and reintegration.   
 
2267 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, pp. 202-206, paras. 567-
569, 580; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber 
II, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 442, para. 1165-1166 
2268 ICC website, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the recent judgment of the 
ICC Appeals Chamber acquitting Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba; ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, Judgment pursuant to article 74 
of the Statute, pp. 542-541, para. 1412 
2269 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07.  Trial Chamber II, 
Order for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, p. 119 
2270 ICC website, Press Release, Trust Fund for Victims decides to provide $1 million for the 
reparations awarded to victims in the Katanga case, welcomes earmarked donations of €200,000 
from the Netherlands 
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The TVF´s draft plan for reparations stated that it was “aware of potential gender 
and power dynamics that may affect victims” and that gender specific issues 
would be addressed.2271 
 
As a consequence, it is possible to conclude that: 
 
- There should be a concerted action between the Prosecution and the VWU 
regarding the protection granted to witnesses who were victims of sexual and 
gender-based criminal offences, not only so as to adequately protect them but 
also in order to avoid undue delays in the proceedings; 
 
- The charging of sexual and gender-based crimes should have been 
wider;2272 
 
- The crime of forced marriage should have been explicitly recognized and 
charged:  
 
- under the head “any other form of sexual violence” (Articles 7 (1) (g) 
and 8 (e) (vi) of the Rome Statute); 
- under the head “other inhumane acts” (Article 7 (1) (k)); 
- under the head “persecution on gender grounds” (Article 7 (1) (h)); 
- by coupling the charge of sexual slavery with the charge of 
enslavement (Article 7 (1) (c)); 
- The crime of forced pregnancy (Articles 7 (1) (g) and 8 (e) (vi) of the Rome 
Statute) should have been expressly recognized and charged (in view of the 
circumstance that Witness P-132 bore a child as a result of the often rapes 
she suffered), thus, acknowledging  the gravity of non-sexual elements that 
are gender-related and should be equally considered in the analysis of the 
violence endured by the victims;2273 
 
- Trial Chamber II should have adopted a more flexible concept of the 
boundaries of indirect co-perpetration (Article 25 (3)(a) of the Statute) so as 
to allow the sexual crimes (that often are perpetrated because they are 
tolerated and allowed instead of being expressly ordered or planned) to be 
subsumed in this type of liability;2274  
 
- TC II should have continued applying its initial broader approach and 
considered that (likewise the crimes of murder, attack against civilians, 
pillaging and destruction) the crimes of rape and sexual slavery did fall within 
the common purpose of the Ngiti militia and, hence, that Katanga could be 
held accountable for them; 
 
2271 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07.  Trial Chamber II, Draft 
implementation plan relevant to Trial Chamber II’s order for reparations of 24 March 2017, p. 35, 
paras. 114-115 
2272 Oosterveld, V. (2009), pp. 407-430 
2273 Ibidem 
2274 Ibidem; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber 
II, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 542, para. 1412; ICC website, Statement of 
ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the recent judgment of the ICC Appeals Chamber acquitting 




- Despite the points above, the fact that Katanga was charged with rape and 
sexual slavery meant an advance in the prosecution o of sexual and gender-
based crime before the International Criminal Court; 
 
- Trial Chamber II appropriately handled the gathering and analysis of 
evidence of sexual and gender-based violence by recognising that its intrinsic 
sensitivities and particularities should be taken into consideration when 
appropriate, hence, avoiding revictimization; 
 
- The Chamber was correct when established that the course of action of the 
TFV, in its assistential role, should be broad so as to attempt to decrease the 
suffering caused by violent acts of sexual nature, encompassing as high a 
number of persons as possible, inclusive those not admitted as victims by the 
Court for the ends of reparations; 
 
- The ICC demonstrated its commitment to effectively provide restorative 
justice by granting individual monetary awards to victims.  
 
9.1.3. Case the Prosecutor v. Bemba 
  
In the Prosecutor v. Bemba case, initially Jean‐Pierre Bemba was charged for 
being criminally responsible, jointly  with  another  person  or  through  other  
persons,  in accordance with  Article  25 (3) (a)  of  the  Rome Statute, for the 
crimes of  rape (as a crime against humanity and a war crime),  torture (as a crime 
against humanity and a war crime), committing outrages upon personal dignity, 
in particular humiliating and degrading treatment (as a war crime), murder (as a 
crime against humanity and a war crime), and pillaging a town or place (as a war 
crime).2275 
 
Nevertheless, the Pre-Trial Chamber III regarded that there were several points 
that indicated that the legal characterisation of the facts of the case could 
correspond to a different form of liability under Article 28 of the Rome Statute. 
Therefore, it requested the Prosecutor to consider amending the charges, in the 
context and within the terms of Article 61 (7) (c) (ii) of the Rome Statute.2276 
 
In spite of that, the Prosecutor charged Bemba as being criminally responsible 
for aforementioned crimes as a co-perpetrator/ indirect perpetrator, within the 
meaning of Article 25 (3) (a) of the Rome Statute, or, in the alternative, as a 
military commander or individual effectually acting as a military commander or 
superior in the terms Article 28(a) or (b) of the Rome Statute.2277 
 
2275 ICC.The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08.  Pre-Trial 
Chamber III, Prosecution´s Amended Document Containing the Charges, para. 57, ICC-01/05-
01/04-264-Conf-AnxA (17 October 2008); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08.  Pre-Trial Chamber III, Decision Adjourning the Hearing pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute, p. 16, para. 41 
2276 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08.  Pre-Trial 
Chamber III, Decision Adjourning the Hearing pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute, 
p. 17, paras. 46, 49 
2277 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Pre-Trial Chamber III, Case No. ICC-




The Pre-Trial Chamber II stated that Bemba's criminal responsibility under Article 
28 of the Statute would only be examined in case there was not enough evidence 
establishing substantial grounds to believe that the he was criminally responsible 
as an indirect perpetrator (within the terms of Article 25 (3) (a) of the Rome 
Statute) for the crimes enumerated in the Amended Document Containing the 
Charges.2278 
 
In the same Decision, PTC II understood that there was no foundation to 
prosecute Bemba for the crimes of murder, rape, and pillage as an indirect 
perpetrator within the meaning of Article 25 (3) of the Rome Statute (it declined 
to confirm the counts of torture and committing outrages upon personal dignity). 
Hence, it rejected the Prosecutor´s main argument in respect of Bemba´s mode 
of criminal responsibility. In view of that, it proceeded to the analysis of the 
accused´s criminal liability on the basis of Article 28 of the Statute.2279 
 
Concerning the victims´ participation, there was a divergence among the Judges 
regarding the quantity of victims who should be allowed to give evidence as 
witnesses or to present their views and concerns in person, as well as the 
requirements for such purposes.2280  
 
The Majority of Trial Chamber III established that the presentation of evidence by 
an individual victim should be "useful" for the Trial Chamber, "make a genuine 
contribution to the ascertainment of the truth" or  
 
"bring to light substantial new information that is relevant to 
issues which the Chamber must consider in its assessment of 
the charges".2281  
 
Also, the Legal Representatives of the victims initially made an application for 17 
victims to testify and/or to present their views and concerns, but the Trial 
Chamber III understood that hearing these 17 victims would considerably 
increase the duration of the trial and might cause undue delay, prohibited by 
Article 67(l)(c) of the Statute. Accordingly, it instructed the Legal Representatives 
to reduce their list to a maximum of 8 victims in total. Following, the victims´ Legal 
Representatives collected and presented written statements for 7 victims. 
Nonetheless, the Majority of the Trial Chamber III (the presiding Judge 
 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, p. 114, para. 341. ICC-01/05-01/08-424 (15 
June 2009). 
2278 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, pp. 114, 115, 139, paras. 341, 342, 402  
2279 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, p. 25, 37, 74-75, 139, 185, paras. 72, 108, 
212, 403  
2280 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the 
supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the 
views and concerns of victims, p.3 
2281 Ibidem pp. 7-8, paras. 13,16 
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dissenting) solely allowed 2 victims to give evidence in person and 3 other victims 
to present their views and concerns via video-link.2282 
 
The presiding Judge opposed the decisions taken by the Majority of TC III. Firstly, 
Judge Steiner was against they adding the supra mentioned requirements so as 
to permit the victims to present evidence. She affirmed that the demand of these 
further elements had no legal basis, and should not be part of the threshold for 
victims to be allowed to present evidence.2283 
 
Secondly, the Judge could not agree with the Majority´s approach that permitting  
7 victims (out of a total of 2287 whose participation in the proceeding had already 
been authorised by TC III) to give evidence and present their views and concerns 
would cause an unjustifiable delay in the proceedings. Especially because the 
Legal Representatives of the victims had curtailed their list of victims from 17 to 
7, following the TC III´s request to decrease the number of victims proposed to 
be called to a total of 8 victims.2284   
 
Thirdly, Judge Steiner disagreed with the Majority in relation to their decision to 
hear via video-link technology the 3 victims who were authorised to present their 
 
2282 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Second order regarding the applications of the legal representatives of victims to 
present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, pp. 6, 7, paras. 11, 12; ICC. The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Partly 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the supplemented applications by 
the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, 
pp. 3-5, paras. 2,9; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-
01/08. Trial Chamber III, Application by the Legal Representative of Victims for leave to call 
victims to appear as witnesses and present their views and concerns to the Chamber, para. 2; 
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber 
III, Rectificatif à la justification relative à "Requête afin d'autorisation de présentation d'éléments 
de preuves et subsidiairement de présentation de vues et préoccupations par les victims”, para. 
8; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber 
III, Complément de la requête afin d'autorisation de présentation d'éléments de preuves et 
subsidiairement de présentation de vues et préoccupations par les victimes du 6 décembre 2012; 
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber 
III, Requête de la Représentante légale de victims concernant des informations supplémentaires 
à sa requête du 6 décembre 2011 afin d'autoriser des victimes à témoigner et à faire valoir leurs 
vues et préoccupations devant la Chambre 
2283 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the 
supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the 
views and concerns of victims, p. 7, paras. 14-15 
2284 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the 
supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the 
views and concerns of victims, pp. 4, 7-10, paras. 3-6, 15-16, 21-22; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Second order regarding the 
applications of the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the views and 
concerns of victims, p. 6, para. 10; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. 
ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Complément de la requête afin d'autorisation de présentation 
d'éléments de preuves et subsidiairement de présentation de vues et préoccupations par les 
victimes du 6 décembre 2012; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-
01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Requête de la Représentante légale de victims concernant des 
informations supplémentaires à sa requête du 6 décembre 2011 afin d'autoriser des victimes à 
témoigner et à faire valoir leurs vues et préoccupations devant la Chambre 
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views and concerns. She would have preferred to call the victims to appear in 
person in the courtroom.2285 
 
In its Judgment, Trial Chamber III found beyond reasonable doubt that MLC 
soldiers perpetrated the crimes of rape (crime against humanity and war crime), 
murder (crime against humanity and war crime), and pillaging a town or place 
(war crime) in the Central African Republic from on or about 26 October 2002 to 
15 March 2003.2286 
 
In relation to the crime of rape, it is noteworthy that the Chamber, recalling the 
disposition of the Elements of Crimes, reaffirmed that the concept of invasion 
inserted in the Rome Statute was intended to be sufficiently ample so as to be 
genderless. It encompasses same-sex penetration, and is applicable to both 
male and/or female offenders and victims.2287  
 
“Bemba Judgement represents the first time in the history of 
international criminal law that sexual violence perpetrated 
against men has been charged as the crime of rape (as opposed 
to crimes of torture, outrages upon personal dignity or cruel 
treatment) or that the defendant has been convicted of rape 
based on the testimony of male victims.”2288 
 
Certainly, up to this point, sexual violence perpetrated against men had never 
been prosecuted as rape international criminal law scenario. Instead, it had been 
been tried as the crimes of torture or cruel treatment (as in the ICTY the 
Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić et al. case) or even under the heads of the crime of 
humiliating and degrading treatment and the crime other forms of sexual assault 
(as in the ICTY the Prosecutor v.  Češić case).2289 
 
The Trial Chamber III (following the steps of Trial Chamber II in the Katanga case) 
appeared to be attuned to the specificities of sexual and gender-based crimes, 
demonstrating to be attentive to the special characteristics of witnesses who were 
victims of rape. The Chamber recognised that the traumatic nature of the 
circumstances these witnesses describe, their eventual young age, and the time 
 
2285 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, pp. 20-21, para. 28; ICC. The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Decision 
on the presentation of views and concerns by victims a/0542/08, a/0394/08 and a/0511/07, pp. 5, 
6, 8, footnote 14, paras. 7, 13(a) 
2286 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, pp. 49-52, 56-62, 313-316, 319-324, 
paras. 87-94, 113-125, 622-630, 639-648 
2287 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 53, paras. 99-101; Elements of 
Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7(1)(g)-1, para. 1, footnote 15; 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1, 
footnote 50; 8(2)(e)(vi)-1, para. 1 
2288 Hayes, N. (2016) 
2289 Ibidem; ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T. Trial Chamber, 
Judgment, pp. 72-72, paras. 183-185 (10 December 1998); ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, 
et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T. Trial Chamber, Judgment, p. 3, footnote 7, p. 364, para. 1066 (16 




elapsed between the events and the testimony are factors that bear weight on 
their accounts and can lead to omissions/gaps or apparent contradictions. The 
TC III addressed the dimension and extent of the omissions and contradictions 
and if such elements could undermine the credibility and reliability of the 
testimony on a case by case basis. It also acknowledged the difficulty the 
witnesses might have in recalling the events and the violence they suffered and 
that it can affect their testimonies.     
 
The TC III found that the constitutive requirements of command responsibility 
established in Article 28 (a) of the Statute were present. As a result, it considered 
that Bemba could be held criminally responsible in the terms of this article for the 
crimes against humanity of murder and rape, and the war crimes of murder, rape, 
and pillaging perpetrated by his forces throughout the 2002-2003 CAR 
Operation.2290 
 
This was the ICC´s first time conviction for a sexual gender-based crime. 
Additionally, the Bemba case was its first conviction grounded on command 
responsibility.2291   
 
In the sentence, the Chamber also found that 2 aggravating circumstances were 
applicable to the crimes of rape, namely that it was perpetrated against especially 
defenceless victims, and that it was carried out with significant cruelty. The 
Chamber understood that Bemba´s culpable conduct was of serious gravity, and 
that there were not any mitigating circumstances in the case. Accordingly, Bemba 
was sentenced to 18 years of imprisonment.2292 
 
However, the Trial Chamber III´s verdict and sentence were subject to appeals, 
and, by Majority, the Appeals Chamber decided to reverse the Trial Chamber III´s 
Judgment.2293  
 
In regard to the merits, the Majority declared that the crimes included in the case 
after the Confirmation Decision  
 
“were not within the facts and circumstances described in the 
charges and that the Trial Chamber, therefore, could not enter a 
verdict thereon.”2294 
 
2290 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 359, para. 742 
2291 The Guardian (2018). Jean-Pierre Bemba 's war crimes conviction overturned. In the 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial Chamber, Annex 
E to the Mr. Bemba’s claim for compensation and damages (19 March 2019)                                                                
2292 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, pp. 43, 44, 45, para. 91, 
93, 94 (21 June 2016)                                                                       
2293 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 4, para. 1; ICC. Media Advisory, Bemba case: 
Appeals Chamber to issue appeals judgments on verdict and sentence on 8 June 2018 (18 May 
2018)  
2294 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The 
Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial 




In fact, the Majority considered that only 
 
“the criminal acts that were mentioned in the Amended 
Document Containing the Charges and mentioned with approval 
in the Confirmation Decision were within the scope of this 
case”2295  
 
According to the Majority´s understanding, the Prosecution should have 
proceeded to a new amendment of the charges so as to include the criminal acts 
added after the Confirmation Decision into the “scope of the case”. There was no 
such amendment. Consequently, these “individual criminal acts” were not part of 
the case and Bemba could not be found guilty of them.2296 
 
Furthermore, the Majority adopted a series of modifications to “the standard of 
review for factual errors”. It decided not to follow the “conventional standard of 
review” (that consists in establishing if a “whether a reasonable trial chamber 
could have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the finding in question”) 
and understood instead that when the Appeals Chamber can identify findings 
which can reasonably be called into doubt, it must reverse them, so as to avoid 
a miscarriage of justice.2297 
 
Even though the application of this standard entails a lower degree of deference 
to the Trial Chamber, the Majority stated that “[w]hen a factual error is alleged, 
the Appeals Chamber will not assess the evidence de novo”.2298   
 
The Majority of the Appeal Chamber found that the Trial Chamber incurred in 
errors that materially affected the latter’s conclusion on Bemba´s failure to take 
all necessary and reasonable measures in answer to MLC crimes in the Central 
African Republic. Absent one of the elements of command responsibility under 
Article 28 (a) of the Statute, Bemba could not be considered criminally 
responsible pursuant to such article for the crimes perpetrated by MLC troops in 
the course of the 2002-2003 CAR Operation.2299    
 
 
2295 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The 
Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial 
Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 39, para. 112 
2296 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, pp. 4, 39, 41-42, paras. 2, 111-112, 115, 116 
2297 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, pp.11, 13, 15, paras. 34, 38, 44-46; ICC. The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals Chamber, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng and Judge Piotr Hofmański, pp. 4, 6, 
paras. 4, 9 
2298 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 14, para. 42; SáCouto, S. (2018) 
2299 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 79, para. 194 
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In these circumstances, the Majority declared that the criminal acts which were 
not confirmed in the Confirmation Decision were outside the reach of the case 
and that the related proceedings were discontinued.2300   
 
In what concerns the remaining criminal acts of which Bemba was found guilty, 
the Majority of the AC reversed Bemba´s conviction and entered an acquittal. The 
Majority considered that the errors it identified in the findings of Trial Chamber III, 
related to necessary and reasonable measures to prevent, repress or punish the 
perpetration of crimes by his subordinates, ruled out Bemba´s criminal 
responsibility for such crimes.2301      
 
However, the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng and 
Judge Piotr Hofmański stated that they would have confirmed Bemba´s 
conviction by Trial Chamber III.2302     
 
These two Judges disagreed with the Majority´s conclusions related to the scope 
of the charges and with its analysis if Bemba had failed to take all necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent, repress or punish the perpetration of crimes by 
his subordinates.2303  
 
In accordance with the Dissenting Judges, the description of the facts and 
circumstances inserted in the charges were appropriate from the viewpoint of 
article 74 (2) of the Rome Statute in the circumstances of the case. Hence, the 
Majority should not have regarded that the criminal acts included in the case 
subsequently to the Confirmation Decision were outside the scope of the case.  
 
Additionally, the Majority did not adduce any reason to change the standard of 
appellate review for errors of fact, and, thus, should have applied the usual 
standard (used by the ICTY and ICTR and the own ICC in all its final appeals 
before the Court), which would lead to the confirmation that Bemba failed to take 
all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent, repress or punish the 
perpetration of crimes by his subordinates.2304    
 
The option of the Majority of the Appeals Chamber to use and apply the modified 
standard for appellate review of factual errors entails a contradiction- even though 
the Majority is entitled to review the record itself (instead of relying on the 
assessment of Trial Chamber, as in the typical standard of review), it did not 
assess again all evidence in the record. Therefore, the Majority was relying on 
restricted evidence when it disregarded the Trial Chamber III’s assessment of 
Bemba’s command responsibility, and acquitted him of all charges. This approach 
 
2300 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 79, para. 197 
2301 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 79, para.198  
2302 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng and Judge Piotr Hofmański, 
p. 3, para. 1 
2303 Ibidem 
2304 SáCouto, S. (2018) 
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is unsatisfactory, in particular for crimes of sexual violence (that often demand a 
comprehensive analysis of context in order to gather how this violence is actually 
carried out in the context of conflict or mass violence).2305  
 
The Majority of the Appeals Chamber´s demand that the Pre-Trial Chamber 
confirms all individual acts (even when the accused is given notice of any 
additional acts underlying the charges during the period of time between 
confirmation and the beginning of trial) consists in a higher standard for the 
prosecution of crimes. In accordance with Article 61, paragraph 7 of the Rome 
Statute, the PTC is to confirm the charges when it finds “substantial grounds to 
believe” that the accused perpetrated the alleged crimes. This regular standard 
applied by the ICC is purposefully low and aimed to prevent wrongful and patently 
baseless charges from passing to the trial stage. The further demand could 
prolong the already lengthy process of confirmation (which is contrary to the right 
of the accused “[t]o be tried without undue delay”) and probably would negatively 
affect the cases involving sexual violence crimes because evidence of these 
crimes frequently is brought out tardy in the investigation of atrocity crimes 
(sometimes even in the course of the trial). Moreover, the degree of particularities 
that the Prosecutor can be demanded to include in the charges might toughen 
the prosecution of2306    
 
“future cases entailing extensive campaigns of victimisation, 
especially where the accused is not a direct perpetrator, but a 
commander remote from the scene of the alleged crimes but who 
may bear criminal responsibility as the superior having effective 
control over the perpetrators, his subordinates.”2307    
 
When assessing the “all reasonable and necessary measures” adopted by 
Bemba as the person holding command responsibility in the terms of Article 28 
(a) (ii) of the Rome Statute, the Majority of the Appeals Chamber considered 
neither if such measures were aimed at crimes of  sexual character (bearing in 
mind that the vast majority of the crimes confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
consisted of rapes) nor if they were enough so as to stop or avoid the crimes 
perpetrated by his subordinates. Certainly, the Appeals Chamber did not verify 
the appropriateness or quality of Bemba´s measures.2308  
 
The fact that the proceedings of the case were discontinued in relation to the 
crimes that the Majority understood not to be within the scope of the case and 
that Bemba was acquitted of the remaining crimes meant that the reparations 
proceedings were discontinued. However, the TFV, in its assistance mandate, 





2306 ICC website, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the recent judgment of the 
ICC Appeals Chamber acquitting Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba; Rome Statute, Arts. 61 (7), 67 (c) 
2307 ICC website, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the recent judgment of the 
ICC Appeals Chamber acquitting Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba 
2308 Ibidem; Rome Statute, Art. 28 (a) (ii) 
2309 ICC website, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the recent judgment of the 
ICC Appeals Chamber acquitting Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba 
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“the harms suffered by victims in the Bemba case as well as 
harms suffered from additional sexual and gender-based 
violence arising out of the situation.”2310 
 
As a consequence, it is possible to conclude that: 
 
- The Prosecution should have included the correct mode of liability in the 
charge (command responsibility in terms of Article 28 of the Rome Statute) 
from the beginning. The case would not have gone to the trial stage if the 
PTC III had not adjourned the hearing and requested the Prosecutor to 
consider amending the charges so as to establish that Bemba was 
criminally liable by reason of his superior-subordinate relationship with 
MLC troops;2311 
 
- There is room for improvement in relation to distinct aspects of victims´ 
participation in the Court´s proceedings. Reason assisted Judge Steiner 
when she disagreed of the Majority in relation to the requirements of 
victims´ participation and stated that no further requirements for their 
participation should be imposed; when she affirmed that to allow 7 victims- 
put forward by the 2 legal representatives of over 2000 victims who were 
participating then in the proceedings- to give evidence and present their 
views and concerns would not cause unjustifiable delay in the 
proceedings; when she affirmed that, likewise the 2 victims who were 
granted permission to give evidence on the case were called to appear in 
person in the courtroom, the 3 victims authorised to present their views 
and concerns should have appeared in person instead of been heard via 
video-link technology;   
 
- The Trial Chamber III adequately interpreted the provision of the Rome 
Statute and the Elements of Crimes when it decided that the crime of rape 
was gender neutral and had been widely constructed so as to encompass 
vaginal, anal and oral penetration, hence, allowing the penetration of 
men´s anus and mouth by the attackers´ penises to be tried under the 
head of the crime of rape;    
 
- By solidifying its course of action in relation to the specificities of sexual 
and gender-based crimes (namely, likewise in the Katanga case, 
recognising the impact that the traumatic nature of the circumstances, the 
witnesses´ eventual young age, and the time elapsed between the events 
and the testimony are factors which bear weight on their accounts), the 
ICC seems to be in the right direction in handling the testimonies of 
witnesses victims of sexual and gender-based crimes and assessing their 
importance in the case. In spite of that, the ICC should continue aware of 
the possibility of secondary victimisation due to both the opportunity that 
 
2310 Ibidem 




Defence has to question these victims about their willingness to participate 
in the acts accounted and the underlying pain which may arise when they 
recollect the violence suffered;        
 
- The Majority of the Appeals Chamber should have confirmed the Trial 
Chamber III´s Judgment against Bemba. All the criminal acts should have 
been considered as part of the scope of the charges against the accused 
for there is no founded reason to require each act to be specifically 
confirmed by the PTC, as supported by the Dissenting Judges. As a result, 
the proceedings should not have discontinued in relation to the offences 
introduced in the case after the PTC´s confirmation of charges;  
 
- The Majority should have applied the ICC´s “standard of review for factual 
errors”, that would substantiate that Bemba failed to take all necessary 
and reasonable measures to prevent, repress or punish the perpetration 
of crimes by his subordinates. Consequently, Bemba´s command 
responsibility would be configured and he would not have been acquitted 
of the offences expressly reported in the charges;2312 
 
- The Majority of the Appeals Chamber, when analysing if Bemba had 
adopted “all necessary and reasonable measures” in the terms of Article 
28 (a) (ii) of the Rome Statute, should have paid attention if the measures 
were appropriate taking into account the nature of the crimes, and if they 
were enough so as to stop or avoid the latter;2313  
 
- In spite of the discontinuation of the proceedings and Bemba´s acquittal, 
the TFV correctly launched a programme of assistance mandate in the 
CAR, so as to address not only the harm endured by victims but also the 
damage caused by additional sexual and gender-based violence that 
derived from the situation.2314 
Bemba´s conviction was an important achievement in the combat of sexual and 
gender-based crimes and there was hope that this conviction would be a catalysis 
element for a shift in the culture of sexual and gender-based crimes in the 
international panorama (including the persecution of rape and sexual violence 
perpetrated against men) both in terms of preventing future crimes and facilitating 
their criminal prosecution. Also, the victims felt that their pursuit of justice was 
satisfied and that reparations would arise from the conviction so as to alleviate 
their suffering. Consequently, the incorrect Bemba´s acquittal by the Majority of 
the Appeals Chamber deleteriously tarnished the ICC´s reputation. 
 
 
2312 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng and Judge Piotr Hofmański, 
pp. 11-12, para. 34 
2313 SáCouto, S. (2018) 
2314 ICC website, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the recent judgment of the 
ICC Appeals Chamber acquitting Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba 
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9.2. Recommendations to the International Criminal Court 
concerning sexual and gender-based crimes and its prosecution 
 
In an era in which the tolerance to sexual and gender-based crimes is getting 
lower and lower, as shown, for instance, by the movement #MeToo (that has had 
a global reach due to the social media spread and press coverage, making well-
known the widespread existence of sexual assault and harassment against 
women), the International Criminal Court is in the spotlight.2315   
 
The Court´s next steps regarding the investigation, prosecution and judgment of 
sexual and gender-based crimes are crucial if it wants to affirm itself as a beacon 
against the impunity of this sort of crimes.  
 
It is noteworthy that, on 8 July 2019, Trial Chamber VI rendered judgment in the 
case the Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06). The Chamber found 
the accused guilty on 18 counts, inclusive of being an indirect perpetrator of the 
crimes of rape and sexual slavery, as both war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Likewise the background of the Lubanga and Katanga cases, the 
crimes for which Ntaganda was convicted were perpetrated in the armed conflict 
of a non-international character which occurred in the Ituri region 
between 2002 and 2003.2316 
 
The conviction is another important victory in the fight against impunity of sexual 
and gender-based crimes. Ntaganda was convicted as an indirect perpetrator for 
the crimes of rape and sexual slavery committed by UPC/FPLC soldiers, and 
which encompassed the rape of men and of young persons, successive rape, as 
well as the use of extreme violence and death threats. However, as of 9 July 
2019, the decision on the sentence is pending, and the parties can appeal the 
verdict, meaning that the accused´s conviction is not final and might still be 
overturned by the Appeals Chamber.2317    
 
So that the ICC can steadily establish its decisive position in the prosecution and 
fight against sexual and gender-based crimes in the international law scenario, 
we recommend the following: 
 
- Article 6 of the Rome Statute should be amended and include gender, rape 
or any other form of sexual violence among the basis for the crime of 
genocide; 
 
- The Prosecution and the Victims and Witnesses Unit should have a 
concerted action regarding the protection that should be granted to 
witnesses who were victims of sexual and gender-based crimes; 
 
2315 Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Me_Too_movement  (5 July 2019) 
2316 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06. Trial Chamber IV, 
Judgment, pp. 2-3, paras. 2-3 (8 July 2019); ICC website, Press Release, ICC Trial Chamber VI 
declares Bosco Ntaganda guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity (8 July 2019). 
2317 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06. Trial Chamber IV, 
Judgment, pp. 2-3, paras. 2-3 (8 July 2019); ICC website, Press Release, ICC Trial Chamber VI 





- The charging of sexual and gender-based crimes should be as wide as 
possible, encompassing all forms of gender-based and sexual violence 
suffered by the victims in the concrete case; 
 
- Non-sexual elements that are gender-related should be equally 
considered in the charging of these crimes;  
 
- The Prosecution should verify the correct mode of liability ahead of filing 
the charge before the ICC, and, in case of doubt, include another type of 
liability as an alternative in order to ensure that the case will pass to the 
trial phase; 
 
- The Court should go back to the regular standard regarding the Pre-Trial 
Chamber (the latter should confirm the charges upon finding “substantial 
grounds to believe” that the accused committed the alleged crimes, 
following the established in the Rome Statute) and not to demand each 
criminal act to be specifically confirmed;2318  
 
- The ICC should appropriately handle the participation of victims in the 
proceedings by: 
 
1) not requiring unnecessary, non-legal demands for their participation;  
2) properly assessing which is a reasonable number of victims to give 
evidence and present their views and concerns; 
3) favouring their appearance in person whenever possible. 
By adopting such approach, the ICC will be promoting a satisfactory 
victims´participation which fosters healing, as envisaged by the drafters of 
the Rome Statute.    
  
- When hearing and analysing the testimonies of witnesses who were 
victims of sexual and gender-based violence, the Court should continue to 
take into consideration particularities entwined with these crimes (such as 
the vulnerability of these victims, which can lead them to tell lies in the 
beginning until they feel safe enough to tell share true story, and the fact 
that they may be overcome with emotion and fear due to the traumatic 
character of the events recollected).  Furthermore, the ICC should keep in 
mind that the victims´ eventual young age at the time of the occurrence 
and the time elapsed may lead to unintentional gaps and/or omissions; 
 
- The ICC should continue aware of the possibility of secondary victimisation 
of victims of sexual and gender-based violence and take all available 
measures to avoid it;        
 
 
2318 Rome Statute, Art. 61 (7) 
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- The Court should make use of an extensive interpretation of the 
boundaries of indirect co-perpetration (Article 25 (3)(a) of the Rome 
Statute), so sexual and gender-based crimes are subsumed into this kind 
of criminal responsability;2319 
 
- In verifying if the person holding command responsibility adopted “all 
necessary and reasonable measures” (Article 28 (a) (ii) of the Rome 
Statute), the ICC should analyse if the measures were adequate taking 
into account the character of the crimes, and if they were enough so as to 
halt or prevent the crimes;2320  
 
- The Appeals Chambers should stick to the commonly applied “standard of 
review in relation to factual errors” and establish if “a reasonable trial 
chamber could have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt” in relation 
to the Trial Chamber´s factual findings;2321 
 
- The Court should maintain its policy regarding the reparation and 
compensation towards victims, in general, and victims of sexual and 
gender-based crimes, in particular. 
 
If the International Criminal Court follows this course of action, it will be closer to 
achieve its core objective- that the gravest crimes relevant to the international 
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the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to 
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Durante la historia del siglo XX hubo mejoras progresivas en la lucha contra los 
crímenes sexuales y de género en el derecho internacional.  
 
Esta evolución alcanzó su punto álgido en la promulgación del Estatuto de Roma, 
que creó la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI) y estableció hitos centrales.  
 
El Estatuto fue el primer instrumento del derecho internacional en incorporar una 
amplia lista de crímenes sexuales y de género y considerarlos crímenes de 
guerra en conflictos armados internacionales y no internacionales. Extendió más 
allá del crimen de violación la lista de crímenes sexuales y de género que 
constituyen crímenes contra la humanidad en conflictos armados internacionales 
y no internacionales, para abarcar la esclavitud sexual, la prostitución forzada, el 
embarazo forzado, la esterilización forzada y otras formas de violencia sexual y 
persecución basada en el género. Estableció un valioso progreso en los 
derechos y prerrogativas de las víctimas "lato sensu" y de las víctimas de 
crímenes sexuales y de género "stricto sensu", garantizándoles protección, 
participación y reparación. 
 
El sistema del Estatuto de Roma fue concebido para constituir un paso adelante 
en la erradicación de la impunidad que afecta los crímenes de género. Por lo 
tanto, el Estatuto supuso un avance significativo en la lucha contra los crímenes 
sexuales y de género, desde un punto de vista teórico. 
 
La presente tesis doctoral proporciona una base amplia de los antecedentes de 
la mencionada evolución del manejo de crímenes sexuales y de género. También 
destaca el proceso que conduce a la creación de la Corte Penal Internacional y 
las innovaciones introducidas por el Estatuto de Roma en relación con los 




El historial contextualiza y permite comprender las expectativas detrás del 
funcionamiento de la Corte Penal Internacional relacionadas con la investigación 
y el enjuiciamiento de crímenes sexuales y de género bajo la jurisdicción de la 
Corte. 
 
Ciertamente, se esperaba que la Corte Penal Internacional al cumplir su 
mandato, estaría a la altura de las disposiciones del Estatuto de Roma.1  
 
Se anticipó que la Corte investigara, acusara y enjuiciara eficientemente los 
crímenes sexuales y de género en situaciones de conflicto armado. De hacerlo 
correctamente, la CPI pondría fin a la impunidad de los autores de tales crímenes 
y contribuiría a su prevención.  
 
Sin embargo, el impulso necesario para abordar la violencia de género y sexual 
prevista en el Estatuto de Roma no parece haberse transferido en su totalidad a 
la práctica de la CPI.2 
 
Para determinar eso, el presente trabajo lleva a cabo una revisión jurídica de la 
práctica en la CPI donde los primeros tres casos de la Corte relacionados con 
crímenes sexuales y de género en los que se han dictado sentencias finales (El 
Fiscal v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, el El fiscal v Germain Katanga, el fiscal v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo) han sido analizados. 
 
El examen ha consistido en un estudio en profundidad del enfoque de la Corte 
Penal Internacional respecto de los crímenes sexuales y de género en cada uno 
de los casos. 
 
El objetivo principal de la tesis doctoral es verificar cómo la Corte Penal 
Internacional ha manejado los crímenes sexuales y de género en sus casos. 
 
La tesis también examina la perspectiva de las víctimas al verificar si la CPI 
brinda asistencia adecuada a las víctimas de crímenes sexuales y de género y 
de cual forma.  
 
El trabajo se organiza de la siguiente manera. 
 
El Capítulo 2 aborda la evolución histórica de los crímenes sexuales y de género 
en el escenario del Derecho Penal Internacional, cubriendo los antecedentes, 
desde el juicio de Peter von Hagenbach hasta el juicio por el genocidio de 
Ruanda. 
 
El Capítulo 3 trata sobre el Estatuto de Roma y la Corte Penal Internacional, 
presentando los antecedentes y el proceso de construcción (incluidos los 
esfuerzos de las Naciones Unidas para crear una Corte Penal Internacional y la 
inserción de cuestiones relacionadas con el género en el Estatuto de Roma). 
 
1 Kambale, P. K. (2015). In De Vos, C., Kendall, S., & Stahn, C., (eds.), pp. 171-197 
2 Green, L. (2011), pp. 529–541 
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Este capítulo aborda la la jurisdicción, la admisibilidad, la ley y el procedimiento 
aplicables de la CPI, así como el comienzo de su funcionamiento. 
 
El Capítulo 4 discute los crímenes sexuales y de género en el Estatuto de Roma, 
aclarando la relevancia del Estatuto para estos crímenes y analizando su 
extensión y definición (cubriendo las disposiciones del Estatuto sobre crímenes 
sexuales y de género y los respectivos elementos de los crímenes). 
 
El tema del Capítulo 5 son las víctimas de crímenes sexuales y de género en el 
Estatuto de Roma. Ese capítulo examina varios aspectos, como las innovaciones 
en los derechos otorgados a las víctimas, las disposiciones específicas dirigidas 
a proteger a las víctimas de crímenes sexuales y de género, y la cuestión de 
cómo equilibrar la protección de los derechos de las víctimas y testigos, la 
protección de derechos del acusado y promoción de un juicio imparcial y justo. 
 
En el Capítulo 6, se presenta la situación en la República Democrática del Congo 
y el caso del Fiscal v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo es analizado con énfasis en el 
manejo de los crímenes sexuales y de género, y la restricción de los cargos 
criminales contra Lubanga, lo que llevó a la ausencia de cargos por presuntos 
crímenes sexuales y de género. 
 
El tema del Capítulo 7 es el caso del Fiscal v. Germain Katanga. Después de 
ofrecer un antecedente y una visión general del caso, se examinan los cargos y 
el enjuiciamiento de crímenes sexuales y de género, así como el hecho de que 
la Sala de Primera Instancia II (en contra de lo que entendió la Sala de 
Cuestiones Preliminares I) consideró que el acusado no podría ser 
responsabilizado por estos crímenes. 
 
El Capítulo 8 aborda la situación en la República Centroafricana, y luego discute 
el caso del Fiscal v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, destacando la condena de 
Bemba basada en crímenes sexuales y de género que posteriormente fue 
revocada por la Sala de Apelaciones. Se analiza el impacto de dicho resultado 
para las víctimas y cómo afecta el enjuiciamiento de los crímenes sexuales y de 
género en el escenario del derecho penal internacional. Se verifica la repercusión 
en la credibilidad de la Corte y su papel en la lucha contra la impunidad de los 
autores de crímenes sexuales y de género y en la promoción de un efecto 
disuasorio. 
 
En el debate y las conclusiones, se reúnen los principales hallazgos que ofrecen 
un retrato de la evolución de la Corte Penal Internacional en el manejo de los 
crímenes sexuales y de género. Se enfatizan los pasos correctos adoptados por 
la Corte hasta ahora y se señalan los temas donde hay margen de mejora.  
 
En resumen, en esta tesis se ha establecido el progreso realizado por la CPI y 
se han determinado los desafíos que aún enfrenta en relación con tales 
crímenes.  
 
Al final, con base en las conclusiones tras el análisis de los casos de la Corte 
Penal Internacional, se han hecho recomendaciones que podrán contribuir al 
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enjuiciamiento y castigo efectivo de los crímenes sexuales y de género bajo la 
jurisdicción de la Corte. 
 
Discusión  
Como se ve a lo largo del presente trabajo, el enjuiciamiento de crímenes 
sexuales y de género prácticamente no tenía lugar en el escenario internacional 
hasta el siglo anterior. 
 
Excepto por muy pocas acciones señaladas (específicamente, la condena de 
Peter von Hagenbach de 1474 por violación entre otros crímenes, la prohibición 
de violación del Código Lieber de 1863, y la introducción de la Cláusula Martens 
y el respeto a las "leyes de la humanidad" por la Convención de 1899 (II) con 
respecto a las leyes y costumbres de la guerra en la tierra), los principales 
desarrollos legales en relación con la criminalización y el castigo de los crímenes 
sexuales y de género en el escenario del Derecho Penal Internacional solo 
comenzaron en el siglo XX. Por lo tanto, constituye un tema relativamente nuevo. 
A lo largo del siglo pasado, tales crímenes comenzaron progresivamente a 
ocupar un papel más destacado en el Derecho Penal Internacional. Los 
documentos internacionales promulgados (como los Cuatro Convenios de 
Ginebra del 12 de agosto de 1949 y los Protocolos Adicionales) reflejan el 
aumento de la atención prestada por la Comunidad Internacional a los crímenes 
sexuales y de género, contribuyendo a la protección de las mujeres. 
 
Este proceso condujo a la incorporación de crímenes sexuales y de género entre 
los crímenes sobre los cuales los Tribunales Penales Internacionales "ad hoc" 
tienen jurisdicción. Los estatutos del Tribunal Penal Internacional para la ex 
Yugoslavia (TPIY) y el Tribunal Penal Internacional para Ruanda (TPIR) 
convirtieron el crimen de violación en un crimen contra la humanidad. Además, 
los casos de estos Tribunales fueron de gran importancia para el enjuiciamiento 
de crímenes sexuales y de género en el escenario internacional. Por ejemplo, el 
caso TPIY el Fiscal v. Duško Tadić (que fue el primer juicio internacional por 
crímenes de guerra con cargos de violencia sexual y el primer juicio por violencia 
sexual contra hombres), y el caso TPIR el Fiscal v. Akayesu (que estableció que 
la violación puede constituir genocidio y diferenció este tipo de crimen de 
violencia sexual) fueron hitos en el combate a este tipo de crímenes.3 
 
El establecimiento de la Corte Penal Internacional coronó el proceso en 
evolución de la criminalización internacional de los crímenes sexuales y de 
género. Los redactores del Estatuto de Roma atribuyeron gran importancia a la 
relevancia del género en la comisión de crímenes penales dispuestos en 
Estatuto. Como resultado, el Estatuto de Roma es el primer instrumento del 
derecho internacional que incorpora una amplia lista de crímenes sexuales y de 
 
3 ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4. Chamber I, Judgment, para. 
598 (2 September 1998); ICTY. The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T. Trial 
Chamber, Judgment, pp. 62, 63, 67, paras. 160, 171 (10 December 1998); ICTY website, 
Landmark Cases; United Nations, Security Council. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (1993), Art. 5 (g); United Nations, Security Council. Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 3 (g) 
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género y los considera crímenes de guerra, en el contexto de conflictos armados 
internacionales y no internacionales.4   
 
Además, el Estatuto de Roma amplió la lista de crímenes sexuales y de género 
que constituyen crímenes contra la humanidad, para incluir la esclavitud sexual, 
la prostitución forzada, el embarazo forzado, la esterilización forzada o cualquier 
otra forma de violencia sexual de gravedad comparable y persecución por 
motivos de género. También, la comisión de crímenes sexuales y de género con 
la intención de destruir, total o parcialmente, un grupo nacional, étnico, racial o 
religioso puede constituir actos genocidas.5 
 
Cabe señalar que los redactores del Estatuto de Roma perdieron una 
oportunidad importante de otorgar mayor protección a las víctimas contra los 
crímenes sexuales y de género cuando no incluyeron el género, la violación o 
cualquier otra forma de violencia sexual entre las bases del crimen de genocidio 
en la definición de genocidio prevista en el artículo 6 del Estatuto de Roma. Para 
los fines del enjuiciamiento del genocidio, los crímenes sexuales y de género 
solo pueden considerarse como actos genocidas subsumidos en los actos de 
causar lesión grave a la integridad física o mental de los miembros del grupo; 
someter intencionalmente el grupo a condiciones de existencia que hayan de 
acarrear su destrucción física, total o parcial, y adoptar medidas destinadas a 
impedir nacimientos en el seno del grupo. 
 
Desde un punto de vista amplio, el Estatuto de Roma alargó considerablemente 
la gama de situaciones en las que uno puede ser considerado responsable de 
cometer crímenes sexuales y de género. Tal hecho generó la esperanza de que 
el enjuiciamiento de los casos de la Corte Penal Internacional representaría la 
culminación de la condena de los responsables de la comisión de esos crímenes, 
y que también tuvieran un efecto disuasorio. De hecho, las víctimas y la 
comunidad criminal internacional esperaban que los juicios de la CPI darían 
cuenta de tales crímenes y promoverían la justicia. 
 
La promulgación del Estatuto de Roma trajo protección y asistencia innovadoras 
a las víctimas en general. Además, observadas ciertas condiciones, a las 
víctimas se les permitió participar en todas las etapas del proceso. Los 
redactores del Estatuto de Roma previeron que la Corte ofrecería una respuesta 
restaurativa complementaria a las víctimas en el escenario del Derecho Penal 
Internacional, en el que, tradicionalmente, las víctimas han tenido un papel 
secundario.6 
 
Es notable que en el Estatuto y en sus instrumentos legales relacionados se 
hayan insertado normas específicas (en particular medidas investigativas, 
procesales y probatorias) con el fin de proteger y apoyar específicamente a las 
 
4 ICTR. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4. Chamber I, Judgment, para. 
598 (2 September 1998); International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor. Policy Paper 
on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes (9 June 2014) 
5 International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes (9 June 2014); Estatuto de Roma, Art. 5 (g) (h), 6 
6 International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes (9 June 2014); Estatuto de Roma, Arts. 5 (g) (h), 6, 7 (1) (g), 8 (2) (b) (xxii), and 8 
(2) (e) (vi); Varona Martínez, G. (2012 a) 
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víctimas de crímenes sexuales y de género. El esquema de la Corte Penal 
Internacional buscó promover la justicia procesal para estas víctimas 
especialmente vulnerables (lo que incluye asegurarse de que las víctimas 
reciban un trato justo, respetuoso y digno durante el proceso y tengan acceso a 
las reparaciones) y proporcionarles un papel significativo en el proceso de 
Justicia Penal internacional.7 
 
En vista de las innovaciones introducidas por el Estatuto de Roma, se podría 
sugerir teóricamente que la Justicia Penal Internacional estaría finalmente en 
condiciones de permitir que todas las víctimas, particularmente las víctimas de 
violencia sexual y de género, tengan acceso a los aspectos retributivos, 
restaurativos, prácticos y procesales de la justicia.8   
 
Conclusiones  la luz de los casos de la CPI 
Para determinar si estas expectativas teóricas han sido mantenidas por la 
práctica de la Corte Penal Internacional, analizamos los tres casos de la CPI que 
son relevantes desde la perspectiva de los crímenes sexuales y de género en 
los que la Corte ha dictado sentencias finales, a saber, el Fiscal v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, el Fiscal v. Germain Katanga y el Fiscal v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo. 
 
- Caso el Fiscal v. Lubanga 
En el primer caso, la Fiscalía solo acusó a Lubanga de los crímenes de 
reclutamiento, alistamiento, y uso de niños soldados. Aunque Lubanga 
presuntamente cometió más crímenes, incluyendo violación y esclavitud sexual, 
esos crímenes no figuraban entre los cargos. 
 
Este fue el primer caso de la CPI en ser procesado. Uno de los problemas que 
enfrentaba la Fiscalía era cómo llevar a cabo investigaciones sobre situaciones 
de violencia continua, que conllevaban dificultades logísticas notables. Para 
abordar este desafío, la Oficina adoptó medidas críticas. Decidió disminuir la 
duración y la amplitud de la investigación, y solicitar una orden de arresto contra 
Lubanga después de 18 meses de investigaciones.9 
 
A este respecto, es necesario destacar que la inminente liberación de Lubanga 
(que había estado bajo arresto en la República Democrática del Congo desde 
marzo de 2005) influyó en la decisión del Fiscal de concentrarse en los crímenes 
de reclutamiento, alistamiento y uso de niños menores de 15 años para participar 
activamente en hostilidades.10 
 
 
7 Benhassine, S. (2015), p. 47; Bedont, B., & Martinez, K. H. (1999), pp. 65-85; Moffett, L.  (2014), 
p 3; Wemmers, J.-A. M. (1996), pp. 101-102 
8 Benhassine, S. (2015), pp. 11-12 
9 International Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor. Report on the activities performed 
during the first three years (June 2003 – June 2006), pp. 2, 7 
10 International Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor. Report on the activities performed 
during the first three years (June 2003 – June 2006), pp. 2-3 
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También en esta dirección, la información del Fiscal sobre la investigación 
adicional del 28 de junio de 2006 declaró que no era posible complementar la 
recopilación de pruebas en la medida necesaria para modificar los cargos 
respectando a los plazos establecidos en los artículos 61 (4) y 61 (9) del Estatuto 
de Roma por causa de las posibilidades limitadas de investigar más sobre los 
crímenes presuntamente perpetrados por Lubanga. Se argumentó que la 
modificación de los cargos contribuiría a retrasar aún más el ritmo de los 
procedimientos, causando demoras significativas, lo que estaría en desacuerdo 
con los derechos del acusado a ser juzgado sin demora indebida.11 
 
Estos argumentos demuestran que la decisión del Fiscal de juzgar únicamente 
a Lubanga por los cargos de reclutar y alistar niños menores de quince años en 
el Force Patriotique pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC) y usarlos para participar 
activamente en hostilidades no se basó especialmente en la gravedad de estos 
crímenes, sino más bien sobre qué crímenes los investigadores pudieron 
recopilar rápidamente evidencia para garantizar una orden de arresto contra 
Lubanga.12   
 
La preferencia del Fiscal por un enfoque práctico es bastante clara en lo que 
respecta a la falta de cargos por crímenes sexuales y de género en el caso. No 
incluyó la violencia sexual o la esclavitud sexual en los cargos originales y 
tampoco solicitó su incorporación en las etapas posteriores del proceso. 
Además, objetó su inclusión durante el juicio al afirmar que sería injusto para el 
acusado si fuera condenado por tales motivos.13 
 
Sin embargo, este curso de acción no parece justificable. Seguramente, cuando 
se trata de crímenes sexuales y de género, la Fiscalía podría haber utilizado dos 
enfoques: 
 
1-) el hecho de que miembros de la Union des Patriotes Congolais/ Force 
Patriotique pour la Libération du Congo (UPC / FPLC)- incluidos los niños 
soldados reclutados y alistados que estaban siendo utilizados para participar 
activamente en las hostilidades- cometieron violaciones como forma de 
propagación de la violencia durante el conflicto armado. 
 
Con respecto al uso de la violación como arma de guerra por parte de la UPC / 
FPLC, el Documento que contiene los cargos claramente establece que los niños 
reclutados habían recibido permiso de un comandante para violar a mujeres 
Lendu.14  
 
Por lo tanto, la Fiscalía tenía una fuerte indicación de que los miembros de la 
FPLC, incluidos los niños soldados, perpetraron violaciones contra mujeres 
 
11 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial Chamber 
I, Prosecutor’s Information on Further Investigation, p. 5, paras. 8-9 
12 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial Chamber 
I, Prosecutor’s Information on Further Investigation, p. 4, para. 7; Kambale, P. K. (2015). In De 
Vos, C., Kendall, S., & Stahn, C., (eds.), pp. 171-197 
13 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, p. 24, para. 60 
14 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06.  Pre-Trial Chamber 
I, Document Containing the Charges, Article 61(3) (a), p. 17, para. 55 
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Lendu durante el ataque en Lipri. Resulta que los propios niños víctimas podrían 
haber arrojado una luz (y haber proporcionado pruebas a la Fiscalía durante la 
etapa de investigación) sobre la cuestión para determinar si las UPC / FPLC 
realmente llevaron a cabo violaciones durante el conflicto armado. 
 
Además, el 15 de agosto de 2006, la organización Women’s Initiatives for Gender 
Justice (Iniciativa de Mujeres para Justicia de Género) envió una carta al Fiscal 
y presentó "un informe al Fiscal que detalla los crímenes de género cometidos 
en el este de la RDC", que incluía una lista de 31 víctimas / sobrevivientes de 
actos de violación y esclavitud sexual cometidas por la UPC que estaban 
dispuestas a presentarse. 15 
 
Como resultado, la Fiscalía podría haber determinado tanto con los presuntos 
autores de violaciones (niños que fueron víctimas de reclutamiento, alistamiento 
y uso por parte de la milicia UPC / FPLC) como con presuntas víctimas (mujeres 
entrevistadas en el informe de la Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice) si la 
UPC / FPLC cometió violaciones en el curso de los ataques en la región de Ituri. 
 
2-) la circunstancia de que las niñas soldados fueron víctimas de violencia 
sexual, siendo objeto de violación y esclavitud sexual por la UPC / FPLC. 
 
En lo que respecta al abuso sexual de niñas soldados, es bien sabido que los 
crímenes de reclutar y alistar niños en las fuerzas armadas están relacionados 
con los crímenes de esclavitud sexual.16    
 
En consecuencia, hubo "evidencia sustancial y disponible" de la práctica 
generalizada de los crímenes sexuales y de género en el caso Lubanga.17 
 
A pesar de las alegaciones de la Fiscalía de que no era posible complementar la 
recopilación de pruebas al nivel exigido para enmendar los cargos dentro de los 
plazos del Estatuto, aparentemente la obtención de las pruebas necesarias 
sobre la perpetración de violación por parte de la UPC / FPLC para acusar a 
Lubanga de crímenes sexuales no sería muy trabajosa ni demasiado lenta.18  
 
15 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Pre-Trial Chamber 
I, Request for leave to participate as amicus curiae in the Article 61 Confirmation of Charges 
proceedings, p.16, para. 27; Letter from Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice to the Prosecutor 
Luis Moreno Ocampo (15 August 2006) 
16 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Observations from the Legal Representatives of the Victims in response to the 
documents filed by the Prosecution and the Defence in support of their appeals against the 
Decision of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009, p. 11-12, para. 30; 
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the Decision 
of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009 entitled "Decision giving notice to the parties and participants 
that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 
55(2) of the Regulations of the Cour,  p.23, para. 59 
17 Letter from Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice to the Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo (15 
August 2006) 




La decisión unilateral de la Fiscalía de no perseguir el cargo a Lubanga de 
crímenes sexuales y de género causó el repudio de las víctimas y de gran parte 
de la comunidad internacional involucrada en cuestiones de género.19  
 
A pesar de su postura anterior hacia el tema de la violencia sexual durante todos 
los procedimientos, el Fiscal afirmó que la violencia sexual debería tenerse en 
cuenta a los fines de la sentencia. Tal actitud fue fuertemente desaprobada por 
la Sala de Primera Instancia (SPI) I.20 
 
En opinión de la mayoría de Sala de Primera Instancia I, no se estableció más 
allá de toda duda razonable la conexión entre Lubanga y la violencia sexual en 
el contexto de los cargos. Tal resultado surgió como consecuencia de la 
imprudencia del Fiscal en relación con la violencia sexual en el caso de Lubanga: 
no presentó evidencia sobre este tema durante la audiencia de sentencia y no 
se refirió a la evidencia relevante presentada durante el juicio.21 
 
A pesar de que la violencia sexual tuvo lugar en el contexto de los crímenes por 
los cuales Lubanga fue condenado, como resultado de la falta de demostración 
de un vínculo entre el acusado y violencia sexual, la mayoría entendió que no 
era adecuado responsabilizarle a Lubanga por ella. Por lo tanto, la violencia 
sexual no puede representarse como una circunstancia agravante para los fines 
de la sentencia.22  
 
Sin embargo, en su opinión disidente, la jueza Odio Benito (contrariamente a la 
mayoría de la Sala) defendió que la violencia sexual y el castigo deben 
considerarse circunstancias agravantes en la elaboración de la sentencia contra 
Lubanga porque estos actos causaron daños graves y con frecuencia 
irreparables a las víctimas y sus familias, e incluso afectarán a las generaciones 
futuras.23 
 
Con respecto a la reparación, aunque la Sala de Primera Instancia I había 
estipulado que la indemnización otorgada a título de reparación adequada para 
las víctimas de violencia sexual y de género deberia ser formulada e 
implementada por la Corte, la Sala de Apelaciones revocó dicha decisión. 
Declaró que, una vez que la SPI había determinado que Lubanga no podía ser 
considerado responsable de actos de violencia sexual, la Sala debería haber 
explicado cómo todavía se hacía responsable de las reparaciones en relación 
con el daño causado por la violencia sexual y de género. La Sala no lo hizo. Por 
lo tanto, la Sala de Apelaciones entendió que Lubanga no podía ser considerado 
 
19 Galain Palermo, P. (2014). In Ambos, K., Malarino, E., & Steiner, C. (eds.), pp. 389-430, 
footnote 4 
20 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, p. 24, para. 60 
21 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, p. 28, paras. 75-76 
22 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, pp. 26, 28, paras. 66, 74-75  
23 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Odio Benito in Public Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 
of the Statute, pp. 42-46, 49, 50, paras. 6-9, 13, 19-22 
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responsable de las reparaciones relacionadas con este daño, y modificó la 
Decisión impugnada en este respecto.24 
La Sala de Apelaciones aclaró que su hallazgo sobre la responsabilidad de 
Lubanga por las reparaciones en relación con el daño derivado de la violencia 
sexual y de género no impediría que estas víctimas se beneficiaran de las 
actividades de asistencia realizadas por el Fondo Fiduciario para las Víctimas. 
En consecuencia, la Sala de Apelaciones permitió la inclusión de víctimas que 
sufrieron daños como consecuencia de la violencia sexual y de género en el 
mandato de asistencia del Fondo Fiduciario.25 
Además, el Fondo Fiduciario y la Sala de Primera Instancia determinaron que los 
programas de los primeros deben estar dirigidos a víctimas directas e indirectas 
de los crímenes de los cuales Lubanga ha sido condenado y deben prestar 
atención específica a los resultados específicos de género de los crímenes e 
incluir una formación sensible al género.26 
Por lo tanto, en relación con el caso Lubanga, es posible concluir que: 
- La Fiscalía optó incorrectamente por un enfoque práctico al manejar los 
crímenes denunciados en los cargos en el caso Lubanga, obstruyendo el 
enjuiciamiento de crímenes sexuales y de género; 
- El Fiscal debería haber designado un Asesor Jurídico Especialista en Género 
desde el comienzo de la investigación del caso; 
- La Fiscalía debería haberse verificado tanto con los presuntos autores de 
violaciones (niños que fueron víctimas de reclutamiento, alistamiento y uso por 
parte de la milicia UPC / FPLC) como con presuntas víctimas (mujeres 
entrevistadas en el informe de la Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice) si la 
UPC / FPLC cometió violaciones durante los ataques en la región de Ituri; 
- Al reunir esta evidencia que estaba fácilmente disponible sobre la perpetración 
de violación y esclavitud sexual, el Fiscal debería haber solicitado la inclusión de 
estos crímenes entre los crímenes denunciados en los cargos en una etapa 
posterior del proceso; 
 
24 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, p. 72, para. 207; 
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals against the “Decision establishing the principles and 
procedures to be applied to reparations” of 7 August 2012 with AMENDED order for reparations 
(Annex A) and public annexes 1 and 2, p. 77, para. 198 
25 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals against the “Decision establishing the principles and 
procedures to be applied to reparations” of 7 August 2012 with AMENDED order for reparations 
(Annex A) and public annexes 1 and 2, p. 77, para. 199 
26 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Filing on Reparations and Draft Implementation Plan, p. 34, paras. 68-69; 
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber II, 




- El Fiscal no debería haber objetado la inclusión de los cargos de esclavitud 
sexual y trato inhumano y / o cruel cuando surgió la cuestión de la 
recaracterización de los hechos;27 
- Una vez que el Fiscal defendió que la violencia sexual debería tenerse en 
cuenta a los fines de la sentencia, él debería haber presentado pruebas sobre 
este tema durante la audiencia de sentencia, o referirse a las pruebas pertinentes 
que se habían presentado durante el juicio, para establecer más allá duda 
razonable de la existencia de un vínculo entre el acusado y la violencia sexual, 
en el contexto de los cargos; 
- La Sala de Primera Instancia I, la Sala de Apelaciones y la Fondo Fiduciário 
para las Víctimas fueran conscientes de la necesidad de prestar la debida 
atención a las especificidades de género e incluir a las víctimas que sufrieron 
daños como consecuencia de la violencia sexual y de género en los programas 
realizados bajo el mandato de asistencia del Fondo. 
Este primer caso estuvo permeado por fallas de la Fiscalía en relación con la 
acusación de crímenes sexuales y de género. No es de extrañar que empañara 
la reputación de la CPI y pusiera en juego su capacidad para traducir en acciones 
prácticas las disposiciones de vanguardia victimológica del Estatuto de Roma, 
así como llevar justicia a las víctimas. Además, el caso significó un duro golpe 
para las víctimas y los que abogan por el enjuiciamiento de los crímenes 
sexuales y de género en el escenario penal internacional. 
 
- Caso el Fiscal v. Katanga 
El caso que el Fiscal v. Katanga fue primera vez en la historia de la CPI en el 
que acusados (mientras Germain Katanga todavía estaba siendo procesado 
conjuntamente con Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01 / 04-01 / 07) fueron acusados 
de crímenes sexuales y de género, específicamente, los crímenes de violación y 
esclavitud sexual, como crímenes de guerra y crímenes contra la humanidad. 
Fue una mejora en relación con el caso Lubanga, ya que en este último la 
Fiscalía no presentó cargos de crímenes sexuales y de género. 
En el caso contra Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (que fue separado por la Corte del caso 
contra Katanga), la Sala de Primera Instancia II no tuvo que considerar si los 
crímenes se habían cometido o no porque consideraba que el acusado carecía 
de autoridad y, en consecuencia, lo absolvió de todos los cargos, incluidos los 
crímenes de violación y esclavitud sexual.28 
 
27  ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, p. 24, para. 60; ICC. The Prosecutor 
v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, Prosecution’s Application 
for Leave to Appeal the “Decision giving notice to the parties and participants that the legal 
characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the 
Regulations of the Court", pp. 8-9, paras. 22-23; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. Trial Chamber I, Prosecution's Further Observations Regarding the 
Legal Representatives' Joint Request Made Pursuant to Regulation 55. ICC-01/0401/06-1966 (12 
June 2009). 
28 Opinio Juris website, Sane, J., Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui: reflections on the ICC’s first acquittal,  
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Sin embargo, en el caso contra Germain Katanga, la SPI II analizó si los 
crímenes de violación y esclavitud sexual habían sido perpetrados. Fue la 
primera vez en que la Corte examinó las pruebas presentadas en relación con 
los crímenes de violación y esclavitud sexual para determinar si se habían 
cometido dichos crímenes. 
La SPI II estaba en sintonía con la vulnerabilidad especial de los testigos que 
fueron víctimas de violencia sexual, y la tuvo en cuenta (no solo en la conducción 
de los procedimientos del juicio, sino también al analizar y dar credibilidad a los 
testimonios de esos testigos). Su enfoque estaba orientado a aliviar la dificultad 
que las víctimas encuentran al recordar su terrible experiencia y, por lo tanto, 
evitar la revictimización para el enjuiciamiento de crímenes sexuales y de género. 
La Sala también reconoció que, además del impacto psicológico y físico causado 
por los crímenes sexuales y de género, las víctimas de estos crímenes enfrentan 
otros desafíos, como la estigmatización y la marginación por parte de sus 
comunidades.29     
 
A pesar de dichos progresos, se pueden hacer algunas críticas con respecto a 
la conducción del caso. 
En primer lugar, la falta de un curso de acción unificado entre la Fiscalía y el 
Dependencia de Víctimas y Testigos (DVT) con respecto al tipo de protección 
que debería otorgarse a los testigos que fueron víctimas de crímenes sexuales 
y de género causó demoras en el proceso.30  
Otra crítica es que la acusación de crímenes sexuales y de género en el caso 
fue limitada. Aunque hay mención explícita a la ocurrencia de matrimonio forzado 
y embarazo forzado, el Fiscal decidió acusar la violencia sexual y de género 
sufrida por las víctimas exclusivamente como esclavitud sexual. Las actividades 
específicas de género se presentaron como una forma de prueba de los 
crímenes sexuales en lugar de ser considerada como una prueba separada del 
daño sufrido por las víctimas.31 
 
La elección de la Fiscalía de acusar hechos que equivalían a matrimonio forzado 
y embarazo forzado exclusivamente como esclavitud sexual denota que se dio 
demasiado énfasis a los elementos sexuales del crimen y no se dio suficiente 
relevancia al daño causado por los aspectos no sexuales (como, por ejemplo, 
forzar la maternidad y a cocinar). Otros aspectos graves, como el embarazo 
forzado y el trabajo doméstico obligatorio, se relegaron al segundo plan, y se 
 
29 Oosterveld, V. (2009), pp. 407-430 
30 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Warrant of Arrest for Germain Katanga, p. 6; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-02/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Warrant of arrest Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 7, p. 
6; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecution's Submission of the Document Containing the Charges 
and List of Evidence, 7, p. 5, para. 5 
31 Oosterveld, V. (2009), pp. 407-430; SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy 
Kamara, Santigie Borbor Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T. Trial Chamber II, Jugdement, Separate 
Concurring Opinion of the Hon. Justice Julia Sebutinde Appended to Judgment Pursuant to Rule 
88 (C), p. 580, para. 16 
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presentaron como una forma de prueba de los crímenes sexuales en lugar de 
considerarlo una prueba separada del daño sufrido por las víctimas.32  
 
Hubo críticas con respecto a la conclusión de la Sala de Primera Instancia II de 
que los crímenes de asesinato, ataque contra la población civil, saqueo y 
destrucción eran parte del propósito común de la milicia Ngiti, pero que los 
crímenes de violación y esclavitud sexual no estaban incluidos este propósito 
común. 
 
La SPI II finalmente decidió adoptar este enfoque, a pesar de su afirmación inicial 
de que los actos de violencia sexual durante la operación para destruir a la 
población civil de Bogoro no eran actos aislados, sino que habían sido 
perpetrados con el mismo objetivo y formaban parte objetiva de esa operación. 
Esta primera comprensión estuvo de acuerdo con el entendimiento de la mayoría 
de la Sala de Cuestiones Preliminares (SCP) I de que, en el curso normal de los 
acontecimientos, la implementación del propósito común implicaría en la 
perpetración de los crímenes de violación y esclavitud sexual. Si la SPI II hubiera 
mantenido su conclusión inicial con respecto a la naturaleza de los crímenes de 
violación y esclavitud sexual, estos serían considerados parte del propósito 
común de la milicia Ngiti y, en consecuencia, Katanga tendría responsabilidad 
accesoria por estos crímenes.33 
 
La Sala de Primera Instancia II adoptó una interpretación restrictiva de la 
coautoría indirecta (Artículo 25 (3) (a)), exigiendo pruebas de que el acusado 
indudablemente ideó el crimen, supervisó su preparación en distintos niveles 
jerárquicos y estuvo a cargo de su desempeño y ejecución. Este enfoque 
configura un umbral especialmente alto para el enjuiciamiento de casos 
relacionados con cargos de crímenes sexuales y de género. La violencia sexual, 
incluso en aquellos casos en los que es generalizada, ocurre con frecuencia 
porque se tolera y se permite en lugar de ser expresamente ordenada o 
planificada. 34  
 
Con respecto a las reparaciones a las víctimas, la Sala invitó específicamente al 
Fondo Fiduciario de las Víctimas a tener en cuenta como parte de su mandato 
de asistencia el daño sufrido por los solicitantes (y no solo con respecto a las 
297 personas que fueron admitidas por la Corte como víctimas de los crímenes 
de Katanga) como consecuencia de la violencia de carácter sexual. 35 
 
 
32 Oosterveld, V. (2009), pp. 407-430; SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy 
Kamara, Santigie Borbor Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T. Trial Chamber II, Jugdement, Separate 
Concurring Opinion of the Hon. Justice Julia Sebutinde Appended to Judgment Pursuant to Rule 
88 (C), p. 580, para. 16 
33 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07. Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, pp. 202-206, paras. 567-
569, 580; The ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial 
Chamber II, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, p. 442, para. 1165-1166 
34 ICC website, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the recent judgment of the 
ICC Appeals Chamber acquitting Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba; The ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, Judgment pursuant to article 
74 of the Statute, pp. 542-541, para. 1412 
35 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07.  Trial Chamber II, 
Order for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, p. 119 
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La Sala de Primera Instancia II otorgó reparaciones individuales a las 297 
víctimas en forma de una compensación simbólica de $250 por persona (que 
asciende a USD 74,250), así como cuatro premios colectivos (que combinados 
ascienden a USD 925,750) en forma de asistencia educativa, asistencia para la 
vivienda, actividades generadoras de ingresos y rehabilitación psicológica. 36 
 
La CPI buscó promover y encontrar medios para materializar su mandato de 
justicia restaurativa, proporcionando una compensación monetaria (que, aunque 
simbólica, es concreta, tangible) a cada víctima individualmente, así como 
programas de financiamiento que revertirán en beneficio de las víctimas, 
promoviendo su curación, rehabilitación y reintegración. 
 
El borrador del plan de reparaciones de Fondo Fiduciario esto declaró que era 
"consciente de las posibles dinámicas de género y poder que pueden afectar a 
las víctimas" y que se abordarían cuestiones específicas de género.37 
Como consecuencia, es posible concluir que: 
 
- Debería haber una acción concertada entre la Fiscalía y la Dependencia de 
Víctimas y Testigos con respecto a la protección otorgada a los testigos que 
fueron víctimas de crímenes sexuales y de género, no solo para protegerlos 
adecuadamente sino también para evitar demoras indebidas en los 
procedimientos; 
 
- La acusación de crímenes sexuales y de género debería haber sido más 
amplia;38 
 
- El crimen de matrimonio forzado debería haber sido reconocido y denunciados 
en los cargos de una de las siguientes maneras: 
 
- bajo el encabezado "cualquier otra forma de violencia sexual" (artículos 
7 (1) (g) y 8 (e) (vi) del Estatuto de Roma); 
 
- bajo el encabezado "otros actos inhumanos" (Artículo 7 (1) (k)); 
 
- bajo el encabezado "persecución por motivos de género" (Artículo 7 (1) 
(h)); 
 
- combinando el cargo de esclavitud sexual con el cargo de esclavitud 
(Artículo 7 (1) (c)). 
 
- El crimen de embarazo forzado (artículos 7 (1) (g) y 8 (e) (vi) del Estatuto de 
Roma) debería haber sido expresamente reconocido y denunciado en los cargos 
(en vista de la circunstancia de que el testigo P-132 dio a luz a un niño como 
 
36 ICC website, Press Release, Trust Fund for Victims decides to provide $1 million for the 
reparations awarded to victims in the Katanga case, welcomes earmarked donations of €200,000 
from the Netherlands 
37 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07.  Trial Chamber II, Draft 
implementation plan relevant to Trial Chamber II’s order for reparations of 24 March 2017, p. 35, 
paras. 114-115 
38 Oosterveld, V. (2009), pp. 407-430 
586 
 
resultado de las frecuentes violaciones que sufrió)  de modo a reconocer la 
gravedad de los elementos no sexuales que están relacionados con el género y 
que deben considerarse igualmente en el análisis de la violencia que sufren las 
víctimas;39 
 
- La Sala de Primera Instancia II debería haber adoptado un concepto más 
flexible de los límites de la coautoría indirecta (Artículo 25 (3) (a) del Estatuto) 
para permitir que los crímenes sexuales (que a menudo se cometen porque son 
tolerados y permitidos en lugar de ser expresamente ordenado o planeado) sean 
incluidos en este tipo de responsabilidad; 
 
- TC II debería haber seguido aplicando su enfoque inicial más amplio y 
considerar que (del mismo modo los crímenes de asesinato, ataque contra 
civiles, saqueo y destrucción) los crímenes de violación y esclavitud sexual 
estaban dentro del propósito común de la milicia Ngiti y, por lo tanto, que Katanga 
podría ser considerado responsable de ellos; 
 
- A pesar de los puntos anteriores, el hecho de que Katanga fue acusado de 
violación y esclavitud sexual significó un avance en el enjuiciamiento de 
crímenes sexuales y de género ante la Corte Penal Internacional; 
 
- La Sala de Primera Instancia II manejó adecuadamente la recopilación y el 
análisis de pruebas de violencia sexual y de género al reconocer que sus 
sensibilidades y particularidades intrínsecas deben tenerse en cuenta, evitando 
así la revictimización; 
 
- La Sala tenía razón cuando estableció que el curso de acción del Fondo 
Fiduciario para las Víctimas, en su función de asistencia, debe ser amplio para 
intentar disminuir el sufrimiento causado por actos violentos de naturaleza sexual 
y abarcar la mayor cantidad posible de personas, incluidos los no admitidos como 
víctimas por la Corte por el fin de las reparaciones; 
 
- La CPI demostró su compromiso de efectivamente proporcionar justicia 
restaurativa al otorgar premios monetarios individuales a las víctimas. 
 
- Caso el Fiscal v. Bemba 
En el caso Fiscal v. Bemba, inicialmente Jean‐Pierre Bemba fue acusado de ser 
penalmente responsable, conjuntamente con otra persona o por conducta de 
otras personas, de conformidad con el Artículo 25 (3) (a) del Estatuto de Roma, 
por los crímenes de violación (como crimen contra la humanidad y crimen de 
guerra), tortura (como crimen contra la humanidad y crimen de guerra), 
atentados contra la dignidad personal, en particular trato humillante y degradante 
(como crimen de guerra), asesinato (como crimen contra humanidad y un crimen 
de guerra) y saqueo de una ciudad o lugar (como un crimen de guerra).40 
 
39 Ibidem 
40 ICC.The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08.  Pre-Trial 
Chamber III, Prosecution´s Amended Document Containing the Charges, para. 57, ICC-01/05-
01/04-264-Conf-AnxA (17 October 2008); ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08.  Pre-Trial Chamber III, Decision Adjourning the Hearing pursuant to 




No obstante, la Sala de Cuestiones Preliminares III consideró que había varios 
puntos en el caso que indicaban que la caracterización legal de los hechos del 
caso podría corresponder a una forma diferente de responsabilidad bajo el 
Artículo 28 del Estatuto de Roma, y solicitó al Fiscal que considerase enmendar 
los cargos, en el contexto y dentro de los términos del Artículo 61 (7) (c) (ii) del 
Estatuto de Roma. 41 
 
A pesar de eso, el Fiscal acusó a Bemba de ser penalmente responsable de los 
crímenes mencionados como co-perpetrador/ perpetrador indirecto, en los 
términos del Artículo 25 (3) (a) del Estatuto de Roma, o, como alternativa, como 
un jefe militar o individuo que efectivamente actúa como jefe militar o superior en 
los términos del Artículo 28 (a) o (b) del Estatuto de Roma.42 
 
La Sala de Cuestiones Preliminares II declaró que la responsabilidad penal de 
Bemba en virtud del Artículo 28 del Estatuto solo se examinaría en caso de que 
no hubiera suficientes pruebas estableciendo motivos sustanciales para creer 
que Bemba era penalmente responsable como autor indirecto (dentro de los 
términos del artículo 25 (3) (a) del Estatuto de Roma) por los crímenes 
enumerados en el Documento Modificado que Contiene los Cargos.43 
 
En la misma Decisión, la Sala entendió que no había fundamento para procesar 
a Bemba por los crímenes de asesinato, violación y saqueo como perpetrador 
indirecto en el sentido del Artículo 25 (3) del Estatuto de Roma (se negó a 
confirmar los cargos de tortura y atentados contra la dignidad personal). Por lo 
tanto, rechazó el argumento principal del Fiscal con respecto al tipo de 
responsabilidad penal de Bemba. En vista de ello, se procedió al análisis de la 
responsabilidad penal del acusado en los términos del artículo 28 del Estatuto.44 
 
Con respecto a la participación de las víctimas, hubo una divergencia entre los 
jueces con respecto a la cantidad de víctimas a las que se les debería permitir 
presentar pruebas como testigos o presentar sus puntos de vista y 
preocupaciones en persona, así como los requisitos para tales fines.45 
 
 
41 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08.  Pre-Trial 
Chamber III, Decision Adjourning the Hearing pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute, 
p. 17, paras. 46, 49 
42 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, p. 114, para. 341. ICC-01/05-01/08-424 (15 
June 2009). 
43 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, pp. 114, 115, 139, paras. 341, 342, 402  
44 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, p. 25, 37, 74-75, 139, 185, paras. 72, 108, 
212, 403  
45 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber 
III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the supplemented 
applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the views and 
concerns of victims, p.3 
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La mayoría de la Sala de Primera Instancia III estableció que la presentación de 
pruebas por parte de una víctima individual debe ser "útil" para la Sala de Primera 
Instancia, "hacer una contribución genuina a la determinación de la verdad" o 
"sacar a la luz información sustancial nueva que sea relevante para cuestiones 
que la Sala debe considerar en su evaluación de los cargos ".46 
 
Además, los Representantes Legales de las Víctimas inicialmente presentaron 
una solicitud para que 17 víctimas testificaran y / o presentaran sus opiniones y 
observaciones, pero la SPI III entendió que escuchar a estas 17 víctimas 
aumentaría considerablemente la duración del juicio y podría causar indebido 
retraso, lo que está prohibido por el artículo 67 (l) (c) del Estatuto. En 
consecuencia, instruyó a los Representantes Legales a reducir sus listas a un 
máximo de 8 víctimas en total. A continuación, los Representantes Legales de 
las víctimas recolectaron y presentaron declaraciones escritas de 7 víctimas. No 
obstante, la mayoría de la Sala de Primera Instancia III (la jueza presidente 
disidente) únicamente permitió que 2 víctimas presentaran pruebas en persona 
y otras 3 víctimas presentaran sus opiniones y observaciones a través de 
grabación de vídeo.47  
 
La jueza Steiner se opuso a las decisiones tomadas por la mayoría. En primer 
lugar, ella estaba en contra de que se agregaran los requisitos mencionados 
anteriormente para permitir a las víctimas presentar pruebas. Afirmó que la 
demanda de estos elementos adicionales no tenía base legal, y no debería ser 
parte del umbral para que las víctimas puedan presentar pruebas.48 
 
En segundo lugar, la jueza presidente no pudo estar de acuerdo con el enfoque 
de la mayoría de que permitir 7 víctimas (de un total de 2287 cuya participación 
 
46 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber 
III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the supplemented 
applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the views and 
concerns of victims, pp. 7-8, paras. 13,16 
47 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber 
III, Second order regarding the applications of the legal representatives of victims to present 
evidence and the views and concerns of victims, pp. 6, 7, paras. 11, 12; ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Partly Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the supplemented applications by the legal 
representatives of victims to present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, pp. 3-5, 
paras. 2,9; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial 
Chamber III, Application by the Legal Representative of Victims for leave to call victims to appear 
as witnesses and present their views and concerns to the Chamber, para. 2; ICC. The Prosecutor 
v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Rectificatif à la 
justification relative à "Requête afin d'autorisation de présentation d'éléments de preuves et 
subsidiairement de présentation de vues et préoccupations par les victims”, para. 8; ICC. The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, 
Complément de la requête afin d'autorisation de présentation d'éléments de preuves et 
subsidiairement de présentation de vues et préoccupations par les victimes du 6 décembre 2012; 
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber 
III, Requête de la Représentante légale de victims concernant des informations supplémentaires 
à sa requête du 6 décembre 2011 afin d'autoriser des victimes à témoigner et à faire valoir leurs 
vues et préoccupations devant la Chambre 
48 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber 
III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the supplemented 
applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the views and 
concerns of victims, p. 7, paras. 14-15 
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en el proceso ya había sido autorizada por la Sala de Primera Instancia III) para 
presentar pruebas y presentar sus opiniones y observaciones causaría un 
retraso injustificable en los procedimientos. Especialmente porque los 
Representantes Legales de las víctimas habían reducido su lista de víctimas de 
17 a 7, luego de la solicitud de la SPI III de disminuir el número de víctimas 
propuestas para ser llamadas a un total de 8 víctimas.49   
 
En tercer lugar, la jueza no estuvo de acuerdo con la mayoría en relación con su 
decisión de escuchar a través de la tecnología de grabación de video a las 3 
víctimas que estaban autorizadas a presentar sus opiniones y observaciones. 
Ella hubiera preferido llamar a las víctimas para que se presentaran en 
persona.50 
 
En su Sentencia, la Sala de Primera Instancia III declaró que estaba convencida 
más allá de toda duda razonable que los soldados del MLC perpetraron los 
crímenes de violación (crimen contra la humanidad y crimen de guerra), 
asesinato (crimen contra la humanidad y crimen de guerra) y el saqueo de una 
ciudad o lugar (crimen de guerra) en la República Centroafricana desde el 26 de 
octubre de 2002 hasta el 15 de marzo de 2003.51  
 
Es de destacar que, en relación al crimen de violación, la Sala, recordando la 
disposición de los Elementos de los Crímenes, reafirmó que el concepto de 
invasión insertado en el Estatuto de Roma tenía la intención de ser lo 
suficientemente amplio para reflejar una neutralidad de género. Por lo tanto, tal 
concepto abarca la penetración del mismo sexo y es aplicable a criminales y 
víctimas, independientemente del género de estos. Como consecuencia, por 
primera vez en la historia del Derecho Penal Internacional, la violencia sexual 
perpetrada contra los hombres fue expresamente cargada como violación, en 
lugar de ser procesada como crímenes de tortura o trato cruel (como en el caso 
del TPIY el Fiscal v. Zejnil Delalić et al.) o incluso bajo los encabezados del 
 
49 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber 
III, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on the Decision on the supplemented 
applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the views and 
concerns of victims, pp. 4, 7-10, paras. 3-6, 15-16, 21-22; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Second order regarding the 
applications of the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the views and 
concerns of victims, p. 6, para. 10; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. 
ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Complément de la requête afin d'autorisation de présentation 
d'éléments de preuves et subsidiairement de présentation de vues et préoccupations par les 
victimes du 6 décembre 2012; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-
01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Requête de la Représentante légale de victims concernant des 
informations supplémentaires à sa requête du 6 décembre 2011 afin d'autoriser des victimes à 
témoigner et à faire valoir leurs vues et préoccupations devant la Chambre 
50 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber 
III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, pp. 20-21, para. 28; ICC. The Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber III, Decision on the 
presentation of views and concerns by victims a/0542/08, a/0394/08 and a/0511/07, pp. 5, 6, 8, 
footnote 14, paras. 7, 13(a) 
51 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber 
III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, pp. 49-52, 56-62, 313-316, 319-324, paras. 
87-94, 113-125, 622-630, 639-648 
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crimen de trato humillante y degradante y el crimen de otras formas de agresión 
sexual (como en el caso del TPIY el Fiscal v. Češić).52 
 
La Sala de Primera Instancia III (siguiendo los pasos de la Sala de Primera 
Instancia II en el caso Katanga) parecía estar en sintonía con las especificidades 
de los crímenes sexuales y de género, demostrando estar atentos a las 
características especiales de los testigos que fueron víctimas de violación. La 
Sala reconoció que la naturaleza traumática de las circunstancias que describen 
estos testigos, su eventual corta edad y el tiempo transcurrido entre los eventos 
y el testimonio son factores que tienen peso en sus cuentas y pueden conducir 
a omisiones / brechas o aparentes contradicciones. La SPI III abordó la 
dimensión y el alcance de las omisiones y contradicciones y si dichos elementos 
podrían socavar la credibilidad y confiabilidad del testimonio caso por caso. 
También reconoció la dificultad que los testigos podrían tener para recordar los 
eventos y la violencia que sufrieron y que pueden afectar sus testimonios. 
 
La Sala determinó que estaban presentes los requisitos constitutivos de 
responsabilidad de los jefes militares establecidos en el Artículo 28 (a) del 
Estatuto y, por lo tanto, consideró que Bemba podría ser penalmente 
responsable en virtud de este artículo por los crímenes contra la humanidad de 
asesinato y violación y los crímenes de guerra de asesinato, violación y saqueo 
perpetrados por sus fuerzas a lo largo de la Operación en la República 
Centroafricana en 2002-2003.53 
 
Esta fue la primera condena de la CPI por un crimen sexual y de género. 
Además, el caso Bemba fue su primera condena basada en la responsabilidad 
de los jefes militares.54   
 
En la sentencia, la Sala también determinó que 2 circunstancias agravantes eran 
aplicables a los crímenes de violación, a saber, que se cometió contra víctimas 
especialmente indefensas y que se perpetró con una crueldad significativa. La 
SPI III entendió que la conducta culpable de Bemba fue especialmente grave, y 
que no hubo circunstancias atenuantes en el caso. En consecuencia, Bemba fue 
sentenciado a 18 años de prisión.55 
 
 
52 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber 
III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 53, paras. 99-101; Elements of Crimes of 
the International Criminal Court, Arts. 7(1)(g)-1, para. 1, footnote 15; 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1, footnote 50; 
8(2)(e)(vi)-1, para. 1; ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T. Trial 
Chamber, Judgment, pp. 72-72, paras. 183-185 (10 December 1998); ICTY. The Prosecutor v. 
Zejnil Delalić, et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T. Trial Chamber, Judgment, p. 3, footnote 7, p. 364, para. 
1066 (16 November 1998); TY. The Prosecutor v. Ranko Češić. Third Amended Indictment, 
Counts 7-8, Sexual Assault; Hayes, N. (2016) 
53 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber 
III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, p. 359, para. 742 
54 The Guardian (2018). Jean-Pierre Bemba 's war crimes conviction overturned. In the 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Pre-Trial Chamber, Annex 
E to the Mr. Bemba’s claim for compensation and damages (19 March 2019)                                                                
55 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. Trial Chamber 
III, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, pp. 43, 44, 45, para. 91, 93, 94 (21 
June 2016)                                                                       
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Sin embargo, el veredicto y la sentencia de la Sala de Primera Instancia III fueron 
objeto de apelaciones y, por mayoría, la Sala de Apelaciones decidió revocar la 
Sentencia de la Sala de Primera Instancia III. 56 
 
En cuanto a los méritos, la mayoría de la Sala de Apelaciones declaró que 
algunos de los crímenes no estaban dentro de los hechos y circunstancias 
descritos en los cargos y que la Sala de Primera Instancia III, por lo tanto, no 
podía emitir un veredicto sobre ellos. Consideró que solo los actos criminales 
individuales que aparecieron en el Documento Modificado que Contiene los 
Cargos y que fueron confirmados en la Decisión de Confirmación estaban dentro 
del alcance de este caso. Dictó que la Fiscalía debería haber procedido a una 
nueva enmienda de los cargos para incluir los actos criminales agregados 
después de la Decisión de Confirmación del caso. En consecuencia, Bemba no 
pudo ser declarado culpable de estos actos criminales posteriormente 
añadidos.57 
 
Además, la mayoría adoptó una serie de modificaciones al estándar de revisión 
de apelaciones por errores de hecho. Decidió desviarse del estándar de revisión 
"regular" en relación con los errores de hecho (que consiste en establecer si una 
sala de primera instancia razonable podría haberse satisfecho más allá de toda 
duda razonable en relación con el hallazgo en juego) y entendió en su lugar que 
cuando la Sala de Apelaciones pueda identificar hallazgos que razonablemente 
pueden ponerse en duda, debe revertirlos para evitar un error judicial.58 
 
Aunque la aplicación de esta norma implica un menor grado de deferencia a la 
Sala de Primera Instancia, la mayoría de la Sala de Apelaciones declaró que 
"[cuando] se alegue un error de hecho, la Sala de Apelaciones no evaluará las 
pruebas de novo".59   
 
La mayoría de la Sala de Apelaciones determinó que la Sala de Primera Instancia 
incurrió en errores que afectaron materialmente su conclusión sobre la falla de 
Bemba de tomar todas las medidas necesarias y razonables en respuesta a los 
crímenes del MLC en la República Centroafricana. En ausencia de uno de los 
elementos de responsabilidad de jefe militar según el Artículo 28 (a) del Estatuto, 
Bemba no podría ser considerado penalmente responsable de conformidad con 
 
56 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p.4, para. 1; ICC. Media Advisory, Bemba case: 
Appeals Chamber to issue appeals judgments on verdict and sentence on 8 June 2018 (18 May 
2018)  
57 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, pp. 4, 39, 41-42, paras. 2, 111-112, 115, 116 
58 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p.15, paras. 44-46; ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng and Judge Piotr Hofmański, p. 4, para. 4 
59 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 14, para. 42; SáCouto, S. (2018) 
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dicho artículo por los crímenes perpetrados por las tropas del MLC en el 
transcurso de la Operación en la República Centroafricana en 2002-2003.60 
 
En estas circunstancias, mayoría de la Sala de Apelaciones declaró que los actos 
delictivos que no fueron confirmados en la Decisión de Confirmación estaban 
fuera del alcance del caso y los procedimientos relacionados con los mismos 
fueron descontinuados.61   
 
En lo que respecta a los actos criminales restantes de los cuales Bemba fue 
declarado culpable, la mayoría de los miembros de la Sala revocó la condena de 
Bemba y lo absolvió. La mayoría consideró que los errores identificados en los 
hallazgos de la Sala de Primera Instancia III, relacionados con las medidas 
necesarias y razonables para prevenir, reprimir o sancionar la perpetración de 
crímenes por parte de sus subordinados, descartaron la responsabilidad penal 
de Bemba por tales crímenes.62      
 
Sin embargo, en su opinión disidente, el juez Sanji Mmasenono Monageng y el 
juez Piotr Hofmański declararon que habrían confirmado la condena de Bemba 
por la Sala de Primera Instancia III.63     
 
Estos dos jueces no estuvieron de acuerdo con las conclusiones de la mayoría 
relacionadas con el alcance de los cargos y con su análisis si Bemba había 
fallado en tomar todas las medidas necesarias y razonables para prevenir, 
reprimir o castigar la perpetración de crímenes por parte de sus subordinados.64 
 
De acuerdo con los jueces disidentes, la descripción de los hechos y 
circunstancias insertadas en los cargos fue apropiada desde el punto de vista 
del artículo 74 (2) del Estatuto de Roma en las circunstancias del caso. Por lo 
tanto, la mayoría no debería haber considerado que los actos criminales incluidos 
en el caso posteriormente a la Decisión de Confirmación estaban fuera del 
alcance del caso. 
 
Además, la mayoría no alegó ninguna razón para cambiar el estándar de revisión 
de apelaciones de errores de hecho, y, por lo tanto, debería haber aplicado el 
estándar habitual (utilizado por el TPIY y el TPIR y la propia CPI en todas sus 
apelaciones finales ante la Corte), lo que llevaría a la confirmación de que Bemba 
“[n]o hubiere adoptado todas las medidas necesarias y razonables a su alcance 
para prevenir o reprimir” la comisión de los crímenes asesinato, violación y 
 
60 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 79, para. 194 
61 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 79, para. 197 
62 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s 
“Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, p. 79, para.198  
63 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals 
Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng and Judge Piotr Hofmański, 




saqueo “o para poner el asunto en conocimiento de las autoridades competentes 
a los efectos de su investigación y enjuiciamiento.”65 
 
La opción de la mayoría de la Sala de Apelaciones de usar y aplicar un estándar 
modificado para la revisión de apelaciones de errores de hecho conlleva una 
contradicción. A pesar de que la mayoría tiene derecho a revisar el registro en sí 
(en lugar de confiar en la evaluación de la Sala de Primera Instancia, como en el 
estándar típico de revisión), no evaluó nuevamente todas las pruebas en el 
registro. Por lo tanto, la mayoría se basó en evidencia restringida cuando ignoró 
la evaluación de la Sala de Primera Instancia III de la responsabilidad de jefe 
militar de Bemba y lo absolvió de todos los cargos. Este enfoque es 
insatisfactorio, en particular para los crímenes de violencia sexual (que a menudo 
exigen un análisis exhaustivo del contexto para recopilar cómo se lleva a cabo 
esta violencia en el contexto de conflicto o violencia masiva).66 
 
La demanda de la mayoría de la Sala de Apelaciones de que la Sala de 
Cuestiones Preliminares confirme todos los actos individuales (incluso cuando el 
acusado recibe notificación de cualquier acto adicional subyacente a los cargos 
durante el período de tiempo entre la confirmación y el comienzo del juicio) 
consiste en umbral más alto de exigencia para la persecución de los crímenes. 
De acuerdo con el estándar regular aplicado por la CPI, la SCP debe confirmar 
los cargos cuando encuentra "motivos sustanciales para creer" que el acusado 
cometió los presuntos crímenes. Este nivel de exigencia es intencionalmente 
bajo y tiene como objetivo evitar que cargos ilícitos y sin fundamento pasen a la 
etapa de juicio. La demanda adicional podría prolongar el ya largo proceso de 
confirmación (que es contrario al derecho del acusado a ser juzgado sin demora 
por la Corte) y probablemente afectaría negativamente los casos que involucran 
crímenes de violencia sexual porque la evidencia de estos crímenes con 
frecuencia se presenta tardíamente en la investigación (a veces incluso en el 
curso del juicio). Además, el nivel de detalle que se le puede exigir al Fiscal que 
incluya en los cargos podría endurecer la acusación en futuros casos que 
involucren amplias campañas de victimización, particularmente cuando la 
persona acusada es un comandante lejos de la escena de los supuestos 
crímenes, pero quién puede ser considerado penalmente responsable de ser el 
superior con control efectivo sobre los perpetradores directos, sus 
subordinados.67    
 
Al evaluar "todas las medidas razonables y necesarias" adoptadas por Bemba 
como la persona que tiene la responsabilidad de jefe militar en los términos del 
Artículo 28 (a) (ii) del Estatuto de Roma, la mayoría de la Sala de Apelaciones 
no consideró si tales medidas estaban destinadas a crímenes de carácter sexual 
(teniendo en cuenta que la gran mayoría de los crímenes confirmados por la Sala 
de Cuestiones Preliminares consistieron en violaciones) ni si fueron suficientes 
para prevenir o reprimir los crímenes perpetrados por sus subordinados. 
 
65 SáCouto, S. (2018), Estatuto de Roma, Art. 28 (a) (ii) 
66 Ibidem 
67 ICC website, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the recent judgment of the ICC 
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Ciertamente, la Sala de Apelaciones no verificó la adecuación o calidad de las 
medidas de Bemba.68  
 
El hecho de que los procedimientos del caso se interrumpieran en relación con 
los crímenes que la mayoría entendío que no estaban dentro del alcance del 
caso y que Bemba fuera absuelto de los crímenes restantes significó que los 
procedimientos de reparación se suspendieron. Sin embargo, el Fondo 
Fiduciario, en su mandato de asistencia, lanzó un programa de mandato de 
asistencia en la República Centroafricana, que tiene en cuenta tanto el daño 
sufrido por las víctimas en el caso como el daño originado por la violencia sexual 
y de género adicional que surgió de la situación.69  
 
Como consecuencia, es posible concluir que: 
 
- La Fiscalía debería haber incluido el tipo correcto de responsabilidad en el 
cargo (responsabilidad de jefe militar en los términos del Artículo 28 (a) del 
Estatuto de Roma) desde el principio. El caso no habría pasado a la etapa de 
juicio si la Sala de Cuestiones Preliminares III no hubiera aplazado la audiencia 
y pedido al Fiscal que considerara enmendar los cargos para establecer que 
Bemba era penalmente responsable por su relación superior-subordinada con 
las tropas del MLC;70 
 
- Hay margen de mejora en relación con distintos aspectos de la participación de 
las víctimas en los procedimientos de la Corte. La razón asistió a la jueza Steiner 
cuando ella no estaba de acuerdo con la mayoría en relación con los requisitos 
de participación de las víctimas y declaró que no deberían imponerse requisitos 
adicionales para su participación; cuando afirmó que permitir que 7 víctimas (de 
entre la más de 2000 víctimas que participaban en el proceso) presentaran 
pruebas y presentaran sus opiniones y observaciones no causaría una demora 
injustificable en los procedimientos; cuando afirmó que las 3 víctimas autorizadas 
para presentar sus opiniones y observaciones deberían haber aparecido en 
persona en lugar de ser escuchadas por tecnología de grabación de video; 
 
- La Sala de Primera Instancia III interpretó adecuadamente las disposiciones del 
Estatuto de Roma y de los Elementos de los Crímenes cuando decidió que el 
crimen de violación era de “gender-neutral” y había sido ampliamente construido 
para abarcar la penetración vaginal, anal y oral, permitiendo así la penetración. 
del ano y la boca de los hombres por los penes de los criminales, de manera que 
tales actos puedan ser juzgados bajo la cabeza del crimen de violación; 
 
- Al solidificar su curso de acción en relación con las especificidades de los 
crímenes sexuales y de género (reconociendo el impacto que la naturaleza 
traumática de las circunstancias y que la eventual edad de los testigos y el tiempo 
transcurrido entre los eventos y el testimonio son factores que tienen peso en 
sus testimonios), la CPI parece estar en la dirección correcta al manejar los 








eso, la CPI debe seguir consciente de la posibilidad de una victimización 
secundaria debido tanto a la oportunidad que Defensa tiene de cuestionar a 
estas víctimas sobre su disposición a participar en los actos como sobre el dolor 
subyacente que puede surgir cuando recuerdan la violencia sufrida; 
 
- La mayoría de la Sala de Apelaciones debería haber confirmado la Sentencia 
de la Sala de Primera Instancia III contra Bemba. Todos los actos criminales 
deberían haberse considerado como parte del alcance de los cargos contra el 
acusado porque no hay razón fundada para exigir que cada acto sea confirmado 
específicamente por la Sala de Cuestiones Preliminares, como lo respaldan los 
jueces disidentes. Como resultado, el proceso no debería haberse interrumpido 
en relación con los crímenes introducidos en el caso después de la confirmación 
de los cargos por parte de la SCP; 
 
- La mayoría debería haber aplicado el habitual “estándar de revisión para 
errores de hecho” de la CPI, lo que confirmaría que Bemba no tomó todas las 
medidas necesarias y razonables para prevenir, reprimir o castigar la 
perpetración de crímenes por parte de sus subordinados. En consecuencia, la 
responsabilidad de jefe militar de Bemba estaría configurada y él no habría sido  
absuelto de los crímenes expresamente denunciados en los cargos; 
 
- La mayoría de la Sala de Apelaciones, al analizar si Bemba había adoptado 
"todas las medidas necesarias y razonables" en los términos del Artículo 28 (a) 
(ii) del Estatuto de Roma, debería haber prestado atención si las medidas eran 
apropiadas teniendo en cuenta la naturaleza de los crímenes y si fueron 
suficientes para detenerlos o evitarlos;71  
 
- A pesar de la interrupción de los procedimientos y la absolución de Bemba, el 
Fondo Fiduciario para las Víctimas lanzó correctamente un programa de 
mandato de asistencia en República Centroafricana, para abordar no solo el 
daño sufrido por las víctimas sino también el daño causado por la violencia 
sexual y de género adicional derivada de la situación. 72 
 
La condena de Bemba fue un logro importante en el combate de los crímenes 
sexuales y de género y se esperaba que esta condena fuera un elemento de 
catálisis para un cambio en la cultura de los crímenes sexuales y de género en 
el panorama internacional (incluyendo la persecución por violación y violencia 
sexual perpetrada contra hombres) tanto en términos de prevención de crímenes 
futuros como de facilitar su enjuiciamiento penal. Además, las víctimas sintieron 
que su búsqueda de justicia estaba satisfecha y que las reparaciones surgirían 
de la condena para aliviar su sufrimiento. En consecuencia, la absolución 
incorrecta de Bemba por parte de la mayoría de la Sala de Apelaciones empañó 
de manera nociva la reputación de la CPI. 
 
 
71 SáCouto, S. (2018) 
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Appeals Chamber acquitting Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba 
596 
 
Recomendaciones a la Corte Penal Internacional sobre crímenes sexuales 
y de género y su enjuiciamiento 
En una era en la que la tolerancia a los crímenes sexuales y de género es cada 
vez menor, como lo demuestra, por ejemplo, el movimiento #MeToo (que ha 
tenido un alcance mundial debido a la difusión en las redes sociales y la 
cobertura de la prensa, lo que está bien -conocida la existencia generalizada de 
asalto sexual y acoso contra las mujeres), la Corte Penal Internacional está en 
el centro de las atenciones.73   
 
Los próximos pasos de la Corte con respecto a la investigación, el enjuiciamiento 
y el juicio de crímenes sexuales y de género son cruciales si quiere afirmarse 
como un faro contra la impunidad de este tipo de crímenes. 
 
Cabe destacar que, el 8 de julio de 2019, la Sala de Primera Instancia VI dictó 
sentencia en el caso el Fiscal v. Bosco Ntaganda (ICC-01 / 04-02 / 06). La Sala 
encontró al acusado culpable por 18 cargos, incluido ser autor indirecto de los 
crímenes de violación y esclavitud sexual, como crímenes de guerra y crímenes 
contra la humanidad. Asi como los antecedentes de los casos de Lubanga y 
Katanga, los crímenes por los cuales Ntaganda fue condenado fueron 
perpetrados en el conflicto armado de carácter no internacional que ocurrió en la 
región de Ituri entre 2002 y 2003.74 
 
La condena es otra victoria importante en la lucha contra la impunidad de los 
crímenes sexuales y de género. Ntaganda fue condenado como autor indirecto 
por los crímenes de violación y esclavitud sexual cometidos por soldados de la 
UPC / FPLC, y que abarcaban la violación de hombres y jóvenes, violaciones 
sucesivas, así como el uso de violencia extrema y amenazas de muerte. Sin 
embargo, en la fecha del 9 de julio de 2019, la decisión sobre la sentencia está 
pendiente, y las partes pueden apelar el veredicto, lo que significa que la 
condena del acusado no es definitiva y aún puede ser revocada por la Sala de 
Apelaciones.75 
 
Para que la CPI pueda establecer firmemente su posición decisiva en el 
enjuiciamiento y la lucha contra los crímenes sexuales y de género en el 
escenario del derecho internacional, recomendamos lo siguiente: 
 
- El artículo 6 del Estatuto de Roma debería modificarse e incluir género, 
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- La Fiscalía y la Dependencia de Víctimas y Testigos deberían tener una acción 
concertada con respecto a la protección que debería otorgarse a los testigos que 
fueron víctimas de crímenes sexuales y de género; 
 
- La acusación de crímenes sexuales y de género debe ser lo más amplia 
posible, abarcando todas las formas de violencia sexual y de género sufrida por 
las víctimas en el caso concreto; 
 
- Los elementos no sexuales relacionados con el género deben considerarse 
igualmente en la acusación de estos crímenes; 
 
- La Fiscalía debe verificar el modo correcto de responsabilidad antes de 
presentar el cargo ante la CPI y, en caso de duda, incluir otro tipo de 
responsabilidad como alternativa para garantizar que el caso pase a la fase de 
juicio; 
 
- La Corte debe volver a su norma habitual con respecto a la Sala de Cuestiones 
Preliminares (esta última debe confirmar los cargos al encontrar "motivos 
sustanciales para creer" que el acusado cometió los presuntos crímenes, 
siguiendo lo preconizado en el Estatuto de Roma) y no exigir que se confirme 
específicamente cada acto criminal; 
 
- La CPI debe manejar adecuadamente la participación de las víctimas en los 
procedimientos y: 
 
1) no añadir demandas innecesarias e ilegales para su participación; 
 
2) evaluar adecuadamente cuál es un número razonable de víctimas para dar 
evidencia y presentar sus opiniones y observaciones; 
 
3) favorecer su aparición en persona siempre que sea posible. 
 
Al adoptar dicho enfoque, la CPI promoverá una participación satisfactoria de las 
víctimas y que fomente la curación, según lo previsto por los redactores del 
Estatuto de Roma. 
 
- Al escuchar y analizar los testimonios de testigos que fueron víctimas de 
violencia sexual y de género, la Corte debe seguir teniendo en cuenta las 
particularidades relacionadas con estos crímenes (como la vulnerabilidad de 
estas víctimas, que puede llevar a decir mentiras en el comienzo hasta que se 
sientan lo suficientemente seguras para contar su verdadera historia, y el hecho 
de que pueden ser superados por la emoción y el miedo debido al carácter 
traumático de los eventos que se recuerdan), así como también la eventual 
juventud de las víctimas en el momento ocurrencia y el tiempo transcurrido 
pueden conducir a lagunas y / u omisiones involuntarias; 
 
- La CPI debe seguir consciente de la posibilidad de revictimización de las 





- La Corte debería adoptar una interpretación amplia de los límites de la co-
perpetración indirecta (Artículo 25 (3) (a) del Estatuto de Roma), que abarque los 
crímenes sexuales y de género en este tipo de responsabilidad penal;76 
 
- Al verificar si la persona que tiene la responsabilidad de jefe militar tomó "todas 
las medidas necesarias y razonables" (Artículo 28 (a) (ii) del Estatuto de Roma), 
la CPI debe analizar si las medidas fueron adecuadas teniendo en cuenta el 
carácter de los crímenes, y si fueran suficientes para detener o prevenir los 
crímenes;77 
 
- Las Salas de Apelaciones deben atenerse al estándar comúnmente aplicado 
de revisión de apelaciones de errores de hecho y establecer si "una Sala de 
Primera Instancia razonable podría haberse satisfecho más allá de toda duda 
razonable" en relación con las conclusiones de hecho de la Sala de Primera 
Instancia;78 
 
- La Corte debe mantener su política con respecto a la reparación y 
compensación a las víctimas, en general, y a las víctimas de crímenes sexuales 
y de género, en particular. 
 
Si la Corte Penal Internacional sigue este curso de acción, estará más cerca de 
lograr su objetivo central: que los crímenes más graves para la comunidad 
internacional no queden impunes y que su enjuiciamiento efectivo esté 
asegurado.79 
 




2. Evolución histórica de los crímenes sexuales y de género en el escenario 
del Derecho Penal Internacional 
 
2.1. Antecedentes: desde el juicio de Peter von Hagenbach hasta el juicio 
del genocidio de Ruanda 
2.1.1. Juicio de Peter von Hagenbach en Breisach, 1474 
2.1.2. Código Lieber, 1863 
2.1.3. Convención (II) con respecto a las leyes y costumbres de la 
guerra terrestre y su anexo: Reglamento relativo a las leyes y 
costumbres de la guerra terrestre (La Haya, 29 de julio de 1899) y la 
 
76 The ICC. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07. Trial Chamber II, 
Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, pp. 542-541, para. 1412  
77 SáCouto, S. (2018) 
78 ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06. The Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of the Prosecutor and Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the 
“Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute”, p. 13, para. 27; ICC. The Prosecutor 
v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08. The Appeals Chamber, Judgment on 
the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute”, p.13, para. 38 
79 Estatuto de Roma, Preambulo  
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Convención (IV) sobre las leyes y costumbres de la Guerra Terrestre 
y su anexo: Reglamento sobre las leyes y costumbres de la guerra 
terrestre (La Haya, 18 de octubre de 1907): la Cláusula Martens y el 
principio de humanidad 
2.1.4. La Conferencia Preliminar de Paz de París 
2.1.5. El Tratado de Versalles (28 de junio de 1919) 
2.1.6.  Estatuto del Tribunal Militar Internacional anexo al Acuerdo 
de Londres (Londres, 8 de agosto de 1945), Ley del Consejo de 
Control Aliado No. 10 Castigo de Personas Culpables de Crímenes 
de Guerra, Crímenes contra la Paz y Contra la Humanidad (20 de 
diciembre de 1945) y el Estatuto del Tribunal Militar Internacional 
para el Lejano Oriente (Tokio, 19 de enero de 1946) 
2.1.7. El Juicio de Nuremberg 
2.1.8. Juicio del general Tomoyuki Yamashita por la Comisión Militar 
de los Estados Unidos, 8 de octubre a 7 de diciembre de 1945 
2.1.9.  El Tribunal Militar Internacional para el Lejano Oriente 
(Tribunal de Tokio) 
2.1.9.i. Juicio del ministro de Asuntos Exteriores Koki Hirota, el 
General Iwane Matsui y el Almirante Soemu Toyoda 
2.1.10. Juicio de Takashi Sakai por el Tribunal Militar de Crímenes 
de Guerra Chino del Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 29 de agosto 
de 1946 
2.1.11. Afirmación y formulación de los Principios de Derecho 
Internacional reconocidos en la Estatuto del Tribunal de Nuremberg 
y en la Sentencia del Tribunal 
2.1.12. Tribunal Militar de Batavia, 1948 
2.1.13. Convención para la Prevención y el Castigo del Crimen de 
Genocidio, 9 de diciembre de 1948. 
2.1.14. Los cuatro Convenios de Ginebra del 12 de agosto de 1949; 
Protocolo Adicional a los Convenios de Ginebra del 12 de agosto de 
1949, y relativo a la Protección de las Víctimas de los Conflictos 
Armados Internacionales (Protocolo I) (8 de junio de 1977); Protocolo 
Adicional a los Convenios de Ginebra del 12 de agosto de 1949, y 
relativo a la Protección de las Víctimas de Conflictos Armados No 
Internacionales (Protocolo II) (8 de junio de 1977) 
2.1.15. Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, Declaración 
sobre la Protección de las Mujeres y los Niños en Situaciones de 
Emergencia y Conflictos Armados, Resolución 3318 (XXIX) de 14 de 
diciembre de 1974 
2.1.16. Estatuto del Tribunal Penal Internacional para la ex 
Yugoslavia, 25 de mayo de 1993, y el Tribunal Penal Internacional 
para la ex Yugoslavia 
2.1.16.i. Caso el Fiscal v. Duško Tadić también conocido como 
"Dule" (IT-94-1), relacionado con crímenes cometidos en 
"Prijedor" 
2.1.16.ii. Caso el Fiscal c. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mucić también 
conocido como "Pavo", Hazim Delić y Esad Landžo también 
conocido como "Zenga", (IT-96-21), en relación con los crímenes 
perpetrados en el "Campamento Čelebići" ( IT-96-21) 
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2.1.16.iii. Caso el Fiscal v. Anto Furundžija (IT-95-17 / 1) sobre 
los crímenes cometidos en el Valle de Lašva  
2.1.16.iv. Caso del Fiscal v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač 
y Zoran Vuković (IT-96-23 y 23/1) sobre los crímenes 
perpetrados en Foča 
2.1.16.v. Caso el Fiscal v. Radislav Krstić (IT-98-33) relacionado 
con los crímenes cometidos en Srebrenica 
2.1.17. Otros instrumentos que protegen a las mujeres 
2.1.18. Estatuto del Tribunal Penal Internacional para Ruanda, 8 de 
noviembre de 1994, y el Tribunal Penal Internacional para Ruanda 
2.1.19. Conclusión 
 
3. El Estatuto de Roma y la Corte Penal Internacional 
 
3.1. Antecedentes y proceso de construcción de la Corte Penal 
Internacional 
3.1.1. El tribunal "ad hoc" de Breisach, 1474 
3.1.2. La Convención de la Cruz Roja de Ginebra, 22 de agosto de 
1864. 
3.1.3. Convención para la Solución Pacífica de Controversias 
Internacionales (Primera Haya, I), 29 de julio de 1899, y Convención 
Relativa al Establecimiento de un Tribunal Internacional de Presas 
(Segunda Haya, XII), 18 de octubre de 1907 
3.1.4. Tratado de paz con Alemania (Tratado de Versalles), 28 de 
junio de 1919 
3.1.5. Los Convenios de Ginebra para la Prevención y el Castigo del 
Terrorismo y para la Creación de una Corte Penal Internacional, 16 
de noviembre de 1937 
3.1.6. El Tribunal Militar Internacional de Nuremberg y el Tribunal 
Militar Internacional para el Lejano Oriente 
 
3.2. Los esfuerzos de las Naciones Unidas para crear una Corte Penal 
Internacional 
 
3.3. La inclusión de cuestiones relacionadas con el género en el Estatuto 
de Roma 
3.3.1 Introducción 
3.3.2. Las discusiones sobre la inclusión del término "género” 
 
3.4. La Corte Penal Internacional 
3.4.1. Estatus, características y poderes inherentes 
3.4.2. Jurisdicción, admisibilidad y ley aplicable 
3.4.2.(I). Fundamentos de la jurisdicción de la Corte Penal 
Internacional 
3.4.2.(II). Jurisdicción personal ("ratione personae") 
3.4.2.(III). Jurisdicción material 
3.4.2.(IV). Jurisdicción territorial ("ratione loci") 
3.4.2.(V). Jurisdicción temporal ("ratione temporis") 
3.4.2.(VI). Admisibilidad 
3.4.2.(VII). Ley aplicable 
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3.4.3. Estructura y organización 
3.4.3.(i). Sector judicial 
3.4.3.(ii). Sector fiscal 
3.4.3.(iii). Sector administrativo 
3.4.4 Investigación y procedimiento 
3.4.4.(i). El procedimiento de la Corte Penal Internacional 
3.4.4.(i).(a). Etapa de examen preliminar 
3.4.4.(i).(b). Etapa previa al juicio 
3.4.4.(i).(c). Etapa de prueba 
3.4.4.(i).(d). Etapa de apelación 
 
3.5. La entrada en vigor del Estatuto de Roma 
 
3.6. El comienzo del funcionamiento de la Corte Penal Internacional 
 
3.7. Exámenes preliminares, situaciones y casos en curso 
 
 
4. Crímenes sexuales y de género en el Estatuto de Roma 
 
4.1. La relevancia del Estatuto de Roma para los crímenes sexuales y 
de género 
 
4.2. El alcance de los crímenes sexuales y de género según el Estatuto 
de Roma 
4.2.1 Artículo 6- Genocidio 
4.2.2 Artículo 7- Crímenes contra la humanidad 
4.2.3 Artículo 8. Crímenes de guerra 
 
4.3. Definición de crímenes sexuales y de género: análisis de las 
disposiciones sobre violencia sexual y de género en el Estatuto y de los 
Elementos de los Crímenes 
4.3.1. Violación 
4.3.1.(i). Introducción 
4.3.1.(ii) Antecedentes de la definición de violación en los 
Elementos de los Crímenes 
4.3.1.(ii).(a). El caso del Fiscal v. Akayesu del Tribunal Penal 
Internacional para Ruanda 
4.3.1.(ii).(b). El Fiscal v. Anto Furundžija del Tribunal Penal 
Internacional para la ex Yugoslavia 
4.3.1.(ii).(c). Las negociaciones dentro de la Comisión 
Preparatoria 
4.3.1.(iii) Definición de violación 
4.3.1.(iii).(a). Introducción 
4.3.1.(iii).(b). "Actus reus" 
4.3.1.(iii).(b)-1. Elemento 1 
4.3.1.(iii).(b)-2. Elemento 2 
4.3.1.(iii).(c). Consideraciones adicionales 
4.3.1.(iii).(d). El crimen contra la humanidad de violación 
4.3.1.(iii).(d)-1. Elemento 3 
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4.3.1.(iii).(d)-2. Elemento 4 
4.3.1.(iii).(e). Crimen de guerra de violación 
4.3.1.(iii).(e)-1. Elemento 3 
4.3.1.(iii).(e)-2. Elemento 4 
4.3.1.(iii).(f). Resumen 
4.3.1.(iii).(f)-1. Crimen contra la humanidad de violación 
4.4.1.(iii).(f)-2. Crimen de guerra de violación 
4.3.1.(iii).(g). Evolución posterior de la definición del crimen 
de violación 
4.3.2. Esclavitud sexual 
4.3.2.(i). Introducción 
4.3.2.(i).(a). Esclavitud (“slavery”) y esclavitud 
(“enslavement”) 
4.3.2.(i).(b). Propiedad v. los poderes vinculados al derecho 
de propiedad 
4.3.2.(ii). "Actus reus" 
4.3.2.(ii).(a). Introducción 
4.3.2.(ii).(b). Elemento 1 
4.3.2.(ii).(c). Elemento 2 
4.3.2.(iii). "Mens rea" 
4.3.2.(iii).(a). Introducción 
4.3.2.(iii).(b). Crimen contra la humanidad de esclavitud 
sexual 
4.3.2.(iii).(b)-1. Elementos 3 y 4 
4.3.2.(iii).(c). Crimen de guerra de esclavitud sexual 
4.3.2.(iv). Observaciones finales 
4.3.3. Prostitución forzada 
4.3.3.(i). Introducción 
4.3.3.(ii). Elementos del crimen 
4.3.3.(ii).(a). "Actus Reus" 
4.3.3.(ii).(a)-1. Elemento 1 
4.3.3.(ii).(a)-2. Elemento 2 
4.3.3.(ii).(b). "Mens rea" 
4.3.3.(ii).(b)-1. Crimen contra la humanidad de 
prostitución forzada 
4.3.3.(ii).(b)-2. Crimen de guerra de prostitución forzada 
4.3.3.(iii). Observaciones finales 
4.3.4. Crimen de embarazo forzado 
4.3.4.(i). Introducción 
4.3.4.(i).(a). La definición del Estatuto de Roma 
4.3.4.(i).(a)-1. Confinamiento ilícito 
4.3.4.(i).(a)-2. Embarazada por fuerza 
4.3.4.(i).(a)-3. Con la intención de afectar la composición 
étnica de cualquier población o llevar a cabo otras 
violaciones graves del derecho internacional 
4.3.4.(i).(a)-4. Esta definición no debe interpretarse de 
ninguna manera como que afecte las leyes nacionales 
relacionadas con el embarazo 
4.3.4.(ii). “Actus reus” 
4.3.4.(ii).(a). Elemento 1 
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4.3.4.(iii). "Mens rea" 
4.3.4.(iii).(a). Crimen contra la humanidad de embarazo 
forzado 
4.3.4.(iii).(b). Crimen de guerra de embarazo forzado 
4.3.4.(iii).(b)-1. Artículo 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-4 Crimen de guerra 
de embarazo forzado 
4.3.4.(iii).(b)-2. Artículo 8 (2) (e) (vi)-4 Crimen de guerra 
de embarazo forzado 
4.3.5. Esterilización forzada 
4.3.5.(i). Introducción 
4.3.5.(ii). "Actus reus" 
4.3.5.(ii).(a). Elemento 1 
4.3.5.(ii).(b). Elemento 2 
4.3.5.(iii). "Mens rea" 
4.3.5.(iii).(a). Crimen contra la humanidad de esterilización 
forzada 
4.3.5.(iii).(b). Crimen de guerra de esterilización forzada 
4.3.5.(iii).(b)-1. Artículo 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-5 Crimen de guerra 
de esterilización forzada 
4.3.5.(iii).(b)-2. Artículo 8 (2) (e) (vi)-5 Crimen de guerra 
de esterilización forzada 
4.3.6. O cualquier otra forma de violencia sexual 
4.3.6.(i). Introducción 
4.3.6.(i).(a). Crímenes contra la humanidad 
4.3.6.(i).(b). Crímenes de guerra 
4.3.6.(ii). Elementos del crimen 
4.3.6.(ii).(a). Crimen contra la humanidad de violencia sexual 
4.3.6.(ii).(a)-1. "Actus Reus" 
4.3.6.(ii).(a)-2. "Mens Rea" 
4.3.6.(ii).(b). Crimen de guerra de violencia sexual 
4.3.6.(ii).(b)-1. Conflictos armados internacionales 








5.2. Estatuto de Roma y la Corte Penal Internacional: innovaciones en 
los derechos otorgados a las víctimas 
5.2.1. Introducción 
5.2.2. La definición de víctima para la Corte Penal Internacional 
 
5.3. Protección y apoyo a víctimas y testigos en los procedimientos 
5.3.1. Disposiciones específicas dirigidas a proteger a las víctimas 
de crímenes sexuales y de género 
5.3.1.(i). Observaciones finales 
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5.4. ¿Protección de los derechos de las víctimas y testigos, protección 
de los derechos de los acusados y promoción de un juicio imparcial y 
justo? 
 
5.5. Participación de víctimas y testigos en los procedimientos 
5.5.1. Proceso de solicitud 
5.5.2. Momento de la participación de las víctimas 
5.5.3. Modalidades de participación de las víctimas 
5.5.4. Observaciones finales 
 




5.7.2. El esquema de reparaciones de la Corte Penal Internacional 
5.7.3. Tipos de reparaciones 
 




6. Caso el Fiscal v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
 
6.1. Situación en la República Democrática del Congo 
 
6.2. Antecedentes y resumen del caso 
 
6.3. Falta de cargos por crímenes sexuales y de género contra Lubanga 
 
6.4. Los factores que llevaron a la Fiscalía a acusar únicamente a 
Lubanga de los crímenes de alistamiento, reclutamiento y uso de niños 
soldados 
 
6.5. El enfoque de la Sala de Primera Instancia I y la Sala de Apelaciones 






7. Caso el Fiscal v. Gemain Katanga 
 




7.3. Después del Juicio  
 
7.4. Importancia del caso el Fiscal v. Germain Katanga para el 
enjuiciamiento de los casos de crímenes sexuales y de género 
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8.1. Situación en la República Centroafricana (ICC-01/05) 
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8.8. La sentencia de la mayoría de la Sala de Apelaciones y las víctimas 
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